

actually obfuscate the fact that the two axioms are by no means mutually exclusive. The Soviet Union was and continues to be a world revolutionary state which always unambiguously denied the possibility of ideological coexistence. Simultaneously, it behaves like a traditional Great Power within the international system, which—as the Kremlin sees it—is gradually disintegrating. By treating the two axioms as irreconcilable opposites, *Shattered Peace* follows the national tradition which steadfastly refuses to see American-Soviet relations as a continuum that can be successfully managed only by an ever-sensitive diplomacy supported by adequate and *unquestionably* committable force. Yergin could have strengthened his interpretation by stressing the sterility of the Yalta-Riga dispute. He also might have clarified the necessity for Roosevelt's Yalta axiom at a time when Russia had to be kept in the war and America's latent anticommunism consequently had to be shelved.

In the light of the ongoing "détente versus containment" debate, *Shattered Peace* gains significance. It will be profitably read by the younger generation which faces similar dilemmas and has not yet absorbed the lessons of the past.

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THE GIANTS: RUSSIA AND AMERICA. By *Richard J. Barnet*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977. 191 pp. \$8.95.

In his previous writing, Richard Barnet presented a revisionist view of Cold War American foreign policy; according to Barnet, the United States has engaged in "a form of permanent war." The reasons are to be found not in the external environment, including the "Soviet threat" so often cited by Cold War statesmen and orthodox historians, but rather in the nature of American institutions. Peace requires a fundamental change in American policy, and that in turn depends on a drastic restructuring of American society. Conspicuously absent from most of Barnet's earlier books has been the Soviet Union. That omission has been corrected in *The Giants*, a book which focuses on détente—what it is, how it developed, and where it is going. *The Giants* does not so much take the United States off the hook as put the Soviets on it. Barnet's thesis is that the United States and the USSR are two of a kind.

The Giants should interest even those who "discovered" the Soviet Union somewhat earlier than Barnet did. The analysis of Kissinger's thinking is instructive, informed as it is by interviews with Kissinger's top Soviet specialists. Barnet's critical approach is particularly suited to analyzing the arms race where, more than anywhere else, the nightmares of the hawks are exaggerated. And the chapter on the politics of trade is an intelligent treatment of the pitfalls as well as of the potential of "linking" American political and economic policies.

But despite its accomplishments, *The Giants* is seriously flawed. The book shows signs of being a rush job. The argument is developed in a haphazard fashion. The author has apparently interviewed a variety of American and Soviet officials, but, for the most part, he does not identify them. He cites secret episodes and confidential exchanges, implying that he has had access to classified sources, but, in the manner of the "National Security managers," whom his past work severely condemns, he will not acknowledge his sources. (The book does not have a single footnote.)

But the main problem is substantive. The notion of Soviet-American similarity (a kind of negative convergence) is valid in part (and too often ignored), but Barnet takes it too far. "Rival elites" may govern the two societies, but how different they are! Each elite may have a devil image of the other, but American leaders like Roosevelt and Cordell Hull managed to misplace theirs during World War II, while Stalin never set aside his morbid suspicions of the United States.

The military establishment is important in both countries, but Barnet underestimates the power of the Soviet Communist Party and the nonmilitary roots of American policy. He cannot resist even the parallel between the U.S.A. Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Russian Research Centers at Harvard and Columbia Universities. He admits that "there is more independence and diversity at the American institutions," but contends that "they are not immune from political pressures"; for example, he states: "Recently [Pepsi-Cola's] Donald Kendall offered to raise a considerable sum for the Columbia Institute provided Soviet dissidents would not be welcomed there." The story may or may not be true, but, in any event, it damages Barnet's argument, for surely no individual Soviet is in a position to do what Kendall did, namely, pressure a leading institution to oppose established orthodoxy by playing *down* the evils of the other side.

Although Barnet tends to equate the giants (and even argues that such institutions as the KGB and the CIA are undeclared allies in fostering East-West tensions), the United States remains "more equal." "For much of the last generation," writes Barnet, "the United States has had clearer and larger ambitions than did the Soviet Union, a *Pax Americana* backed by a preponderance of military might and economic power." But he admits that lately the Soviets, in part imitating the United States, have become dangerously aggressive. In the future then, if not in the past, "lasting détente" will require changes in *both* superpowers, and the realization by both elites that "the most urgent security threats facing the giants come not from each other but from systemic crises which each faces at home." The moral is: it takes two to make a conflict and two to settle it. In the realm of Cold War revisionism, a revelation like that constitutes a breakthrough.

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RED STAR ON THE NILE: THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE RELATIONSHIP SINCE THE JUNE WAR. By *Alvin Z. Rubinstein*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977. xxiv, 383 pp. \$25.00, cloth. \$9.95, paper.

YOM KIPPUR AND AFTER: THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. By *Galia Golan*. Soviet and East European Studies. New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1977. x, 350 pp. \$18.95.

THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT IN SOVIET CARICATURES, 1967-1973. By *Yeshayahu Nir*. A Research Monograph in Visual Communication. Tel Aviv: Tcherikover Publishers, Ltd., 1976. 126 pp. Illus. Paper.

Analysis of the relationship between the Soviet Union and various states in the Arab world, particularly Egypt and Syria, is beset by serious methodological problems. First, is it realistic to deal with the issue on a "one-on-one" basis, that is, is the "single actor model" appropriate for Soviet decision making any more than it is for other regimes? In fact, there are excellent reasons for doubting whether the political process can be brought to an arbitrary halt by fiat or ukase, even in closed societies with authoritarian forms of government, just as Mr. Novotný (to his surprise) could not terminate inflationary trends in Czechoslovakia by "administrative measures." Of course, given the theoretical concept of "democratic centralism," the political process is bound to seek circuitous routes around the artificial obstacles created by ideological imperatives, that is, to take the form of factional struggles that find expression in esoteric symbols and arcane language. This is hardly a startling revelation, and many will object that acceptance of the proposition does not provide the necessary tools for deciphering the "platforms," not to mention identifying the personalities of kaleidoscopically changing factional alignments. The fact remains, however, that it *can* be