

A Note on the Theory of Nationalism as a Function of Ethnic Demands

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Stephen Leacock once wrote that "Modern scholarship is seldom content to let a good thing alone." Perhaps this is a valid criticism which may legitimately be levied at any attempt, like the one embodied in this paper, to depart from the traditional scholarly approaches to a particular field of enquiry. None the less, it is my first assumption that there is some value to be derived from a systematic look at the phenomenon of "nationalism," notwithstanding the fact that quite a considerable body of literature has accumulated in the efforts of academics to provide an exhaustive cataloguing of the peculiar traits which characterize nationalist movements and their derivatives.

Until recently, the traditional approach to the study of nationalism has been one of historical perspective, as a movement projected against a background of historical development. Endowed with a certain aura of mystery, nationalism becomes a property of a group acting together. To Hans Kohn it is "first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness."¹ To Crane Brinton it is "at bottom no more than the important form, the sense of belonging to an in group."² And to Carleton J. Hayes the term "nationalism" can describe either an actual historical process, a theory or ideal, the political activities pursuant to the achieving of it, or a sentiment or state of mind.³ Coupled usually to this approach has been a strongly normative evaluation of the vaguely defined consequences of patriotic nationalism or, at the other pole, separatist activity. That such perjorative attitudes may prejudice the scholarly accuracy of the works concerned goes without saying. And yet, Professor Elie Kedourie, the most recent and ardent exponent of this traditional line of approach, can offer little more to the understanding of nationalism than that it is not desirable: "The invention [of nationalism] has prevailed, and the best that can be said for it is that it is an attempt to establish once and for all the reign of justice in a corrupt world, and to repair for ever, the injuries of time. But this best is bad enough, since, to repair such injuries, other injuries must in turn be inflicted, and no balance is ever struck in the grisly account of cruelty and violence."⁴ After his argument is concluded, Kedourie can only contend that at most the study of nationalism, because of its nature, is one "which . . . admits of no final and conclusive answer."⁵ Perhaps a different approach might yield more satisfying results.

*The author wishes to acknowledge the initial suggestions of Professors Khayyam Paltiel and Kenneth McRae of Carleton University in whose seminar on nationalism these thoughts were, with trepidation, first advanced.

¹*The Idea of Nationalism* (New York, 1951), 10.

²*The Shaping of the Modern Mind* (New York, 1953), 151.

³*Essays on Nationalism* (New York, 1926), 5-6.

⁴*Nationalism* (New York, 1961), 139. ⁵*Ibid.*, 140.

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Given the understanding that nationalism in some way is a useful descriptive definition for a particular type of cohesive group activity, it becomes necessary to trace the realm and define the boundaries of the group—or “nationality.” In this fashion, a political leader like Josef Stalin can speak of a nation as “an historically evolved, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup manifested in a common culture.”⁶ Scholars of the “Lord Acton” school of thought also seek out the physical delineation of the nation as “. . . a body of men, inhabiting a definite territory, who normally are drawn from different races, but possess a common stock of thoughts and feelings acquired and transmitted during the course of a common history.”⁷ The notions of a common territoriality, ethnic derivation, religious customs, language, and some type of general common will are generally implicit in these attempts at a definition of nationalist behaviour. But it soon appears that even the most extensive and exhaustive cataloguing of exhibited characteristics of movements labelled “nationalist” can be of little *explanatory* use unless we are provided with some type of framework for comparative analysis, for the “distinguishing” characteristics of a nationalist group can usually and successfully be identified in similarly configured but “non-nationalist” collectivities. So far in the study of nationalism this framework has been lacking, and the traditional literature must generally be viewed as useful, although piecemeal, case studies.

Professor Inis Claude, Jr., writing in 1955, was among the first to suggest that the efforts to establish a set of objective criteria for the identification of a nationality were condemned to futility. In his study, *National Minorities: An International Problem*, he writes perceptively of the subjective group nature of nationhood: “a group of people constitute a nation when they feel they do—when they have an active sense of belonging together and of being distinct from other groups.”⁸ He treats racial, religious, linguistic and other such differentiations as useful, but fallible, clues to the existence of unassimilated “national” minorities. Nationalism, as a phenomenon, cannot be explained by the mere existence of relatively “permanent” factors which act only to inhibit or enhance its development.⁹ Rather there must be an attempt made to conduct an analysis of other than these static factors, to seek out the original impetus which causes—and differentiates—the “nationalist” movement. It is clear that distinctive and unassimilated ethnic groupings may exist without exhibiting the nationalist propensity: what then distinguishes nationalism as a socio-political phenomena?

