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RECALIBRATING THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME THROUGH NARROWED JURISDICTION
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 April 2020
Abstract
The legitimacy crisis confronting the international investment regime has called for reforms to eliminate the asymmetric and troubled nature of investment treaties. These instruments grant extensive investor protections without offering reciprocal safeguards for host States wishing to preserve regulatory space. This article argues that any reform designed to redress imbalances in the existing regime should first aim at narrowing the personal jurisdiction of investment tribunals. Problematically, access to most investment treaties depends on broad nationality requirements, which have enabled investors to use corporations or passports of convenience to obtain treaty protection. This practice exacerbates the unbalanced relationship between host States and investors. It increases host States’ exposure to investment treaty claims and allows investors to circumvent newer, more State-oriented investment treaties. Using as an example the novel anti-nationality planning approach embraced in the 2019 Dutch Model BIT, this article suggests effective treaty mechanisms that States can adopt to restrict the range of investors that are entitled to claim.
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- Copyright © The Author, 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press for the British Institute of International and Comparative Law
Footnotes
An earlier version of this article was presented at the International Economic Law Interest Group Session of the 2018 ESIL Conference in Manchester. I am grateful for the questions and comments received there, and to the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for its financial support for my attendance at the conference. Valuable comments and criticisms of Professor Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Jérémy Faivre, Michael De Boeck and the members of the Department of International Law are acknowledged. The views expressed and the errors or omissions made are the responsibility of the author alone.
References
1 See, for instance, the 2018 United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, which eliminates ISDS between the United States and Canada, or the decision of the Member States of the European Union to terminate their intra-EU BITs in line with the Achmea judgment <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/190117-bilateral-investment-treaties_en.pdf>.
2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report (2019) (UNCTAD's World Investment Report 2019) 99–100.
3 UNCTAD, Recent Developments in the International Investment Regime, 1 IIA Issue Note (May 2018) 3.
4 UNCTAD's World Investment Report 2019 (n 2) 105–9.
5 European Commission, ‘European Court of Justice confirms compatibility of Investment Court System with EU Treaties’, Dispute settlement, Brussels, Press Release (30 April 2019).
6 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (2018). The agreement will replace the 12 existing bilateral investment treaties between Singapore and 13 EU Member States.
7 For a full list of reform options see UNCITRAL's Working Group III website at <https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state>.
8 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1966).
9 UNCTAD, Phase 2 of the IIA Reform: Modernizing the Existing Stock of Old-Generation Treaties, 2 IIA Issue Note (June 2017) 3.
10 ibid 4.
11 ibid.
12 Salacuse, JW, ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries’ (1990) 24(3) The International Lawyer 665Google Scholar.
13 Wells, LT, ‘The Emerging Global Regime for Investment: A Response to Jeswald W. Salacuse’ (2010) 51 HarvIntlLJ 427Google Scholar, 48.
14 Finland–Egypt BIT (2005) art 1(3).
15 Canada–Chile FTA (1997) Annex B-01.1.
16 The ECT (1998) art 1(7).
17 NAFTA (1994) art 201.
18 UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub, International Investment Agreements Navigator 2019 (UNCTAD's IIA Mapping) <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/iia-mapping>.
19 Uruguay–Armenia BIT (2002). (‘this treaty will not apply to investments made by natural persons who hold the nationality of both Contracting Parties’, translation by the author).
20 ICSID Convention (n 8) art 25(2)(a).
21 M Perkams, ‘The Determination of Nationality of Investors in International Investment Agreements (IIAs) – Taking Stock of the Criteria Used in Modern Investment Law’ in ILA German Branch, Working Group, The Determination of the Nationality of Investors under Investment Protection Treaties (106 Heft 2011) 13.
22 F Franke, Der personelle Anwendungsbereich des internationalen Investitionsschutzrechts (Nomos/Hart Publishing 2013) 138.
