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## Czartoryski and His *Essai sur la diplomatie*

*If we wish to progress we must have an object we have not yet attained. And in order to be always in progress we must be capable of conceiving an object which will never be attained.*

PRINCE ADAM CZARTORYSKI  
Memorandum to Tsar Alexander I (1803)

The first book of Tolstoy's *War and Peace* contains an episode from the Allied War Council at Olmütz, on November 27, 1805, five days before the Battle of Austerlitz. With the Council over, Prince Andrei Bolkonsky takes Prince Boris Drubetskoy, a new aide-de-camp, to present him to Tsar Alexander. Coming out of the emperor's room as they approach is a tall man in civilian dress who has a striking face and sharply projecting jaw, which gives him a peculiar vivacity and keenness of expression. "Who was that?" asks Drubetskoy. "He is one of the most remarkable but to me most unpleasant of men—the minister of foreign affairs, Prince Adam Czartoryski," replies Bolkonsky. "It is such men as he who decide the fate of nations." To a Russian nationalist such as Bolkonsky, Czartoryski was an intruder, an interloper, a foreigner who managed to gain the favor of his sovereign—a misguided Russian tsar with strange cosmopolitan leanings. Moreover, by that time Czartoryski was widely suspected of supporting a scheme to reconstruct Poland, perhaps at the expense of the lands that every Russian patriot regarded as the recovered patrimony of Riurik. Yet even the resentful and suspicious Bolkonsky could not hide his admiration for Czartoryski's superior intelligence.

The career of Prince Adam Czartoryski had many aspects and phases. During his long and eventful life (1770–1861), he was first of all a diplomat and statesman of great and varied experience. Czartoryski's biographer has characterized the scope of the prince's experience: "He was the contemporary of five Russian sovereigns. His partners and adversaries included Vorontsov, Rumiantsev, Nesselrode, and Gorchakov; Talleyrand, Guizot, Thiers, Lamartine, Walewski, and Drouyn de Lhuys; Pitt, Fox, Castlereagh, Grey, Palmerston, and Russell; Cobenzl, Metternich, Buol, and Goluchowski. He was an adversary of the great Napoleon and became a friend of Napoleon III. His activities as statesman started at the time of Jefferson's presidency and ended at the time of Lincoln's."<sup>1</sup> The prince was also a prolific writer. During nearly

1. Marian Kukiel, *Czartoryski and European Unity, 1770–1861* (Princeton, 1955), p. vi.

seventy years of active life, he wrote over a thousand volumes and portfolios of speeches and diplomatic records as well as half a dozen books, some of them of considerable historical and even literary value—for example, his *Mémoires*, a minor classic of its kind.<sup>2</sup> Yet his *Essai sur la diplomatie* is more significant than his *Mémoires*.

To understand this important yet relatively little known literary work of the prince, one must bear in mind his background. Son of one of the great and politically most active Polish-Lithuanian families, Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski was born two years before the first partition of the Commonwealth. When the troops of Catherine II invaded it to prevent the implementation of the new Constitution of May 3, 1791, he took an active part in the campaign of 1792 under General Kościuszko. Taken prisoner, he was kept as a hostage at the court of St. Petersburg, where he met and befriended the young Tsarevich Alexander, whose aide-de-camp he was soon appointed. The warm personal relationship which rapidly developed was to last, despite periods of tension, almost to the end of Alexander's life. Removed from St. Petersburg by Tsar Paul in 1799 because of the striking resemblance of the Grand Duchess Elizabeth's daughter to Czartoryski, the prince spent two years as Russian envoy at the Sardinian court. Immediately after Paul's assassination, Czartoryski was recalled by Alexander and persuaded to accept the post of deputy foreign minister and then minister of foreign affairs; he was in office for four years, from 1802 until 1806. In this capacity and through his participation in Alexander's Secret Committee, as well as through frequent personal contact, he undoubtedly influenced in some measure the course of Alexander's policy. This is especially true of foreign policy. Czartoryski's memorandum of 1803, "Sur le système politique que devrait suivre la Russie," had a far-reaching effect on Russia's policy in the Balkans. "With regard to Turkey," writes a

2. The main works of Czartoryski are as follows: *Essai sur la diplomatie: Manuscrit d'un Philhellène* (Paris and Marseilles, 1830), the first, anonymous edition; the second (posthumous) edition (Paris, 1864) was published under the prince's name, and has been used in writing the present article. *Le dernier mot sur le Statut Organique imposé à la Pologne* (Paris, 1833). Charles de Mazade, ed., *Mémoires du prince Adam Czartoryski et sa correspondance avec l'empereur Alexandre Ier*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1887); also available in an English edition: Adam Gielgud, ed., *Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski and His Correspondence with Alexander I: With Documents Relative to the Prince's Negotiations with Pitt, Fox, Brougham, and an Account of His Conversations with Lord Palmerston and Other English Statesmen in London, 1832*, 2 vols. (London, 1888); the English edition is not identical with the French one. T. Olizarowski, ed., *Zbiór mów mianych, 1838–1847* (Paris, 1847). *Żywot J. U. Niemcewicza* (Paris, 1860). "Bard polski," in J. U. Niemcewicz, *Skarbiec historii polskiej*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1840); then published separately (Paris, 1860).

To this list one should add several miscellaneous works—poetry, a novel, essays, philosophical treatises—some unpublished, such as "Traktat o pocieszeniu." Manuscripts are deposited in the Czartoryski Library of the National Museum in Cracow.