In reviewing these considerations we become aware of the need for new approaches to the study of nationalism in this modern era. As Professor Kedourie has unfortunately demonstrated, to speak of nationalism only in terms of its expression as an ideology, or to attempt usefully to study it as such, is to explain very little—little more in fact than a collective enumeration of the various demands that have been made by particular selected nation-seeking groups and their self-appointed spokesmen. It is as essential here, as in other

⁶*Marxism and the National Question* (Moscow, 1950), 16.

⁷Ernest Barker, *National Character and the Factors in Its Formation* (London, 1927), 17.

⁸(Cambridge, Mass., 1955), 2.

⁹John Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism* (New York, 1962), 30.

A propos de la théorie considérant le nationalisme comme canal aux aspirations ethniques

Les études traditionnelles du nationalisme l'ont considéré comme un processus historique, mettant l'accent sur les activités politiques reliées à la montée ou au déclin des divers mouvements nationalistes ou tâchant d'évaluer les théories mises de l'avant pour justifier le support de comportements nationalistes ou irrédentistes.

L'auteur estime qu'il serait plus à propos de considérer le nationalisme comme un phénomène exprimant les aspirations nationales et qu'il variera en intensité suivant les milieux institutionnels, psychologiques et politico-économiques qui en constituent les coordonnées. En considérant le nationalisme comme un mode de comportement normal chez un groupe ethnique, il devient possible d'en dégager un cadre d'analyse comparative. La viabilité de toute communauté nationale, comme entité autonome, est directement reliée à sa capacité de commander les allégeances de ses membres en tant que participants de la même ethnie.

D'une certaine façon, on peut dire que tous les groupes ethniques, même ceux dont la situation est majoritaire dans un ensemble politique, y font valoir des aspirations ethniques. C'est seulement lorsqu'une minorité perçoit le régime comme incapable de satisfaire à ses aspirations les plus fondamentales que le désir d'institutions séparées caractérise son comportement nationaliste.

Pour faire de cette conception un instrument de travail, il faut pouvoir établir la propension du groupe au ralliement national ou, en d'autres mots, il faut préciser le support social potentiel des demandes faites à l'appareil de décision du régime. Un schéma systémique peut être construit pour nous permettre d'établir avec quelque certitude les niveaux institutionnels où une réponse doit être apportée à un problème si l'on veut que le régime s'adapte aux diverses pressions que lui font subir les groupes ethniques. On voit que, au delà d'un certain point, les solutions qui n'impliquent pas de changement institutionnel sont incapables de satisfaire les aspirations des groupes ethniques.

areas of political science, to look at the factors supporting the expressions of an ideology to gain a measure of understanding of the eventual results of social, political, and economic interaction. It is possible, I believe, to avoid the subjective shortcomings of previous approaches by undertaking the study as essentially a phenomenon of group behaviour. There is implicit in all writings on nationalism an acceptance of its essential ethnic group character—linguistic, religious, cultural, physical, as well as ethnic—but the studies have been side-tracked apparently by the attempt to accommodate “aberrant” minorities (that is, those dissenting from the ruling configuration of institutions and patterns of leadership) within any existing state structure, accepting as a failure of the state's system its inability to integrate all participants. But by viewing nationalism as one expression of a potential spectrum of group demands, particularly related to ethnic communities, it is possible to observe the function of demands on the political system without the *a priori* rejection of them as unnaturally disruptive. To the degree that these ethnic demands are capable of satisfaction, as in the case of other demand patterns, the system remains viable.

Hence in this paper it is my intention to view nationalism as resulting from a particular set of ethnic group demands, which are reinforced sufficiently in certain cases by factors noted below to require institutional realignment if the general political system is to remain. By attempting a representation of the effect

of these demands and the degree of their accommodation by formal institutions of the political system as a model, I hope to suggest that it may eventually be possible to define with some precision levels of congruence and possibilities for system stability. The purpose of the model is thus to represent graphically the relationships existing among the defined variables within a given system as they affect nationalist expressions.

