

INTERSTATE CONFLICT, CONFLICT RESOLUTION, AND ARMS TRANSFERS

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- THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF ARMS SALES.* By ANDREW J. PIERRE. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. 353. \$20.00 cloth, \$5.95 paper.)
- CONTROLLING LATIN AMERICAN CONFLICTS: TEN APPROACHES.* Edited by MICHAEL A. MORRIS and VICTOR MILLAN. (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. 272. \$22.50.)
- GASTOS MILITARES Y DESARROLLO EN AMERICA DEL SUR.* By CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIONES ECONOMICAS Y SOCIALES DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE LIMA (CIESUL). (Lima: Universidad de Lima, 1980. Pp. 312.)
- THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CONFLICT: A SPUR TO ARMS BUILD-UPS.* By JOZEF GOLDBLAT and VICTOR MILLAN. (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], 1983. Pp. 63.)
- MODERN WEAPONS AND THIRD WORLD POWERS.* By RODNEY W. JONES and STEVEN A. HILDRETH. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. Pp. 125. \$16.00 paper.)

In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to the topic of interstate conflicts in Latin America, the possible resolution of these conflicts, and their relationship to the transfer of weapons to the countries involved. Situations as diverse as the Falklands/Malvinas war, shooting incidents between Peru and Ecuador, and heightened tensions in Central America have led many to conclude that interstate conflict in Latin America is now considerably more likely than in past years.

A number of reasons account for this pessimistic view. For one, the kinds of conflicts seem to have shifted from relatively simple ones involving disputes over territory by relatively weak states to conflicts over resources and ideology involving not only the small states, but also some of the more powerful nations in the hemisphere, including the United States. Whereas in the past these conflicts generally involved obsolete conventional weapons of limited capability, current disputes increasingly involve weapons at two more extreme points of the arms spectrum. These categories are either the very simple weapons of guerrilla warfare that permit insurgents to fight with minimal logistical

support or advanced weapons capable of much more destruction than the ones they replaced. Further, the larger Latin American military establishments have recently shown an increasing reluctance to become too dependent on U.S. arms, and they have made conscious efforts to diversify their sources as well as to improve their own arms factories. As a result, they are less responsive to U.S. pressures aimed at limiting interstate conflict. At the same time, the traditional means for resolving the earlier conflicts through the Organization of American States seem to be less and less capable of coping with the demands made by these new types of conflicts.

As a result of these circumstances, a continuing search is underway for explanations of these new forms of conflict, their causes, and ways to ameliorate and control them. The Contadora initiative for resolving the Central American crisis proposed by four Latin American nations (Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela) represents an important new mechanism for conflict resolution. Recent research has also addressed the role of arms transfers in terms of conflict and its resolution, posing a number of questions. Do the arms themselves tend to make conflict more likely, or would it occur anyway with virtually the same results? What financial burden do arms purchases place on top of the already staggering debt of many of the Latin American nations? If limits could be placed on arms purchases, would significant funds then be made available for socioeconomic development projects? The five books reviewed here address these questions from a variety of perspectives that include the global, the Latin American, and the U.S. policy-making points of view.

As the title suggests, Andre J. Pierre's *The Global Politics of Arms Sales* attempts to provide a broad look at the links between the transfer of weapons and international relations. His wide perspective provides the reader with an all-encompassing view; however, the wide scope of his analysis is sometimes disappointing because of the detail the author omits. Despite this drawback, Pierre's book remains one of the best introductions to the field, especially its chronicle of the dramatic increase in arms sales in the 1969–79 period.

Pierre organized his book into four parts. In "Dilemmas" he examines the trends and rationales of arms sales as well as the frequently competing foreign policy aims involved in weapons transfers. He cites as an example the sometimes divergent goals of human rights policies and national security. Two parallel parts, "Suppliers" and "Recipients," examine by nation or geographic region the policies and motivations of the various actors involved. He closes with a section on "Restraints," in which he examines past approaches and future possibilities for the control of arms sales.