23 Perkams (n 21) 15. eg United Kingdom–El Salvador BIT (2001) art 1(c)(i).
24 United Kingdom–El Salvador BIT (2001) art 1(c)(i).
25 France–Libya BIT (2006) art 1(2)(b). (‘the term ‘‘company’’ means a juridical person constituted in the territory of a contracting party in accordance with its national legislation and having its seat in that state’, translation by the author).
26 See Perkams (n 21) 14.
27 See eg, Netherlands–Bahrain BIT (2007) art 1(b)(ii) and (iii).
28 R van Os, ‘Dutch Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Gateway to ‘‘Treaty Shopping’’ for Investment Protection by Multinational Companies’ (2011) Amsterdam/SOMO.
29 Netherlands–Bahrain BIT (2002) art 1(b)(ii) and (iii). The criterion in all Dutch IIAs is worded as controlled directly or indirectly by natural or legal persons; see also art 1(b)(iii) of the Netherlands–Brazil BIT or art 1(b)(iii) of the Netherlands–Ethiopia BIT.
30 ICSID Convention (n 8) art 25(2)(b).
31 ECT (no 16) art 1(7).
32 UNCTAD's IIA Mapping (n 18).
33 RF Hansen, ‘Parallel Proceedings in Investor-State Treaty Arbitration: Responses for Treaty-Drafters, Arbitrators and Parties’ 2010 73(4) MLR 542–3; P Dumberry, ‘The Legal Standing of Shareholders before Arbitral Tribunals: Has Any Rule of Customary International Law Crystallised?’ 2010 3(18) MicSJIL 360.
34 J Arato, ‘Reforming Shareholder Claims in ISDS’ (2019) Academic Forum on ISDS Concept Paper 2019/9 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3433465>.
35 J Baumgartner, Treaty Shopping in International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2016) 12.
36 ICSID Convention (n 8) art 25(2)(a). As explained above, this provision precludes any consent by parties to ICSID jurisdiction where the claimant has the nationality of the respondent Contracting State at the relevant dates.
37 Serafín García Armas and Karina García Gruber v The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, PCA Case No 2013-3, Decision on Jurisdiction (15 December 2014). The author was legal counsel for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in this case. The views stated here are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela or any other State or entity.
38 Spain–Venezuela BIT (1995) art 1.
39 García Armas I v Venezuela (n 37) paras 107–117.
40 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006) art 7.
41 García Armas I v Venezuela (n 37) paras 56–67.
42 ibid, paras 159–166.
43 See eg Antonio Valle Ruiz and others v Kingdom of Spain, ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration, Notice of Arbitration (23 August 2018); Michael Ballantine and others v The Dominican Republic, PCA Case No 2016-17, Final Award (3 September 2019); Alberto Carrizosa Gelzis and others v The Republic of Colombia, Notice of Arbitration (23 February 2018) PCA Case No 2018-56; Carlos Esteban Sastre v United Mexican States, ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration, Notice of Arbitration (29 December 2017); Sergei Viktorovich Pugachev v the Russian Federation, ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration, Notice of Arbitration (21 September 2015); Dawood Rawat v The Republic of Mauritius, PCA Case No 2016-20, Award on Jurisdiction (6 April 2018); Julio Miguel Orlandini-Agreda and others v Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2018-39 Jorge Heemsen and Enrique Heemsen v The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration, Award on Jurisdiction (29 October 2019).
44 Manuel García Armas and others v The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, PCA Case No 2016-08, Award on Jurisdiction (13 December 2019).
45 Mohamed Abdel Raouf Bahgat v Arab Republic of Egypt, PCA Case No. 2012-07, Decision on Jurisdiction (30 November 2017); Rawat v Mauritius (n 43); Cem Cenzig Uzan v Republic of Turkey, SCC Arbitration V 2014/023, Award on Respondent's Bifurcated Preliminary Objection (20 April 2016).
