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Somalia’s evolving political market place: from famine and humanitarian crisis to permanent precarity*

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ABSTRACT

Somalia has a long history of famine and humanitarian crisis. This article focuses on the years 2008–2020, during which governance and aid practices changed substantially and which include three crisis periods. The article examines whether and how governance analysed as a political marketplace can help explain Somalia’s repeated

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humanitarian crises and the manipulation of response. We argue that between 2008 and 2011 the political marketplace was a violent competitive oligopoly which contributed to famine, but that from 2012 a more collusive, informal political compact resulted in a status quo which avoided violent conflict or famine in 2017 and which functioned to keep external resources coming in. At the same time, this political arrangement benefits from the maintenance of a large group of displaced people in permanent precarity as a source of aid and labour.

Keywords—Somalia, famine, politics, governance, displacement.

INTRODUCTION

Somalia has a long history of famine and humanitarian crisis, from drought, conflict and refugee crises in the 1970s and 1980s, to the civil war and famine in 1992, and to protracted conflict and humanitarian crises ever since (De Waal 1997; Maxwell & Majid 2016; Majid *et al.*, 2022). The nature and severity of crisis have changed over time; with severe crisis in 2008, 2011 and 2017. These crises are not isolated events but the result of historical and structural inequalities in power relations between clans and struggles over control of resources. Production, trade, services and aid have long been controlled by a few powerful individuals or businesses, with benefits often allocated according to clan affiliation. Other groups have been marginalised, discriminated against and exploited, in particular the agro-pastoral populations in Bay and Bakool regions and the riverine farmers along the Juba and Shebelle rivers (African Rights 1993; Majid & McDowell 2012; Jaspars *et al.* 2020). These groups have shown persistently high levels of acute malnutrition and suffered the most severe famines, including in 1992 and 2011 (Young & Marshak 2018; Jaspars 2019).

While some people in Somalia have been persistently vulnerable to crisis and famine, governance, aid practices and the nature of crisis have changed over time. The 1990s was a period of warlords, looting and large-scale diversion of food aid. The 2000s saw the establishment of different governments and the rise of the Union of Islamic Courts (ICU) as well as changes from food aid to cash transfers and nutrition interventions. The year 2000 was the first attempt at a national government since the fall of President Siad Barre in 1990, but the Transitional National Government (TNG) was unable to govern (Menkhaus 2007; De Waal 2019). Dominated by interests within the Hawiye (one of the dominant clans), it soon faced resistance. This was followed by a new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004, which allied with Ethiopia but which faced opposition from a Mogadishu group of clans, militia leaders, civic groups and the ICU, ultimately leading to a resumption of conflict. It was not until 2012 that a broadly accepted Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was established. The ICU came to prominence from 2005 and briefly held much of southern and central Somalia. The group Al-Shabaab, initially a militia under the Courts' control, became the principal Islamic extremist

group after the defeat of the Courts in December 2006, and has controlled most of southern and central Somalia thereafter.

This article examines whether and how governance analysed as a political marketplace can help explain Somalia's humanitarian crises and response. The political marketplace is a system of governance where transactions or deals to buy political loyalty dominate institutions, laws and regulations. In other words a system of governance in which political loyalty is bought or sold (De Waal 2015). The basic premise is that political outcomes are driven by material transactions and/or violence rather than formal institutions or the rule of law. While the idea of governance as political marketplace is not new, its nature varies across countries and changes over time. Among the earliest articulations of politics as a marketplace was Andreski's (1968), who defined kleptocracy as the trade in political allegiances in accordance with the laws of supply and demand, typically conjoined with gangsterism. Almost all subsequent debate has focused on kleptocracy as politically organised corruption. In this article, we consider the political marketplace as a form of governance in which political loyalties are bought to gain or maintain political aspirations or power, rather than simply being about corruption and personal gain. Over time, a price principle evolved from earlier barter transactions. Political rents, or finance, may be gained from land or natural resources, from being able to assert sovereignty, from external patronage, as well as from using or threatening violence (De Waal 2015: 21). Furthermore, the political marketplace has become liberalised, dollarised and internationalised. In Somalia, President Siad Barre's regime in the 1970s and 1980s, can be called a rentier kleptocracy based on corruption, bribery and militarised patronage (based on superpower rents). When he was unable to regulate private political funds, and political contests remained unresolved, his government collapsed (De Waal 2015: 14). During the civil war of the 1990s, Somalia's political marketplace turned into a competitive oligopoly between armed groups, who financed their operations through looting and extortion, involving violent land-grabbing and aid manipulation. With the establishment of a notional government in the early 2000s, politico-military-business groups competed for power. In addition to humanitarian aid contracts, offers of future political positions were a new source of political finance and bargaining (Majid *et al.* 2021). The political market also became globalised: with oil exploration, new forms of international aid, security cooperation (counter-terrorism following the War on Terror), political (pay-offs for cooperation), and international crime (human and arms trafficking, piracy), all providing new forms of rentierism (De Waal 2015: 50). Since 2012, the FGS has been positioned as a superior actor vis-à-vis its federal member states and within a system designed to distribute – largely external – rents broadly enough to buy in everyone (except for those designated as terrorists). This led to elements of collusion within the marketplace to maintain this income stream (De Waal 2015: 124). Over this recent period, between 2006 and 2020, Al-Shabaab arguably moved from an initial ideological phase – based

on Islamist and anti-Western principles, to one mainly focused on self-preservation and increased taxation.

This article covers the period from 2008–2011 and from 2012–2020. Covering three famines or humanitarian crises, several changes in government, and the rise of Al-Shabaab, it provides plenty of scope for analysing why crises unfold differently at different times. Our analytical framework links political economy, political finance and famine. In line with the political marketplace toolkit (De Waal *et al.* 2019), we start with identifying critical junctures and thus times of substantial political change. Our first period, 2008–2011, is associated with attempts at centralised government, ongoing violent conflict and two periods of humanitarian crisis and famine. The second period, 2011–2017, marks a distinct change because of the establishment of an internationally recognised federal government and federal member states, associated with changes in international aid and investment. For each period, we start with an overview of key political and economic developments (including key actors), followed by sources of political finance, and use this to analyse the nature of the political marketplace (including political alliances) and how it links to humanitarian crisis and famine in that period.

