

## *Introduction*

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This year's *C.J.P.* supplementary volume consists of ten papers in the philosophy of mind, an area that is as difficult to delineate as any other philosophical area.

G.E. Moore used to answer the question, 'What is philosophy?', by pointing to the books on his shelves and saying, 'Philosophy is what these books are about.' Philosophy of mind is what *some* of those books are about, and its enquiries frequently move into neighbouring areas, with logic, semantics, neurophysiology, literature, epistemology and metaphysics providing some obvious examples, as the papers in this collection reveal.

Though it is hard to say *exactly* what 'philosophy of mind' encompasses there are some issues which are clearly central. Here are three questions concerning 'minds' – 'souls, actually,' one of our contributors (Sharvy) suggests, nicely achieving today's shock value with yesterday's truism – which have loomed large in our questionings about ourselves.

(1) What is the relation between the world we perceive and our perceptions of it?

(2) What is the relation between mental events/processes/states and events/processes/states in the brain?

(3) What is the connection between mental faculties (especially memory) and personal identity?

In the area between philosophy of mind and ethics comes the further question, too seldom asked.

(4) What are the moral restrictions on our inner lives: are there things we ought not to do, even in thought?

The language in which these questions are couched is question-begging and could easily be made more so without moving away from what are still standard idioms within the field. Descartes must bear some of the blame for this, since many of the misleading assumptions embedded in our vocabulary are indeed his, even if not his alone, and have been entrenched there because of his deserved popularity and influence.

Therefore, and without wishing to play down the degree of continuity between Descartes and his mediaeval and renaissance predecessors, I offer the following three debilitating doctrines as *Descartes' legacy*:

(1) That *idea* – a term labelling distinct, individuable entities – should be one of the primitive terms in philosophy of mind and epistemology. By extension, that we can make sense of hoping, choosing, fearing, intending, etc., in a vocabulary rich in count nouns. Further, remembering the sentential function of 'idea' in Descartes and Spinoza, it is easy to see that this doctrine must bear at least part of the responsibility for the development of the sorts of sentential epistemology which we shall find Churchland deprecating.

(2) That at least some of these *ideas* are non-physical, and not located in the brain. By extension, that we need an account of the relation between our 'ideas' and the workings of our brains.

- (3) That the explanation of our abilities to indulge in certain sorts of ratiocination, as well as our ability to behave in a non-stereotyped way (particularly when the behaviour in question is linguistic) is not to be sought in terms of brain-centred explanations. By extension, that with respect to humans ('free' 'rational' 'agents'), 'animal' is a phase sortal and 'person' is the substance sortal rather than the other way around, and that, in consequence, *personal* identity poses a different problem from (say) oyster identity, or from that of the identity of human animals, viewed as members of a particular biological species.

For some of us, all three of these suggestions are totally implausible, but a glance at the literature shows their ubiquity and, like prejudices acquired unwittingly in childhood, they are likely to colour our views without our noticing their influence.

Since I blame them, in part at least, on Descartes, it is worth reminding ourselves that, for Descartes, a large part of what *we* label the mental was unproblematically physical. In particular, staying well within the tradition of such writers as Roger Bacon, da Vinci, and Kepler, Descartes held that *images* (which he sometimes calls *ideas*) were spatio-temporal items located in the brain, and that, in consequence, non-corporeal entities such as the angels would not have an imaginative faculty. There is also, clearly, a problem for *us* in the putative after-life, given that Descartes thinks that memory of particular events is also corporeal. Descartes recognizes this problem but conspicuously fails to solve it.

Memory becomes a more acute problem when, with Locke — though not with his more scientifically minded contemporaries, Boyle and Hooke — Descartes' partial physicalism begins to be dropped, and the problems that we try to solve in terms of functionalism, e.g., begin to arise.

For people within the pre-Lockean tradition memory need not pose a particular problem, for the memory images are simply stored in the brain (Hooke even offers us a calculation to show that there is plenty of space available). There is, of course, *our* problem of connecting the top-down and the bottom-up stories. However, for philosophers such

as Locke, Berkeley and Hume there is an *extra* problem or set of problems.

The problem arises when we try, with Locke, to combine the things we want and need to say about remembering, particularly if we try to couch our remarks in the *ideas* terminology, with a thorough going (non-Cartesian) dualism in which we regard *all* ideas/images as purely mental entities. This, as McIntyre points out in 'The Connection Between Impressions and Ideas' was the bind Locke landed himself in, for on the one hand he uses the language of common sense (ideas are *recalled*) and of the earlier scientific tradition (so that images come into the mind from outside), while on the other (partly, McIntyre suggests, in order to accommodate his doctrine of personal identity) he makes ideas totally mind-based (so that they are evanescent and can only be 'as it were' recalled).

Realizing that there was a problem with the 'idea' terminology, but being unwilling or unable to scrap it completely, Hume attempted to sort things out by adding a distinction between ideas and impressions but this, McIntyre argues, proved insufficient to deal with all of Hume's problems, some of which were inherent in bits of doctrine he took over, but some of which were self-inflicted.

For example, in a manner reminiscent of Spinoza before him, Hume wanted an *intrinsic* difference between memory and non-memory images. Moreover, given the fact that Hume's theory of personal identity is such a heavy drawer on the memory bank, and given Hume's views about causality, it is implausible to argue, McIntyre suggests, that any causal theory of memory can be constructed to save the (or a) Humean position, particularly since Hume explicitly disavows the possibility of continuing inherence of the memory images in 'something simple and individual.'