46 Rawat v Mauritius (n 43) para 168.
47 ibid, paras 170–172. The tribunal ultimately declined jurisdiction because the France–Mauritius BIT only allows investors to submit their disputes to ICSID through an investment contract. The tribunal first rejected the claimant's attempt to use the MFN clause in the BIT to import the UNCITRAL dispute settlement mechanism from another investment treaty. It then held that the reference to the ICSID Convention in the BIT meant that, since under art 25(2)(a) of the Convention there would be no jurisdiction over a dual French–Mauritius national, the claimant could not qualify as investor. This notwithstanding, the tribunal was still consistent with the findings in García Armas I that the BIT's silence on dual home–host State nationals should be understood as an implicit agreement by the Contracting Parties to be sued by their own nationals. Put another way, if the ISDS clause in the France–Mauritius BIT also provided for UNCITRAL arbitration, the tribunal would have had upheld jurisdiction.
48 García Armas II v Venezuela (n 44) and Heemsen v Venezuela (n 43).
49 García Armas II v Venezuela (n 44) para 702.
50 ibid, para 695 (‘international investment law [has not] evolved to the extent of allowing claims by dual home–host State nationals without any limitations’, translation by the author).
51 ibid, para 721 (‘given this hierarchy that imposes the priority or obligation of ICSID arbitration’, translation by the author).
52 ibid (‘through the explicit reference to ICSID’, translation by the author).
53 ibid (‘the Contracting Parties “have implicitly, but necessarily, excluded dual nationals [Spanish–Venezuelan nationals] from the scope of application of the BIT”’, translation by the author). On this point, the tribunal quoted the tribunal in Rawat v Mauritius at para 179.
54 ibid, para 172 (‘[t]he practical consequence of this conclusion is that the definition of ‘‘investor’’ in the BIT does not have different meanings depending on the forum resorted to’, translation by the author).
55 A Millington, ‘23 Countries Where Money Can Buy You a Second Passport or ‘‘Elite Residency’’’ Business Insider (27 December 2018).
56 Antonio Valle Ruiz and others v Spain (n 43) para 2.
57 ibid.
58 See, eg, Olguin v Paraguay, ICSID Case No ARB/98/5, Award (26 July 2001); Saba Fakes v Turkey, ICSID Case No ARB/07/20, Award (14 July 2010); Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v United Arab Emirates, ICSID Case No ARB/02/7, Award (7 July 2004).
59 David R. Aven and others v The Republic of Costa Rica, Case No UNCT/15/3, UNCITRAL, Final Award (18 September 2018).
60 ibid, para 188.
61 ibid.
62 ibid, para 215.
63 ibid, para 242.
64 Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No ARB/11/33, Award (3 November 2015) para 274.
65 J García Olmedo, ‘Claims by Dual Nationals under Investment Treaties: Are Investors Entitled to Sue Their Own States?’ (2017) 8(4) JIDS 32.
66 L Reed and JE Davis, ‘Who Is a Protected Investor?’ in M Bungenberg et al. (eds), International Investment Law: A Handbook (Hart Publishing 2015) 614.
67 K Yannaca-Small, ‘Who Is Entitled to Claim? The Definition of Nationality in Investment Arbitration’ in K Yannaca-Small (ed), Arbitration under International Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2018) 129–60.
68 Baumgartner (n 35) 13.
69 Wells (n 13) 49.
70 For a study on the frequency of corporate structuring, see E Lee, ‘Treaty Shopping in International Investment Arbitration: How Often Has It Occurred and How Has It Been Perceived by Tribunals?’ (2015) LSE Working Paper Series 15/167 <http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/Dissertations/WP167.pdf>.
71 UNCTAD, Fact Sheet on Investor–State Dispute Settlement Cases in 2018, Recent Developments in the International Investment Regime, 2 IIA Issue Note (May 2019).
72 R Knottnerus, ‘Socialising Losses, Privatising Gains: How Dutch Investment Treaties Harm the Public Interest’ (2015) SOMO, Amsterdam.