Geographically, we focus on southern and central Somalia (including Mogadishu) because that is where most famines and humanitarian crises have occurred. Outside of Mogadishu, this includes Bay and Bakool regions, and the areas along the Juba and Shebelle rivers; inhabited by historically marginalised populations such as the Rahanwein and Somali Bantu. The majority of the displaced in Mogadishu (and other urban centres) are from these areas and populations. The reasons for their vulnerability are discussed throughout the paper. Much of southern and central Somalia has been controlled by Al-Shabaab since 2006. Since 2012 key towns such as Afgoye, Baidoa and Kismayo have come under government control, creating a series of government-held city-states surrounded by rural areas held by Al-Shabaab. For each period, we consider the role of Al-Shabaab within the political marketplace, and in particular how its actions, as well as international policies, relate to famine and humanitarian crisis.

We argue that from 2008–2011, the political marketplace operated as a competitive oligopoly, and that the associated violence contributed to the 2011 famine. From 2012, it acquired elements of collusion, when an informal political compact was created in which political actors benefited from the development of a status quo which avoids violent conflict or famine, and keeps external resources coming in. It also includes the maintenance of a large group of displaced people as a source of external aid and casual labour. While a severe famine in 2017 was averted, the post-2012 political marketplace is associated with a state of precarity for some. Many displaced people have sold, or been driven off, their land, and live a precarious and uncertain existence as a flexible source of casual and exploitable labour. When we started writing this article, in 2020, the compact was holding but with the possibility of a return to a more competitive political marketplace. Aid organisations once again identified a risk of famine in 2022.

The article partly draws on previous research reported in Jaspars *et al.* (2020), which explored recent changes in the political economy of food with changes in governance and in aid practices. Fieldwork was done in Nairobi, Mogadishu and Baidoa, with in total 71 interviews. This included qualitative semi-structured interviews with long-term aid workers (39), businessmen (15) (in transport, trade, money transfer), government officials (9) and IDP representatives (8). Given the challenges of operating in Somalia, and issues of security, access and trust, we started by interviewing people with whom we had established relationships of trust over 20 or more years. They would in turn suggest others, and we continued until information could be triangulated from multiple sources. The first set of interviews was done from 28 April to 5 May 2019 with aid workers in Nairobi, many of whom had been involved with aid in Somalia since the 1990s. This helped identify themes and interviewees for the second stage with government officials, traders, transporters, IDPs as well as aid workers. Fieldwork in Somalia was carried out from 21 June to 4 July 2019. Half of those interviewed in stage 1 were Somali and all were Somali in stage 2. The reliability of data collection was maximised by having a clear analytical framework, and validity by triangulating data collection (asking the same question from different sources, interviews and reports). For reasons of security and confidentiality, all interviews have been anonymised and given a number according to each category (aidworker 1–20, businessman 1–7, etc.). Using these empirical findings, this article presents a new analysis on political marketplace and famine links, also drawing on relevant literature. It builds on the long-term experience of the authors in conducting research in Somalia; including on food aid targeting and distribution (Jaspars 2000; Jaspars & Maxwell 2008) and on famine (Maxwell & Majid 2016). One of us (Guhad Adan) is Kenyan Somali and has participated in a number of research projects on famine and aid in Somalia.

The article starts with a section on the situation of displaced populations in Mogadishu and Baidoa, and their precarious economic, political and social condition. This is followed by an analysis of, first, the political marketplace and famine between 2008 and 2011, and second, the political marketplace and the prevention of severe famine from 2012 and 2016. The next section analyses persistent marginalisation and the functions of displacement, including how and why IDPs became a business opportunity and a key component of the collusive oligopoly. The article ends with a discussion of the period from 2017 onwards, which is characterised by increased displacement and later the risk of famine (in 2022) and conclusions on how an analysis of the political marketplace can add to our understanding of famine and humanitarian crisis in Somalia.

DISPLACEMENT AND PRECARIETY IN THE 2020S

In the villages we come from, we Somali Bantu or Jareer are being wiped out because whenever there is drought or floods, Abgaal take advantage and buy all our land and literally we will have no place. (IDP representative 1 2019 Int.)

IDPs are used as a human commodity. I think they were forcibly displaced, then taken advantage of in towns, then [formed to create] a cheap labour force. (Government officer 1 2019 Int.)

By the late 2010s and early 2020s, IDPs in Somalia had become a business opportunity: for local camp managers or gatekeepers, for local authorities, for land-owners, business (e.g. in construction, commercial farming, portering and more), and for aid organisations. The number of displaced increased dramatically between 2011–2017 from 1 to 2 million (UN OCHA 2018). This increase happened in particular in 2017 and numbers remained high in subsequent years. In 2021, the total number of displaced was 3 million (IDMC 2022), which represents almost 20% of the population of Somalia (Jelle *et al.* 2021). More than 700,000 people have been newly displaced since early 2021 (UN OCHA 2022). Most displaced populations belong to the politically marginalised clans of Bay and Bakool regions and along the Shebelle and Juba rivers. These populations have been historically excluded from systems of governance, services and economic opportunities; they have been subjected to land-grabs and – during conflict – looting, destruction and displacement. They have also regularly been excluded from humanitarian assistance or receive much less than aid organisations plan (Jaspars & Maxwell 2008; Thomas & Opiyo 2021). When displaced, their main source of income is labour (Jaspars & Maxwell 2008; Bakonyi 2021; Thomas & Opiyo, 2021). For these reasons, they have historically also been the most vulnerable to famine. The famine of 1992 was most severe among these groups, and again these populations were food-insecure and displaced in 2008, 2011, 2017 and at the time of writing.

The reasons for displacement are usually reported to be conflict or drought. A number of other factors are also important, however, in particular that displacement offers benefits for a range of actors. The first are gatekeepers for camps of IDPs. Camps in Somalia do not offer UN protection or aid management – they consist of hundreds of scattered settlements in urban areas, on private land, that are managed by camp leaders, as they are sometimes called, or gatekeepers. Gatekeepers provide IDPs with access to land and try to connect them with aid organisations, and as such provide an essential service (UN Security Council 2012; Bakonyi 2021). They also, however, tax displaced populations on any aid received. In our interviews, IDPs generally reported this to be about 30%. Gatekeepers also benefit from building and service provision contracts (UN Security Council 2012; Bakonyi 2021). At district and national level too, huge benefits could be gained by obtaining contracts for aid transport and aid money transfer, and from having a role in its distribution (Jaspars *et al.* 2020). The more IDPs in camps, therefore, the more money there is to be made. As one aid worker in Mogadishu commented: ‘I saw a huge increase in gatekeepers from 2011 to 2017. They were picking people up in buses. It became an industry ... part of the urban economy’ (Aid worker 1 2019 Int.). According to Human Rights Watch (2013), gatekeeper-ship itself can be bought or sold. A related factor is that IDP settlement increases the

value of the land, as access to services such as healthcare and water improves. Combined with an influx in investment and construction, following the establishment of the Federal Government in 2012, the value of land increased even more dramatically. This has resulted in multiple evictions from displaced camps. UN OCHA (2018) reported 729,000 evictions between 2015 and 2018. In 2022, most IDPs have been evicted many times (Jelle *et al.* 2021). A humanitarian rent economy has developed which allows land-owners and camp leaders to capitalise on aid flows (Bakonyi 2021). For displaced populations, evictions result in loss of assets and social networks, and physical and mental health issues (Jelle *et al.* 2021).

