

industrial revolution to Russia. The uniqueness of Russian industrial development before 1860, the author argues, lies precisely in the complexities of capitalist production under serfdom. When backward Russia was integrated in the worldwide capitalist system, capitalist production appeared at times to strengthen serfdom, while basically creating a contradictory element within it. The tsarist government responded to the development of capitalist production, adopting a series of policies favoring it even prior to 1860. The author maintains that the emancipation was thus not the break of tsarist policy but rather the culmination of its recognition of Russia's capitalist development.

The author's argument is buttressed by his meticulous use of primary sources. Particularly valuable are his statistical analyses of the three primary materials: the factory report of 1816 and the two industrial statistics on the Moscow Province in 1843 and 1853. Number of factories, number of workers, regional distribution, social origins of entrepreneurs, social origins of workers, output of factories, and degree of mechanization are examined in detail in their complex relations. More than thirty tables derived from these sources will provide specialists with valuable information. The author's conclusions on the industrial development in the industries he examines during this period are not much different from Blackwell's, but Arima makes a more detailed, more convincing argument on the basis of his analyses of primary sources. Yet when he attempts to interpret the specific policies of the tsarist government in the context of the change in the mode of production, his argument becomes unconvincing. The author's conclusions are not substantiated by rigorous examination of primary sources on the decision-making process within the ruling class or by careful analyses of the intermediary factors that lay between the basis and the upper structure. In this sense Blackwell's comprehensiveness seems to give more justice to the overall picture of Russian industrialization in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Despite its weaknesses, Arima's book is a welcome contribution to the economic history of Russia. One will find a wealth of information in his statistical analyses. In addition, it introduces us to the stimulating debate between the Japanese Marxist historians of Russia—a debate little known outside Japan, but which deserves the attention of both Western and Soviet historians.

TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA

State University of New York College at Oswego

THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. By J. N. Westwood. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1974. 127 pp. \$8.95.

This brief illustrated history of the war traces the significant events from the causes to the final peace settlement, more than half the space being occupied by text. Both the selection of pictures and other illustrations and the text give emphasis largely to individuals and small groups, portraying a selection of commanders as well as a sampling of enlisted and civilian groups. The pictures also deal with a wide spectrum of the usual aspects of war, such as the regions affected, the battles, scenes showing troops in the field or sailors aboard ships, the human cost of war, and others. There are some familiar pictures in the collection along with some that are new.

The book is clearly intended for a fairly general readership and should be judged in this context. There will, of course, be much interest in views dealing

with action, such as those setting forth the encounter between the Russian Baltic Fleet and the British fishing boats, an episode developed in the author's earlier book about the voyage of this fleet. The absence of references to sources, however, leaves in limbo the identity and general significance of the "unscrupulous bureaucrat" who reported ship movements from Copenhagen in exchange for "great sums of money," thus helping to lead the Baltic fleet into trouble. The assertion that Witte returned from the Portsmouth conference "to a deservedly warm welcome" will mislead the reader, however, since the author gives no reference concerning Witte's reception by his family, friends, or any other special group, and these words are invalid unless by "warm" the author implies the resentful mood of Russia in 1905.

One of the serious drawbacks of the book is that its bibliography contains only two books, one of them the author's own *Witnesses of Tsushima* and the other a diary of a Russian colonel. One is left wondering where the pictures were found and what the sources were for the rest of the information, particularly that dealing with Japan, about which there is no reference at all. The question of sources becomes of special interest when one finds an assertion, such as the one on page 22, that Russia did not expect Japan to go to war. I am sure the author must realize that this is true only in a very limited sense, otherwise the Russian military and naval preparations long before the outbreak of war would be meaningless, as would the warnings of responsible persons at the time. Again, on page 51, the author states that General Stackelberg was one of the few Russian generals willing to learn from the Japanese, but the reader is left wondering about the source and the broader significance of this observation. Finally, on the very last page of the book the author notes that President Roosevelt received the Nobel Peace Prize and then, without any qualifying detail about its relevance and in complete disregard of accuracy, adds the statement that this was quite an achievement for a man who had "more or less single-handedly launched the Spanish-American War a few years previously."

JOHN A. WHITE
University of Hawaii

- A. V. KRIVOSHEIN (1857–1921 G.): *EGO ZNACHENIE V ISTORII ROSSII NACHALA XX VEKA*. By *K. A. Krivoshein*. Paris, 1973. 351 pp. Paper.

This work is a detailed personal and professional biography of father by son. A. V. Krivoshein was born in 1857 in Warsaw, the son of an army officer and the grandson of a peasant. His success in government was due to his abilities and tireless work. He completed high school in Warsaw and graduated from the law school of St. Petersburg University. Shortly thereafter he entered government service, and in 1896 was appointed deputy chief (in 1902, the chief) of the Resettlement Administration, the agency in charge of peasant migration to Siberia. In 1906–8 he was director of two state land banks.

In May 1908 Stolypin offered him the post of chief administrator for land settlement and agriculture, which he occupied until his dismissal in October 1915. Thus Krivoshein became the chief executive official who implemented Stolypin's agrarian laws: the decree of November 9, 1906; the law of June 14, 1910; and the land settlement regulations of March 4, 1906, and of May 29, 1911. Krivoshein