Russian historian, "Czartoryski presented to the Czar an important memorandum outlining Russia's interests in that country. This document became the basic charter of Russia's Near Eastern policies, and its ideas, re-endorsed in 1829, formed the guiding principles of Russo-Turkish relations throughout the nineteenth century."<sup>3</sup>

When in 1805 the orientation of Russian policy shifted, and Alexander rejected the idea of carrying out the plans concerning Europe worked out jointly by himself and Czartoryski, the latter gave up his post. After his resignation, on December 17, 1806, he presented to the tsar a memorandum entitled "On the Necessity of Restoring Poland to Forestall Bonaparte."<sup>4</sup> In this document, essential for an understanding of Czartoryski's ideas, the prince stressed that it would be in the interest of Russia "to proclaim Poland a kingdom, the Emperor declaring himself a king." The test of Russia's peaceful attitude toward Europe lay in her relationship to Poland, he argued. As in his memorandum of 1803, he reminded the tsar that a Poland subjugated to Russia could only be a jumping-off place for further conquests, but a Poland freely associated with Russia and endowed with a constitution might have a gradual mellowing, civilizing effect on the empire. The memorandum received no immediate response. But in 1810-11 and again during the crucial moments of the 1813-14 campaign, the tsar returned to these concepts. They germinated in 1814-15 at the Congress of Vienna, where the emperor put forward the idea of a restored Poland-Lithuania in personal union with the Russian Empire. Alexander's and Czartoryski's plans were frustrated by the joint opposition of Great Britain, Austria, and France—all of them afraid of Russia's paramount position in a voluntary union between the tsarist empire and the lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Only a rump Polish kingdom

3. Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Europe, 1789-1825* (Durham, N.C., 1947), p. 79. For interesting remarks about Czartoryski's Balkan plans and policies see Henryk Batowski, *Podstawy sojuszu bałkańskiego 1912 r.: Studium z historii dyplomatycznej, 1806-1912* (Cracow, 1939). For the text and an evaluation of the memorandum see Patricia K. Grimsted, "Czartoryski's System for Russian Foreign Policy, 1803: A Memorandum, Edited with Introduction and Analysis," *California Slavic Studies*, 5 (1970): 19-90. For an earlier analysis of Czartoryski's role as Russia's foreign minister and his friendship with the tsar see two articles by Charles Morley, "Alexander I and Czartoryski: The Polish Question from 1801 to 1813," *Slavonic and East European Review*, 25 (April 1947): 407-11; and "Czartoryski's Attempts at a New Foreign Policy Under Alexander I," *American Slavic and East European Review*, 12, no. 4 (December 1953): 475-85. For a recent attempt see the chapter on Czartoryski in Patricia K. Grimsted, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801-1825* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969). For a panoramic view of Czartoryski's activities see the most important general work on the prince: Kukiel, *Czartoryski and European Unity*.

4. For a recent work on Czartoryski as Russian foreign minister written with emphasis on his attempts to counteract Napoleon's growing hegemony in Europe see Jerzy Skowronek, *Antynapoleońskie koncepcje Czartoryskiego* (Warsaw, 1969).

was established by the Congress—too small to exercise, through its constitutional system, any significant influence on the huge tsarist empire.<sup>5</sup>

Soon after the Congress the prince, disappointed by Russian policy in the newly established small kingdom, withdrew from public affairs. In need of rest, he sought retreat. At forty-seven he married the eighteen-year-old Princess Anna Sapieha and settled down. In 1823 he was forced to give up his curatorship of the University of Wilno because of Novosiltsev's discovery of an anti-Russian student conspiracy. After years of political hopes—years filled with intensive diplomatic and political labors—came a period of disillusionment and meditation. The prince assembled a library and plunged into study. A Freemason of long standing, he now began to return to the Christian ideals of his youth. In order to restore his health, he traveled abroad—to Italy, France, Switzerland, and Germany. He was in touch with liberal leaders of Western Europe and with some Greek patriots, including Capo d'Istria, his old protégé. He read a great deal—Grotius, Kant and Hegel, Herder, Burke, de Maistre, and Chateaubriand. Finally he began to write. The fruit of his labor was his *Essai sur la diplomatie*, the most complex and mature of his literary works. The book was finished in 1826, but the first edition appeared in print only in 1830, in Paris and Marseilles, under the pseudonym "Philhellène."<sup>6</sup>

The book is divided into three parts: diplomacy as it was, diplomacy as it is, and the ways to make diplomacy what it should be to fulfill its objective of eliminating violence and preserving peace and understanding among nations. In the introductory historical part Czartoryski praises both the Greeks and the Romans for their skills in foreign relations.<sup>7</sup> Although the word "diplomacy" is of Greek origin, it does not appear in Plato's *Republic* or in Aristotle's *Politics*, notes Czartoryski. The Greeks first introduced federative principles; the Romans, despite their cruelty, on the whole adhered to the principles of protecting the weak and assimilating rather than obliterating the qualities of conquered nations. *Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos* was the guiding principle of Roman statesmanship at the peak of the republican period. Even under the empire the Romans proved themselves able colonizers and generally respected the autonomy of their possessions.

5. For Czartoryski's activities during and following the Congress of Vienna see Kukiel, *Czartoryski and European Unity*, chaps. 9 and 10.

6. *Essai sur la diplomatie* (henceforth *Essai*) is a work of considerable importance, both intrinsically and because it provides an insight into the prince's mentality; yet the book has not received the attention it deserves. It was almost unnoticed by contemporaries; the fact that it was published under a pseudonym did not help, of course. Marcell Handelman, in his monumental *Adam Czartoryski*, 3 vols. in 4 (Warsaw, 1948–50), has only a few words about the *Essai*; Kukiel's *Czartoryski and European Unity* includes a brilliant but short chapter of eight pages only (12:151–58).