Of special interest is the Latin American portion of "Recipients,"

in which Pierre notes the recent reversal of the historic U.S. monopoly on arms sales to Latin America and explores the security concerns and issues of selected Latin American countries. The author takes note of the “surprisingly large number of border disputes and territorial claims within Latin America which lead to local rivalries and revanchist attitudes” (p. 235), and he foresees increasing potential for conflict in the years to come. At the same time, Pierre believes that Latin America offers opportunities for regional arms restraint, and he points to the Ayacucho Declaration of 1974 as a significant precedent, despite its lack of concrete results.

One of the basic themes of *The Global Politics of Arms Sales* is the view that arms sales, because of their close links to politics between nations, have tended to become more diffused and diversified in recent years as the decline of a tight postwar bipolar world has permitted the rise of increasingly independent regional actors. Some of these actors now manufacture and export their own weapons (Brazil is the best Latin American example). Because of this diffusion of power, Pierre suggests, the best approach to arms restraints is one that is regionally oriented. But he also suggests that the most efficient approach is one in which the suppliers initiate and coordinate their efforts to limit arms sales. Given the diversity of countries supplying arms to Latin America (the United States, the Soviet Union, and several European countries), this task may be much more difficult than Pierre believes.

Michael A. Morris and Victor Millan have edited a work, *Controlling Latin American Conflicts: Ten Approaches*, whose stated purpose is to generate new perspectives on controlling conflicts in Latin America. The result is a useful, if somewhat uneven, set of perspectives that should stimulate thinking in a number of nontraditional directions. In their introductory chapter, the editors present a typology of interstate conflict in the region and argue that some form of interstate conflict in Latin America is now more likely than in the past.

An individual chapter by Juan Carlos Puig examines traditional Latin American juridical approaches to conflict and analyzes the contributions and shortfalls of existing law and treaties. He recommends a number of steps to increase the value of diplomatic and legal approaches to conflict, including the adoption of confidence-building measures and the creation of an exclusively Latin American system of peaceful settlement of disputes. In parallel chapters, Victor Millan and Augusto Varas examine national approaches to controlling conflict in the Caribbean Basin and South America, respectively, and provide details on conflicts and peace efforts in those regions. In the Caribbean Basin, Millan notes the trends toward more local management of conflict, despite the pervasive U.S. influence. In the South American case, Varas observes that recent actual and potential conflicts have shown the

marginal effectiveness of traditional conflict-resolution measures, and he suggests that a major cause of conflict in this area is the autonomy of the military.

In a brief, but important, chapter, Millan examines the applicability of confidence-building measures (CBMs) to conflict resolution, arguing that increasing the trust between possible adversaries can avoid or ameliorate conflict. The basic concept of CBMs emerged from super-power confrontation and the tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Millan argues that the principles are applicable to Latin American conflict and in fact have been used, although they have not been labeled "confidence-building measures." Millan notes a number of maneuvers and conferences between hemisphere military institutions; however, some of these involve the strengthening of existing bilateral military agreements, and as such, they are not confidence-building measures in the European sense.

The theme of "Latin only" approaches to conflict resolution prevails in Carlos Moneta's chapter, in which he examines the Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (SELA) as a mechanism to control conflicts. Moneta argues that SELA is an important organization that functions as a settler of disputes and a coordinator of Latin American action, citing SELA's role in the Malvinas/Falklands crisis as an example. Max G. Manwaring's chapter presents a quantitative approach to measuring the war-making potential of states with a view toward using measurable changes in this potential as means of verifying arms control agreements. In a case study chapter on the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, Rubén de Hoyos describes a seeming paradox: if a solution is not found to a long-term problem, crisis management or negotiations can produce the very crisis they were supposed to manage or control. Consequently, he counsels caution in using negotiations. De Hoyos also notes that in the case of the Anglo-Argentine dispute, the failure of negotiations and the ensuing conflict make achieving an eventual solution all the more difficult.

