

VOLUME 16
NUMBER 1
MARCH 1993

An International Journal of Current Research
and Theory with Open Peer Commentary

Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Appearing in this issue, with Commentary . . .

How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality Alison Gopnik

The psychology of folk psychology Alvin I. Goldman

A perspective for viewing the history of psychophysics David J. Murray

Also, Continuing Commentary on

"Sex differences in mathematical reasoning ability in intellectually talented preadolescents: Their nature, effects and possible causes" (Benbow)

"Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science" (Searle)

"The neuropsychology of schizophrenia" (Gray et al.)

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences

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Subscriptions *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* (ISSN 0140-525X) is published quarterly in March, June, September, and December. Four parts form a volume. The subscription price for institutions of Volume 16 (1993) is US \$196.00 net in the U.S.A. and Canada; £133.00 in the rest of the world; for individuals US \$80.00 net (£54.00); for BBS Associates and for students (in the U.S.A. and Canada only) with proof of eligibility with order US \$46.00 net (£34.00); for APA, APS, and ASA members US \$64.00 net (£34.00) with proof of eligibility with order. Subscription price includes postage.

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