7. The *Essai* (pp. 74–76) contains an interesting analysis of the partitions and their consequences for Russia and for Europe in general.

Czartoryski stresses the decisive influence of Christianity on Western civilization, and subscribes to Chateaubriand's view that "le monde moderne prend naissance au pied de la croix." The *Essai* points out: "Christianity leveled human vanities and elevated goodness and sacrifice above all. . . . Equality before the Lord implied equality before the law." In the Middle Ages the unity of Christendom tended to restrain the passions and cruelty of bellicose nations, and led to the organization of "unum Corpus Christianum," which, despite its frequent lapses and numerous imperfections, furthered the progress of civilization.

The Treaty of Westphalia was, according to Czartoryski, the masterpiece of modern diplomacy. For a century it was the "political code of Europe and gave it a whole century of lawful international relations, even though it was based not so much on moral principles as on a judiciously applied principle of balance of power." The Seven Years' War violated the principles of the Peace of Westphalia and inaugurated a new policy of outright annexations: "You take, but let me take also," or, as Catherine II put it, "Qui ne gagne pas, perd. . . ." Czartoryski believed that the worst example of such greed was the partitioning of Poland. These partitions dealt a mortal blow to the lingering concept of morality in European politics.<sup>8</sup> Their consequences for the European system were disastrous, because they destroyed the existing balance and created a criminal solidarity of the copartitioning powers.<sup>9</sup>

Why is it, asks the author of the *Essai*, that the most vital issues, those of war and peace, are decided by people often selected in a casual way and deprived of moral sense? Is it that there exists a separate morality, a special religion, another God for diplomats? How is it that no one is surprised, and that nations are not horrified, to know that their fate is determined by unscrupulous and unprincipled men, and the most important acts regulating public life are decided irrespective of all that is holy and worthy? Of all the arts and sciences, only diplomacy has made no progress. When we consider all that has been achieved concerning social institutions, equality before the law, individual freedom, and so forth, we come to ask ourselves what improvement has there been in diplomatic practice, what are the principles regulating the law of nations? In the evolution of international law, Czartoryski perceived a stagnation caused by the absence of moral principles. Diplomacy,

8. For a similar view expressed by a conservative writer, opponent of Czartoryski, and a close coworker of Prince Metternich see Friedrich von Gentz, *Fragments Upon the Balance of Power in Europe* (London, 1806), pp. 76–77. "If the division of Poland was the first event which by an *abuse of form* deranged the political balance of Europe, it was likewise one of the first which begot an *apathy of spirit*, and stupid insensibility to the general interest" (pp. 89–90, italics in the original).

9. *Essai*, pp. 7–8. "States, like individuals, are bound by the same natural laws" (p. 140).

as an art, had checked in its progress the new kindred science of political economy, which had so far been unable, despite its rapid development, to systematize the principles of international trade and lay down permanent rules in this domain. Diplomacy, notes the prince, unlike any other profession, is marked by no virtue whatever. "It is no praise to call someone a good diplomat," he says, which amounts to saying that a diplomat is an accomplished hypocrite and a deceitful person to be avoided: "Indeed, such words as virtue or heroism are incompatible with the present notion of diplomacy and indeed their opposite. To say of a cabinet that it is virtuous would be a most serious criticism, and no one has ever heard of diplomatic heroism" (*Essai*, p. 222).

In Czartoryski's view, the French Revolution introduced new hopeful principles into international relations, but soon they were vitiated by violence and tyranny. Napoleon's failures were caused by a lack of understanding of the essential nature of the European nations, with whom collaboration in the name of certain principles was possible, but on whom the will of one power could not be imposed permanently. Such attempts always led to serious crises and constant wars, which united the majority of nations against the state that was trying to establish a hegemony over Europe. The Allies had defeated Napoleon not only with their armies but also with catchwords about respect for law. When they felt themselves masters of the situation, however, they were inclined to forget about these words. The promises made in their period of weakness became inconvenient and embarrassing to them. When the Allies were victorious, they put forth arguments "with which they could enlarge and round off their own territories and which impelled them to commit on a small scale the same injustices which Napoleon had perpetrated on the grand scale."<sup>10</sup>

Although the former promises and declarations had been forgotten by the victorious Allies, the words "right of nations" came up from time to time during the discussions of the Congress; for such is the power exerted over men by the idea of right that even those who violate it feel an irresistible desire to refer to it constantly. Here Czartoryski would agree with La Rochefoucauld that "l'hypocrisie est l'hommage que le vice rend à la vertu." Moreover, when the danger passed, the powers became aware that their interests were profoundly conflicting. So, forgetful of their fine promises and declarations, the four Allies divided up Europe into spheres of influence without considering the national aspirations and legitimate desires of the different nations. High-sounding principles were forgotten. Territories and nations were awarded and exchanged without regard for the wishes of the people concerned. Opinion in Europe, at first dazzled by the successes of the Coalition,

10. For a detailed criticism of the system of the Holy Alliance see *Essai*, pp. 223-28.



reawoke, and a murmur of dissatisfaction and criticism spread through the continent. True, the Holy Alliance was concluded in the name of sacred, eternal, and universal laws, but diplomacy distorted its benevolent intention and turned into poison what had been intended as a balm. The Alliance became a deceitful system, designed to stifle all the aspirations for the good of mankind, to affirm all injustice committed in the past, and thus to check the progress of civilization (*Essai*, p. 244).