The more traditional approaches have, I think, understandably played down the ethnic underpinnings of nationalism largely because of the tendency of majority groups to describe themselves in universalist terms. "Ethnicity" becomes descriptive of minorities and irregularities, that is to say, deviations from the norm. In the Canadian case this is illustrated by the *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*: "Ethnicity . . . appears as a strange, possibly distasteful phenomenon: 'ethnic' seems to be given a sense something like 'foreigner' . . . Dominant groups are often more aware of the ethnicity of minority groups than they are of their own; awareness of their own ethnic affiliation is usually keener among members of minorities than among those of dominant groups."¹⁰ But is it not also clear that ethnic groups in a majority situation may exert nationalist demands? Because of their numerical advantage, however, the political system is usually more able to accommodate these assertions and silent manifestations of nationality, thus restricting the necessity for a series of clearly articulated nationalist demands. It is only when a minority strives for an expression of its uniqueness, is frustrated, and begins to articulate its group differences that there is some recognition of the seeds of a new "nationalism." It is important to begin the attempt to characterize these demands for national expression within a framework which may establish avenues for comparative analysis.

Karl Deutsch in his pioneer study, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, initially suggests the general premise for the theory. To him, as a matter of definition, a *nationality* ". . . is a people pressing to acquire a measure of effective control over the behaviour of its members. It is a people striving to equip itself with power, with some machinery of compulsion strong enough to make the enforcement of its commands sufficiently probable to aid in the spread of habits of voluntary compliance with them."¹¹ In this sense it is a group attempting to legitimate its authority by habitualizing a nationalist pattern of allegiances among the group members. Dr. Benjamin Akzin speaks perceptively of a national group as existing when ". . . an ethnic group exercises in fact or effectually strives to exercise major influence on the political structure of society."¹² In striving to place an operational boundary on the national group, Akzin comes in effect to define a nation as a politically conscious ethnic group. This notion is implicitly advanced in more recent studies on the processes of nation-building, in one of which Rupert Emerson argues that, "in any situation in which the distinction between ethnic groups marks the primary and most evident difference between people, it is inevitable that these groups should seek political

¹⁰Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, *Report: General Introduction* (Ottawa, 1967), xxiv.

¹¹(Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 104.

¹²*State and Nation* (London, 1964), 33.

expression.”¹³ We come to a second tier in the theory. We have considered the first gauge of effective nationalism to lie in the latent political power (its effectiveness, that is, in mobilizing its adherents) of the group claimed to be nationalistic on the strength of certain indices of group characteristics and behaviour to be considered below.¹⁴ The second level in the analysis rests on the accurate measurement of the range of demands (substantiated as ethnically derived by their spokesmen) which are *actually* made on the decision-making apparatus of the state, and their support by the underlying population. Demands for political self-rule are by definition the most “nationalist” any ethnic aggregation can exert upon the system.

It can conceivably be established that any given national grouping (as indeed any effective interest group exercising a measure of authoritative control over the orientations of its members) may during the period of its existence as a distinctive entity be in a position to place any number or distribution of political-cultural-economic demands upon the system. The more extensive these demands are, and the more they complete a full distribution across the total spectrum of potential demands which might be placed on the system, the closer will the group come to demanding an autonomous political identity and authority either within the system or, in the final analysis, without. Once in possession of the political instruments of a subsystem (as in the case of a federalized polity), the closer will the ethnic group be to approximating in itself an *ethnically integrated national system*. This suggests, for example, that demands by a minority group for an expression as a nationality in the political arena will be reinforced to the extent of group dissatisfaction with such social developments as other-ethnic economic domination, religious discrimination, educational control, or linguistic assimilation stemming from this perceived ethnic differentiation. As these feelings develop the sense of group identity, the more extensive will be the support generated for political leadership articulating some level of dissociated political status for the group.

In terms of our model (Figure 1), one can visualize a continuum of demands stretching along the *X* axis from the origin to a point designated as that at which *all conceivable demands* (thus, political, economic, religious . . .) for ethnic/national group expression are being exerted upon the system. Almond and Verba might be expected to describe the political culture existing in the type of system represented at our point of origin as being perfectly parochial with the frequency of political orientations toward the system hovering near “absolute zero.” At the designated point *X*, the terminal of the continuum, one could describe the political culture as being perfectly participant; or, in these terms, one in which all members of the ethnic nationality are actively oriented to the political system and to placing the complete demands for their ethnic satisfaction upon it.¹⁵ As the demand pattern boundaries of an ethnic group approach the

¹³“Nation-Building in Africa,” in K. Deutsch and W. J. Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building* (New York, 1963), 106.

