

proto-fascist orientation of the French left. While I strongly support Vincent's dismissal of Sternhell's profascism thesis, the issue of anti-Semitism remains a troubling one that, in my view, is not wholly resolved by Vincent's account.

Benoit Malon's main financial backers for his journalistic activities were Henri Rochefort and Rodolphe Simon – both confirmed anti-Semites. In *La Revue Socialiste*, anti-Semitic articles by writers such as Auguste Chirac and Albert Regnard appeared during Malon's editorial tenure. As Vincent points out, Malon distanced himself from such writers' racialist theories and condemned the fanaticism of Edouard Drumont in his review of Drumont's rabidly anti-Semitic *La France Juive*; but that Malon, like many better educated intellectuals of his epoch readily associated Judaism with the evils of capitalism and that he was not sensitive to the social discrimination experienced by this particular minority group cannot be denied.

Vincent argues that this insensitivity resulted more from Malon's anti-clericalism, his Enlightenment belief in assimilationism, and his need to forge anti-capitalist alliances. To equate such insensitivity with Drumont's brand of hatred, Vincent writes, "obscures precisely those aspects of the matter – especially the prevalence of hidden prejudice in assimilationist programs – that are of historical interest" (p.128). This is a subtle argument, as is his claim that for Malon the term "Semite" connoted the negative aspects of Judaeo-Christian civilization as opposed to the Republican embrace of Graeco-Roman ideals. Malon's fellow editors and closest associates at the *Revue*, Eugène Fournière and Gustave Rouanet became socialist deputies in Jaurès's camp and, like Jaurès, were ardent Dreyfusards. However, in the course of my own research on Malon, I have found enough evidence of his cultural and political prejudice against Jews to wonder whether Malon, had he lived to experience the Affair, would have been so ardent. The question remains to be explored; but Vincent's careful reasoning on this issue will ensure that it is examined with both care and conscience.

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DONGEN, BAS VAN. *Revolutie of integratie. De Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij in Nederland (SDAP) tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog.* Stichting Beheer IISG, Amsterdam 1992. 864 pp. D.fl. 75.00.

In Rotterdam on 11 November 1918, Pieter Jelles Troelstra, the leader of the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDAP), proclaimed to thousands of exultant workers, the takeover of political power by the Dutch proletariat. The following day, in The Hague, Troelstra addressed Parliament, again announcing the impending triumph of the Dutch proletariat. It was, he said, to be a non-violent revolution, and he appealed to the Dutch government to resign. The next few days showed Troelstra's proclamation to have been a dramatic error, however; neither the party leadership and rank and file, nor the rank-and-file members of the socialist trade unions, nor the military and the proletarian masses were willing to lead the SDAP to power. Furthermore, the Dutch government organized a "counter-revolution" and succeeded in mobilizing the army and thousands of protestant and catholic workers against the "red menace". So the "Dutch socialist revolution" perished before it had really even got under way, leaving the SDAP and the trade unions suspected of being an unreliable "alien" in Dutch society and condemning the SDAP to a position of political isolation.

The author of this thesis, Bas van Dongen, concentrates on how this dramatic situation came about and on its historical conditions. He analyses the history of the party from its founding in 1894 to the party congress of April 1919. The particular focus of his analysis is the period of the First World War, which is dealt with in extraordinary detail. He shows that characteristic of the position and policy of the party was the growing tension between its Kautskyan-Marxist programme and theoretical position on the one hand, and a growing tendency to "conform" to existing capitalist conditions on the other. This tendency to conform was the result of so-called "vested interests", which turned the SDAP into a party supportive of reform. This concept of vested interests is the central theoretical concept of van Dongen's study and was exemplified by the participation of the SDAP in the electoral system and its involvement in national and local representative bodies – a result of its striving for political power as a means of realizing a socialist society. One of these vested interests was the party apparatus itself, with its many functionaries and their particular interests.

Although van Dongen is certainly right to stress the importance of vested interests, his interpretation faces serious objections. Firstly, the concept of vested interests presupposes a society that "allows" these interests to take shape and develop, which means of course an analysis of the basic socioeconomic and politico-cultural features of Dutch society. Van Dongen takes these conditions for granted, however, and considers only their results, the vested interests and their consequence: (relative) integration into capitalist society. Secondly, the author provides only a superficial consideration of the distinct features of these vested interests. This not only prevents him from offering a clear insight into the structure of the party's integration into capitalist society; it also implies the impossibility of analysing in depth the power structure of the party. Thirdly, it is highly doubtful whether the SDAP ever was a revolutionary party; from the very beginning the party leadership and the rank and file gravitated strongly towards the electoral system and so had (future) vested interests. Thus for most of the party the revolutionary implications of Kautskyan Marxism were non-existent and the striving after a socialist society was merely party propaganda; its real aim was the emancipation of the working class within a changing capitalist society. It was exactly this point which led to strong criticism of the party line by Marxist opponents and to the expulsion from the party in 1909 of its most radical wing, which became the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and later the Communist Party.

Yet despite his own thesis with regard to the consequences of conforming to vested interests, van Dongen adheres to the idea that there was a fundamental contradiction within the SDAP between social revolution and integration, one that would manifest itself in particular in periods of extreme social and political tension. Two of these periods are of special importance in van Dongen's study: the First World War, and the attitude of the SDAP towards this war, and the so-called November days of 1918.