The Great Powers which gave the prevailing tone to the Congress did not, among other failures, understand the role of the small nations, seeing them only as puppets and not as copartners in the European order, essential elements in a harmonious international collaboration. Fundamentally, argues Czartoryski, these smaller states determine international equilibrium, since the respective strengths of the great powers are relatively equal. Both large and small states have the same basic, natural right to life and the development of their national qualities. But because the smaller states could protect their true independence only by acquiring adequate strength to defend it, Czartoryski favored linking the weaker states into larger groups, or federations.<sup>11</sup>

It is interesting to compare Czartoryski's federalist program with that of the Decembrist Pavel Pestel as outlined in his blueprint for the future entitled *Russkaia Pravda*. Both books were written at about the same time (during the early 1820s), and the philosophies of both were based on the concept of natural law. Yet Pestel, a convinced Jacobin, rejected federalism and favored a strictly centralized Russian republic. "Federalism would be Russia's ruin," he wrote; the Russian state should always be "one and indivisible." Pestel denied any individuality to the Ukrainians and Belorussians, and planned to Russify even such racially alien people as the Finns and the Jews. Those Jews who resisted integration, said Pestel, should be expelled. Poland would be the only exception to the rule of compulsory absorption of the non-Russian ethnic groups, because of her long and distinct historical past. Poland's independence, however, was to be subject to at least three conditions. First, the frontier between Poland and Russia would have to be determined by the Russians. Second, a military alliance would have to be concluded between the two countries. In return for a close military cooperation Russia would take Poland "under her protection" and would thus guarantee "the inviolability of her boundaries." Third, Poland's political organization would have to be patterned after Russia's, as outlined by Pestel's program.<sup>12</sup>

11. Compare Czartoryski's views with those of Thomáš G. Masaryk in *The Role of Small Nations in the European Crisis* (London, 1918).

12. For the Russian text of Pestel's work see Pavel I. Pestel, *Russkaia Pravda: Nakaz Vremennomu verkhovnomu pravleniu* (St. Petersburg, 1906). For a recent analysis of Pestel's ideas by the Soviet historian see P. Kh. Iakhin, *Gosudarstvenno-*

In Czartoryski's view, the federal system would protect the smaller states from the rapacity of the great, without prejudice to their national interests or loss of their national individuality. Nations of different origin and tongue could come together, impelled by common interests. By forming unions based on their fundamental interests, they could create a force that would assure them the position of honorable partners in conversation with the great powers. A defensive alliance, the federation could not threaten the interests of great powers: "Europe has even the right to demand it of them, because it is the only way in which the small states can effectively contribute to the realization of a successful functioning and perfecting of the community of nations."<sup>13</sup> For the sake of her stability, Europe had no choice but to accept federal solutions to her problems.

Although he criticized the Vatican for its inability to reconcile the temporal interests of the papacy with the requirements of Italian national unity, Czartoryski advocated something which almost materialized in 1847–48—an Italian federation presided over by the pope. Another federation he suggested was one for Germany, minus Austria. Generally speaking, federalism was one of the essential features of the prince's political philosophy.

Describing the role of the Great Powers during the years 1789–1814, Czartoryski, an Anglophile by tradition and education, concludes that Great Britain acted according to principles similar to those he would like to see adopted by other powers. During the Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain fought, often alone, in defense of the rights of all Europe, showing a consistency which won her immense authority on the Continent. But unfortunately when the danger had passed and England had surmounted obstacles which seemed almost insuperable, British statesmen were unable to take the leadership in the European community that rightfully belonged to Britain, both because of her past achievements and because of her potentialities. After making a vast military effort to overcome her difficulties and to help the other members of the Coalition, Britain had, at the time of victory, little to say in the matter of organizing Europe. After the victory the British immediately became absorbed in their own affairs, and lost most of their interest in the continent of Europe, except for its trade. In general, argues Czartoryski, in peaceful times England does not estimate her own strength correctly and does not realize her own possibilities until confronted with overwhelming danger.

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*pravovye vsgliady P. I. Pesteli* (Kazan, 1961). See also I. A. Stone, "Paul Pestel and the Decembrist Revolution of 1825" (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1934), esp. chap. 4 on *Russkaia Pravda*. Professor William Blackwell was the one who drew the attention of this author to the parallels and differences between Pestel's and Czartoryski's work.

13. *Essai*, p. 231; the whole of chapter 10 is devoted to the role of British diplomacy during and after the Vienna Settlement. A great deal about the prince's attitude toward England may be found in Eugeniusz Wawrzakowicz, *Anglia a sprawa polska, 1813–1815* (Warsaw, 1917).



Despite all her mistakes England was the state that repeatedly tried to oppose the principle of intervention by the Holy Alliance in the internal affairs of smaller nations. Czartoryski criticizes, however, Britain's tendency to moralize, to pronounce sentence on others, combined with a desire to wash her own hands—that is, to make judgments without supporting the right cause.

As a sworn anticolonialist, the prince praises London's struggle against the slave trade, even though the British opposition was largely inspired by selfish reasons. He condemns British colonial rule, especially in lands such as India, where a trading company ruled over vast territories.<sup>14</sup> A regime motivated by greed is the worst of all possible regimes, he says. But, again prophetically, he anticipates the end of the British control of India, which he sees as eventually emancipated but united to Britain by voluntary ties.