One of the problems with the Humean position lies in Hume's acceptance of the *idea* terminology, and in 'Reid on Testimony and Perception' Lehrer and Smith offer us an interesting and sympathetic account of Reid's rejection of such an account, and his attempt to redo the analysis within a semantic framework, offering Reid to us, plausibly enough, as a sort of materialistic Berkeley, someone who keeps both the linguistic elements of Berkeley's philosophy of nature, and his decisive rejection of Locke's resemblance account of primary qualities.

The doctrine on which Reid relies heavily, that like effects are produced by like causes, has considerably less plausibility than its converse, even within the limited sphere in which he employs it, but Lehrer and Smith are surely right in suggesting that the results he gets by adding this doctrine to his general account of first principles and of natural signs deserve more respect and attention than they generally receive.

Contemporary answers to the questions posed earlier continue to be haunted by the ghosts of ideas but are, in the main, squarely in the camp of what earlier thinkers would have regarded as materialism. Since Ryle, of course, we have less interest in such 'ism'ing, and indeed the issues are more subtle than such labels allow.

In 'Searle on Programs and Intentionality' Sharvy, distinguishing between the strong and the weak sense of 'instantiating' ('following,' 'obeying') takes Searle's Chinese room puzzle and offers us a more cautious but also, as he believes, a more correct account of the relation between computing and intentionality. His startling claim in note 4 will, I trust, lead many readers to his *Teaching Philosophy* article.

Worries about intentionality also provide the starting point for Lyons's 'Dennett, Functionalism, and Introspection,' but though he touches on the Searle problem, he is primarily interested in the version(s) of functionalism that Dennett has offered. Dennett's writings on this topic represent one of the strongest cases for functionalism, and Lyons's balanced and careful unveiling of the difficulties Dennett's views face, particularly with respect to the question of introspection, show how difficult the matter is for anyone who wants to take a Dennett-like line.

Levin looks at another attack on functionalism, one which results from adapting Kripke's 'conceivability' attack on the identity thesis to the case of functionalism. In a way that is not open to the identity theorist, she argues, the functionalist can plausibly deny that there are any 'conceivability' counter-examples to functionalism as properly understood.

It is not the case, she claims, 'that, for any functional description [of one of our states], we can imagine or conceive of a being that satisfies it, yet is unable to feel what we feel [when in the state in question.]'

This strong claim leads her into very interesting, if murky, Leib-

nizian waters, particularly since she is clear that (a) we do not currently have correct functional descriptions of our states, and (b) such descriptions must eventually come from the empirical sciences. Her paper and Churchland's make an interesting pair.

The next three papers consist of attacks on a pair of theses which Paul Churchland has espoused, plus his reply to them. The first thesis is that of eliminative materialism, the second concerns the semantics of sensation terms.

In 'A Materialist's Misgivings About Eliminative Materialism' Foss offers himself, by implication at least, as an embarrassed materialist (surely one of this volume's least plausible claims; Fossian embarrassment is to real embarrassment, I suspect, much as Cartesian doubt is to real doubt), and offers us reasons why such embarrassment is appropriate, at least for an *eliminative* materialist.

Thurston and Coval, in their subtle and closely argued 'Sensation, Theory and Meaning' look at the difficulties which arise for someone like Churchland (or earlier, for someone like J.J.C. Smart, say, who reaches the same conclusion by a different route) who wants to suggest that the phenomenological aspect of sensation terms may be, as far as meaning goes, totally ignored.

In his reply Churchland suggests, *contra* Foss, that it is only a considerably more extreme kind of eliminative materialism than he either needs or wishes to avow that should cause Fossian embarrassment. With respect to Thurston and Coval, too, he argues that the differences may, by and large, be more apparent than real, with the final difference being merely 'residual.'

He remains firmly committed, however, to the view that for us as 'epistemic engines,' sensations are not essential either 'semantically or epistemologically.' It does seem that such epistemic engines are conceivable (though Levin might disagree) and as Churchland points out, the phenomenon of blind-sight provides us with a partial case. This remains true, incidentally, even if recent attempts to explain blind-sight in terms of light scattering, threshold effects, and remaining striate cortex win out over the earlier 'mid brain' explanatory story.

There is, as both parties to the dispute would undoubtedly agree, more – much more – to be said on both sides of this discussion, and it is to be hoped that the debate will continue.

With Cherry's 'The Inward and the Outward: Fantasy, Reality and

Satisfaction' we return to the topic of imagination, but to a function of imagination that seems not to have attracted a great deal of philosophical attention in the past. This is the question of the use of imagination in achieving real or surrogate ends through day-dreaming or fantasizing, and the further, associated questions which arise concerning the moral evaluation of such fantasizing.

At the far end of one evaluation spectrum we have the clearly immoral (though why, *exactly*?) drug induced fantasies of *Brave New World*; at the near end of one advice spectrum we have Rousseau endorsing the stoical views that we should starve the imagination in order to reduce the frustration resulting from the reality/fantasy gap.

Cherry concentrates on a more difficult, intermediate area: can I demean or harm myself by my fantasizing and, more difficult still, can I demean or harm *you*, through having you as a figure playing a particular role in my fantasies? We know that many 'demeaning' fantasies can have desirable or desired *immediate* effects (their role for many people in reaching orgasm provides an obvious case) but are the long term effects equally acceptable? — and what about their *intrinsic* desirability? Again, this is a fruitful area that deserves more attention than it gets.

With 'Amnesia and Psychological Continuity' Brennan brings us back to the role of memory in personal identity, but with a look at forgetting as well as at remembering. By concentrating on real cases of amnesia he performs at least two services for us. He reminds us, salutorily, of how various the human animal is, and how unwise it is to tie personhood, a priori, to the possession of a long term memory. Further, looking at such cases reveals an ambiguity in the accepted account of 'continuity' which has vitiated some recent discussions of personal identity.