In addition to benefits from attracting and taxing aid, and increasing the value of land, IDPs also present a source of flexible and exploitable labour. The increase in investment and development from 2012 onwards has resulted in a construction boom and a need for labour – for which IDPs offer a cheap and plentiful source. The mid-2010s also saw an increase in commercial agriculture and export, in particular sesame and lemon, due to increased demand from the Middle East, India and China (Jaspars *et al.* 2020: 24). This increase has been associated with the acquisition and consolidation of land by more powerful groups or, conversely, the sale by marginalised groups (IDP representatives 1–4 2019; Aid workers 2–4 2019 Int.). Displaced representatives said they sold their land to powerful clans in the area before leaving, in particular in times of drought. Land sales also create labour, including agricultural labour. One aid worker informed us that the displaced in Dollo and Luuq work as labourers on farms or as porters in town (Aid worker 15 2019 Int.). In Mogadishu, portering, housework or construction appear most common. In other words, whether by aid contracts or taxation, increased land value or cheap labour, IDPs have become an important business opportunity. The remainder of this article examines whether and how changes in the political marketplace can explain this situation of maintaining precarity but not famine. How did a country which has received large volumes of international aid since the 1970s create and maintain 3 million people in a precarious and exploitable condition?

2008–2011: FROM KLEPTOCRACY TO COMPETITIVE OLIGOPOLY AND FAMINE

The years from 2008 to 2011 are characterised by active conflict, displacement, high volumes of humanitarian assistance, and famine. Since before the civil war, a small elite has controlled wealth and power in Somalia, but the nature of these power dynamics has changed over time. From 2008, the changes in governance, aid and foreign investment have led to changing elite resource capture, competition and collusion. This section analyses the political marketplace by examining political and economic change, elements of the political marketplace and the reported causes of famine. The political market was defined by a struggle for power between businessmen (from powerful clans),

Al-Shabaab and government, with the government as the relatively minor player. It follows an earlier period in the 1990s in which Somalia's business class had become politically and economically prominent (Menkhaus 2018), and when the resources of UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) were a key means of business creation and expansion. By 2000, businesspeople essentially controlled telecommunications, remittances, transport and trade, and had considerable political clout.

Political developments: the rise of Islamist groups and violent conflict

This period saw a number of attempts to establish national or federal governments, but also the rise of Islamist movements. The TFG was established in 2004 with Ethiopian and US support but ultimately had little power or control over territory. Big business played a key role in the establishment of the TFG, as they wanted an end to destructive war but not a strong state. Their cross-clan alliances (in order to operate nationally) were key to the elite bargain which enabled the TFG (Hagmann & Steputtat 2016; Menkhaus 2018: 14). Business was also key in the establishment of ICU control in Mogadishu in 2006; as it involved an arrangement of business figures, clan leaders and Islamic sheikhs. When the TFG proved unable to govern, due to competing interests and internal dysfunction, the ICU brought about a sense of stability and rule of law albeit along very strict Islamist lines. It lowered the cost for businesses, as Islamists operating across clan-lines were more cost-effective than previous strategies of paying for security (Ahmad 2015). It led to the reopening of Mogadishu port. Similarly, Kismayo port opened and became a source of revenue for Al-Shabaab from 2008–2012 (Hoffman *et al.* 2017). De Waal (2015: 123) called the role of the ICU a non-rentier way of regulating political violence.

ICU control of Mogadishu, however, immediately led to an Ethiopian offensive in 2007 resulting in conflict between the TFG and its backers, and the ICU and the Al-Shabaab militia, involving extreme violence. Around 700,000 people were displaced from Mogadishu to the north-west of the city in the direction of Afgoy (also known as the Afgoye corridor), leading to a humanitarian crisis and large-scale humanitarian response. Following the defeat of ICU, the more militant Al-Shabaab became the main Islamist force, controlling much of southern and central Somalia by 2008 (including the towns). At the same time, the war against the ICU may ultimately have saved the TFG (Menkhaus 2018: 20). It enabled the government to move back into Mogadishu, and the threat of Al-Shabaab yielded a wealth of counterinsurgency funds for the government. This period also coincides with Al-Shabaab's ideological phase, fiercely Islamist and anti-Western, and supporting the historically marginalised population groups in disputes over land. It established a court system widely recognised as more effective than that of the government. It also, however, taxed farmers heavily and banned Western aid (see below).

Aid and political budgets: the importance of aid and logistics contracts

Aid flows increased following the establishment of the TFG in 2004, the Djibouti peace agreement in 2008 (between the TFG and the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia, which included ICU and other opposition leaders), and in response to the humanitarian crisis that same year. The US, EU and the UN all stepped up engagement, as they wanted the TFG to succeed (Menkhaus 2018: 13). The combination of a new system of government and an influx of resources meant that MPs could put a price on their votes. Both the first TFG President, Abdulahi Yusuf, and the second, Sheikh Sharif (from 2009), had the necessary business interests to buy votes and could attract external resources to maintain political loyalty. Hagmann (2016) uses the term 'extraversion' to describe this kind of dependent relationship with the external world to appropriate resources and authority. With government based on clan representation, clan will be used to attract resources and trump policy and humanitarian concerns.

Humanitarian aid, in particular food aid, was big business during this period and in turn financed politics. The best example of this is the 2010 scandal of three Somali contractors who colluded with implementing partners and World Food Programme (WFP) staff to divert food aid (see UN Security Council 2010). In response to the 2008–2010 humanitarian crisis, WFP's operation had changed from 1.47 million beneficiaries to 3.20 million – nearly a quarter of the population of Somalia (Nicholson *et al.* 2012). The three contractors received WFP transport contracts worth \$200 million. 'It turned them into oligarchs' (Aid worker 5 2019 Int.). Although the UN report was controversial at the time 'the UN Monitoring Group confirmed what everyone already knew: large amounts of food aid had indeed been going astray in South Central Somalia, although the level of diversion came as something of a shock' (Maxwell & Majid 2016: 46). As much as half of all food aid to that part of the country was being diverted (*ibid.*). An earlier study had also shown collusion between businessmen, implementing agencies and WFP, and can be considered as a precursor to the larger-scale collusion and diversion in 2010 (Jaspars & Maxwell 2008).¹

Politically, Sheikh Sharif was closely connected with one of the three big WFP contractors, who had a wealth of business interests, including construction and charcoal exports as well as food aid transport (Jaspars & Maxwell 2008; Hoffmann *et al.* 2017: 41). The later (and current) President Hassan Sheikh was for some time a WFP contractor himself (Jaspars & Maxwell 2008: 37). Logistics contracts, in this period in particular for humanitarian assistance, have been an important source of political finance (Elder 2022). WFP's logistics contractors used the wealth gained from food aid transport as a direct source of political finance. More generally, competition over 'logistics rents' within a small elite has been an ongoing source of instability in Somalia's governance (Elder 2022).