In his *Essai* the prince devotes much space to discussing Russia and her role in the world. His observations are all the more interesting because of his close relations with that country all his life. Through his experiences—the campaign of 1792 in Poland in defense of the Constitution of May 3, 1791, his internment at Catherine's court, his subsequent friendship with Grand Duke (later Tsar) Alexander, his post as envoy to the Sardinian court, his four years as head of the Russian foreign service, and his role as a close adviser to the emperor in Vienna in 1814–15—Czartoryski developed an attitude toward Russia which passed from an initial enmity to cooperation, and even a most intimate involvement in Russia's affairs, and returned again to opposition. Thus in the course of nearly thirty-five years, between 1792 and 1827, his attitude toward Poland's great eastern neighbor underwent dramatic changes. First he was a soldier who fought against Russia, arms in hand. Then he was a virtual hostage at the Imperial Court, and eventually a friend and coworker of the tsar as well as a politician trying to achieve collaboration and even union with Russia. Later when he saw the need to defend his native country's rights against the Russian encroachments, he became the spokesman for a legal opposition. It was during this phase that he wrote the *Essai*, which is his evaluation of the Russian phenomenon. To complete the picture of Czartoryski's attitude toward Russia, one should bear in mind that eventually, carried away by the events of November 1830 in Warsaw, the prince, initially an opponent of the uprising, emerged as a leading member of the revolutionary government. After the suppression of the insurrection he left Poland, and finally settled in Paris, where he became the leader of a conservative faction

14. In 1789 Czartoryski, as a young visitor and student of British political institutions, attended Warren Hastings's trial in London. The trial made a profound impression on him, and his passages on India have undoubtedly been influenced by this early personal experience. For Czartoryski's views on colonialism see Kukiel, *Czartoryski and European Unity*, pp. 179–82, 204–5, 233, and 319.

of émigrés, a group who based their hopes on an armed intervention against Russia by the European powers.<sup>15</sup>

It must be stressed here that Czartoryski came from a family that had long advocated cooperation and even friendship with Russia. His father (who was Catherine's original candidate for the throne of Poland in 1763–64 before she decided to back her former lover, Poniatowski), as well as his grandfather and many of his uncles, had advocated a policy of close cooperation with St. Petersburg. For over thirty years he himself had promoted such a policy with vision, vigor, and courage. His profound studies and convenient position for observation made it possible for him to attain a wide knowledge of the problem, more than most other contemporary diplomats. Without being a Russian, he had the opportunity to observe the Russian people at close quarters, and their most intimate state secrets were known to him.<sup>16</sup> Thus he was able to formulate opinions with an authority greater than that possessed by most other observers of the period.

Essentially, Czartoryski held the same opinion as Alexander Herzen and many other Russian critics of imperial policy: the Muscovites were victims of their victories and imperial conquests. Russia's possession of non-Russian territories had a corroding influence on her domestic as well as her foreign relations. The control of ethnically alien lands committed her to an autocratic regime at home and an imperialist policy abroad. Though masters over other peoples, the Muscovites were themselves slaves of their tsar. Czartoryski favored the gradual introduction of a more liberal regime throughout the empire. Here the existence of a constitution in the Congress Kingdom of Poland should be regarded as a pilot project (*avant la lettre*), a worthy experiment, a useful example. Establishment of a constitutional system in Russia would influence Russia's foreign policy.<sup>17</sup> Despite his disappointments of the past years, Czartoryski still believed that the conflicts between Poland and Russia could be resolved by conciliation.

Russia's new role in Europe, desirable and beneficial as long as she ob-

15. For this phase of his activity see Kukiel, *Czartoryski and European Unity*, chaps. 13–20, and Handelsman, *Czartoryski*; most of Handelsman's work is devoted to the latter part of the prince's life.

16. As minister of foreign affairs, Czartoryski overhauled the Russian political intelligence service and organized a vast network of secret agents in Europe. He managed to recruit, among others, some prominent French émigré personalities, including Louis-Emmanuel de Launai, Count d'Antraigues, as well as an inspector general of Napoleon's army, Count Daru. See Léonce Pingaud, *Un agent secret sous la Révolution et l'Empire: Le Comte d'Antraigues* (Paris, 1893). The intelligence activities of the count have been analyzed recently by Jacqueline Chaumié, *Le réseau d'Antraigues et la contre-révolution, 1791–1793* (Paris, 1965).

17. *Essai*, pp. 84–95. Czartoryski recognized what Walter Bagehot called the vital principle of representative government: "Le gouvernement représentatif est dans la nature même de toutes les sociétés civiles" (p. 143).

served the laws of right and justice, had become, according to Czartoryski, a harmful source of new complications which resulted in her acquisition of numerous territories that she could not control in the long run. Inaccessible from the east and north, Russia had become an increasing source of danger to Europe as she extended her hegemony in the south and west. Were, for instance, her conquests of Polish territory a source of strength for Russia? She needed neither new territories nor new populations, for her population was growing at a fast rate. Poland and Russia could and should live amicably together as partners and allies. But control of Poland, stressed Czartoryski, was not necessary to assure Russia a position as a great power or to provide the means for exerting a decisive influence on the fate of Europe. With inexhaustible resources in men and raw materials, Russia should have inspired her rulers to occupy themselves with exploiting all of these natural riches for the benefit of her people. By concentrating on problems of internal development and surrounding herself with friendly and loyal allies, Russia could have extended her influence and authority and protected her interests without losing anything of her strength. "A good and loyal friend," Czartoryski wrote, "is in the long run always more valuable than a slave." ("Un ami vaut mieux qu'un esclave.")<sup>18</sup>

After criticizing the Vienna Congress and the state of contemporary diplomatic theory as well as practice, Czartoryski gives his views on the tasks of diplomacy, drawing on his own experience. An heir to the federalist tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, he believed it necessary to set up an East Central European Federation: "Europe needs in this region a state which can, because of its character and composition, be nothing else but a defensive force. It lies in Europe's interest . . . that this state should be a solid and permanent element in the European equilibrium" (*Essai*, p. 315).

