

of the spring 1972 First All-Union Hippie Congress in Vilnius (p. 61) or for the closing of the Riga Phosphate Plant in the late 1960s for environmental reasons (p. 108).

In spite of its shortcomings, the work is perhaps the best available introductory book for anyone interested in the contemporary Baltics. It should be hoped that a translation into a major Western language will be forthcoming.

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THE WAR HITLER WON: THE FALL OF POLAND, SEPTEMBER 1939.

By *Nicholas Bethell*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. viii, 472 pp. \$10.00.

CODEWORD BARBAROSSA. By *Barton Whaley*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973. xxviii, 376 pp. \$10.00.

The English historian and journalist Bethell has utilized the recently opened British archives together with a variety of published materials—including Polish ones—to prepare an account of the first portion of World War II. The author combines a considerable use of quotations with the passing out of evaluations; the main actors, like pupils in school, are awarded grades for most performances and utterances. Even when the reader agrees with the grade, there is something grating about the procedure.

As an account of last-minute diplomacy, the book is not up to the standard of Walther Hofer's book on the same subject. The picture of Polish planning and actions is, on the whole, convincing, while that of the German military plans and operations is curiously thin for a book with the title of this one. The beginnings of the German occupation, however, are described carefully, as is the Polish reaction to it. The most valuable portions of the book deal with the internal developments in Britain's government and society. Bethell demonstrates Neville Chamberlain's complete unsuitability as a war leader, illuminates the oft-forgotten opposition to the war in circles on the British right and left, and has some very useful points to make on the relation between the war and Britain's imperial ties. His presentation of British military leaders, especially General Ironside, is devastating. Gamelin comes off no better, but there is much less on France than on England. The author has little understanding of American politics and developments, and his chapter on the United States is even worse than his rather superficial treatment of Soviet policy.

Churchill is Bethell's hero. How the author came to think of the man who once went to Belfast to speak for Home Rule, and who as chancellor of the exchequer made permanent the ten-year-rule which crippled British rearmament, as always a hardliner on Ireland and always in favor of rearmament is difficult to understand. Presumably written for a wider audience, this book will be helpful to scholars primarily for its picture of an England moving slowly and reluctantly into war—though it should be remembered that, apart from Daladier, Chamberlain was the only leader who took his country into a war with Hitler *before* the latter had attacked it.

Whaley's book on Barbarossa—the German plan to attack Russia—takes up the interesting question of what intelligence was actually received by the Soviet Union about these German intentions, when such information was transmitted, and how it

was interpreted. As an effort at an analysis of this difficult and fascinating subject, the book is indeed to be welcomed. In a field that has often been the focus of idle speculation, dubious tales, and outright fabrications, the author's attempt at a systematic and scholarly review makes a significant contribution.

If the Whaley book is not entirely satisfactory, three deficiencies are primarily responsible. The first failure is in part the author's and in part the publisher's. There are so many errors of detail—misidentifications, errors in geography, and so forth—that the reader cannot help becoming skeptical, and possibly unfairly skeptical, of other portions of the text. In the second place, the author accepts too many dubious sources in the text only to enter strong reservations in the footnotes and backnotes. Sometimes Whaley will accept a far-out theory in one portion of the text (for example, Farago's assertion that Sumner Welles leaked the existence of Magic to the Soviet ambassador who tipped off the Germans who warned the Japanese, pp. 44–46) only to reject it implicitly elsewhere (p. 155). The speculative structure is strained too often; how can one list as a warning something which "may well have reached Russian ears by some indirect route" (p. 116)?

In the third place, the analysis of Stalin's interpretation of the information he was receiving is suggestive but incomplete. Whaley's main point, if I have understood it correctly, is that the model he ascribes to Roberta Wohlstetter's Pearl Harbor theory—a great variety of intelligence noises serving to obscure those signals which pointed in the right direction—does not apply to Stalin's surprise on June 22, 1941, because Stalin had read the signals as pointing in a specific direction: a German ultimatum which would precede an attack. There is even more evidence than Whaley cites to support his reading of Stalin's view—for example, the clues pointing to Soviet willingness to make territorial concessions to Germany in Lithuania. Nevertheless, Whaley does not succeed in proving that Stalin's misreading was the product of deliberate German deception, nor does he even try to explain why Stalin might have thought he would receive an ultimatum prior to invasion when Hitler had not followed such a procedure with *any* of the eight countries he had previously invaded during the war.

With all these reservations, Whaley is to be commended for tackling an exceedingly difficult project with a feeling for the intelligence problems of the time and for the seriousness of the events he describes. A future revision may remedy some of the defects, and the opening of new archives might assist such a process.

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GERMAN STRATEGY AGAINST RUSSIA, 1939–1941. By *Barry A. Leach*.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973. xv, 308 pp. \$17.75.

During the past twenty years, works about World War II on the eastern front have become numerous enough to constitute a distinct genre, indispensable for limited areas of Soviet studies but often of slight interest to most students of the Soviet system. The problem is compounded by the fact that with rare exceptions World War II studies are divided into two sharply distinct categories. One group consists of books based on the increasingly numerous Soviet memoirs and histories (very rarely on interviews). Obviously such works are apt to contain considerable information useful to Soviet specialists—even those who are only peripherally con-