Sources of political finance expanded with the 2011 famine response. In addition to US, UK and UN aid and security sector support, Turkey became a key donor from 2011 and – in addition to humanitarian aid – provided direct government budget support until 2013 (Jorgic & Karadeniz 2014). The African Union Peace Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), mandated by the African Union Peace and Security Council in 2007, and Ethiopia also provided revenue as part of the counter-insurgency operation against Al-Shabaab's control of southern and central Somalia. Only Dolo (on the Ethiopian border) and Mogadishu were held by the government, leading to a concentration of aid and displaced populations in these towns. This in turn created local strongmen. Mogadishu was notorious for the strength of its District Commissioners (DC), many of whom controlled and profited from access to IDPs (often through links to 'gatekeepers') and aid. The DC of Dolo, Abdirashid 'Janan', was one of the most notorious strongmen, and later became Security Minister of Jubaland (Bader 2020).

Much aid in response to the 2011 famine was in the form of cash transfers. Food aid decreased because of the WFP scandal described above, because the US proscribed Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organisation in 2008 and because Al-Shabaab itself banned US food aid in areas under its control from 2010. CARE pulled out of south-central Somalia in 2008 and WFP in 2010. Like food aid, cash could also be used as a source of political finance; by influencing who received contracts at the local level (as before), who received aid, and from gatekeeping and 'taxing' displaced populations (Human Rights Watch 2013; McCullough & Saed 2017; Jaspars *et al.* 2020). Gatekeeping increased in 2011 as famine-affected people had to move to Mogadishu to receive aid (Hedlund *et al.* 2012).

Humanitarian crisis and famine

Somalia experienced a severe humanitarian crisis in 2008 and a famine in 2011. In 2006–2008, a number of factors came together to cause humanitarian crisis. In addition to the Ethiopian invasion, battles with the ICU and the displacement of 700,000 people, parts of Somalia experienced drought and the entire country faced high food prices as a result of the 2008 global food crisis (Menkhaus 2009). Somalia was considered the world's worst humanitarian crisis, with 1.3 million displaced and 3.5 million people in need of emergency assistance (Menkhaus 2009; Maxwell & Majid 2016: 33). Difficulties in aid delivery contributed to humanitarian crisis too. Delivering aid was difficult because, first, TFG administrative and security measures hindered aid provision to the displaced, who were considered an enemy or supporters of Al-Shabaab. Second, uncontrolled TFG security forces and criminal gangs set up about 400 checkpoints. Third, the US designation of Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organisation made it difficult for Western aid agencies to distribute food in areas under their control (Menkhaus 2009: 228). Fourth, aid diversion through collusion between businessmen, implementing agencies and WFP, as indicated above.

The agro-pastoral population of Bay and Bakool and the riverine populations along the Juba and Shebelle rivers were among the most affected, and according to FSNAU had the highest prevalences of acute malnutrition between 2000–2007. These groups received little of the aid intended for them, when western aid could still go into rural Al-Shabaab controlled areas (Jaspars & Maxwell 2008) as well as when they were displaced, because aid coming into the country was controlled and diverted by business-political elites.

The famine in 2011 was more severe than the 2008 crisis. Conflict between the TFG and Al-Shabaab continued. Internal leadership struggles weakened Al-Shabaab and made negotiating access more difficult, and a major AMISOM offensive in February 2011, drove Al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu (Maxwell & Majid 2016). In addition, drought was severe and global food prices were once again high. Obstacles to aid delivery were again considerable. Al-Shabaab limiting access for humanitarian organisations and US anti-terrorist legislation delayed response and reduced food aid. In 2010, Al-Shabaab banned food aid from its territory, and placed restrictions on population movement. WFP left because of the scandal (see above) and security risks. This hugely limited the scope and capacity for responding to the crisis. When famine was declared in July 2011, more than 3 million people were affected (Maxwell & Fitzpatrick 2012). With food aid banned, and limited access, aid organisations switched to cash transfers, but even then the hardest hit areas – mostly in Al-Shabaab territory – could not be reached (Hedlund *et al.* 2012; Maunder *et al.* 2018). Just like in our interviewees in 2019, people had sold land, lost livestock and migrated to urban centres in search of aid or work (Hedlund *et al.* 2012; Maxwell & Majid 2016). This led to concentrations of IDPs and of aid provision in Mogadishu and other urban centres, which made its use as a source of power and political finance, and IDP exploitation, easier. Once again, most famine victims were from Bay and Bakool or minority clans along the Juba and Shebelle rivers.

To conclude, in 2008 and in 2011, the political marketplace was a violent competitive oligopoly, in which food aid was a key business opportunity and source of political finance. The resources and nature of the political marketplace contributed to famine and humanitarian crisis because the struggle for resources and political power led to violent conflict and large-scale displacement, and large-scale diversion of aid as a source of political finance. This was aided by the concentration of displaced and aid flows in a limited number of cities. Al-Shabaab contributed indirectly to displacement by banning aid in their areas, as did US anti-terrorist legislation, and by taxing populations under its control. Both contributed to displacement, aid concentration in towns, and famine in southern and central Somalia.

AFTER 2012: FROM COMPETITION TO COLLUSION, DISPERSAL OF POWER AND FAMINE PREVENTION?

This period is characterised by an internationally recognised federal government, and the establishment of member state governments, increased external

funding and investment, rapid humanitarian response in 2017 but also a large increase in internal displacement. From 2012, the political marketplace changed from a competitive oligopoly based on resource extraction (e.g. aid and land by force and diversion) into a more collusive oligopoly based on an informal political compact between key actors. Al-Shabaab is located in opposition to the federal system (and arguably led to its creation) but can also increasingly be seen as more ambiguous, sometimes colluding and sometimes contesting the FGS (Majid *et al.* 2021), as this section will show. With the introduction of cash transfers (replacing food aid), the role of aid in the political marketplace became more dispersed, continuing the trend of creating local strongmen. Overall, however, humanitarian aid became less important as a source of political finance when development aid, investment, and consequently other business opportunities, proliferated. This section discusses each of these changes.