Peace in Europe would be more secure with a return to the ideas formulated by Henry IV of France and Elizabeth I of England, namely, a "European League," argues the *Essai*. In the *Grand Design*, which Sully ascribed to Henry and Elizabeth, Europe was to form a "Christian Republic," under the presidency of the Roman emperor. The general council of Europe, over which the emperor was to preside, was to consist of a perpetual senate of sixty-four delegates, four from each great power and two from each lesser power, renewable every three years. Czartoryski wanted to continue the ideas of Sully, Henry IV, and Elizabeth I. Many features of his European league were

18. *Essai*, p. 206; for Czartoryski's views on Russo-Polish relations see pp. 74-76 and 85-95. Even when he was in opposition to Russia, Czartoryski never completely abandoned the idea which he expressed in his letter to his Russian friend, Count Paul Stroganov: "The happiness and glory of one of our two nations are not necessarily dependent on the enslavement and unhappiness of the other" (Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, *Le Comte Paul Stroganov*, 3 vols. [Paris, 1905], 2:270).

strikingly modern. For instance, Italy was to be unified under the presidency of the pope, an idea advocated by many Italian patriots of the early nineteenth century; the dukes of Savoy were to become the kings of Lombardy; an independent Belgium was also foreshadowed. Czartoryski's European league would assure the integrity and security of its members, who would pledge respect for each other's rights and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. Mediation and arbitration should be the means of liquidating disputes arising between members of the league. There were no disputes which could not be settled if both sides wanted to settle them peacefully. Public deliberation of the league would encourage publicity of diplomatic dealings.<sup>19</sup>

Here again, one perceives a certain similarity between Czartoryski's views and those of his old opponent at the Congress of Vienna, Friedrich von Gentz. Gentz also favored a "confederacy" of European states in which "a certain number of states, possessing various degrees of power and wealth, shall each remain untroubled within its own confines, under the protection of a common league." According to Gentz, the essence of achieving balance of power consisted in equalizing the power of states by establishing a system in which "the smallest as well as the greatest [state] is secured in the possession of *his right*" against "*lawless power*." Such a system, although imperfect, had existed in Europe between the Treaty of Westphalia and the partition of Poland, which was an act "incomparably more destructive to the higher interests of Europe than any former acts of violence," because it originated "in that very sphere from which was expected to flow nothing but benefits," namely, a union of regents.<sup>20</sup>

The idea of state sovereignty and *raison d'état* placed above any moral law ousted the old concept of common obligation and common allegiance to a higher idea. Czartoryski, although rejecting the practices of the Holy Alliance, wanted Europe to return to such an ideal in an updated form which stressed the rights of people and not of their sovereigns.

Czartoryski agreed with Immanuel Kant that man exists not in order to be happy but in order to deserve happiness. He insisted that what is criminal and wicked, what brings down ignominy on a man in private life, should not come to be a principle in international relations. His fundamental idea was the universality of natural law, or those fundamental principles which the Creator has implanted in the conscience of all men; he believed that natural law is applicable to collective as well as individual life. Czartoryski was in favor of

19. "Les représentants de nations, toujours réunis et en présence dans un point central, ôterait à la diplomatie ce air suspect et mystérieux qui la dépare et donnait à chaque matière politique la plus grande publicité, en la rendant, dès son début, l'affaire du monde entier" (*Essai*, p. 288). Here is the Wilsonian concept of "open covenants openly arrived at" clearly formulated.

20. Gentz, *Fragments*, pp. 58–59 and 76.

drawing up a code of international law which should, according to him, be the reflection of moral law applied to life between nations. He thought of politics as applied ethics, and he believed that what was morally wrong could not in the long run be politically right. Thus, morally grounded natural law and its universal application was a central concept in Czartoryski's thinking. He counted the right to national independence and the legitimacy of government among the natural laws. By legitimate government he essentially meant representative government. Nations should be guaranteed their existence within internationally recognized frontiers; the principle of independence excludes foreign intervention in domestic affairs.

Czartoryski was no nationalist. He deplored the degeneration of patriotism into "sacred egoism," and held that it had checked the moral progress of the world. He distinguished between moral and material civilization, and feared that the mechanical sciences might triumph over wisdom, goodness, and virtue. If the disastrous effects of material development were to be avoided, "it must be preceded by moral development which alone can prevent its evil effects and turn them to the advantage of humanity." More than a century before the invention of the atom bomb, Czartoryski was worried by the problem of what would become of "courage, devotion to duty, and heroism if the means of destruction reach a degree of horrible perfection, and whose hands are to be entrusted with them?"

Czartoryski concludes by suggesting that if the principles defined and developed in the *Essai* were accepted by the cabinets of Europe, they would reform diplomacy and make it a nobler occupation. The first government to adopt them would find itself at the head of all nations, having thus acquired the ascendancy which diplomacy seeks to obtain through perfidy and violence; yet elimination of violence should be the main objective of diplomacy.

The *Essai* has many aspects—some transitory, some of more lasting value. It is an interesting treatise directed against the Treaty of Vienna, the territorial status quo, and the political system created by it, including the Holy Alliance. But it is also a blueprint for the future, an attempt not only to anticipate but also to shape future events through a well-reasoned, persuasive statement of the postulated changes in the field of international relations.

