

matters, and military and civilian developments. The author is conscious of the greater scope of history and examines the complicated post-Yalta period from a perspective of the mid-1940s rather than performing the usual *retroactive* job of rewriting, particularly the crucial conferences at Yalta and Potsdam.

This reviewer enjoyed the author's personalized approach to diplomatic history which emphasizes the leadership roles, especially of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Harry Truman, but judiciously balances the importance of these political elites against the sweeping forces of history. This is indeed diplomatic history at its best.

Among strong features of the book, the following should be noted. In describing the post-World War II situation the author succeeds in raising the question that most worried the "anti-Russians" vis-à-vis the "pro-Russians": "Where does real self-interest lie?" He then proceeds to offer concise answers in the chapters "The Dawn of a New Day" and "From Yalta to Potsdam." The Yalta conference is brilliantly analyzed. In the second half of the book, the chapter "Grand Disillusion" is both aptly titled and fascinating in detail. For the first time in many volumes on American diplomatic history, Churchill's famous Fulton, Missouri, speech is admirably dissected and given its proper place as the initial round of the cold war. The volume ends with a multidimensional review of the establishment of Soviet influence, and of a Soviet *cordon sanitaire*, in Eastern Europe, as well as of the extension of the Soviet political and diplomatic presence on the mainland of Asia. The diplomatic events of 1946 set the stage for the intensive cold war diplomacy of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Dr. Rose shows a great deal of "sympathetic understanding" in his scholarly judgment of this era.

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THE BERLIN CRISIS OF 1961: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN THE KREMLIN, JUNE-NOVEMBER 1961. By *Robert M. Slusser*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. xvi, 509 pp. \$17.50, cloth. \$8.50, paper.

Professor Slusser has written a detailed, closely argued, sometimes day-to-day monograph on the 1961 stage of the Berlin crisis. He concentrates on what he sees as serious, continuing factional divisions in the Soviet leadership with respect to the Soviet handling of the crisis, centering on the rivalry between Khrushchev, who consistently took a less aggressive line toward the West, and Kozlov, who took a more hostile one. Specifically, he maintains: "The actions taken by the hard-line faction during its temporary dominance in the Kremlin during the late summer of 1961 included: (1) launching a direct challenge to the Western powers' right of unrestricted access to West Berlin by air (the Soviet note of August 23); (2) reversing Khrushchev's policy of making no further build-up of Soviet armed strength (the announcement on retention of service men in the armed forces of August 29); (3) the decision to violate the de facto nuclear test ban by resuming nuclear testing (announcement of August 30); (4) the preceding clandestine report of this decision to the Chinese Communist leadership (August 26); and (5) the decision to name the principal figure in the opposition faction, Frol Kozlov, to head the Soviet delegation to the sixteenth U.N. General Assembly (announcement of September 1)" (p. 283). He concludes with an extremely detailed analysis of the Twenty-second CPSU Congress.

One of the fascinations (and disadvantages) of the art of Kremlinology, of which Slusser's book is one of the major recent examples, is that it is almost always impossible to judge its results with certainty. Since, as in ancient and medieval history, most of the evidence about Soviet policy is, and probably long will be, unavailable, historians must resort to hypotheses and conjectures. This reviewer, therefore, can only give his personal opinion on the validity of Slusser's results. They are best compared with those of the late Franz Borkenau—stimulating, internally consistent, often "not proven," sometimes simplistic, and, on balance, overstated. Michel Tatu's treatment of the same period (in his standard *Power in the Kremlin*) is more differentiated and less reductionist. For Slusser, during this period Khrushchev and Kozlov were locked in near-deadly combat, with others taking one side or the other. For Tatu, Brezhnev and Kozlov were competitors for the succession, with the latter more opposed to Khrushchev than the former, and with Suslov often allied with Kozlov on a more conservative position.

Slusser also points out, in my view correctly, the evidence that Kozlov was less hostile to the Chinese than Khrushchev was, although I doubt Slusser's hypothesis that Kozlov was in "clandestine" communication with them. His analysis of U.S. policy is less detailed, and he concludes from it that Kennedy's policies throughout were moderate, not provocative. The author could well have devoted more attention to American–West German tensions during the crisis and to their relevance to Soviet policy. His case for the primacy of the Khrushchev–Kozlov rivalry would have been strengthened if he had discussed the 1963 changing of the CPSU May Day slogans on Yugoslavia.

Having said this much, however, I would conclude this all too brief discussion of Slusser's book by stressing, despite my reservations, its detail, exhaustiveness, and depth of analysis. It will be required reading for all students of the Khrushchev era, of the Kennedy era, and of the Berlin crisis. From now on any analysis of these problems must take it fully into account. It is a major contribution to the decipherment of esoteric communication and to recent Soviet, German, and American history.

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THE SOVIET UNION IN WORLD AFFAIRS: A DOCUMENTED ANALYSIS, 1964–1972. By *W. W. Kulski*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1973. xiv, 526 pp. \$17.50, cloth. \$5.95, paper.

Professor Kulski has provided us with an interesting and enlightening analysis of Soviet foreign policy. The book is particularly strong in its discussion of the limited influence of ideological beliefs on definitions of Soviet national interest, on the necessity of subordinating the interests of the international Communist movement to the state interest of the Soviet Union, and on the political and economic advice given by the USSR to Third World countries to avoid excessive economic radicalism in dealing with the West. In essence, Kulski's analysis demonstrates that Soviet specialists have a much more sophisticated, hard-headed, and nonideological attitude in their perspective on international affairs than is commonly felt to be the case.

Unfortunately, several implications which are suspect emerge from the analysis. Specifically, the impression is given that a high level of consensus prevails in the Soviet Union on issues of foreign policy, that little conflict or disagreement exists, that the possibility of any significant change in Soviet policy is minimal, and that