

One of the fascinations (and disadvantages) of the art of Kremlinology, of which Slusser's book is one of the major recent examples, is that it is almost always impossible to judge its results with certainty. Since, as in ancient and medieval history, most of the evidence about Soviet policy is, and probably long will be, unavailable, historians must resort to hypotheses and conjectures. This reviewer, therefore, can only give his personal opinion on the validity of Slusser's results. They are best compared with those of the late Franz Borkenau—stimulating, internally consistent, often "not proven," sometimes simplistic, and, on balance, overstated. Michel Tatu's treatment of the same period (in his standard *Power in the Kremlin*) is more differentiated and less reductionist. For Slusser, during this period Khrushchev and Kozlov were locked in near-deadly combat, with others taking one side or the other. For Tatu, Brezhnev and Kozlov were competitors for the succession, with the latter more opposed to Khrushchev than the former, and with Suslov often allied with Kozlov on a more conservative position.

Slusser also points out, in my view correctly, the evidence that Kozlov was less hostile to the Chinese than Khrushchev was, although I doubt Slusser's hypothesis that Kozlov was in "clandestine" communication with them. His analysis of U.S. policy is less detailed, and he concludes from it that Kennedy's policies throughout were moderate, not provocative. The author could well have devoted more attention to American–West German tensions during the crisis and to their relevance to Soviet policy. His case for the primacy of the Khrushchev–Kozlov rivalry would have been strengthened if he had discussed the 1963 changing of the CPSU May Day slogans on Yugoslavia.

Having said this much, however, I would conclude this all too brief discussion of Slusser's book by stressing, despite my reservations, its detail, exhaustiveness, and depth of analysis. It will be required reading for all students of the Khrushchev era, of the Kennedy era, and of the Berlin crisis. From now on any analysis of these problems must take it fully into account. It is a major contribution to the decipherment of esoteric communication and to recent Soviet, German, and American history.

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THE SOVIET UNION IN WORLD AFFAIRS: A DOCUMENTED ANALYSIS, 1964–1972. By *W. W. Kulski*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1973. xiv, 526 pp. \$17.50, cloth. \$5.95, paper.

Professor Kulski has provided us with an interesting and enlightening analysis of Soviet foreign policy. The book is particularly strong in its discussion of the limited influence of ideological beliefs on definitions of Soviet national interest, on the necessity of subordinating the interests of the international Communist movement to the state interest of the Soviet Union, and on the political and economic advice given by the USSR to Third World countries to avoid excessive economic radicalism in dealing with the West. In essence, Kulski's analysis demonstrates that Soviet specialists have a much more sophisticated, hard-headed, and nonideological attitude in their perspective on international affairs than is commonly felt to be the case.

Unfortunately, several implications which are suspect emerge from the analysis. Specifically, the impression is given that a high level of consensus prevails in the Soviet Union on issues of foreign policy, that little conflict or disagreement exists, that the possibility of any significant change in Soviet policy is minimal, and that

Soviet policy is firmly committed to *détente* with the West. All of this may be true, but there is sufficient evidence to suggest that some powerful opinion groups in the Soviet Union take a hardline approach toward *détente* and are suspicious of any accommodation with the West. Such viewpoints can certainly be found among the Soviet military, party apparatus, and heavy industrial ministries.

This weakness is basically a product of Kulski's approach. He is interested in analyzing the views of Soviet scholars on international relations. In doing so, however, he studies primarily the views expressed by the Soviet intellectual establishment, in several journals dealing with international relations, and the official policy pronouncements made by the country's leadership. Thus the groups which express their views through other sources do not receive the attention they deserve. It is especially regrettable that some of the divergent views published by military officials were effectively excluded by this approach.

A second weakness is the book's failure to examine the process of foreign policy decision-making. How are decisions reached in the foreign policy area? More important, what groups participate, and what is the respective influence of each? Kulski's research is based on the assumption that the specialists play an influential part in the process, but the book never attempts to show how they are involved or to what extent they have influence. Moreover, certain other groups which might be influential are omitted from systematic analysis because the model of foreign policy decision-making is inadequately developed.

Despite these problems, however, the book is important and will be of interest to students of Soviet politics. The analysis is comprehensive and—except for an excessive use of quotations—well written.

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THE SOVIET UNION IN ASIA. By *Geoffrey Jukes*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973. vii, 304 pp. \$8.75.

In the first paragraph the author states that he decided to write the book for three reasons: these were his "discovery that . . . no general study has attempted to deal with Soviet interests in the Asian area on a broad basis," his conversations during a journey through Siberia in 1969, and his "realisation that some Soviet apprehensions about Asia are similarly grounded to those of Australia" (where he has been working as a senior fellow in the Department of International Relations of the Australian National University). The last two considerations did not visibly affect the book. (The similarities of Moscow's and Canberra's attitudes toward Asia might be of interest for Australian readers, but for others they are not particularly helpful in the understanding of the problem.) It was clearly the author's first observation—his discovery, as he calls it—which prompted him to write about the Soviet Union in Asia.

After an introduction of some thirty pages, the author treats Soviet Asia (34 pp.), military problems of the USSR in Asia (30 pp.), Moscow's relations with the countries of Asia (155 pp., of which 55 deal with Communist Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, and China), and economic relations (35 pp.). Thus a great deal of ground is covered in less than three hundred pages, and not much space is available for the treatment of the multitude of topics discussed. The space, incidentally, is divided quite unevenly. Although twenty-two pages are allotted to Indonesia, Japan is given six and a half pages (not much more than Ceylon has),