The ideal of universal peace has never been lost from sight. Throughout the period that followed the break-up of the Pax Romana, the concept was revived by the Holy Roman Empire of the Middle Ages and the early modern period. For centuries writers and philosophers had sought to establish a system of public law in Europe. The Grand Design of Henry IV and Elizabeth I was in the same tradition. Thus in this respect Czartoryski followed a long line of distinguished writers, starting with Thomas More, Erasmus, and Kant, and

including Benjamin Franklin and William Penn. Czartoryski was acquainted with the well-known project of international peace entitled *Projet de traité pour rendre la paix perpétuelle*, drafted by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and published in 1713 after the Treaty of Utrecht, and also with Kant's treatise on perpetual peace (*Zum ewigen Frieden*) published in 1795. But the *Essai* also had its Polish ancestors, going back to the political writers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Moreover, in 1748, after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the exiled king of Poland, Stanisław Leszczyński, at that time the reigning duke of Lorraine and Bar, wrote his *Mémorial de l'affermissement de la paix générale*. Leszczyński was as much impressed with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle as the Abbé de Saint-Pierre had been with the Treaty of Utrecht, and wanted to make the status quo of 1748 a point of departure for a lasting settlement. In 1775 a Piarist priest and professor at the Collegium Nobilium of Warsaw, Father Skrzetuski, wrote another, rather detailed project for the rearrangement of international relations to preserve peace and stability in Europe.<sup>21</sup>

Unlike Saint-Pierre and Kant, Czartoryski did not believe in eternal peace—peace for its own sake. In human relations no order could last forever. As a practical diplomat he was aware of the dynamic character of international relations. As he put it, the goal of good policy is not “to find means of keeping nations in a state of fixity, which is impossible, but to harmonize their strivings” (*Essai*, p. 224). Thus not immobility but progress and harmony were his ideals.

Czartoryski was in many ways a child of the Enlightenment. The *Essai's* style is reminiscent of the elegant, polished style of the eighteenth-century *philosophes*, and it is full of maxims and epigrams. With the eighteenth-century philosophers he shared a naïve moralizing and a love for abstract, utopian views and blueprints for “heavenly cities.” He believed in the essential goodness of human nature and in the constant progress of humanity.<sup>22</sup>

On the other hand, with his strong emphasis on the natural law, Czartoryski followed not only the Enlightenment but also the old Christian tradition, dating back at least to St. Thomas Aquinas. With him the prince argued that

21. K. J. Skrzetuski, “Projekt czyli ułożenie nieprzerwanego w Europie pokoju,” in his *Historia polityczna dla szlachetnej młodzieży* (Warsaw, 1775). For a study of the subject see Piotr S. Wandycz, “The Polish Precursors of Federalism,” *Journal of Central European Affairs*, 12, no. 4 (January 1953): 346–55. For a general study of the early Polish political writers see Waclaw Lednicki, *The Life and Culture of Poland as Reflected in Polish Literature* (New York, 1944). See also Stanislaus F. Belch, *Paulus Vladimiri and His Doctrine Concerning International Law and Politics*, 2 vols. (The Hague, 1965).

22. “It is this doctrine of the natural goodness of man that is, to the traditional Christian, the fundamental heresy of the Enlightenment” (Crane Brinton, *Ideas and Men: The Story of Western Thought*, 2nd ed. [Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963], p. 318). For an illuminating discussion of the relationship between the Enlightenment and Christian tradition see Brinton, *Ideas and Men*, pp. 312 and 332. See also Carl L. Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (New Haven, 1932).



natural law has its source in the principles implanted in human nature by the Creator. Consequently, natural law forms a system of rights and obligations independent of human will, agreement, or legislation. Since the law has been imbedded by God in the moral nature of man, it is universal and immutable. The *Essai* represents the reflections of a man who had long participated in the counsels of a great power which was decisive in the planning, creation, and functioning of an international system. Out of office, he was free to blueprint the future and to sketch bold, vast, utopian schemes, far ahead of his time. One may cynically maintain that, as Albert Sorel put it, "in default of the guarantees promised to the people of the silver age, the next best thing is to invoke the legend of the golden age which they had never experienced, but of which the imaginary memory gives substance to all the illusions of hope."<sup>23</sup> One may also say that it is such myths that have been the driving forces of all great human endeavors—religious creeds as well as political movements. The importance of historical myths and legends has, of course, little to do with the fact that they are wholly or largely fictitious, and that they represent postulated reality. These myths are important because they capture the imagination of people and impel them to act. They are what the French call *idées-forces*.

In essence, the same concepts which gave birth to Czartoryski's memorandum of 1803 and the instruction issued by Tsar Alexander to Novosiltsev in 1804, at the time of the formation of the Third Coalition against Napoleon, inspired the *Essai*. The instruction had envisaged a new European order "founded upon the sacred rights of humanity" and guaranteed by "a treaty which would become the basis of reciprocal relations"; it had also projected a European league. There were, of course, distinct differences between the *Essai* and the two other works, reflecting both the different nature of the respective work and the periods during which they were written. The memorandum and the instruction were composed by an active statesman, and the *Essai* was written a generation later by a man out of office meditating over his experiences during the preceding thirty years or so.

One of the striking features of the *Essai* is its internationalist spirit. Czartoryski was remarkably internationally minded for a statesman of his day. His internationalism, however, like Mazzini's, was founded on the principle of nationality. Like the Italian patriot, he believed that "nations are the individuals of humanity": "Les nations sont les fractions naturelles, les membres légitimes du genre humain."<sup>24</sup> Due respect for the rights of nations is as vital as respect for the rights of individuals. Here he is also close to Herder. Czartoryski's principle of nationality was closely linked with federalism, which

23. Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, 8 vols. (Paris, 1885–1904), 7:65.