73 RL Wellhausen, The Shield of Nationality: When Governments Break Contracts with Foreign Firms (Cambridge University Press 2015).
74 J Lee, ‘Resolving Concerns of Treaty Shopping in International Investment Arbitration’ (2015) 6(2) JIDS 355–79.
75 An analysis of 72 awards by GV Harten shows that in nearly all of these decisions (85 per cent) arbitrators have adopted an ‘expansive approach’ to the definition of ‘corporate person investor’. See GV Harten, ‘Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication (Part Two): An Examination of Hypotheses of Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2016) 53(2) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 558.
76 Tidewater Inc and others v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/10/5, Decision on Jurisdiction (8 February 2013) para 184. For a comprehensive analysis on arbitral decisions endorsing the narrow reading of broad definitions of national and favouring the practice of corporate structuring see Baumgartner (n 35) 26.
77 See eg E Gaillard, ‘Abuse of Process in International Arbitration’ (2017) 32(1) ICSIDRev 19–20; SW Schill and HL Bray, ‘Good Faith Limitations on Protected Investments and Corporate Restructuring’ in AD Mitchell, M Sornarajah and T Voon (eds), Good Faith and International Economic Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 88–114; C Schreuer, ‘Nationality Planning in Contemporary Issues In International Arbitration And Mediation’ (2013)The Fordham Papers 19 and 26.
78 C Schreuer et al., The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2009) para 273. With respect to locally incorporated companies bringing claims under the second limb of art 25(2)(b) of the Convention, States must agree in their treaty, or other instrument, to treat these companies as nationals of the home State because of ‘foreign control’. This has raised the question whether the investor must satisfy a ‘subjective control test’ pursuant to the treaty, an ‘objective control test’ under the ICSID Convention, or both. Arbitral jurisprudence is inconsistent on this point. See, eg, TSA Spectrum de Argentina SA v the Argentine Republic, Award (19 December 2008) ICSID Case No ARB/05/5; and Quiborax SA v Bolivia, Decision on Jurisdiction (27 September 2012) ICSID Case No ARB/06/2.
79 Isolux Netherlands, BV v Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, Final Award (17 July 2016).
80 ibid, para 668 (‘the formal requirements of Article 1(7) of the ECT [ie incorporation]’, translation by the author).
81 ibid, para 704. (‘the dispute arose after the aforementioned restructuring and the interposition of the investment in a Dutch entity’, translation by the author). For another recent case recent case on the acceptance of shell companies see United Utilities (Tallinn) B.V. and Aktsiaselts Tallinna Vesi v Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No ARB/14/24, Award (21 June 2019).
82 Philip Morris Asia Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (17 December 2015) UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2012-12, para 554.
83 For a discussion on investment jurisprudence setting limits on corporate structuring see D Watson and T Brebner, ‘Nationality Planning and Abuse of Process: A Coherent Framework’, (2018) ICSIDRev 33(1) 302–29.
84 Philip Morris v Australia (n 82) para 554.
85 ibid, paras 555–569.
86 See eg Glencore Finance Ltd.v The Plurinational State of Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2016-39, Bolivia's Preliminary Objections, Statement of Defence and Reply on Bifurcation (18 December 2017) paras 296–297.
87 For a recent analysis of the different types of parallel claims see G Zarra, Parallel Proceedings in Investment Arbitration (Eleven International Publishing 2017).
88 Z Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge University Press 2015) 153.
89 M Friedman, ‘Treaties as Agreements to Arbitrate – Related Dispute Resolution Regimes: Parallel Proceedings in BIT Arbitration’ in AJ van den Berg (ed), International Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics? (Kluwer Law International 2007). The author reviewed awards in 78 completed cases and found evidence of concurrent proceedings in 41 per cent of them. See also Zarra (n 87).
90 OI European Group B.V. v Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/11/25, Award (10 March 2015).
91 Fábrica de Vidrios Los Andes C.A. & Owens-Illinois De Venezuela, C.A. and Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/12/2, Award (13 November 2017) para 168. The tribunal ultimately declined to exercise jurisdiction for reasons concerning Venezuela's denunciation of the ICSID Convention in 2012.
