EDITORIAL COMMENT

WHY TRY AGAIN TO DEFINE AGGRESSION?

The United Nations is trying again to define aggression. After nearly a decade of inaction the General Assembly established in its Resolution 2330 (XXII) the "Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, composed of thirty-five Member states to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly, taking into consideration the principle of equitable geographical representation and the necessity that the principal legal systems of the world should be represented."[1]

In the face of strong opposition from some, who feel that the effort will be turned into a search for propaganda advantage,[2] and from others that it is an exercise in futility,[3] the General Assembly has instructed the new Special Committee "to consider all aspects of the question in order that an adequate definition may be prepared and to submit to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session a report which will reflect all the views expressed and the proposals made."

Some states sought much more than the resolution requires, namely, preparation of a text in "black letter" form to be presented in September, 1968, to the General Assembly for adoption as a resolution.[4] Others envisaged the Special Committee's work as primarily an examination of the question with a view to drawing up a draft definition, while still others wanted to make of the Special Committee no more than a study group devoted to the problem. Under this latter view the Special Committee would submit no draft definition in 1968 but would conduct only preparatory work to permit the General Assembly to decide on further procedure. Those with the narrowest view suggested limiting the Special Committee to study from a technical viewpoint of the different types of aggression and of the relation of any definition that might ultimately ensue to the general work of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and security, and of the legal consequences to be expected of a

[1] Dec. 18, 1967. General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 16 (A/6716), p. 84. The item has been placed on the agenda by the U.S.S.R. with an explanatory statement. See U.N. Doc. A/6833, Sept. 22, 1967, and *ibid.*, Corr. 1, Sept. 25, 1967.

[2] See remarks by Ambassador Goldberg for the United States in response to remarks of Ambassador Kuznetsov, introducing the proposal for the U.S.S.R. See U.N. Doc. A/P.V. 1611, Nov. 28, 1967, at p. 22.

[3] Japan had said in 1959 that, even if a definition should be adopted, such a definition would neither be binding upon those Member states which had opposed it, nor could it eliminate under the present international situation the possibility of arbitrary interpretations by the Member states which had favored it. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.91/1, Rev. 1, April 3, 1959. Similar comments were made privately to the author by representatives of European states when the resolution was adopted.

[4] For a summary of the debate in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, see Report of the Sixth Committee on "Need to Expedite the Drafting of a Definition of Aggression in the Light of the Present International Situation." U.N. Doc. A/6988, Dec. 15, 1967, pars. 10 and 11.

definition formulated in a General Assembly resolution. The final text took a middle view, calling for study and a report of all views expressed, but requiring no presentation of an approved definition for adoption.

Trouble lies ahead for the Special Committee and ultimately for the General Assembly if it attempts to use the report as the basis for adoption of a resolution. There were eighteen abstentions and one negative vote on Resolution 2330 (XXII),[5] demonstrating the strong doubts and even hostility in the minds of several delegations.

Why the doubts and hostility to an idea that seems eminently sensible to the 90 Member states which voted for the resolution? The answer is not hard to find. Since the first effort to define aggression in the Preparatory Commission for a Disarmament Conference in 1927, there have been many attempts at definition and few results.[6] Notable milestones in the course of these 40 years are the Pacts of 1933 executed by the U.S.S.R. with neighbors to define aggression,[7] the provisions of the 1945 Charter for the Nuremberg trials, a discussion in the International Law Commission in 1951,[8] and the deliberations of earlier "Special Committees" in 1953,[9] 1956[10] and 1959.[11] From none of these has there been lasting impact upon international law.

[5] Malawi voted against the resolution. The abstainers were Member states generally associated with the "Western" group; but Canada, Finland, France, Portugal, Spain and Sweden voted for the resolution. Austria abstained, as usual in conflicts. No roll-call vote was recorded, but observers calculated that the other abstainers were Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States.

[6] For a thorough review of the history of definitions of aggression prior to 1952, see Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/2211, Oct. 3, 1952, reprinted in U.N. General Assembly, 7th Sess. 1952–1953, Official Records, Annexes, Agenda item 54. See also Harvard Research Draft Convention and Comment on Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression, 33 A.J.I.L. Supp. 819 (1939).