24. *Essai*, p. 160. This motif recurs; for example, on page 158 he stresses that individuals should never forget that they are particles of humanity.

he understood in the sense of free, spontaneous associations of peoples possessing not only parallel political and economic interests but also cultural ties, again a Herderian idea.

Perhaps the most outstanding feature of this book, which was an attempt to write a philosophy of international relations, is the strong tendency to stress the value of moral factors in the field of international affairs. Here Czartoryski was a pioneer. His advocacy of the criminal responsibility of statesmen for the deeds they performed while in office which were contrary to natural law foreshadowed the ideas of our generation. He repeatedly stressed that individual conscience should be the supreme judge of individual as well as state acts.<sup>25</sup>

Thus Czartoryski emphatically rejected the Machiavellian tradition of a divorce between politics and morality. He criticized the Machiavellian imperative that in politics interest should outweigh every other consideration, regardless of justice or morality; he pointed out that such an approach was not only ethically wrong but in the long run politically fruitless. Thus by preaching a political morality based on Christian ethics as well as inalienable human rights and the basic solidarity of all men, Czartoryski appears as another anti-Machiavel.

Although the phraseology of the *Essai*, which often praises the role that Christianity played in history and stresses the value of Christian ethics, may remind us occasionally of the verbiage of the Holy Alliance, the similarity is purely superficial.<sup>26</sup> Both were products of the same spirit, of the same *Zeitgeist*. But Czartoryski drew diametrically opposite conclusions from Christian principles, and the *Essai* is an eloquent protest against the policies of the settlement of 1815. Although critical of the Holy Alliance, the *Essai* makes it clear that it was the secret English-French-Austrian alignment that thwarted the plan of Alexander I to restore a greater Poland united with Russia by personal union and with Prussia compensated by Saxony.<sup>27</sup> Another aspect of this *Zeitgeist* is Czartoryski's praise of the influence of Christianity on European civilization. There is no doubt that Chateaubriand's great work was known to Czartoryski and had influenced his thinking. He was, however, considerably more critical and incomparably less sentimental than Chateaubriand. Moreover, the prince frequently criticized the Vatican, especially for its short-sighted policy in the Italian question.

25. "Quand on prépare des perfidies, des désastres . . . un homme d'honneur, un homme moral, un homme chrétien doit y prendre part, et son devoir est de quitter plutôt que d'agir contre sa conscience" (*Essai*, p. 194).

26. For the act of the Holy Alliance see Walter A. Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe: A Study of the European Alliance, 1813-1823*, 2nd ed. (London and New York, 1920), pp. 305-6; for a discussion of its origins and foundations see pp. 128-41. For the story of the Alliance sketched against a broad European, as well as American, background see Maurice Bourquin, *Histoire de la Sainte Alliance* (Geneva, 1954).

27. See *Essai*, pp. 80-95, 215-17, 223-34, and 268-76.

Czartoryski was not an original philosopher, but a statesman with a considerable philosophic background and a definite tendency toward philosophic speculation. His outlook was based essentially on the ideas of the Enlightenment, but was also greatly influenced by traditional Christianity. This mixture was, in many ways, close to the liberal Catholicism of his day.<sup>28</sup> Yet although the *Essai* was written at the time its author began to return to Roman Catholicism, he opposed much of the contemporary Catholic thought. He was critical, for instance, of Joseph de Maistre, whose gloomy philosophy of uncritical worship of the past, passive resignation, and stern authoritarianism he emphatically rejected. Nevertheless, together with de Maistre, as well as with Chateaubriand, he tended to perceive throughout history the guiding hand of Divine Providence in human affairs.

In the *Essai* Czartoryski was perhaps more of a precursor, a planner more interested in things as they ought to be than as they are—not so much a practical statesman as a builder of another “heavenly city.” In this he represented a true continuation of the eighteenth-century moralistic tradition. He was constantly trying in his speculations to escape from the present into the future, as if to find there a better place for his ideas, so much ahead of his generation. There was undoubtedly a strong streak of the dreamer in his character. It was, perhaps, responsible for many of his failures in practical politics.

With more justification than Chateaubriand, Czartoryski could have complained of not belonging to his century—of being a link between two centuries, two worlds. Like the Frenchman in the last chapter of Chateaubriand’s *Mémoires d’outre-tombe*, Czartoryski could have said: “I found myself between two centuries, as if at the confluence of two rivers. I plunged into their troubled waters, receding regretfully from the old bank where I was born, and hopefully swimming toward a shore unknown. . . .” He was, to use Matthew Arnold’s words, “Wandering between two worlds, one dead, / The other powerless to be born.”

28. To Czartoryski may be applied the term that Eleanor L’H. Schlimgen gave to Leszczyński, that of “Christian internationalist,” in her article “Stanisław I. Leszczyński, King of Poland—Reformer-in-Exile,” *Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America*, 3, no. 3–4 (April–July 1945): 647. But Czartoryski was first of all an heir to the Polish tradition of the Enlightenment, the embodiment of which was the Four-Year Diet and the Constitution of May 3, 1791. For interesting remarks about the Czartoryskis as heirs and admirers of the tradition of the constitution see Bogusław Leśnodorski, *Dziela Sejmu Czteroletniego, 1788–1792* (Wrocław, 1951), pp. 455–56. For connections between Polish liberalism and the French influence, see Marcei Handelsman, *Les idées françaises et la mentalité politique en Pologne au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1927), esp. pp. 20–23. See also Helena Więckowska, *Opozycja liberalna w Królestwie Polskiem* (Warsaw, 1925); Kukiel, *Czartoryski and European Unity*, chaps. 11 and 13; and R. F. Leslie, *Polish Politics and the Revolution of November 1830* (London, 1956).