Controlling Latin American Conflicts concludes with a chapter by Michael Morris on the mechanics of consensus-building as a means of resolving conflicts by identifying shared values and interests, then exploring ways of reconciling or containing differences. He applies this approach to two issues of U.S.–Latin American divergence: the exclusive economic zone and human rights. Other chapters in the book include those by Morris on the proliferation of weapons and technology and on naval arms control, as well as a chapter by Susan Eckstein on the containment of internal conflict after revolution.

Gastos militares y desarrollo en América del Sur was published by the Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales de la Universidad de Lima (CIESUL). This report of a research project provides an important

Latin American perspective on the issue of arms sales, military budgets, and their relationship to development. It focuses on the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho (and subsequent related meetings) as the basis for a possible general agreement on limiting military expenditures in South America. Toward this end, *Gastos militares* analyzes South American military budgets and employs a mathematical model to project what these budgets may be in the two decades before the turn of the century. Projections are also made that demonstrate the possible savings if military budgets were curtailed. The basic assumptions of the work are that it is possible to drastically cut military budgets in South America and that these savings can be transferred to social and economic development projects. Additional funding for these projects can also be generated by diverting external military assistance to development. The arguments are linked to proposals for a New International Economic Order and reflect Latin American views on "integral security and development," which argue that national security is not possible without a parallel focus on development.

In the first two parts, *Gastos militares y desarrollo en América del Sur* presents background information on the region and its military budgets, set in what the authors call the broader economic, social, and political crisis of South America's traditional equilibrium. Foreign military assistance programs and arms transfers are portrayed as a form of "neo-imperialism" (p. 46) that ties the receiver nations to the suppliers in a dependency relationship. In response, the South American nations have tried to break this dependency by diversifying their arms purchases and stimulating their own arms industries, but with only partial success. In part three, the authors examine the Declaration of Ayacucho as an instrument of Latin American nationalism that seeks economic and social liberation. They emphasize an integrated military system in South America that would create a climate of confidence and trust. Such a climate would in turn permit the reduction of military budgets in the region through an agreement on ceilings for arms and military budgets.

In part four, CIESUL offers details of this proposed agreement, exploring the problems posed by definitions of terms and categories of weapons, the verification issue, and the required institutions. Using the mathematical model and several options and scenarios, the authors generate data for a series of possible reductions in military spending. Confidence-building measures play a large role in the authors' scenarios by reducing tensions between traditional South American rivals and thus permitting a reduction in arms and military budgets. The broad scope of the authors' ideas can be seen in the institutions they propose: a South American security and development council, which would include a South American military board (Junta Militar Suramericana) for

technical military matters and a South American fund for economic and financial matters. The book's fifth and final part assumes that the agreement has gone into effect and that significant savings have been realized. Accordingly, the analysis establishes criteria and norms for converting the savings in military budgets to projects of social and economic development, also suggesting some regional projects that would lead to greater integration in South America.

Any critique of this work would have to begin by challenging the basic assumption that military budgets could be dramatically cut through a process of integration and confidence-building. The political role of the military, its natural institutional resistance to cuts, the bitterness over old territorial disputes, and deep-rooted nationalism all indicate that significantly reducing arms and military budgets would be an extraordinarily difficult task. Even if the Ayacucho Declaration had succeeded in its ambitious call for South American integration, it is doubtful that the integration process would ever reach the point where hypothetical savings in military budgets could be diverted into integration and national development schemes agreed upon by all the South American nations. The security concerns of each nation and currents of aggressive geopolitical analysis would effectively work against this process. Nevertheless, this book (which Pierre has called "rare, perhaps unique") remains an important, if excessively optimistic and idealistic, contribution to the field of conflict resolution and arms transfers.

Jozef Goldblat and Victor Millan of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) have written a useful and concise monograph, *The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict: A Spur to Arms Build-ups*. Appearing first in the 1983 SIPRI *Yearbook*, its stated purpose is "to describe the consequences of the war for arms buildups in the two protagonist countries, as well as for the state of security in the whole Latin American region" (p. v). The monograph provides information on the historical background of the dispute, the conflicting claims, the military potential of the adversaries, the losses incurred, and a chronology of the war.