92 ibid, para 9.
93 Eskosol S.p.A. in liquidazione v Italy, ICSID Case No ARB/15/50, Decision on Respondent's Application under Rule 41(5) (20 March 2017). Request for arbitration filed on 9 December 2015. Proceedings are still pending on the merits.
94 Blusun S.A., and others v Italy, ICSID Case No ARB/14/3, Award (20 December 2016). Request for arbitration filed on 21 February 2014. The award was rendered in favour of the State.
95 Eskosol v Italy (n 93) para 169.
96 UNCITRAL, ‘Concurrent Proceedings in International Arbitration’, Note by the Secretariat, A/CN.9/881 (April 2016).
97 J Arato, ‘The Private Law Critique of International Investment Law’ (2019) 113(1) AJIL 53.
98 Orascom TMT Investments v Algeria, ICSID Case No ARB/12/35, Award (31 May 2017).
99 ibid, para 553.
100 Vodafone International Holdings BV v India (I), PCA Case No 2016-35.
101 Vodafone Group Plc and Vodafone Consolidated Holdings Limited v India (II), ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration. For more details on the case see, TW Chiang, ‘Anti-Arbitration Injunctions in Investment Arbitration: Lessons Learnt from the India v. Vodafone Case’ (2018) 11(2) Contemporary Asian Arbitration Journal 254–7.
102 Lee (n 74) 378.
103 Watson and Brebner (n 83) 329.
104 RL Wellhausen, ‘Recent Trends in Investor–State Dispute Settlement’ (2016) 7(1) JIDS 642–3.
105 U Topcan, ‘Abuse of the Right to Access ICSID Arbitration’ (2014) 29(3) ICSIDRev 19–20.
106 Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection and of Investments between ___ and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (22 March 2019) <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse-zaken/documenten/publicaties/2019/03/22/nieuwe-modeltekst-investeringsakkoorden>.
107 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2019 (n 2) 105.
108 ibid.
109 Olmedo (n 65) 8.
110 UNCTAD's IIA Mapping (n 18).
111 Mauritius–Egypt BIT (2014) art 1(3)(b).
112 ICSID Convention (n 8) art 25(2)(a).
113 Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v Chile, ICSID Case No ARB/98/2, Award (8 May 2008) para 317.
114 Slovak Republic–Iran BIT (2016) art 1(3)(a).
115 ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (n 40) art 7.
116 R Dolzer and C Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 44.
117 See Dissenting Opinion of arbitrator Oreamuno in García Armas v Venezuela I (n 37) 102, where he observed that an investment qualifies for BIT protection only if, as was the case at hand, the investor held the nationality of the home State party at the time his or her investment was made.
118 UNCTAD's IIA Mapping (n 18).
119 Aven v Costa Rica (n 59) para 205 (emphasis added).
120 Slovak Republic–Iran BIT (2016) art 1(3)(b).
121 A Schurink, ‘New Dutch Model BIT: Negotiations to Commence Soon’ Freshfields Risk & Compliance Archive (18 June 2019).
122 Dutch Model BIT (n 106).
123 Michael Ballantine et al v The Dominican Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2016-17, Final Award (3 September 2019).
124 ibid, para 531.
125 ibid, para 530.
126 ibid, para 559.
127 ibid, para 554.
128 Australia–Hong Kong BIT (2019) art 1.
129 Baumgartner (n 35) Ch 8.
130 Dutch Model BIT (n 106). Other IIAs containing similar provisions include the EU–Singapore FTA (2018) and the Rwanda–United Arab Emirates BIT (2017).
131 M Feldman, ‘Setting Limits on Corporate Nationality Planning in Investment Treaty Arbitration’, (2012) 27(2) ICSIDRev 283.