[7] Pacts of July 3, 4 and 5, 1933. For texts see 147 L.N. Treaty Series 66 and 148 *ibid.* 79 and 211. Also see 27 A.J.I.L. Supp. 192 *et seq.* (1933).

[8] The I.L.C. report, filed with the General Assembly in the autumn of 1951, proposed that a definition of aggression in general terms treating only of force and threat of force be placed in its Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind. See U.N. Doc. A/1858; reprinted in U.N. General Assembly, 6th Sess., 1951–1952, Official Records, Supp. 9, and in 45 A.J.I.L. Supp. 103 (1951). Documents submitted to the Sixth Committee for use in the debate of the I.L.C. report appear in U.N. General Assembly, 6th Sess., 1951–1952, Official Records, Annexes, Agenda item 49.

[9] Report of Special Committee, 1953, U. N. Doc. A/2638, Aug. 24–Sept. 21, 1953. Reprinted in U.N. General Assembly, 9th Sess., 1953–1954, Official Records, Annexes, Supp. 11.

[10] Report of Special Committee, 1956, U.N. Doc. A/3574, Nov. 27, 1957. Reprinted in U.N. General Assembly, 12th Sess., 1957, Official Records, Annexes, Agenda item 54 at p. 2.

[11] Report of Special Committee, 1959, U.N. Doc. A/AC.91/2, April 24, 1959, recommending adjournment to 1962. A second adjournment was voted to 1965. See U.N. Doc. A/AC/91/3, April 13, 1962. A third adjournment was voted to 1967 unless a majority of members desired a 1966 meeting, U.N. Doc. A/AC.91/5, April 26, 1965. No earlier meeting was requested. The current proposal was the first manifestation of activity of a positive character since 1959.

The record discloses that definition of aggression is one of the most politically oriented operations in a field where politics always plays some rôle. No one reading the documents can conclude that definition is a purely technical operation to be conducted like a "Restatement of the Law" by academically inclined authorities examining practice. There is no "black letter" essence to be extracted from "cases" to be incorporated in a list of activities to be declared illegal under the Charter of the United Nations. There is no way to create situations which will confer upon states subjected to hostile action unquestioned authority to exercise their right of self-defense while waiting for the Security Council to act.

While some have been grievously disappointed, the United Nations has proved itself to be no machine functioning on the basis of rigid application of "black letter" law. It is, and can be expected to remain, a political assemblage of Member states, some of which have authority to veto with impunity whatever call to action is requested, even when others think it indubitably based on the words of the Charter. A definition of aggression can be formulated only while taking these factors into account.

Some of the proponents and opponents of the proposal to resume attempts to define aggression may be motivated by considerations of legal technique quite removed from power politics. The record of past attempts presents arguments based on the legal techniques of the principal legal systems of the world. Resolution 2330 (XXII) takes into consideration the diversity of thinking caused by differing schools of legal thought, and there is reason to do so. During previous exercises in definition there have been conflicts presented by the Bulgarians, Canadians, Ceylonese, French, and the Pakistanis. To begin with the Canadians, a delegate to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in 1957 demonstrated his legal tradition as a student of the common law when he stated his doubts as to the feasibility of definition. He thought them due in part to the common law's avoidance of definitions of legal concepts or of codifying them in advance of the creation of law through practice.[12] The Pakistani echoed this view in doubting that a definition was desirable because it would hamper the progressive growth of international law.[13] He chose to draw analogy to the municipal law of torts which he thought would have suffered from premature codification. He concluded that

> If it was wise to allow for the development of law in the highly centralized system of municipal law, how much wiser would it be to follow that policy in the highly decentralized system of international law.

Ceylon as a state with Roman-Dutch law as its base, but directed by barristers with an educational experience in the techniques of the English common law, was represented by a delegate prepared to proceed to codification on the ground that "Even in common law countries, the present

[12] See U.N. General Assembly, 12th Sess. 1957, Official Records, Committee 6, 524th sitting, Oct. 29, 1957, par. 3.

