

and the exile centers in London, Moscow, and Kiev. Brandes rates the intelligence operations of the underground favorably, yet demonstrates that partisan activity and sabotage did not inflict serious damage on production for the German war effort until 1945.

The third section is a dramatic account of preparations for and the execution of the Prague uprising in May 1945. Brandes devotes much space to the successful prevention of the city's destruction, but the general picture of the internal resistance is again one of failure: military weakness vis-à-vis the Germans, and political impotence in the power struggle with the Beneš government in Košice. A concise summary concludes the book.

Brandes might have analyzed the overall failure of the Czech resistance in the context of its significance for modern society in general. The cynical and successful German efforts to buy compliance with tidbits of economic and personal security stand as a frightening example of the vulnerability of an advanced industrial society to tyranny. The author has nevertheless given us a valuable study of a previously neglected period of Czech history.

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HUMANITY: THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS G. MASARYK. By *Antonie van den Beld*. Issues in Contemporary Politics, Historical and Theoretical Perspectives, 1. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1975. x, 162 pp. 25 Dglds.

Was Masaryk a major philosopher? Dr. van den Beld, in this English edition of his thesis (Faculty of Divinity, Utrecht, 1973) notes that Masaryk's name rarely appears in modern textbooks on philosophy or ethics. He concedes that, indeed, Masaryk did not make a significant contribution to logic, epistemology, metaphysics, or religion. Masaryk's importance, he says, lies in the sphere of social and political philosophy. This study examines Masaryk's thought, taking as its starting point the concept of *humanita*, the fundamental norm of morality in Masaryk's system. The author concludes that Masaryk upheld two mutually incompatible views on the relationship "between human nature and morality": at times he argued that all humans were endowed with a natural sentiment of humanity; at other times he upheld a fundamental distinction between *is* and *ought*, though he failed "to find a proper theoretical basis for this distinction." Masaryk understood humanity in broad terms as promotion of nationality, social justice (which he often called "socialism"), and democracy, and the book examines his ideas on these matters as concrete applications of *humanita*. A concluding chapter deals with the question of revolution in Masaryk's thought: can the goals of humanity be attained by means of force, or revolutionary violence?

There are many interesting observations in the author's discussion of these problems; the chapter on Masaryk's treatment of the social question and his attitude toward Marxism is especially valuable. The concluding chapter clearly presents Masaryk's critique of the Bolshevik Revolution. It is less successful, however, in elucidating Masaryk's arguments in favor of his own nationalist revolution against Austria. In this regard the author's analysis is marred by his failure to recognize that Masaryk had accepted the *ideal* of national independence long before 1914: van den Beld thinks that when Masaryk spoke about the Habsburg Monarchy's likely survival he was thereby declaring his loyalty to the idea of the empire. Van den Beld's statement, "It was only during the First World War that the idea of a nation state dawned upon him; even though it was not a coherent idea," is simply wrong. The author would have avoided this mistake if he had treated Masaryk's ideas historically, as they

developed in response to the changing circumstances of Czech and European politics. The idea of Czechoslovakia was not an opportunistic afterthought but Masaryk's most important political idea.

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HUNGARY BETWEEN WILSON AND LENIN: THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1918-1919 AND THE BIG THREE. By *Peter Pastor*. East European Monographs, 20. Boulder, Colo.: *East European Quarterly*, 1976. viii, 191 pp. \$13.00. Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York.

Revolution as a response to military defeat is a political reflex that can take a number of different directions, depending on a variety of local conditions and external pressures. Hungary's experience at the end of the First World War is particularly interesting in this regard, as it includes two distinct variants of this process: the People's Republic of Hungary led by Mihaly Karolyi, and its equally short-lived successor, the Hungarian Soviet Republic led by Bela Kun. Professor Pastor's monograph examines the struggle for survival of the Karolyi regime, mainly in the context of its relations with the Western Allies.

Focusing on the relationship between victors and vanquished, the study is a detailed account of Hungary's attempts to evade the territorial consequences of a punitive peace during the five-odd months between the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire and the coming to power of Bela Kun. Since Wilsonian principles were the stated ideology of the victors, any attempt to ameliorate the peace conditions appeared to require a government pledged to democratic rule, which in the case of Hungary implied not only social and political reforms but also plebiscites to determine the future of her subject nationalities. Nonetheless, that the Frostflower Revolution (as the author labels the events that led up to the proclamation of a Hungarian republic in late October 1918) "had its roots deeply set in the Hungarian past" seems open to question. The author's reference to 1848-49 is too brief to be convincing on this point.

Though the study fully documents the disillusionment and the humiliation suffered by the Karolyi government at the hands of the Allies, particularly the French, the author does not confront the underlying question: To what extent was the Karolyi regime merely a form of nationalist self-defense, to be discarded when it proved ineffective in preserving "territorial Hungary" from the claims of her neighbors? Beyond the personal integrity and reformist aspirations of members of the Karolyi government, how much of the support it commanded was a function of its assumed capacity to negotiate a favorable settlement with the Allies? This question is also central to the author's thesis that it was Allied insensitivity and lack of understanding that brought about the rapid demise of Hungary's "liberal democratic revolution." But how strong was a revolutionary regime that could be brought down by outraged nationalism responding to a foreign ultimatum?

In the immediate aftermath of the Habsburg Monarchy's dissolution, the question of the subject nationalities was clearly of overarching importance for the future of a socialist or democratic regime in Hungary. Yet Pastor does not attempt to analyze the implications, for Hungary and for her neighbors, of the nationalities policy advocated by the Karolyi government. Scattered references to self-determination through plebiscites and cultural autonomy can not do justice to this complex question, which would have a determining influence not only on domestic politics and social policy, but also on Hungary's relations with the peacemakers in Paris.

Magyar leaders of this period emerge from Professor Pastor's account as naïve visionaries, united in their determination to avoid the consequences of a lost war and