Political and economic developments; federal government and expansion of aid and business

The year 2012 marks the beginning of an internationally recognised Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) with Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President. In political market terms, the federal formula establishes the basic regulatory structure for the market as an oligopoly, with the FGS as the superior actor and the Federal Member States (FMS) as subordinate actors. This period saw more finance, more actors and more aid. In addition to foreign aid, the return of diaspora actors increased investment substantially (Hagmann *et al.* 2018). Business opportunities expanded: from money transfer, aid and trade; to mobile money, construction (property) and cash crops, all of which continue to be controlled by a powerful but expanding and sometimes new elite (see below). Al-Shabaab remains a major source of violence against FGS and AMISOM (the AU Mission in Somalia), and to people it sees as collaborators, including coercion for payment of taxes and attacks on targets associated with the FGS and its allies. Between 2012 and 2014, it was driven out of most towns in southern and central Somalia, but it extended its taxation capacity over much of the economy (Hiraal Institute 2020). During this period, Al-Shabaab appears to have shifted from supporting marginalised groups and production, to self-preservation and a survival policy of increased taxation. It not only increased taxes on harvest, humanitarian aid and checkpoint fees from people in territories it controls (UN Security Council 2017), but also from businesses. It collected fees for trade and movement of goods through their areas (which traders often prefer because it is safer than through government areas), for cash-crop production, import and export of goods from Al-Shabaab to government areas, and in ports (interview with food trader, Baidoa, 25 June 2019). Other fees in government-held areas, including those for hotels, restaurants and aid organisations means that it was essentially running a protection racket. Ahmad *et al.* (2022) point out that the group also continues to provide some

services, such as the courts, as part of a more predictable governance, frequently out-competing the FGS. At the same time, the threat of Al-Shabaab maintains funding for anti-terrorist activities.

International support and investment was symbolised by the Somali New Deal Compact between donors and the Somali government (2013) and later the New Partnership for Somalia (2017) (De Waal 2017). Turkey continued its influence with contracts for port and airport operations, including the expansion of Mogadishu International Airport (MIA) and the resulting concentration of resources there. The establishment of the 'green zone' for aid and political actors at MIA massively increased the presence of private military and security actors (Norman 2020). According to government figures, Turkey committed US\$400 million in aid to Somalia between 2011 and 2016 (Pitel 2016) and bilateral trade grew from US\$6 million in 2010 to US\$72 million in 2015 (Hoffmann *et al.* 2017: 60). The US, EU and AMISOM remained important, with the UAE and Qatar coming in as new actors (opening missions in 2013 and 2014 respectively). The importance of development, security and diplomatic aid was far greater than humanitarian assistance during this period (Majid *et al.* 2021).

Construction, oil and cash crops became key business opportunities. The diaspora and the expansion of mobile money have fueled a property boom, particularly in Mogadishu (Hoffmann *et al.* 2017). The three big WFP contractors have switched to similar lucrative ventures post-2012 too, including AMISOM and UN contracts for construction, accommodation, transport, port management or fuel storage and supply (Aid workers 5–8 2019; Businessmen 1–3 2019; Government officer 1 2019 Int.). These contracts are key sources of political finance in the post-2012 period, and a source of ongoing competition between elites (Elder 2022). Food aid often gave businessmen the capital to invest in new more profitable ventures. Another new business opportunity is cash crops. In the last 10–15 years, cash crops have been revived as a source of revenue, mainly sesame and dried lemon. This too is controlled by a limited number of businesses, in particular their export, including out of Al-Shabaab areas (which is expensive) (Aid workers 9–11 2019; Government officials 1 and 2 2019 Int.). In fact, a limited number of big companies appear to invest in whatever is profitable at the time, ranging from cash crops and trade to construction, and need to be able to shift operations quickly. Often the same companies are involved in aid, production, trade and politics (Jaspars *et al.* 2020). Al-Shabaab is intimately involved as it continues to contribute to displacement, and taxes all of this (and ensures payment with the threat of violence).

Political finance and budgets; a more diffuse political market

Politics-business links to external finance (state or international aid) remained a key source of political budgets for those in government areas (Hagmann 2016). Being an internationally recognised government did not, however, increase its ability to tax people, as people have little trust in government to provide services

(Rift Valley Institute 2019). As a result, government (federal and local) and aligned militia demand a plethora of informal taxes and fees and politicians need to maintain a source of political finance and patronage to maintain loyalty. Business actors and connections have become increasingly central to political campaigns (Hoffman *et al.* 2017: 63), in particular because of the need for widespread vote-buying (Menkhaus 2018: 22). Like Sheikh Sharif, President Hassan Sheikh had a number of business connections, including companies involved in oil exploration and storage, port re-construction and operations (Hoffman *et al.* 2017: 39–40). The highest political offices benefited from a booming economy in Mogadishu: real estate and servicing private contracts (*ibid.* 53). Companies secured access to contracts by placing close allies in government positions and by proposing projects to please donors (*ibid.* 124).

Overall, however, a more diffuse or dispersed political marketplace developed from 2012 onwards because of the creation of the FMS and because of the new modalities of cash transfer programming. Cash programming has led simultaneously to a dispersal of power and resources by involving more small retailers, as well as to its centralisation in the form of the money transfer and communications company Hormuud. Compared with central transport contracting, WFP's food vouchers support a large number of small retailers (over 900 in 2019). Possibilities for collusion and diversion have continued to exist but at a lower administrative level, including between district authorities, WFP staff and NGOs for contracts (Businessmen 2, 4–6 2019 Int.). Diversion of aid and or gatekeeping continues (Aid workers 12 and 13 2019; IDP representative 2 and 5 2019 Int.; see also Majid & Harmer 2016). District authorities can gain power from selecting retailers and through their involvement in selecting beneficiaries. At the same time, the development of mobile money systems, including for aid, has contributed to the rise of Hormuud as one of the most powerful actors in Somalia. Since 2012, Hormuud has been the key agent for aid agencies' mobile cash transfers, and it has invested in construction, electricity, agriculture, food processing and exports, including a monopoly on sugar imports through Mogadishu (Aid workers 7, 14–19, as well as Hormuud itself, Businessman 7 2019 Int.). It dominates the Chamber of Commerce (Hoffman *et al.* 2017: 46). This means Hormuud influences much of Somalia's food production and trade, as well as controlling communication and mobile money transfer (including as aid). Hormuud differs from the logistics firms in that it has aligned more closely with the state (in the interest of economic growth and security) whereas logistics contractors remain embroiled in 'dirty' domestic politics based on bribery and corruption (Elder 2022: 11). In addition, the telecoms industry is vital to the functioning of Al-Shabaab and vice versa. Hormuud operates extensively in Al-Shabaab areas, and thus provides a substantial proportion of Hormuud's revenue. This also means that Al-Shabaab can indirectly exert pressure on the government via Hormuud.