Goldblat and Millan take into account the implications of the conflict in two sensitive areas—Antarctica and nuclear proliferation. Argentina and Great Britain (as well as Chile) have overlapping claims on the Palmer Peninsula of Antarctica, and the existing peaceful status of Antarctica may be strained as the 1991 date for possible revision of the treaty draws closer. The authors assess the Argentine accusation that the United Kingdom violated the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America. They also note statements made toward the end of the conflict by the head of the Argentine commission on atomic energy that suggest interest in obtaining nuclear submarines and in advancing Argentine atomic research programs.

The principal thesis of Goldblat and Millan is that the conflict will stimulate further arms purchases in the region. They support this argument by assessing the sales completed or under way since the end of the conflict. They argue that Argentina will more than make up her combat losses, which will cause Chile and Brazil to increase their purchases. This development in turn may induce other South American nations (most notably Peru) to do the same.

Developments since *The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict* was published have only partly confirmed this thesis. The Argentine military indeed replaced much of its lost equipment, but the debt crisis and the return to civilian rule have dampened excessive purchases. By the same token, an accelerated arms buildup in the other South American countries has not occurred, although there have been some important purchases in the period since the Malvinas/Falklands fighting. Among the factors limiting arms spending by South American nations have been the external debt, the redemocratization process, and hopeful signs that some of the conflicts (such as the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile and perhaps even the Malvinas/Falklands dispute) might be resolved by peaceful means.

In *Modern Weapons and Third World Powers*, Rodney W. Jones and Steven A. Hildreth present the product of a research project undertaken by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, as part of that center's study of the future of conflict in the 1980s. The book examines the acquisition of modern weapons by major Third World nations. The impact of these weapons on international relations, security issues, and regional conflict and its management are also assessed. The study concludes that the most likely conflicts in the coming years will not be between the superpowers, but rather between Third World nations at a low-intensity level, one for which the United States does not have adequate policies available. *Modern Weapons* has a strong U.S. policy emphasis, but it also includes specific Latin American case studies of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.

Jones and Hildreth observe that Third World military power is usually focused more on internal than external threats and that when these nations engage an outside threat, their military power is weaker than generally assumed. There is also a tendency for these Third World nations to acquire modern and sophisticated weapons beyond their absorptive capacity as well as a tendency to emphasize weapons and hardware over the human factor. A classical lesson in this regard was demonstrated in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, in which the decisive factors in the British victory were leadership, training, and tactics.

Modern Weapons and Third World Powers concludes that Western interests can be threatened by Third World conflicts and that the psychological and cultural roots of such conflicts are not adequately under-

stood. A key issue in any policy response is whether to concentrate on resolving the conflict itself or on limiting the arms flow. Jones and Hildreth conclude that weapons are generally a secondary concern, except in cases of arms that would be of special interest to terrorists. A second exception would be nuclear weapons, where the need for proliferation control is paramount. In this connection, the authors note that both Argentina and Brazil appear to be developing nuclear options but that actual construction of weapons will be held back by a number of factors. Accordingly, they argue that the United States should encourage a policy of "no first production" on the part of Brazil and Argentina (p. 78).

The five books reviewed here emphasize several common themes that are the principal focus of current research in the field of arms transfers, conflict, and its resolution.¹ The first consideration is the impact of arms transfers to Latin America and the extent to which these transfers reinforce dependency links and divert funds from development projects and basic human needs. Second comes the question of the likelihood of interstate conflict in Latin America: is there indeed a higher probability, as several authors have suggested, and what steps can be taken to lower this probability? Third, what are the causes of conflict and to what extent do arms themselves tend to cause conflicts? Fourth comes the question of the utility of existing mechanisms such as the Organization of American States for conflict resolution. In the wake of the Malvinas/Falklands conflict, the invasion of Grenada, and the continuing crisis in Central America, the OAS seems less and less relevant as a mechanism for settling disputes. Moreover, a profound distrust arises regarding any formal proposal for "peacekeeping," especially if the United States seems to be in favor of it. Fifth, in light of the declining faith in the OAS, there is a current of thought that proposes a "Latin-only" system for conflict resolution in the hemisphere. Sixth and last is the problem of obtaining accurate data on arms transfers, military budgets, and the size of armed forces. Because nations tend to be very secretive about this information, few reliable sources exist. The books reviewed here have used data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and the London Institute for International and Strategic Studies.

