

ARMS FOR THE THIRD WORLD: SOVIET MILITARY AND DIPLOMACY. By *Wynfred Joshua* and *Stephen P. Gibert*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. x, 169 pp. \$6.95.

This work exemplifies the two main characteristics of the "nonbook" in the scholarly field. First, its data has been collected in an unsystematic manner. Consequently it is unreliable even as a check list of sources screened, including the readily available *New York Times*. Moreover, the data apparently was not subjected to any standard critical tests of evidence. Hence it is a hodgepodge of unevaluated errors, unresolved inconsistencies, and major omissions. Second, the analysis is primitive. Indeed, even the major and better generalizations and conclusions flow not so much from the authors' own data as from the works of already published authorities, particularly Herbert Dinerstein. Any claim to originality fails the authors' own test (p. 4), that "the Soviet military assistance program can only be understood as an integral part of contemporary Soviet global foreign policy."

The book is a reprint of the authors' contract research paper, "Soviet Military Aid as a Reflection of Soviet Objectives, 1955-1967." That 294-page multilithed paper was submitted in October 1968 to the U.S. Air Force by the Atlantic Research Corporation as part of the Georgetown Research Project. Unclassified, it received more than adequate circulation at that time among those of us doing related research on arms trade and control. The hard-cover version differs only in minor details—typographical and editorial changes to conform with the publisher's style manual, the addition of an index, and a slightly rewritten preface that misleadingly implies that "further research and analysis" of a substantial nature went into the printed version. In fact, even the typographical errors have been preserved, such as the repeated "Laquer" for Walter Laqueur.

I can sympathize with the authors' problem of trying to produce scholarship within the constraints of a contract program that sets deadlines and often assigns inadequately qualified staff. When applied to research requiring highly specialized understanding of Soviet foreign and military policy, recipient military needs, and detailed collection of data on arms negotiations and transfers, such deadline and staffing policies invite quick-and-dirty results, and even four years (1964-68) was not long enough for the two authors and one research analyst to master either the data or the analysis for their client. That is no excuse, however, for passing on such preliminary unrevised research to a wider public in a university press book. Both the general reader and the researcher can save time and avoid error by reading instead the superb new book by Uri Ra'anani, *The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969).

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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE. By *Robert G. Wesson*. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press. Georgetown, Ont.: Irwin-Dorsey Ltd., 1969. viii, 472 pp. \$9.50.

One of the major paradoxes of Soviet policy-making throughout virtually the entire period of Communist rule has been the verbal adherence of policy-makers to a universalistic ideology which only in a limited degree provided the real framework for the formation of foreign policy. Throughout more than fifty years of dealing with the outside world, the Soviet leadership has manifested considerable realism

in relations with “bourgeois” and “capitalistic” states. Lenin provided economic assistance to Kemal’s Turkey, even though the latter was smashing the local Communist Party. Stalin in 1939 concluded the pact with Hitler in a remarkable display of state’s interest after five years of ideological campaigns for the anti-Nazi popular front all over Europe. In the postwar period, Khrushchev promoted “peaceful co-existence” as a theoretical emphasis in Marxism-Leninism in order to establish an ideological base for an essentially pragmatic evaluation of existing power relations in the world. Even the “revolutionary” world organizations such as the Comintern and the Profintern in the mid-1920s were transformed into instruments of Soviet state interest rather than vehicles for world revolution.

All the examples cited above are examined at great length in Professor Wesson’s book; indeed, the discrepancy between ideology and practical foreign policy “outputs” in Soviet relations with the rest of the world is a major theme in his work. At the same time Wesson quite correctly points out that the need for ideological pronouncements and justifications for every pragmatic Soviet move in the foreign policy arena to a considerable degree caused fear and retaliation from the other participants on the world political scene, insofar as the latter perceived Soviet policies as efforts of Red revolution. The resulting difficulties for Soviet foreign policy in many areas have been well documented by the author.