[13] See *ibid.*, 522nd sitting, Oct. 25, 1957, par. 22.

tendency was to formulate definitions and that was the only way to avoid doubt and ambiguity."[14]

The French delegate, coming from the mother country of contemporary codes, had expressed his traditional dislike of judge-made law in 1952 by replying to the common lawyers that "If there were no description of aggression, the legislative power would necessarily have to be vested in the judge or other executive authority."[15] He sought to prove his point by adding that "The same difficulties would then be encountered as had arisen at the time of the Judgment of Nuremberg, when improvisation had been rendered necessary by the inadequacy of international penal law."

The Bulgarian, as a representative of the Marxian Socialist legal system, which adopts what Professor F. H. Lawson of Oxford has called the "grammar" of the Romanist system, took an extreme position, indicating his lack of familiarity with the development of the common law and its methods of interpreting codes in the light of preceding judicial decisions. He said sweepingly:

> All enactments of law in all countries were subdivided into articles or sections; indeed, in the countries in which the law was embodied in codes, rules of law were identified by the number of the section or article in which they were contained.[16]

He harked back to the past in derogation of his critics by adding:

> Primitive or feudal societies, perhaps, could be content with mere general rules and dispense with legislation in the modern sense of the word, but a more advanced type of society required a set of clear and specific principles applicable to particular cases.

Clearly, differing traditional attitudes toward the techniques of law will plague members of the Special Committee when the task is undertaken. The traditional hostility to codification will play a major rôle in the thinking of delegates reared in the spirit of the ancient English common law. To the Romanists their reluctance may look like hostility based on political grounds, for those Romanists also have traditions deeply imbedded in their minds, and the conflict of traditions can lead to misunderstandings of motives, just as seems to have been the case with the Bulgarian who shot back at his critics in 1957 with: "The enumerative system has become so familiar to the practicing lawyer that it is hard to think of an alternative."

The Special Committee will not be the first to struggle with conflict occasioned by differing legal traditions. The same problem hampered the members of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, when it began to draft "black letter" law in Mexico in 1954, and the differences

[14] See *ibid.*, 521st sitting Oct. 24, 1957, par. 1.

[15] See U.N. General Assembly, 6th Sess., 1951–1952, Official Records, Committee 6, 280th sitting, Jan. 8, 1952, par. 5.

[16] See U.N. General Assembly, 12th Sess., 1957, Official Records, Committee 6, 519th sitting, Oct. 18, 1957, par. 5.

in view have remained with the committee ever since.[17] As incredible as it may seem to jurists with Romanist legal training, lawyers taught to think of growth of law through judicial decision are suspicious of legislative attempts to create new law. Professor James L. Brierly of Oxford typified the common law school when he expressed at Lake Success, in the very first meetings called to discuss the structure and work of the International Law Commission, his preference for the development of international law through practice rather than through legislation.

The reluctance of the anti-codification traditionalists can be overcome only by patient argument presented by jurists of the Romanist school. They must prove that they are basing their recommendations upon practice and have no desire to hamper the development of the law through practice. If there is to be a clear break with practice on some point, the reasons must be made quite clear, and they must be compelling. Further they must show that if they are to depart from what has been the consensus to date, there must be good reason to suppose that, when the new principle is placed within a definition, it can be expected to give rise to such general consensus that it will not be flouted but observed. The tactic of those who proposed the codification of the law of the sea and of diplomatic and consular custom succeeded because it met these tests. It is a tactic which should not be abandoned under the color of argument that the anti-codification group deserves no hearing because it must be motivated by political opposition, since no reasonable man could oppose definition otherwise.

To take a dogmatic position against the schools that oppose codification is to overlook the fact that those who doubt the wisdom of codification include more than the North Americans and the English, the Australians and the New Zealanders. There are newly emerging states in Asia and Africa whose jurists understand legal development in terms of the decisions of judges and choose this method in preference to often hasty legislation of codes of law.[18] Law based on custom widely accepted and respected may appear indefinite to the Romanist-trained legal mind, but it has remarkable strength because it is firmly rooted in the mores of the community. It is obeyed and not flouted as the dictate of some far-away authority creating norms for which there is no general acceptance among the peoples of a given region.

Enough has been said to suggest that there may be opposition to definition of aggression on grounds of legal tradition. Yet the argument against codification because it cannot be rooted in social mores has been rejected by 90 Member states of the United Nations. These have indi-

[17] For a review of the work of the Special Committee, see E. McWhinney, "The 'New' Countries and the 'New' International Law: The United Nations' Special Conference on Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States," 60 A.J.I.L. 1–33 (1966).