As far as the first of these is concerned, van Dongen notes that the party leadership proclaimed the "truce of God" at the very beginning of the war, a decision supported by an overwhelming majority of the party. The party leadership even did its utmost to prevent any criticism of the government, fearing that the introduction of universal suffrage would otherwise be obstructed. Opposition to this line, particularly from anti-militarists, was weak and unable to affect either the party leadership or the rank and file. So this episode clearly confirms the importance of vested interests in shaping SDAP policy.

The turbulent days of November 1918 were also of pivotal importance because, according to van Dongen, sections of the trade unions and of Troelstra's SDAP exploited the apparent revolutionary mood in the country to proclaim the takeover of state power by the SDAP. And, indeed, van Dongen states, there were objective conditions favouring at least considerable concessions from a hesitating government and defeatist employers. So an emotional Troelstra increasingly distanced himself from those within the party who supported conformation to embrace those who favoured a more revolutionary stance, only to experience the disastrous effects of the government's "counter-revolution" and opposition from powerful sections of the SDAP and the trade unions, however. Thus, van Dongen concludes, because of its vested interests the party was characterized by a permanent division between those favouring revolution and those who aimed at integration within Dutch social democracy.

Such an interpretation is unconvincing, particularly when it contradicts many of the facts presented by van Dongen himself. One of the great merits of van Dongen's study is the very detailed information it provides on the discussions held by the party executive, which reveal the real background to Troelstra's "revolution" and the opposition to it. The minutes of party executive meetings clearly show that it was not prepared to support revolutionary action in the absence of unrest in the country. When, from 1917 on, there were increasing signs of unrest, Troelstra suddenly revised his position because the SDAP was increasingly losing ground to more radical left-wing groups, i.e. the syndicalist movement and the SDP. All elements within the party establishment were worried about this situation and were willing to defend the party organization and its vested interests; opinions about *how* to realize the party's policies clearly differed though. Whereas a majority was opposed to any threatening display of power, which it was supposed would have disastrous consequences for the party organization and for social and political reform, Troelstra and his sympathizers aimed to strengthen the position of the party by using (pseudo)revolutionary slogans to extort concessions from the government and employers and to undermine potential support for the syndicalists and the SDP.

Why, despite evidence opposing his thesis, does van Dongen still adhere to his claim that the party experienced a fundamental conflict between revolution and integration? One possible reason is the more or less axiomatic view of Dutch historiography which argues that in the First World War the SDAP was still guided by its revolutionary programme. This argument ignores the ornamental character of the party programme and the party's increasingly reformist line. Another reason could be the historiography's presupposition of an inner conflict between Troelstra's revolutionary mood and the necessary pragmatism enforced on him because of the peculiar features of Dutch society. This argument neglects the fact that, right from the beginning of the SDAP's existence, Troelstra was the architect of reformism within the party.

In addition to the events of November 1918, van Dongen details the reaction of the SDAP to the political bankruptcy of the Second International at the beginning of the First World War and to the efforts by Troelstra and other party leaders to bring about reconciliation between the social-democratic parties in neutral and belligerent countries. In fact none of these efforts really succeeded, mainly because Troelstra and the International Socialist Bureau (ISB) were strongly dependent on the social-democratic parties in these belligerent countries and these parties

were not prepared to make concessions. So efforts to organize international conferences, even of those social-democratic parties in countries not involved in the war, had little success; nor were Troelstra's persistent manoeuvres to reconstruct the Second International. Van Dongen's analysis of the international politics of the SDAP leadership is fascinating and reveals a great deal of new information on the functioning of the ISB, the many quarrels between Troelstra and foreign social-democratic leaders, including Camille Huysmans, the secretary of the ISB, and the difficult relationship between social-democratic parties. This is of extraordinary value, especially for scholars of the international labour movement, and it certainly contributes to a better understanding of the labour movement during the First World War.

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GRABHERR, STEPHAN. *Das Washingtoner Arbeitszeitübereinkommen von 1919. Versuch einer internationalen Regelung der Arbeitszeit in Europa. [Schriften zur Europäischen Rechts- und Verfassungsgeschichte, Band 5.]* Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1992. 472 pp. DM 98.00.

After the First World War a strong movement for the eight-hour working day made itself felt all over Europe. At the same time, the International Labour Organization (ILO) was founded as part of the provisions of the peace treaties which had ended the war. The ILO tried to guarantee a minimum of social legislation world-wide. Its first international conference, held in Washington in 1919, adopted a convention limiting working hours in industry to eight a day and forty-eight a week. This Washington Convention on Working Hours became the touchstone for the work of the ILO, Albert Thomas (the director of the ILO), declared. Stephan Grabherr is therefore able to analyse the effectiveness of both the Convention and the ILO in one study.

In Washington, each participating country was represented by delegates from its government, its trade unions and its employers' organizations. This tripartite structure would remain basic to the ILO. The conventions adopted by the conference, however, had to be ratified by states. In theory, therefore, an ILO conference could adopt a convention which was opposed by a majority of the governments which would have to ratify it. In practice, this problem never materialized. Workers' and employers' delegates often opposed one another, leaving the governments' delegates room to decide the questions under discussion in the way most governments wanted. In the case of the Washington Convention even this was not necessary. It was overwhelmingly adopted by all three groups. In 1919 the time seemed ripe for an international settlement of working hours.

Soon, however, dark clouds gathered. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union became members of the ILO. In practice this limited the effect of the Convention to Europe. But even European countries which had adopted the eight-hour working day hesitated to ratify the Convention.

The prime example of this attitude was Great Britain. In the first industrial nation, the eight-hour working day was already common practice in industry, without international or even national legislation to regulate working hours. Indeed, the railway workers' unions in Britain were so strong that they had won important