Prevention of catastrophic famine?

Despite competition for resources and political finance, the period after 2012 saw the emergence of an informal political compact between government, business and aid actors. According to Menkhaus (2018), the informal rules that govern this collusive oligopoly might include: clan elites have a monopoly on resources in states where they are dominant; restrained political violence and some commitment to rule of law to keep foreign aid and investment coming in; the need to include the diaspora; and that clan-partnerships may be necessary for business. The threat of Al-Shabaab, its role in external support for the federal system and the influx of external resources, are key in maintaining this informal political compact (Menkhaus 2018). Al-Shabaab itself benefits from the expansion of resources by being able to tax any aid, trade or production. Money-transfer agencies are part of the compact, but in contrast to the food aid contractors before, their strategy appears to be to buy political compliance (rather than loyalties or positions) so that their business can continue to expand. While humanitarian aid became less important as a source of political finance, we argue that a political marketplace has developed over time which involves, and may even have come to depend on, maintaining large numbers of displaced in urban areas. This political compact may have contributed to preventing a severe famine in 2017. Evaluations concluded that famine was averted because of a fast and coordinated response (see for example ICG 2017; Daniels & Anderson 2018; DuBois *et al.* 2018; Maunder *et al.* 2018; Clayton 2019) but we argue that the changing – more collusive – political marketplace was an added factor.

In August 2017, an estimated 6.2 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance with 3.1 million people severely food-insecure. As before, the epicentre was southern and central Somalia. Around 900,000 people were newly displaced. Donors responded within months and, unlike in 2011, the Somali government, diaspora and private sector – as well as international organisations – responded quickly (Dubois *et al.* 2018) and in a coordinated manner (Clayton *et al.* 2019). However, there were other key differences with 2011. By 2017, Somalia had a broadly accepted federal government based on an elite bargain or informal political compact. The political marketplace existed within this federal arrangement and was more diffuse (thus less violent), with more actors, more sources of finance and more money; turning it into a collusive oligopoly in which powerful actors (including government, business and aid organisations) maintain a set of rules which restrains political violence in order to keep external resources coming in. Large-scale violence and famine would risk upsetting a status quo in which all elite actors benefit. Federal government and member states receive aid and other external investment, business can bid for a range of lucrative contracts, construction, urban development and commercial farming expands, and Al-Shabaab is able to tax them. Al-Shabaab benefits from the status quo – or compact – through its extensive taxation abilities (on production, trade and aid) and the increased flow of resources from

2012 onwards. It can be seen as part of the political marketplace because the threat it poses maintains external support for the federal system and conditions in areas under its control maintain displacement and aid flows – thus maintaining sources of political finance for government-business actors. Its control over all aspects of the food chain arguably makes it an equal or more important actor in causing or preventing famine, than the government (or international organisations).

Within this compact, the marginalisation and exploitation of certain groups has continued, including their displacement to urban areas. Aid provision in urban areas, and poor coverage in rural areas meant aid continued to act as a pull factor (Dubois *et al.* 2018: 25). By late 2017, WFP had been unable to reach 600,000 extremely food-insecure people – mostly in rural areas controlled by Al-Shabaab (Daniels & Anderson 2018; Maunder *et al.* 2018). Despite an influx of aid in urban areas, IDPs from poorly connected clans were excluded or marginalised (Dubois *et al.* 2018: 27). As discussed above, manipulation of aid in terms of diversion by local authorities and taxation by gatekeepers, for those that did receive aid, continued. Hence the need for IDPs to engage in labour opportunities and become part of the expanding urban and commercial farming economy. The exploitation and displacement of these groups has become a business opportunity and part of the political compact or political marketplace. It requires part of the populations to be kept in a state of permanent precarity, to function as a source of cheap and exploitable labour (for example on commercial farms, for construction, or as porters) and to keep aid coming in. It is striking that although severe famine is said to have been prevented, internal displacement has massively expanded and remained high from 2017 onwards. An analysis of mortality data later concluded that more than 44,000 excess deaths had occurred between 2014 and 2018 (Warsame *et al.* 2020).

FROM FAMINE TO PERMANENT PRECARITY

One continuity throughout the 1990s and 2000s is who experiences food insecurity and famine. From colonial times, the maintenance of power has depended on the marginalisation and exploitation of particular groups in Somalia. These groups have included in particular the Bantu and Gabaweyn riverine groups along the Juba and Shebelle rivers and the Digil and Mirifle in Bay and Bakool regions. They live in some of Somalia's most fertile areas, but have been excluded from systems of power or governance, until recently, and have been subjected to various forms of land-grabbing (African Rights 1993; Samatar 2008). These marginalised clans in southern and central Somalia experienced the most severe famines or crisis in 1992, in 2008, 2011, again in 2017 and are most at risk now. Throughout this period they have been systematically excluded or marginalised in aid distributions. They consistently showed the highest acute malnutrition rates (Jaspars & Maxwell 2008; Majid & McDowell 2012; Jaspars *et al.*

2020). This section examines how the nature of vulnerability and exploitation of marginalised groups, or weaker clans, has changed over time with changes in the political marketplace.

Changes in land-grabbing

Famine and displacement are closely related to land-grabbing, the nature of which has changed over time. During Siad Barre's regime, it changed from well-connected clans benefiting from state farms along the rivers, to more direct land grabs when land tenure was liberalised (Samatar 2008). Production along the rivers (banana) was highly commodified and depended on cheap and exploitable labour. The 1992 conflict and famine were associated with large-scale and violent looting and resource capture, including land. The riverine and inter-riverine populations were vulnerable and displaced because they were unarmed. Hawiye (dominant) clans from Mogadishu claimed land along the Shebelle rivers (sometimes as liberators), while the Marehan and Ogaden (also dominant) claimed land along the Juba river (De Waal 2007). The original landowners became a group of smallholders and labourers, and as a consequence more vulnerable to drought, floods or food crisis (African Rights 1993). These trends continued throughout the 1990s, while business (including livestock, charcoal and banana export) boomed (Hagmann & Stepputat 2016). Weaker clans were subjected to violent land grabs, displacement and diversion of aid (Jaspars 2000). Since 2008, much of the riverine areas and Bay and Bakool have been controlled by Al-Shabaab. While initially Al-Shabaab appeared to protect Somalia's marginalised groups, over time its punitive taxation and the purchase of land by commercial actors forced many farmers to move out. Violent conflict, destruction, displacement, as well as obstruction and exclusion from aid, caused crisis and famine.

