

Apart from scope and emphasis, the volume is also important because of the rich source material on which it draws. Besides already existing publications, Barker has laboriously and skillfully used unpublished official documents now available at the Public Record Office, London (Foreign Office, cabinet, and chiefs-of-staff papers, as well as some reports and correspondence of the Special Operations Executive) and material from the Hugh Dalton papers, London School of Economics. She has also interviewed persons who were involved in the region at the time (particularly George Taylor, Bickham Sweet-Escott, Ivor Porter, and Lázló Veress) and in some cases has utilized their private collections of papers. Finally, her own wartime experience in the Political Warfare Executive has given her a special feel for her subject.

Her basic thesis is simple and balanced. British effort in southeast Europe was "a story of last-minute improvisations and the undertaking of commitments without the resources to fulfill them," a "large and strenuous undertaking" which fizzled out and did "very little to serve British national interests" in the narrow sense. But military, economic, and political facts made the British task impossible, while "unheroic muddle" contributed to Germany's defeat and did not offer "much cause for shame."

Within the terms of presentation, the thesis is indisputable, supported by new documentation, and even-handedly elaborated. But the terms themselves are inadequate. Criticisms receiving greatest scrutiny (such as sellout to the Soviet Union, or leading Balkan client groups to expect too much of the West) derive from the political right or center. Concerns of the left, such as the role of economic interests in the conduct of foreign policy, are rarely addressed. Moral criticism is cast in terms of basically personal values (bullying and deception) rather than public values (representativeness of British client groups or adequacy of British postwar planning in terms of the region's inherited problems). Stress on "muddle" and internal differences among the British, all too true, is not counterbalanced by attention to underlying perceptions and purposes common to all these competing groups. In spite of zealously drawn contrasts, inferences about British behavior in the region as a whole are colored by the cases receiving greatest attention ("failures"), especially when Greece, the deviant "success," receives so little attention. Finally, the relevance of detailed analysis to larger issues of historical interpretation is seldom made explicit.

As a result, only those already initiated into the subject will find the book exciting and easy to appreciate. For the uninitiated, sustained reading may require special interest in the subject, and much that remains problematic about a complex reality may seem "settled" by so competent and judicious a piece of writing.

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A HISTORY OF MODERN SERBIA, 1804–1918, 2 vols. By *Michael Boro Petrovich*. New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976. Vol. 1: xx, 359 pp. + 8 pp. plates. Maps. Vol. 2: xi, 372 pp. (pp. 360–731) + 8 pp. plates. Maps. \$49.50 for 2-vol. boxed set.

Hooray! Michael Petrovich's history of Serbia has arrived, and it is magnificent. Superbly designed and printed in a boxed two-volume edition by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, complete with a stunning dust jacket, this long-awaited work has immediately become the standard account of its subject in a Western language. Skillfully, and with full attention to the social, economic, and cultural aspects of Serbian history, Petrovich presents a detailed account of the transformation of the Belgrade pashalik of 1800 into the almost modern state of Serbia one hundred years later.

Petrovich's interpretation of Serbian history in the first half of the nineteenth century is traditional. He believes that the church preserved the memory of Serbia's

medieval past during Turkish times, that folk epics reinforced the resulting sense of national identity, and that local autonomy under the Turks prepared the Serbs for political democracy. When the first Serbian uprising, or the Serbian revolutionary war of independence as he calls it, erupted in 1804, "the Serbian people were ready for it as though they had been waiting since . . . 1389" (p. 26). In tune with this interpretation, which is a venerable one in Serbian historiography, he finds "the beginnings of a modern Serbian government" (which he identifies as the creation of the Governing Council in 1805) "firmly rooted in the traditional folk democracy" (p. 38). Thus two themes popular with Serbs appear early in the book: a Whiggish notion of the continuity of national identity, and the related idea that the democratic forms which emerged in Serbia in the nineteenth century were not simply adopted from the West, although Petrovich does not deny that influence and even emphasizes it, but were also outgrowths of native Serbian democracy.

A contrasting interpretation of this period less flattering to Serbian sensibilities could also be developed. Petrovich's description of the first Serbian uprising belies his point that the Governing Council, created in 1805, established the beginnings of Serbian government on the basis of folk democracy. He actually shows how little influence the Council had in the face of Karadjordje's successful maintenance of his own authority. During Miloš's reign, of course, there can be no question of folk democracy, but only of autocracy, as Miloš supplanted every local leader with one appointed from the center. The basic characteristic of the following period was the tutorship of the bureaucracy, shaped into a responsive and centralized body by Ilija Garašanin. In the 1860s, even Prince Michael, noted for his Balkan diplomacy, was an autocrat in the bureaucratic style. What opposition he received came not from the subservient peasant legislatures, but from liberals educated abroad. These data suggest the alternative theme of Serbia as a Balkan Prussia (rather than Piedmont), in which strong early rulers established a centralized bureaucracy.