¹⁴The work of David Truman, Earl Latham, and subsequent interest group analysts, for example, is important in suggesting the basis for the mobilizing of effective interest activity. Thus see Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951), and Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics* (Ithaca, 1952).

¹⁵Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston, 1963), 16–20.




FIGURE 1

extent of those evident in any other identifiable political system, we expect by definition to view the conscious exercise of political nationality.

It should be emphasized that the X axis is to be considered as a continuum; that any given identifiable ethnic group at any particular given time or place may be placed somewhere along a similar continuum with the exact location being dependent upon the strength and scope of the group's demands. It should be observed further that this is not intended as a model of the functioning of a total system but of a single ethnic group which acts within the framework of an established system. As in Riker's attempt to examine comparative federalisms on a similar type of continuum, emphasizing in his case the degree of central or peripheral tendency, both the idea of the number of possible categories, and their strengths or importance, are evaluative.¹⁶ To a certain extent they are confined to the political cultures in which they are located, but because they are to be considered as similar types of demands for ethnic expression, albeit in different systems, they may also, for our purposes of comparison, be thought of as being relative to one another over and above their relation to the particular system upon which the demands are made.

Crucial to this approach is the notion of a *critical point* (which may be represented by point B) or level at which the ethnic demands upon the system change rather dramatically in nature. Before this point we may consider these demands as being much like those of other types of interest or pressure groups as some variation of an attempt to gain effective influence in the authoritative

¹⁶William Riker, *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* (Boston, 1964), 7.

decision-making processes of the established political system. We might, for example, consider demands for a bilingual school system, or for unilingual army units, to be a typical type of demand in this case. Beyond this political hurdle demands become "nationalist" (one might suggest "separatist"), institutional and insatiable in character: they are made primarily for an ethnically separate institutional vehicle which presumably will be more responsive to the group's particular demands. That is to say, a hitherto pluralistic society can be expected to break down, even if it accedes to the demands rather than attempting suppression of the nationalists, into its ethnically plural components. Attempted reconciliation of the dissident ethnic grouping by the majority culture appears unlikely to succeed once the momentum generated within the nationalist movement approaches this measure, and the minority group moves outside the system toward fuller autonomy. Karl Deutsch, speaking in 1966, referred to a nation as a "people," that is, a large communications net of human beings in possession of a state. He implicitly recognized the critical point of departure in terms of demands: "*When a significant part of a people desire to gain political power for their ethnic or linguistic group we may call them a nationality. When they do acquire such power, usually through controlling the machinery of a state, we call them a nation.*"¹⁷ It may be more precise, or in any event more conventional, to refer to them as a nation-state. Thus, for example, we might consider ethnic/national demands for federalized institutions, in substitution for an unviable unitary system and as a move to allow *partial* ethnic exclusiveness in decision-making, to lie somewhere to the right of this point *B* on our model. At point *X*, however, demands, as noted, are exclusively for an ethnically homogeneous, fully integrated, political community for the dissenting minority which is, presumably, the "ideal" nation-state.

Of equal importance to the system, to the demands placed on it and their accompanying supports, are the outputs of the process, or the accommodation provided in response to demands. A political system, faced with demands from a distinctive ethnic grouping, must provide some response. As with the demands, these outputs in terms of formal decisions from the process can usefully be perceived as a continuum whose lowest level of formal response is in the tribal or parochial political culture (located at the origin on our model) where there are virtually no expectations of the process, or indeed even any awareness of it on the part of individual members of the culture. We may consider the other end of the continuum (in our model placed along the *Y* axis) as the perfectly subjective political culture (again to use the terminology of Almond and Verba) in which the outputs, as decisions, of the political system are such as to attract the participants' positive orientations to the institutions, and their acceptance as legitimate and satisfying. Thus the level of accommodation by the system might be considered to range from informal cognizance of an ethnic pressure group at some point close to the origin, through various levels of formalized acceptance of the group as a legitimate actor in the decision-making sphere to some critical level, *A*, along this axis where the political system provides satisfaction to the ethnic/national group by formal provision of separate, identifiable institutions,

¹⁷"Nation and World," a paper delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 9, 1966, p. 2. The italics are added.

that is, legitimized political power. Below this critical point the accommodation by the system in response to demands for ethnic identification returns the system to congruence and stability. Beyond *A* the state must realign its institutional structures about a new ethnic configuration by either physically attempting to suppress the dissident elements into grudging assimilation into the majority culture, or through accepting the creation of the new political nationality, move itself toward being an ethnically homogeneous national group.