[18] For Indonesian rejection of development of law through codification in preference for development through the courts, see D. S. Lev, "The Lady and the Ban Yan Tree: Civil Law Change in Indonesia," 14 Am.J. Comp. Law 282 (1965). Lenin followed the same method in Soviet Russia until he felt the necessity, with the introduction of a modified form of capitalism with his New Economic Policy, to codify in 1922.

cated by their votes in the General Assembly their determination to proceed. They want to study the problem and to achieve, if possible, a code to take the form of a General Assembly resolution. What positive suggestion can be made to give to the process some chance of universal acceptance and value?

An answer to this question lies in the trends emerging within the United Nations itself during recent years. While the founding fathers at San Francisco looked to the "codification and development of international law" as one of its functions, they seem to have focused on the advantages to be expected from the final result of a well defined body of law rather than on the educational value of the process itself. Only since 1962 has the new element entered the General Assembly's concern with international law. Delegates have begun to think of the United Nations as an educator, perhaps in reflection of its success with seminars on human rights. In 1965 these thoughts took form in the establishment of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and in a "Programme of technical assistance to promote the teaching, study, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law." [19] A preliminary seminar was held in Tanzania in 1967 with the aid of both agencies, coupled with UNESCO.

The Tanzanian seminar was the first of a series to be conducted in rotation every two years in Africa, Asia and Latin America. From various reports, both public and private, the seminar shared disappointments with successes. The success was registered in the willingness of distinguished professors to give their vacation to teaching. The disappointments lay in the fact that those who attended were in some cases rather junior and uninfluential members of the staffs of their Foreign Ministries.

The United Nations has also established registers of experts and scholars in international law from which governments may select consultants. Libraries are also being supplied with materials for the use of students of international law, and fellowships are being awarded so that candidates proposed by developing countries may study and gain practical experience in the legal work of the United Nations and its associated bodies.

The new line in international law is becoming clear: the United Nations is determined to become an educational institution as well as a law-creating and peacekeeping one. This suggests as a possibility an educational instrument which is already finding favor with scholars in non-governmental institutions, namely, the seminar in comparison of legal attitudes and legal solutions. The concept has emerged both in international and national educational institutions.

The International Faculty for the Teaching of Comparative Law, having its seat in Strasbourg, has for some years made progress in developing a series of very advanced seminars in which professors from six or eight

[19] General Assembly Res. 2099 (XX), Dec. 20, 1965; 60 A.J.I.L. 664 (1966). The first program was approved by General Assembly Resolution 2204 (XXI), Dec. 16, 1966. The differences of views on creating an educational program in international law within the United Nations were set forth by the author in "Technical Assistance in the New International Law," 60 A.J.I.L. 342 (1966).

legal systems meet with senior graduate students coming from many lands and all schools of legal tradition to discuss burning issues of the day and the solutions proposed for those issues.[20] The results have been electrifying. From a program originally conceived in conventional terms to instruct students, it has developed into exciting exchanges between the professors themselves. All of the scholars meet with the students on some of the days of the seminar to share their thoughts on a common solution of a common problem, using as a basis for thinking the quite different experiences of their own legal systems. The seminars have proved that even the most experienced jurists can benefit from such an educational exchange. Education is no longer conceived to be for young students alone, but even for the mighty of the legal profession.

The same can be said of a program initiated over twenty years ago by Professor Philip C. Jessup at Columbia University in New York as a University Seminar on Problems of the Peace. Not only were the participants professors from various nearby universities, but also members of the Secretariat of the United Nations and members of various national delegations. With the departure of Jessup to become a Judge of the International Court of Justice the seminar has continued to meet regularly twice a month under various chairmen, and the original concept has been kept: well-informed men and women of both the academic and diplomatic world do not demean themselves when they sit in academic discussion for years at a time in an attempt to understand the complexities to be faced in creating conditions for peace. They appreciate that there is no "instant" way to develop either an institutional framework or a program that may help the United Nations perform its functions.