Petrovich's treatment of the second half of the nineteenth century remains traditional, but with significant nuances. The importance of the ruler diminished only slightly after Prince Michael's assassination. When Milan and Alexander's tomfoolery finally played itself out, however, the heir to state power was a politician, Nikola Pašić. Pašić was presented with the historic opportunity of resolving the tension among the three goals that had inspired Serbian politics since the 1840s: independence from foreign tutelage, the unification of all Serbs into one state, and the creation of a South Slavic state. Petrovich does not commit the anachronistic error of overstressing the third of these goals. He makes it clear that whereas the idea of Yugoslavism was always present among the Serbs, its fluctuating importance never rose to the level of the other two goals. And Petrovich is certainly no apologist for Pašić. He does not turn Pašić into a crypto-Yugoslav, nor does he hide the arbitrary authoritarianism that made him so unpopular with Serbian politicians during World War I. Pašić emerges as a clever, stubborn, and contradictory political animal who, despite his Bismarckian success, did not quite have the greatness to meet the new situation in 1918 as creatively as was necessary.

Petrovich handles the subject of modernization less skillfully, even though his economic sections are full of useful and interesting data. He correctly stresses the modernizing impact of political centralization, which set up the fertile conflict between the governing bureaucracy and the spokesman of revived folk democracy. But he has a tendency to push structural economic changes too far back into the Serbian past. For example, in his chapter on economic developments of the first half of the nineteenth century he characterizes the keepers of village shops as a "Serbian petty bourgeoisie" (p. 188), and stresses Serbia's "rising capitalist [and market] economy" (pp. 181–87). This is simply pressing too hard in an economy that did not even change from transhumance agriculture to grain cultivation until the second half

of the nineteenth century, and which in the year 1903 contained only about 4,000 machine horsepower and 4,000 nonagricultural workers. Petrovich has the merchant class "rising" from the early eighteenth century (p. 22), in Miloš's time (p. 178), and through the last quarter of the nineteenth century (p. 531). As if by some Newtonian law, this rise is compensated by the fall of the extended family (*zadruga*), which seems to be a constant of histories of this period, recent research to the contrary. Both the rising merchant and the falling *zadruga* are traditional explanations of economic development even outside of Serbian historiography, and they have their value, but neither have proven particularly incisive analytical tools for contemporary students of economic transformation.

Petrovich's book has many strengths, such as his coverage of church history, especially up to 1850, and the discussions of cultural history, including art and choral music. But over and above these virtues, Petrovich's history has one overriding importance for historians of the Balkans and the South Slavs, and even for the general reader to whom Petrovich addresses his book. Until very recently, foreign investigators of Balkan history have written about questions that interested Europeans, usually their own relations with the Balkans. Study of the Eastern Question—diplomatic history—has been our strength. Within the last ten or fifteen years, however, a new generation of scholars has realized that the Balkans cannot be understood solely from the outside, from the diplomatic perspective. Petrovich obviously has written his book with this in mind. He wastes little time discussing the complexities of the European origins of World War I, but devotes many pages to wartime politics among the South Slavs that led to the creation of Yugoslavia; he passes over the diplomacy of the wars of 1875–78 lightly, but analyzes the creation of the Radical Party and the Constitution of 1888 in detail. These are not oversights. Petrovich stresses what needs to be stressed if one is to comprehend Serbia. That is why in the future, whenever someone wishes to understand a Balkan problem that concerns the Serbs in the nineteenth century, he will have to start with this book.

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POLITIČKI ŽIVOT JUGOSLAVIJE 1914–1945: ZBORNIK RADOVA. Edited by *Aleksandar Acković*. Originally broadcast on Radio-Belgrade. Belgrade: Prosveta, 1973. 562 pp. Paper.

In the spring of 1973 Radio Belgrade broadcast a series of lectures by prominent Yugoslav historians dealing with Yugoslav political developments from 1914 to 1945. The material was divided into three parts: (1) the First World War and the formation of Yugoslavia; (2) Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1941; and (3) the Second World War. The lectures, presumably somewhat changed and amplified, were published in a volume of almost six hundred pages, obviously intended for a mass audience. Thus the political and ideological control over the content was more rigorous than it would have been had the presentations been intended solely for a limited audience of scholars. This is particularly true of the material dealing with the role of the Communist Party between the two world wars and the armed struggle for power during the war years, 1941–45. The volume also suffers because it is a composite of separate fragments; the fragments are often valuable and interesting, but are not fully integrated into a balanced whole.

As is inevitable, a section of ten pages is devoted to a discussion of atrocities perpetrated during World War II. But the author of this section, Venceslav Glišić, makes no attempt to present an overview of the subject. Instead, he focuses on the atrocities perpetrated by the Germans in occupied Serbia. Nothing is said in a meaningful way about the crimes committed by the Ustashi, Chetniks, and other warring