In an analysis such as this which views political nationality as a function of ethnicity, the state can be considered the instrument which makes possible the formal accommodation of articulated ethnic demands. While admitting that the political system in reality is required to resolve a full spectrum of interest group demands, we have, in considering the phenomena of nationalism, isolated that system from all factors but ethnicity. Amitai Etzioni has, of course, made the crucial notation when he observed that political unification faced its greatest impediments when “. . . the various background factors are distributed in such a manner that division deriving from one background factor reinforces divisions deriving from other background factors.”¹⁸ Thus other forces operative on the system must be considered in so far as their distribution acts to support or detract from the intensity of ethnic group demands. To the degree that these other forces do act as reinforcements, they will serve to push the level of ethnic demands to the right along the *O-X* axis.

The third line in the model, *O-S*, might be labelled the *stability line*. It may be taken to represent levels of congruence in the system and should be considered as a continuum indicating those possible levels of satisfaction between the capacity of institutional structures and decision-makers to satisfy inputs in the form of ethnic demands, and the exertions and demands made by the ethnic political culture. These stabilizing compromises may be distributed from the purely parochial (at the origin) to the critical point *E* where the pluralist compromise breaks down. The point *E* represents the level at which demands equal to *O-B* are placed upon the system, representing a legitimated call (legitimate in the sense of being able to command sufficient factor supports suggested below to control the ethnic population's national identification) for political self-rule by a given ethnic minority, and system outputs generated to the level, *O-A*, which represent the accommodative disposition on the part of the decision-makers to establish stability within the system by providing a lower level of institutional self-rule (for one example, associate statehood). Beyond critical point *E* demands placed on the system no longer permit subject status (that is, full autonomy is required), and the accommodation capacity is exhausted leading to either suppression or the establishment of a new independent state.

Along both the demand-input and accommodative-output axis it is possible to construct areas of tension which come into existence once the critical point is surpassed. In some ways a no man's land, these areas can be considered to represent the disruptive period which exists when the demands for ethnic national identity possess sufficient supports to require response, but are not satisfied by the authoritative decision-makers. Provided that demand potential continues to augment itself in support of dissociation from the existing order,

¹⁸*Political Unification* (New York, 1965), 25.

it can be hypothesized that this position of instability and stress will be resolved only when the existing formalized processes have been realigned. A collapse of the demand barrage accompanied by appropriate system response will permit suitable compromise. Any given ethnic group, as a dynamic entity, in its command of supportive factors and its exercise of demands may at any time be moving either toward the full autonomy *X* position or, on the other hand, toward the perfect satisfaction indicated by the origin.

Granted this perspective (or, if you will, paradigm) of nationalism as a dynamic but explicable part of the political process in an ethnically plural society, the study of the subject is properly focused upon the particular ethnic interest demands, indices of their representativeness of the peculiar ethnic sentiment, and upon techniques of measuring, on a comparative basis, the depth of infrastructural supports. Ideological rationalizations of nationalism on the part of political apologists are to be considered in this context as being not relevant except in the supporting role of acting to legitimate demands for power. As a general principle, it has been observed that restiveness will occur among a "threatened" population when a state is not symbolically in harmony with it.¹⁹ A pervading and inclusive national ideology which provides sufficient enduring myths to satisfy the aspiration of minority ethnic groups, will serve in this context to legitimize the existing institutional state. In so far as a nationalist ideology acts as a symbol to provide legitimacy to disuniting or separatist movements, it can be hypothesized that it will aid in the alignment of individuals within the "threatened" ethnic group movement. It is in this fashion that it becomes a definable, quantifiable force. The rhetoric of nationalist ideology is thus viewed as either positive or negative support for demand inputs or, on the other side, the outputs in terms of accommodation, depending on its emphasis. When a predominant national ideology acts to legitimize the existing institutional structure, it acts to reduce supports for a minority ethnic expression and the possibility that this type of interest articulation will be transformed into a separate nationalist movement.

