

The heart of the book is a catalogue of 353 excavated burials from the late fourth and early fifth-century cemetery at Bratei in the northeast part of the former Roman province. The catalogue is preceded by several introductory essays. There are drawings, photographs, and a plan of the cemetery, but there is no index and no map to show the location of Bratei and other sites. A twenty-page résumé in French is also included.

In the introductory essay, "Ethnic Classification," Bârză attempts to identify by race the people of the Bratei Cemetery. He shows that there is little correspondence between Bratei and the extensive Germanic-related Sintana de Mureş-Chernyakov culture northeast of the former province. Bratei seems free, therefore, of significant influence from invading German peoples. The expected link with Roman Dacia, however, is not so easily established, for along with Daco-Roman features, the Bratei burials show Illyrian influences, especially in the particular type of cremation ritual. Bârză's interpretation is that these were Illyrian colonists but influenced by a residual Daco-Roman culture. However that may be, the Bratei Cemetery yields further evidence supporting the post-Roman continuity of Daco-Roman culture in Transylvania.

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THE KAPETANIOS: PARTISANS AND CIVIL WAR IN GREECE, 1943–1949. By *Dominique Eudes*. Translated from the French by *John Howe*. New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1972. xviii, 381 pp. \$11.50.

This account of the Greek Civil War of 1943–49 has particular interest as it is written from the often brushed-aside point of view of the vanquished. It begins with the birth of ELAS and the first part, "Popular Uprising of 1942–1944," is dominated by the dark, moody, bearded Aris Velouchiotis, an avowed communist (whose real name was Thanasis Klaras, his *nom de guerre* being derived from Ares the god of war, and Velouchi, the mountains where he was born). Although Aris served in the Royal Greek Army in 1925, his claim to have been a colonel of artillery was a dubious one, but there was no doubt about his aptitude for partisan warfare, his energy, positive leadership, dedicated political convictions and ruthlessness. In the tradition of the Klepht resistance to the Ottoman occupation of Greece, Aris is likened to one of their Kapetanios, the legendary chieftains who held out in the wild mountains.

Under Velouchiotis's leadership ELAS fought alone for a while against the occupying German and Italian forces. They did, however, receive some British help as the conflict expanded. When the tide of war in Europe changed, the waiting ELAS, dedicated to establishing a government of the Left, began to move into the towns. The takeover was thwarted by military action of the British, who were interested in restoring the exiled Greek king to his throne and prevented ELAS from entering Athens. In Moscow in 1944, Churchill and Stalin had cynically agreed that Britain would exert the predominant influence in Greece while Russia would have a similar privilege in Rumania. Without this agreement, the Greek tragedy might have had a different ending. As it was, Stalin showed little interest in the Greek Left and gave it no help. Only later, after Stalin and Tito fell out, did even Yugoslavia provide some aid to the Democratic Army, which, unfortunately,

had already made the fatal mistake of abandoning guerrilla tactics for positional warfare. When American military aid began to flow in quantity to the government forces, it was only a matter of time before the end came.

After the defeat of ELAS by the British in January 1945, Aris stayed in the mountains. For his refusal to give up his arms, he was condemned by Zachariadis, and he died as he had lived, violently, in an ambush by government troops in July 1945 (his severed head being exhibited in the Triokka main square). A strong personality with an abrupt manner, he was a better partisan fighter than a politician or statesman, but as "the first and last combatant figure of ELAS" he has secured a niche in Greek history as one of the great Kapetanios.

The last part of the book, "Rewriting History," attempts to fill in some of the political gaps and omissions in more conventional or right-wing accounts. Dramatized versions of conversations (hinting of poetic license) seem out of place in such a serious and important subject, tending to give it a touch of frivolity. But, nonetheless, the author, who has gone to a great deal of trouble to interview many of the scattered survivors, has been able to depict their heroism, hopes, fears, distress, disappointment, and disillusionment vividly. He is to be complimented for producing an excellent first book. He has done his research thoroughly, and the volume can be read with pleasure and profit.

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CYPRUS: RELUCTANT REPUBLIC. By *Stephen G. Xydis*. Near and Middle East Monographs, 11. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1973. 553 pp. 86 Dglds.

Stephen Xydis has written an account of the diplomacy leading to the Zurich and London agreements creating the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. It is as exhaustive a detailing of the negotiations as is likely to be written. In over five hundred pages of tightly packed facts he covers in great depth the meetings between Greece, Turkey, Britain, and the Greek and Turkish Cypriotes which led to more than a decade of uneasy peace on that strategic Mediterranean island. The agreement contained the seeds of its own breakdown, however, for the best that could be negotiated, in view of the strong feelings of the two countries and two communities directly involved, was essentially a papering over of longstanding disputes and mutual suspicions. The intricacy of the net of compromises and arrangements can be appreciated through the lengthy and complex bargaining which Professor Xydis ably narrates.

Unfortunately, only two rather small groups of readers are likely to find this book useful. Those who have an intense interest in Cyprus coupled with knowledge of the background and context of the situation, may find it rewarding to go through page after page of minute intricacies of diplomacy in 1958–59. For all those who are interested in Cyprus or in the eastern Mediterranean, but are not already specialists in Cypriote affairs, the absence of any general perspective or interpretive material makes this book extremely difficult to use. Professor Xydis's account stops at the end of 1959 which is his prerogative, of course, but considering that thirteen years elapsed between the negotiations and the publication of his book, an evaluation of the agreements does not seem beyond the realm of expectation. Even with this temporal limitation, Professor Xydis could have provided a much broader service to his readers if, rather than including almost every conceivable fact of