From 2012 onwards, the purchase of land by commercial actors and the concentration of aid in urban centres, have been key factors in displacement. Farmers had to sell to more powerful clans because their situation had been made impossible – without aid, services or a voice in local government (IDP representatives 1–4, 6 2019; Aid workers 2–4, 20 2019 Int.). Rather than outright violence, it was a combination of business interests and pressure from dominant clans (often with business, political and aid connections) that forced people to move during times of drought or floods. According to the International Crisis Group (2017), Somalis identified one cause of famine as insufficient local production due to land-grabbing by businessmen connected to powerful clans and the switch to cash crops.

The development of IDPs as a business opportunity

Diversion of aid has long been a way of gaining funds, boosting authority and rewarding family and friends in Somalia. Much of the aid to Ethiopian refugees in the 1970s and 1980s was diverted (Askin in De Waal 1997), and

manipulation of aid continued during violent conflict in the 1990s (Jaspars 2000). In 1992, ICRC established soup kitchens because so much food was looted from dry distributions (Jaspars 2000), but even then, elders registered ghost kitchens (De Waal 1997). From the late 1990s, taxation of IDPs by gatekeepers became a particular concern (Narbeth & McLean 2003). During the 2011 famine, aid workers rediscovered gatekeepers because of large concentrations of displaced in Mogadishu where gatekeepers were prominent, and the taxation of aid rife. The number of displaced increased dramatically from 1 million in 2011 to 2 million in 2017 (UN OCHA 2018). By 2017, as seen in the opening section, gatekeeping had developed into a form of entrepreneurship. Encouraging IDPs into camps has economic benefits as it attracts aid and increases the value of land. It appears that businessmen had learnt from the opportunities that displacement provided in 2011. From 2017 onwards, the number of internally displaced has continued to increase and stood at about 3 million in 2021 (IDMC 2022), or about 20% of the population (Jelle *et al.* 2021).

Business also benefits from aid that displaced populations bring, in terms of contracts for transport, distribution, money transfer, and from the cheap and flexible labour they provide. In some cases, the same business may be involved in providing aid, construction and agricultural production; the politics-aid-business link has become more dispersed and sophisticated, with more actors, a more diverse business sector, and sources of political finance. Until recently (see below) this arrangement has maintained a situation of precarity for the displaced although famine has been prevented. In addition, from a political perspective, IDP concentrations help maintain the government's hold on towns, as aid provision requires the presence of AMISOM and the Somali National Army. This in turn depends on a continued threat from Al-Shabaab (Harper 2019). Keeping people out of rural areas can also be seen as a form of counter-insurgency, as it reduces the population under Al-Shabaab's control. As mentioned earlier, Al-Shabaab also benefits in the collusive political marketplace because of its ability to tax business and aid organisations (indirectly) both within and outside of its own territory. The effects of aid, in particular in protracted humanitarian crises, thus go well beyond those intended by humanitarian organisations. In Somalia, there are a number of dimensions to the politics-aid-business link, of which the political marketplace is one. Large numbers of displaced people in 2022 have become part of Somalia's rent-seeking economy and a means of maintaining funds, labour and power.

FROM 2017 ONWARDS: A MORE FRAGILE POLITICAL COMPACT?

From 2017, political changes in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa have threatened the informal political compact. These changes stemmed from a new President in Somalia in 2017 (Farmajo) and in Ethiopia from 2018, and a new political alliance among FGS, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The alliance in 2017–18 contributed to a return to a more aggressive centralising stance

from the FGS, increasingly asserting its power by force; for example as seen in the regional elections under Farmajo's Presidency (Majid *et al.* 2021). Some of the elites that were part of the Federal system in earlier Presidencies were marginalised. For example, Farmajo attempted to bring the logistics economy under state control. According to Elder (2022), he was rightly enraged about the logistics contracting that had undermined the formation of a legitimate centralised authority. Rent-producing structures such as port, airport, counter-terrorism funds remained fiercely fought over, and pushing for the auctioning of oil and gas concessions became more prominent as a source of political finance (Gundel 2020). In early 2021, the President's term expired and it took until May 2022 for a new President to be elected, with a period of instability – and a risk of renewed civil war – in between. In 2022, several factors appear to once again raise the possibility of famine. In the 2022 elections, lead businesses won parliamentary and senatorial seats highlighting the ongoing business-politics links. Security deteriorated during the election period, in part manufactured by Farmajo's opponents (Elder 2022). The delay in elections contributed to a decline in foreign aid (other reasons for a decline in aid to Somalia included changed geopolitical priorities with the Covid-19 pandemic, Brexit, and increase in demands elsewhere). A decrease in international diaspora remittances since the pandemic, a protracted drought and higher global grain prices as a result of the war in Ukraine, further constrained resources. Displacement remains high as does the exclusion of the weaker clans from aid and services (Majid *et al.* 2022). The five years under Farmajo highlighted the risk of the political marketplace to become more competitive with a resultant increased risk of famine. The re-election of Hassan Sheikh may yet lead to a return to a more collusive arrangement. However, it remains to be seen whether a new arrangement can help prevent famine, or change the role of displaced populations. Other risk factors such as access to Al-Shabaab controlled areas, and the international community's inability to find a way of working with them, the challenges of IDP returns, and the current prolonged drought, also need to be considered. This will need to be closely monitored, also taking into account changing regional and global political and economic dynamics.

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this article was to examine whether and how governance analysed as a political marketplace can help explain Somalia's humanitarian crises and response. In analysing both the political marketplace and the nature of humanitarian crisis, we suggest that the violent and competitive political marketplace in 2008 and in 2011 contributed to humanitarian crisis and famine. Not only was this a time of conflict, displacement, and violent resource extraction, but food aid was a key business opportunity and source of political finance. Contracts to transport food aid created massive wealth for already elite businessmen and helped finance political careers, including for two Somali presidents. Politically marginalised groups were excluded or received less aid than aid

organisations intended. However, a political marketplace analysis does not explain all aspects of famine. A key part of explaining the famine in 2011 was the political ideology of Al-Shabaab which prohibited aid, and placed restrictions on movement, along with US anti-terrorist legislation. Its role in the political marketplace may have been limited to its policies contributing to displacement, which led to concentration of aid in towns, and increased the scope for diversion. A political marketplace analysis, however, focuses on elites, and a famine analysis requires more in-depth exploration of the vulnerability of particular groups and how they can become part of political and economic processes which create power for some. Elite-level politics alone does not explain who is vulnerable, exploited or marginalised and how.

