

of the two republics. On the other hand, she also notes that the political and social organization of Ragusa was modeled more directly on that of Venice. Unfortunately she does not use a work that would have thrown additional light on the comparisons between Venice and Ragusa that she does make—James Cushman Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class* (Baltimore, 1962).

The author further observes that Ragusa experienced an economic transformation during the eighteenth century and before the French (Napoleonic) occupation of 1806—a shift of mobile wealth from the order of patricians to the orders of the citizens and of the people or *pučani* (three distinct estates), without a corresponding diversion of political authority to the now economically dominant groups. As a result, a tendency to question the mode of operation of the existing social order became apparent and may have culminated in a social revolution after 1820. But the French occupation of Ragusa, undertaken in part to halt Russia's northward advance from Cattaro (Kotor), burdened the city and its territory with a premature revolution imposed by outside military force. Many Ragusans, especially among the youth, citizens, and Jews, but also among the "people" and even among the patricians and clergy, were originally sympathetic to the French. Because of the association between revolution and foreign occupation, however, the trend toward a self-made revolution was thwarted. Like others before her, the author fails to define "revolution."

Readers who may not be fully convinced by this interpretation will nevertheless find valuable details on the political and social structures of Ragusa, on the Ragusan merchant marine, clergy, and peasantry (or *contadini*, quite distinct from the noncitizen but urban-based "people"), and on quarantine practices against the plague, the revolt of the peasantry of the fertile county of Canali (Konavle) several years before the French occupation, the conflict between France and Russia in the southern Adriatic, and the French occupation and later (1811) incorporation of Ragusa in the Illyrian Provinces. The book contains a useful bibliographical essay.

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DAS ENDE AUF DEM BALKAN 1944/45: DIE MILITÄRISCHE RÄUMUNG JUGOSLAVIENS DURCH DIE DEUTSCHE WEHRMACHT.

By *Karl Hnilicka*. Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 13. Göttingen, Frankfurt, Zürich: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1970. 404 pp. DM 78.

The story of the German operations in the Balkans in 1941 is well known, but as the author of this study rightly observes, what happened after that campaign has been written almost exclusively from the standpoint of the enemies of Germany. Yugoslavian accounts of the Partisan war abound, but until Hnilicka published this study there were almost no scholarly accounts giving the German side of the story. The author does not attempt to fill the whole gap, but rather confines himself to the last eight months of the war during which the Germans fought a desperate rear-guard action against the combined forces of the Red Army and Tito's Partisans. Despite all difficulties the German command managed to conduct a reasonably orderly retreat and were able to prevent any large body of troops from being cut off. This accomplishment was particularly impressive, for though the

Allies controlled the air and the sea, the Germans still succeeded in removing most of their garrisons from Greece and the Mediterranean islands without undue losses. Hnilicka's account of the retreat is both exhaustive and exhausting. Most of the hundred and fifty pages of narrative read like daily position reports prepared by a staff officer. The only respite from the bone-dry quality of the writing is an occasional excerpt from an eyewitness account. The most interesting as well as the most useful part of the book is the document appendix. Included in the documents is a clear, concise account of the retreat, written in January 1945 by the commander of the German forces in the Balkans, Field Marshal von Weichs. It is unfortunate that Weichs never expanded this brief account into a full study.

Though Hnilicka's narrative is in general lifeless, one should not infer from this that he does not have strong prejudices. He fervently defends the collaborators; he gives lurid accounts of the atrocities committed by the Partisans (including a description of a "death march" during which thousands of German prisoners of war died); and he pays a stirring tribute to the German soldiers who fought in the Balkans, saying that they "helped spare Germany and Austria from Communist occupation." He seems to imply that if the Balkan states had rallied to Hitler in August 1944 when the Red Army first penetrated the area, they too might have been spared.

Hnilicka has not written a history of the epic German retreat; rather he has collected the material from which a history could be written. He has interviewed all the important survivors; he has surveyed all the relevant literature; and he has used all the documents that he could get his hands on. The result is a competent but dull account. Perhaps that is all Hnilicka intended to write. If so, then more is the pity, because warfare in the Balkans has provided a rich mine of information upon which a case study could be written that examines the problems and frustrations of an occupying power faced with a guerrilla war.

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TRAGEDIJA HRVATSKE HISTORIOGRAFIJE: O FALSIFIKATORIMA, BIROKRATIMA, NEGATORIMA, ITD . . . ITD . . . HRVATSKE POVIJESTI. 2nd, revised and expanded edition. By *Zvonimir Kulundžić*. Zagreb: Nezavisno Autorsko Izdanje, 1970. 526 pp. 60 new dinars, paper.

Zvonimir Kulundžić's book about the "tragedy" of Croatian historiography was an instant best seller in Croatia when it appeared in 1970. So far it has gone through two editions despite its seemingly esoteric subject matter and the fact that it was published by the author at his own expense. This is not so surprising, however, when one notes that Kulundžić is a popular and prolific writer of best sellers dealing with political history, such as *Atentat na Stjepana Radića* and *Politika i korupcija*. The book under review is no dispassionate scholarly study of the shortcomings of Croatian historiography. Rather it is a violent attack on many of Croatia's foremost historians and Slavists (Professors Šidak, Štefanić, Anica Nazor, Nada Klaić, and others), as well as prominent institutions and scholarly journals, for deliberately and systematically distorting, negating, and disparaging Croatian history, and doing so for reasons of careerism, political cowardice, or professional incompetence.

These are grave charges to level at those who teach Croatian history at Zagreb University and against the Staroslavenski Institute and the Yugoslav Academy.