All of this may seem irrelevant to the General Assembly's renewed attempt to define aggression, but there is a link. The Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression will gather some of the most distinguished authorities on international law from the principal legal systems of the world and from the primary regions. It can perform a most valuable function as an "educational" institution devoted to a discussion by experts in depth of the problems to be anticipated in the area from which the United Nations has received its major setbacks. No high official of a Foreign Ministry or of a university need feel that he is demeaned by participation, regardless of the extent of his learning or experience. The Special Committee would not be a seminar for beginners, but for the most advanced. Like the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, it could hear expressions from all sides of the types of action which seem to various members to be aggressive, and they will be many. It can gather facts from the developing areas of the world whose specialists had no voice when efforts of a decade ago to present the problems were undertaken. Independence within the past ten years has added many states to the halls of the United Nations.

[20] Programs of the Faculty are available at the Secretariat, 1, rue Longpont, 92 Neuilly, France.

Should the Special Committee try to draft a "black letter" definition? To this question, the answer of most jurists will be "yes," if only to focus the study. Lawyers of many lands have said privately that their imaginative thought is evoked only when they face a document with pencil in hand. If drafting is approached as a means of evoking thought rather than with determination that a General Assembly resolution must result, the process of defining could become not an exercise in futility, as some have feared, but something more. It could be a fact-gathering operation in which the developing countries together with those of longer experience might indicate the kinds of activities which worry them as threats to their sovereignty.

To some readers such a proposal will sound naïve because of the penchant of delegations to make political capital of all that occurs in the United Nations. To educators it is not to be damned at the outset, for the record of past discussions has demonstrated the educational potential of attempts to define. From the early years, when attention of the draftsmen was focused primarily upon "force and threat of force," and a narrow interpretation of "force" as being only "armed force," the draftsmen have moved far. Now there are claims that "force" takes many forms, and "arms" can be of several kinds. All present danger to sovereignty to those against whom they are used.

The extent to which emphasis has shifted can be portrayed by comparison of definitions of aggression as they have been developed since the first drafts. At the time of the 1933 Pacts fear of conventional arms was widespread. The Pacts included among their definitions declaration of war, invasion by armed forces, attack by land, naval and air forces, naval blockade and provision of support to armed bands.[21] The issue of "volunteers" was raised later when the Chinese entered by the thousands into Korea in 1950. In denying that this was aggression, A. Y. Vyshinsky, speaking for the U.S.S.R., said that under the Hague Convention of 1907 it was not unneutral to permit the crossing of a state's frontiers by persons offering their services to one of the belligerents.[22]

By 1952 the narrow definitions of aggression found in the 1933 Pacts seemed inadequate. Although the International Law Commission, in reporting on the subject in that year, had not chosen to go beyond the line taken by the Pacts, the General Assembly, under the influence of the small Powers, indicated their fear that there were threats to their sovereignty from activities other than those initiated by men with arms. A Latin American view was heard when the delegate of El Salvador expressed fear of "indirect aggression," which he conceived to be an intangible force.[23] The Netherlands' delegate feared "indirect, economic and ideological aggression."[24]

[21] See Pacts of 1933, cited note 7 above.

[22] U.N. General Assembly, 5th Sess., 1950–1951, Official Records, 319th Plenary Sess., Dec. 6, 1950, pars. 33–39.

[23] U.N. General Assembly, 7th Sess., 1952, Official Records, Committee 6, 330th sitting, Nov. 30, 1952, par. 13.

[24] U.N. General Assembly, 6th Sess., 1951, Official Records, Committee 6, 289th sitting, Jan. 17, 1952, par. 37.

By 1953 these fears were noted and developed in a draft presented by the U.S.S.R.[25] It included a section on "indirect aggression" of three types: encouragement of subversive activity, promotion of civil war and promotion of an internal upheaval. "Economic aggression" was defined in the 1953 draft as economic pressures, prevention of exploitation of or nationalization of a state's riches, and economic blockade. A final section treated "ideological aggression" as encouragement of war propaganda, propaganda in favor of using atomic, bacterial, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction, and promotion of the propaganda of Fascist-Nazi views, of racial and national exclusiveness, and of hatred and contempt for other peoples. The draftsmen wanted to avoid closing the list so they empowered the Security Council to declare "any other acts" aggressive as an attack or an act of economic, ideological or indirect aggression. The 1953 terminology seems to have become settled in Soviet minds, for it was resubmitted in 1954,[26] 1956,[27] and 1957.[28]

