

GREECE AND THE EASTERN CRISIS, 1875–1878. By *Evangelos Kofos*. Foreword by *W. N. Medlicott*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975. 283 pp.

The dilemmas confronting a small, militarily weak state without allies but with ambiguous foreign-policy goals in a period requiring decisive action is the subject of Dr. Kofos's latest book. A well-written and exhaustive study of the role and position of Greece during the Near East Crisis of 1875–78, it must be regarded as an invaluable contribution to the existing literature dealing with a crucial and dramatic period of modern Greek history. The two major themes—the relations of Greece with her Balkan neighbors and with the Great Powers, and the interaction between Greece and the “unredeemed” Greeks of the Ottoman Empire—are pursued with balanced judgment and great thoroughness. Kofos's meticulous study of the archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the numerous file reports of the Greek consuls in the Ottoman Empire, and other unpublished Greek sources and private papers furnish invaluable and previously unused data to help clarify the neglected role and importance of the “unredeemed” Greeks during the events of the period under review. His detailed use of the British, French, and Austrian archives underline the often erratic and unpredictable behavior of the various Great-Power actors during the Crisis. This material helps to explain the inability of the Greek state to exploit fully the rapidly changing developments in the Balkans.

Should Greece join the Russians and the other Balkan peoples in the hope of sharing in the spoils of a defeated Turkey; or should she side with Britain and the other opponents of Russia in order to preserve, for the time being, the status quo in the Balkans? To what extent would a Turkish defeat destroy the long-range objectives of Greek nationalism—the liberation and national emancipation of the “unredeemed” Greeks? This subject was the center of the spirited debate concerning Greece's role in the Near East Crisis, and it is the main focus of this study.

Greece was, of course, too weak to determine the final outcome of the contest in the Balkans, although Great-Power rivalry allowed her a measure of maneuverability. Unfortunately, the degree of influence Greece could exert in order to safeguard the interests of Hellenism was diminished by the lack of effective leadership, by insufficient knowledge of the views of the Great Powers, and by the erratic tactics of the Powers, particularly Austria and Germany. Kofos's conclusion is essentially a negative one—the results of the Congress of Berlin were a mixed blessing for Greece. They could have been worse.

Dr. Kofos has written an excellent book. It has laid some of the groundwork for those who would like to have a better understanding of the relations between Athens and the “unredeemed” Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, but the definitive study on these relations has yet to be written. Both in terms of sources and analysis, Kofos's study of the dilemmas confronting the Greek government throughout the period of the Crisis is the best available in any language.

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RUSSISCHE ROMANTIK. By *Bodo Zelinsky*. *Slavistische Forschungen*, vol. 15. Cologne and Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1975. xviii, 522 pp. DM 94.

Although the author points out that his study is merely a presentation of *Russische Romantik* and not of *Die russische Romantik*, in some respects this book can be considered an encyclopedia of Romanticism in Russian literature. A brief review cannot do justice to this impressive opus, written by a scholar of striking erudition and under-