

(vols. 1–4, Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich, 1962–70), and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are well represented. Czechoslovakia is among the countries covered: Sonderheft number 3 (1968) contains, among other contributions, a twenty-page survey of Slovak historiography by Horst Glassl; and number 4 (1970), written by Ferdinand Seibt, is devoted exclusively to Czech historiography. Glassl's account has now been issued in a much expanded form as a separate volume by Harrasowitz, and may be regarded as a companion piece to Seibt. Both volumes survey the historical output published since 1945. Seibt covers the works dealing with Czech history from the earliest times to the outbreak of World War II, and Glassl's terminal year for Slovak history is 1918. Most of the works reviewed by Glassl are monographs and articles published in Czechoslovakia, but studies published by Western historians also command his attention, and there are a few references to émigré Slovak material.

A volume of this nature on any one of the "established" European nationalities could be regarded as just another historiographical survey. Not so a volume on Slovakia. Before 1945 serious accounts of Slovak history usually began only with the period of national awakening around the year 1800, and the story of Slovakia's past was little more than an appendage to Czech history. It is one of the paradoxes of Slovak historiography that it fell to the Marxists—by definition committed to internationalism rather than nationalism—to redress this imbalance and to develop an overall conception of Slovak national history. This conception reaches back as far as the period of the Greater Moravian Empire in the ninth century. Earlier historiography did not identify this empire specifically with either the Czech or the Slovak element, but the Slovak consensus today is—as Glassl shows—that this state was basically created and inhabited by the forefathers of the present-day Slovaks. In other words, the Slovaks have more or less appropriated for themselves Greater Moravia, with all its achievements and its contributions to Christianity (Cyril and Methodius!). There is a striking resemblance here to the Kievan State and its role in Russian and Ukrainian history. Doubtless some of the findings of Slovak scholars will have to be modified, but nothing is likely to change the fact that the Slovaks now have a past to call their own. To show how this past has been reconstructed in all its important aspects is the chief merit of Glassl's volume. He has helped to etch the Slovaks into Europe's consciousness. One only hopes that their newly found sense of history will not make them too extravagant in staking out a place for themselves in European history.

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THE RAGUSAN REPUBLIC: VICTIM OF NAPOLEON AND ITS OWN CONSERVATISM. By *Harriet Bjelovučić*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970. 184 pp. 32 Dutch guilders, paper.

This study attempts to show how, between 1750 or 1760 and 1813, the history of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) fits into the pattern of Robert R. Palmer's well-known thesis of a Western democratic revolution initiated during the same general period in large parts of Western and Central Europe and the Americas. In particular, the author sees a close analogy between the Ragusan and Genevan revolutionary patterns, which she explains by the similarity of the political and social institutions

of the two republics. On the other hand, she also notes that the political and social organization of Ragusa was modeled more directly on that of Venice. Unfortunately she does not use a work that would have thrown additional light on the comparisons between Venice and Ragusa that she does make—James Cushman Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class* (Baltimore, 1962).

The author further observes that Ragusa experienced an economic transformation during the eighteenth century and before the French (Napoleonic) occupation of 1806—a shift of mobile wealth from the order of patricians to the orders of the citizens and of the people or *pučani* (three distinct estates), without a corresponding diversion of political authority to the now economically dominant groups. As a result, a tendency to question the mode of operation of the existing social order became apparent and may have culminated in a social revolution after 1820. But the French occupation of Ragusa, undertaken in part to halt Russia's northward advance from Cattaro (Kotor), burdened the city and its territory with a premature revolution imposed by outside military force. Many Ragusans, especially among the youth, citizens, and Jews, but also among the "people" and even among the patricians and clergy, were originally sympathetic to the French. Because of the association between revolution and foreign occupation, however, the trend toward a self-made revolution was thwarted. Like others before her, the author fails to define "revolution."

Readers who may not be fully convinced by this interpretation will nevertheless find valuable details on the political and social structures of Ragusa, on the Ragusan merchant marine, clergy, and peasantry (or *contadini*, quite distinct from the noncitizen but urban-based "people"), and on quarantine practices against the plague, the revolt of the peasantry of the fertile county of Canali (Konavle) several years before the French occupation, the conflict between France and Russia in the southern Adriatic, and the French occupation and later (1811) incorporation of Ragusa in the Illyrian Provinces. The book contains a useful bibliographical essay.

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DAS ENDE AUF DEM BALKAN 1944/45: DIE MILITÄRISCHE RÄUMUNG JUGOSLAVIENS DURCH DIE DEUTSCHE WEHRMACHT.

By *Karl Hnilicka*. Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 13. Göttingen, Frankfurt, Zürich: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1970. 404 pp. DM 78.

The story of the German operations in the Balkans in 1941 is well known, but as the author of this study rightly observes, what happened after that campaign has been written almost exclusively from the standpoint of the enemies of Germany. Yugoslavian accounts of the Partisan war abound, but until Hnilicka published this study there were almost no scholarly accounts giving the German side of the story. The author does not attempt to fill the whole gap, but rather confines himself to the last eight months of the war during which the Germans fought a desperate rear-guard action against the combined forces of the Red Army and Tito's Partisans. Despite all difficulties the German command managed to conduct a reasonably orderly retreat and were able to prevent any large body of troops from being cut off. This accomplishment was particularly impressive, for though the