The political marketplace framework also helps explain why 2017 was not a severe famine. By 2017, Somalia had a broadly accepted federal government based on an elite bargain and which was part of an informal political compact with business and aid actors. With more sources of aid, investment and finance, a more collusive oligopoly was necessary to keep external resources coming in. The manipulation and diversion of humanitarian aid was less important as a source of political finance, and its decentralisation meant it boosted the power of local authorities but also that it had a higher chance of reaching those in need. To maintain the informal political compact the threat from Al-Shabaab was necessary and violent conflict and famine would risk upsetting it (as this would reduce development aid and commercial investment). Al-Shabaab enters the political marketplace by maintaining external support for the federal system, and the need for aid, and thus sources of political finance for government and business actors. Al-Shabaab itself benefited from the elite compact as it was able to tax production, transport, trade and import/export in ports, as well as tax businesses for protection (including in government areas). Lower-level conflict or political instability was the norm during the 2012–2017 period. Post 2017, a more aggressive centralising stance from the FGS, followed by increased instability and delays in elections, as well as a reduction in aid and investment, may have contributed to an increased risk of famine in the early 2020s.

This status quo has required – or at least functions by – maintaining displaced populations in a permanent state of precarity. This needs close monitoring and further exploration. Large concentrations of displaced populations benefit government and business in a number of ways. Camps yield income through gate-keeping and by increasing the value of land. Businesses benefit through contracts to supply or distribute aid or because IDPs are a source of cheap casual labour, whether for construction or for commercial agriculture – which were two of the most profitable businesses in 2019. Somali businesses need to be able to invest quickly in whatever is most profitable at a particular time, and for this they need a cheap and flexible labour force. Even though severe famine was avoided, therefore, the collusive political marketplace in Somalia maintains the ongoing marginalisation of Somalia's weakest clans, who form the majority of IDPs. The increase in IDPs between 2012 and 2017 (and

onwards) coincided with an increase in commercial opportunities. The status quo that prevented severe famine in 2017 maintains historically marginalised groups as IDPs in a permanent state of precarity; with their displacement facilitating land acquisition, providing a source of aid, the cheap and flexible labour force that Somalia's businesspeople benefit from, maintaining the government's hold on towns and benefiting Al-Shabaab through its ability to tax property, trade, movement. As Bakonyi *et al.* (2019: 90) argued, urban camps in Somalia are globally governed formations of precarity: 'they may be at the edge of the world but they nonetheless remain part of it and are shaped by its socio-political logics and the multiple agencies that contribute to their emergence'. Furthermore, Somalia is not alone in having a large and growing precariat – and this study provides one way of looking at their emergence, maintenance and functions in today's world.

This article has shown how a political marketplace analysis can contribute to an understanding of famine and precarity but also that further research is needed to sufficiently capture what is happening in Somalia.² Understanding Somalia's protracted humanitarian crisis needs further on-the-ground in-depth analysis of the changes in the political marketplace, the role of Al-Shabaab within it, and the effect on marginalised populations. This includes further exploration on the political economy of displacement and its links with the rural and humanitarian economy.

NOTES

1. In addition, in our discussions and dissemination with UN organisations (including WFP), donors and NGOs, in Nairobi and Mogadishu in February 2020, no one disputed the 2010 diversions and collusion reported by the UN Monitoring Group. The diversions and collusion in 2010 were accepted by all (Majid & Jaspars 2020).

2. How and why aid practices fail to reveal the political dynamics of food insecurity and aid in Somalia is discussed extensively in Jaspars *et al.* (2020).

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Interviews

- IDP representative 1. *Interview with IDP head of household (male)*. By GA on 2 July 2019. Mogadishu.
- IDP representative 2. *Interview with IDP head of household (woman)*. By GA on 29 June 2019. Mogadishu.
- IDP representative 3. *Interview with IDP representative (female)*. By GA on 29 June 2019. Mogadishu.
- IDP representative 4. *Interview with IDP head of household (male)*. By GA on 2 July 2019. Mogadishu.
- IDP representative 5. *Interview with IDP head of household (woman)*. By GA on 29 June 2019. Mogadishu.
- IDP representative 6. *Interview with IDP representative*. By GA on 22 June 2019. Baidoa.
- Government Officer 1. *Interview with former government official*. By SJ on 8 July 2019. Skype.
- Government Officer 2. *Interview with government official*. MoA. By SJ on 26 June 2019. Mogadishu.
- Aid worker 1. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By SJ on 24 June 2019. Nairobi.
- Aid worker 2. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By SJ on 4 May 2019. Nairobi.

- Aid worker 3. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By GA on 29 June 2019. Mogadishu.
- Aid worker 4. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By GA on 3 July 2019. Mogadishu.
- Aid worker 5. *Interview with long-term aid worker (Jarat Chopra)*. By SJ and NM on 29 April 2019. Nairobi.
- Aid worker 6.) *Interview with long-term aid worker (Joakim Gundel)*. By SJ on 29 April 2019. Nairobi.
- Aid worker 7. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By SJ on 26 June 2019. Mogadishu.
- Aid worker 8. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By SJ on 27 June 2019. Mogadishu.
- Aid worker 9. *Interview with long-term aid worker (Luca Alinovi)*. By SJ and NM on 1 May 2019. Nairobi.
- Aid worker 10. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By SJ and NM on 3 May 2019. Nairobi.
- Aid worker 11. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By SJ on 10 July 2019. Skype.
- Aid worker 12. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By SJ and NM on 5 May 2019. Nairobi.
- Aid worker 13. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By SJ on 18 June 2019. Nairobi.
- Aid worker 14. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By SJ on 29 March 2019. Skype.
- Aid worker 15. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By SJ on 29 April 2019. Nairobi.
- Aid worker 16. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By SJ and NM on 2 May 2019. Nairobi.
- Aid worker 17. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By SJ and NM on 3 May 2019. Nairobi.
- Aid worker 18. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By SJ and NM on 9 May 2019. Skype.
- Aid worker 19. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By SJ on 19 June 2019. Nairobi.
- Aid worker 20. *Interview with long-term aid worker*. By GA on 25 June 2019. Baidoa.
- Businessman 1. *Interview with transporter. Jubaland*. By SJ on 23 June 2019. Nairobi.
- Businessman 2. *Interview with food trader*. By GA on 25 June 2019. Baidoa.
- Businessman 3. *Interview with old businessman and politician*. By GA on 24 June 2019. Baidoa.
- Businessman 4. *Interview with wholesaler. WFP retailer*. By GA on 24 June 2019. Baidoa.
- Businessman 5. *Interview with food trader*. By GA on 25 June 2019. Baidoa.
- Businessman 6. *Interview with food trader* By GA on 30 June 2019. Mogadishu.
- Businessman 7. *Interview with money transfer agent (Hormuud)*. . By SJ and NM on 2 May 2019. Nairobi.