Wesson’s book is for the most part organized chronologically, and attempts to deal with Soviet approaches to the world in terms of state interest as well as CPSU efforts to deal with the world Communist movement through the periods of “Lenin and Revolutionism,” “Stalin and Nationalist Reversion,” “Stalinism,” “Competitive Coexistence,” and “Conservative Communism.” The conflicting tasks of being a promoter of Realpolitik and at the same time leader of the revolutionary world movement did cause some of the most severe problems for Soviet decision-makers, as the author points out, but the Kremlin was not completely unsuccessful in the revolutionary field; after all, the existence of a set of cadres in virtually every country, fully dedicated to Moscow’s cause on ideological grounds, did have important payoffs for Moscow during World War II, when the Communist underground came into national prominence in virtually all of occupied Europe. Perhaps one might consider the somewhat scanty coverage of World War II as a weakness of the book; a more detailed analysis of the confluence of “revolutionary” and “national” policies produced by Communists in this period could have illustrated a relatively successful epoch of Soviet foreign policy.

One substantive area where some scholars might take slight issue with Wesson’s analysis is the postwar period of Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe. While discussing the Soviet timetable for establishing control in this area in some detail, he nevertheless seems to argue that in many cases Soviet policies were mostly a reaction to American moves. Though this is certainly true in some instances, many prominent scholars in the field have documented the view that there was considerable Soviet initiative in carrying out some kind of plan for the establishment of Communist-dominated regimes in this part of Europe. More direct documentation concerning this question would have been helpful.

The question of documentation leads to a final substantive point. A large amount of material is contained in this book, but only a fraction of it is footnoted. It might have been an improvement if more extensive footnoting had been attempted, at times in the form of explanatory notes which could have examined some of the detailed evidence used in Wesson’s more general analysis.

In general, there is little that is completely new to the specialist in this volume,

but I do not think that the author intended the book to be mainly a contribution to specialized literature. It is valuable as a *general* overview of this important subject. Its chief virtue is that it gives the *broad* lines of development of Soviet foreign policy. Further research on specific aspects must be promoted for a more detailed understanding of this important field.

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WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA. By *Harrison E. Salisbury*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969. 224 pp. \$4.95.

THE NEW RUSSIAN TRAGEDY. By *Anatole Shub*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969. 128 pp. \$4.50.

RUSSIA: HOPES AND FEARS. By *Alexander Werth*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969. 352 pp. \$6.95.

MESSAGE FROM MOSCOW. By *An Observer*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. 288 pp. \$5.95.

A post-Khrushchevian Russia characterized by an increased repression of its educated elite, timid indecisiveness in matters of economic reform, and an uncertain aggressiveness in foreign affairs is the subject of these four firsthand accounts by foreign observers.

Salisbury's *War Between Russia and China* differs from the other three books in its concentration on Sino-Soviet relations rather than Soviet society itself. Although the book can be recommended as a useful general introduction to the topic, it suffers from serious oversimplifications. The account of the centuries-old national hatreds between Russians and Chinese is useful if exaggerated, but the suggestion that this deep-seated rivalry is inevitably escalating toward a military denouement underestimates the role that political leadership plays in deciding questions of war and peace. Nor would the author's description of China's dilemma, in view of its overpopulation and food shortage, as that of "fight or starve" appear to conceptualize adequately the range of alternatives open to Peking.

But while one may legitimately quarrel with Salisbury's journalistic penchant for using the technique of exaggeration to emphasize his points, the book is to be welcomed for the main themes it justifiably stresses: that nuclear war between the Communist giants could be disastrous not only for the participants but for the rest of the world as well, and that the United States should earnestly seek to establish some influence with Peking in an effort to avert such a conflict.

The New Russian Tragedy is a collection in book form of a series of newspaper articles written by Anatole Shub (son of Lenin biographer David Shub) immediately after his expulsion as *Washington Post* correspondent from Moscow in the spring of 1969. Shub's Russia is a composite of three exceedingly hostile worlds: that of the embattled foreign correspondent, hounded by the KGB and restricted to foreign compounds; that of the increasingly persecuted and martyred dissident intelligentsia—the Larisa Daniels and Andrei Amalriks—among whom Shub established some close friendships; and that of the Kremlin. Although this side of Russia needs to be reported, it is simply not correct to suggest that the same characteristics occur in all aspects of life in the Soviet Union. In Shub's book one gets no inkling that there are millions of Soviet citizens, including some