132 L Mistelis and C Mihaela Baltag, ‘Denial of Benefits and Article 17 of the Energy Charter Treaty’ (2009) 113 Penn State Law Review 1320–1.
133 UNCTAD's IIA Mapping (n 18).
134 United States–Peru FTA (2009) art 10.12(2).
135 For a comprehensive analysis of arbitral decisions favouring the prospective application of DOB clauses, see Y Banifatemi, ‘Taking into Account Control under Denial of Benefits Clauses’ in Y Banifatemi and E Gaillard (eds), Jurisdiction in Investment Treaty Arbitration IAI Series on International Arbitration No 8 (Juris Publishing 2018). She also examines decisions where tribunals have reached a different conclusion on the timing and effect of these clauses, finding that a DOB right can be exercised by the respondent State at the time when treaty benefits are sought by the investor through a request for arbitration. See eg Ulysseas Incorporated v Ecuador, PCA Case No 2009-19, Interim Award (12 June 2012).
136 Plama Consortium Limited v Bulgaria, ICSID Case No ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction 8 (February 2005).
137 ibid, para 161.
138 ibid, para 162.
139 ibid, para 157.
140 See eg Masdar Solar and Wind Cooperatief UA v Spain, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/14/1 (16 May 2018).
141 ibid, para 239.
142 Ampal-American Israel Corporation and others v Egypt, Decision on jurisdiction, ICSID Case No ARB/12/11 (1 February 2016).
143 ibid, paras 164–169. Art 25 of the ICSID Convention (n 96) provides that ‘when the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally’.
144 BLEU Model BIT (2019) art 13(2).
145 Serbia–United Arab Emirates BIT (2013) art 14(1).
146 International Energy Charter, ‘Energy Charter Conference Gives Green Light for Negotiations on Modernisation of the ECT’ Media/News (7 November 2019) <https://www.energycharter.org/media/news/article/energy-charter-conference-gives-green-light-for-negotiations-on-modernisation-of-the-ect/>.
147 Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Policy Options for Modernisation of the ECT’, CCDEC 2019 08S TR, Brussels (6 October 2019) <https://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/CCDECS/2019/CCDEC201908.pdf>
148 ibid 26
149 ibid.
150 P Eberhardt, ‘One Treaty to Rule Them All: The Energy Charter Treaty and the Power It Gives Corporations to Halt the Energy Transition’ (2018) CEO and TNI, Brussels/Amsterdam.
151 UNCITRAL, ‘Report of Working Group III (Investor–State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its thirty-sixth session (Vienna, 29 October–2 November 2018)’ A/CN.9/964 (6 November 2018) para 42.
152 ibid, para 41.
153 UNCITRAL, ‘Reform Options: Tabular Presentation of Framework for Discussion’ A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.166/Add.1 (30 July 2019) 9.
154 Reinisch, A ‘The Issues Raised by Parallel Proceedings and Possible Solutions’ in Waibel, M et al. (eds), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2010) 121Google Scholar. Voss, JO, Impact of Investment Treaties on Contracts between Host States and Foreign Investors (Martinus Nijhoff 2011) 278–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
155 K Yannaca-Small, ‘Parallel Proceedings’ in P Muchlinski et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford Handbooks Online 2012) 123.
156 UNCITRAL's Note on Concurrent Proceedings (n 96) para 50.
157 Eskosol v Italy (n 93); see also SARL Benvenuti & Bonfant v People's Republic of Congo (Case No ARB/77/2) (15 August 1980), VIII YB Com Arb 145 (1983) para 1.14.
158 Cremades, BM and Madalena, I, ‘Parallel Proceedings in International Arbitration’ (2008) 24(4) Arbitration International 534CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
159 Dutch Model BIT (n 106).
160 UNCITRAL's Note on Concurrent Proceedings (n 96) para 59.
161 UNCTAD's IIA Mapping (n 18). Only 135 out of 2,577 mapped IIAs contain some form of waiver provisions.
162 EU–Singapore FTA (2018) art 9(7).
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