While the list is long as it appears in the 1953 draft, it may yet fail the expectations of small states. It may include too much or too little. The forthcoming meetings of the Special Committee will have to ascertain present thinking, especially among the new states which have not participated in earlier deliberations. Some will surely call attention to a new technique which goes beyond the armed bands forbidden under earlier drafts. It is the single assassin trained abroad who crosses a frontier to kill local mayors one after the other until no one willing to risk his neck as a leader can be found. It is the system developed of recent years in both hemispheres to reduce a society to chaos. While some governments have denounced this form of activity, others have sought to attempt to disguise it as acts of civil war. No account is taken of the distinction between the rising in rebellion of local citizens and the infiltration of assassins drawn from their homeland for training abroad by outsiders intent upon weakening sovereignty through creating chaos.

Discussion may expose still other forms of activity on which the spotlight of world public opinion should be focused in development of a common sense of outrage. Up to the present, the new states have hardly availed themselves of the opportunity offered them since admission to the United Nations to inform the Secretary General of their views on the subject. Only a few have suggested types of activity which concern them and methods of approach which they think fruitful. Dahomey desires liberal interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations with respect to what constitutes "armed aggression," noting that today the most common form of aggression is economic, which in its view has the same effect as armed aggression.[29] It would draw a distinction between types of aggression: those that would permit a state to act in self-

[25] See U.N. Doc. A/AC.66/L.2, Aug. 25, 1953.

[26] See U.N. General Assembly, 9th Sess., 1954, Official Records, Annexes, Agenda item 51, p. 6.

[27] U.N. Doc. A/AC.77/L.4, Oct. 23, 1956. [28] U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.399, Oct. 3, 1957.

[29] See U.N. Doc. A/AC.91/4, March 15, 1965, p. 9.

defense under Article 51 of the Charter, and those that would not, even though the aggression should be condemned. Among the latter types it would place ideological aggression, and subversive activities, at least when conducted in limited form.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo also relates a definition to the rights of a state to self-defense under Article 51, as well as to Security Council action under Articles 41 and 42.[30] This approach leads it to conclude that there is no need to define atomic aggression, as the state which is attacked will have no chance of self-defense unless the first strike fails to achieve its objectives. Its major concerns are two: certain activities of armed bands as when arms, instructors, advisers or volunteers are sent to bands operating on the territory of another state; and economic aggression, as when one state dispossesses another of its natural resources, its assets or its products sold abroad.

Burundi indicated its concern with acts which should not be considered aggression.[31] Thus it would exclude non-compliance with an alleged international obligation, refusal to sign an armistice, rejection of jurisdictional competence, and failure to observe a war moratorium. To make certain that there would be no broad extension of the concept, it proposed that the definition be unambiguous and narrowly interpreted.

Clearly there are many views as to what should be included, what form the definition should take, and what consequences it should have. Conceived in educational terms the current return to attempts to define aggression can be meaningful in exploring these fundamental problems, if the participants restrict themselves to discussion and education of each other. The temptation is great to strike telling blows against opponents so as to win the minds of men. In itself such activity is itself a form of aggression, although not of such a type that any one would suppose that a right of self-defense under Article 51 had been created. All must realize that the peoples of the world want not only universal restraint in the use of force but also universal restraint in the use of words.

The attempt to define aggression will become truly fruitless if the Special Committee permits itself to become a forum for name-calling. It is general legal principles designed to fit dangerous situations that must be discussed and not carefully selected cases chosen to demonstrate the presence of a mote in an opponent's eye and no beam in one's own.

JOHN N. HAZARD

SOME ASPECTS OF SOVIET INFLUENCE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

In the years following World War II increasing interest has been evidenced in the extent to which Soviet theory and practice may have influenced the development of the law of nations. This is to be expected in view of the prominence and power which the U.S.S.R. has come to enjoy

[30] See U.N. Doc. A/AC.91/4/Add.1, March 23, 1965, p. 2.

[31] See doc. cited, note 29 above, at p. 3.