A current major theme, one that unfortunately is not adequately treated in the five works reviewed, is the ongoing effort to find a peaceful resolution to Central American tensions, especially that of the Contadora group. The Contadora process is especially noteworthy as a Latin American regional initiative aimed at resolving a series of conflicts in Central America based on a confidence-building regime. The concept of confidence-building measures appears in several of the works re-

viewed,² but the specifics of how this concept might be applied to Central American conflicts are only beginning to appear in the literature.³ The May 1984 *Report of the Inter-American Dialogue*, headed by Sol M. Linowitz and Galo Plaza, made recommendations that specifically relate CBM concepts taken from the European environment to the Latin American arena.⁴ In addition, several reports of the International Peace Academy address issues of peace and security in Central America and propose the employment of CBMs as important steps in the Contadora group's efforts to resolve the conflicts.⁵

As described by its proponents, the basic purpose of such a confidence-building regime in Central America would be to increase communication and trust between potential adversaries in such a way as to reduce the probability of interstate or regional conflict through accident, misunderstanding, or misreading of the behavior of one of the actors in the region. At the same time, verifiable steps would be taken to freeze and then reduce the numbers of foreign military advisors, the arms flow, and the size of the armed forces of each nation in the region. In border areas of high tension, third-party neutrals (from the Contadora group or other acceptable nations) would be placed between the possible adversaries as a peace-observing element. This observation group could employ recently developed electronic surveillance devices to increase substantially the area under observation. All of these confidence-building and peace-observing measures are secondary to the fundamental issue of a political solution to the conflict. Despite their secondary role, however, they are essential for diminishing the tensions to a level where fruitful and continuing dialogue between the parties is possible.

The five books reviewed here provide a fresh look at the interrelated issues of arms sales, military expenses, conflict, and its resolution. Their contribution is important at a time in Latin America when arms appear to be exacerbating historical tensions and when new forms of interstate conflict are outstripping the ability of the traditional conflict-resolution system to control them.

NOTES

1. For examples of current literature, see *The Americas in 1984, A Year for Decisions: Report of the Inter-American Dialogue* (Washington: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1984); Phillip Berryman, *What's Wrong in Central America* (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1984); *Central America: Anatomy of a Conflict*, edited by Robert S. Leiken (New York: Pergamon, 1984); *The Future of Conflict in the 1980s*, edited by William J. Taylor (Washington: Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982); Jonathan Alford, "Confidence-Building Measures," *Adelphi Papers* 149 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979); Falk Bomsford, "The Confidence-Building Measure Offensive in the United Nations," *Aussenpolitik* 4 (1982):370-90; Chester L. Brown, "Latin American Arms: For War?,"

- Inter-American Economic Affairs* 37 (Summer 1983):61–66; Ronald L. Slaughter, "The Politics and Nature of the Conventional Arms Transfer Process during a Military Engagement: The Falklands-Malvinas Case," *Arms Control* 4 (May 1983):16–30.
2. See Morris and Millan, chap. 5; CIESUL, 91–97, 150; and Pierre, 293–95.
 3. *Report of the Inter-American Dialogue*; Alvaro Echeverría Zuno, *Centroamérica: la guerra de Reagan* (Mexico: El Día, 1983); Leiken, *Central America*; Bomford, "The CBM Offensive;" *Toward Peace and Security in the Caribbean and Central America*, International Peace Academy Report no. 16 (New York: International Peace Academy, 1983), and *Maintenance of Peace and Security in the Caribbean and Central America*, International Peace Academy Report no. 18.
 4. *Report of the Inter-American Dialogue*, 51–53.
 5. International Peace Academy Reports nos. 16 and 18; and *Summary Report of Regional Cooperation in Peace and Security in Central America and the Caribbean* (New York: International Peace Academy, 1984).