By way of summarizing, I would like to suggest several categories of support factors for nationalist demand patterns of particular racial/ethnic groupings which may aid in systematizing our approach to various cases. There are two reasons for proposing these categories of analysis: first, they will help to determine if a group is politically competent to exert nationalist demands, in this way deleting analysis of irrational separatist advocates, and secondly, they will present comparative indices to help determine the group's capacity to maintain a force of "nationalism." I suggest this type of factor analysis in opposition to the more traditional historical approach as evidenced in the work of Elie Kedourie and his antecedents, which attempts in some measure to attribute the basic phenomenon to the writers and philosophers of nationalism. That this is an interesting approach is true, but it seems to strike at the wrong end of the problem by analysing the *effects* of nationalism in terms of its writers and articulators, instead of probing deeper into the *causes* of that nationalism. These causal factors may, I believe, generally be seen as falling into two groups: a first one prompting the primary demands for recognition of ethnicity as a result of the

¹⁹Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana, 1964), 167.

differentiation of the group and the positive orientation of group members to the group as a source of social identity and indicator of social behaviour;²⁰ and a second one, at a level of psycho-political factors, superimposed on to the social and political systems, which act to focus generalized demands into the specifics necessary for ethnic/nationalist political responsibility.

The first set of factors, encompassing group awareness of ethnic social differentiation, might be suggested by the following sub-divisions:

1. UNDERLYING PHYSICAL FACTORS
 - a. the extent to which the group finds itself differentiated from the surrounding culture;
 - b. the extent to which members of the group are possessed with distinguishing racial and physical characteristics;
 - c. the extent to which the group is characterized by its uniqueness of ethnic group customs;
 - d. the extent to which extra-community communication is limited by distinctiveness and impermeability of group language;
 - e. the numerical size of group both in relation to other surrounding population and in relation to size necessary to maintain a viable national community.
2. UNDERLYING GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS
 - a. the integral proximity of the group as opposed to a widespread dispersion;
 - b. degree of physical association with non-group members;
 - c. geographical existence of possibilities for irredentism;
 - d. degree of geographic isolation due to historic and natural frontiers.
3. UNDERLYING COMMUNICATIONS FACTORS
 - a. level of within-group literacy;
 - b. degree of submission to modernizing media influences and extent to which this communication is group-directed;
 - c. relative completeness of group-directed media infrastructure;
 - d. pattern of internalized versus externalized group transactions;
 - e. pattern of socialization agency distribution.

The second set of factors which function to amplify and focus trends on societal integration established by the above factors might be generally suggested within the following range:

4. SUPERIMPOSED POLITICAL FACTORS
 - a. federalized or unitary polity (that is, degree of political autonomy available to political subsystems);
 - b. degree of formal institutional recognition of the minority group;
 - c. existence of separate educational agencies for the ethnic minority;
 - d. number of discriminatory sanctions (formal and informal) directed against ethnic minorities;
 - e. degree of integration into the institutions of the political system (for example, within political parties, voluntary associations . . .);
 - f. the extent of access to the formal decision-making process (both in reality, and as perceived by group members).

²⁰Robert Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York, 1962), 381–99; Robert Lane and David Sears, *Public Opinion* (Englewood Cliffs, 1964), 40. Both discussions, while not necessarily in this context, emphasize the significance of loyalty to social groupings in providing a focus of orientation for individuals in a society. The impact of primary loyalty to a familiar ethnic group in an unfamiliar “host society” cannot be overemphasized in a discussion of that group’s bargaining power.

5. SUPERIMPOSED PSYCHO-POLITICAL FACTORS

- a. degree of assimilation of natural group opinion leaders;
- b. degree to which "nationalist" appeals by opinion leaders are sympathetically supported;
- c. degree of positive orientation to ethnic group symbols of differentiation;
- d. degree to which ethnic minority social identity is superseded by the integrating host society;
- e. degree of group self-reference as a distinctive nationality;
- f. relative acceptability of parallel "nationalist demands" to political leaders representative of the scale of differing ideological positions.

The above categorization of factors is suggestive of the types of operational concepts which ought to be considered in attempting to develop a point of common departure in the endeavour to analyse the relative strengths and significance, and indeed even the seriousness, of proffered "quasi-nationalist" movements. It appears important, when considering broadly the notion of nationalist ideology, especially within the context of national integration, not to view each instance as a peculiar specific case, nor even to differentiate radically between pre- and post-industrial communities. The thesis offered here is simply that nationalism lies in the normal pattern of grouped human behaviour, being rooted in ethnicity, explicable in terms of a group demand theory, and permissive of substantial quantification on a comparative basis in due course as data collection and measuring techniques become more satisfactory and reliable.