Western reader to be derived from such a completely ideological interpretation of a major disciplinary interest. Once the Soviet approach is grasped, then the interpretation flows naturally and logically.

The book's basic point of departure is that the United States is a capitalistic-bourgeois society. The owners of capital have but one and only one overriding concern: to increase profits by exploiting the proletariat and expropriating the surplus value that can be squeezed from the workers. Industrial sociology is just one (and often more subtle) tool in the capitalistic armamentarium to generate more profits, and sociologists have sold out to the capitalists. Their efforts, however, have been only partly successful, thanks to the workers' ability to see through some of these tricks and to resist this exploitation. The condition of the American working class will not be improved until capitalism is eliminated. What industrial sociologists attempt to do is to fool the working class so that it will reconcile itself to exploitation.

The book then reviews the major developments of industrial sociology in the United States, starting with the Hawthorne Experiment and Elton Mayo—although Taylor is mentioned as a precursor of Mayo, and the major differences between the two are pointed out. Industrial sociology is labeled the "new paternalism" among which "social or human relations" occupies an important position, followed by "psychosociology," "participation," "games theory," "communications theory," "workers' participation," and so on. The author's conclusion is that industrial sociology in the United States consists of a multiplicity of measures to heighten the exploitation of the workers, to mask the true nature of capitalist society, to deny the essentially irreconcilable clash of interests between workers and capitalists, to splinter the working class into antagonistic groups and thus reduce its strength, and to use every possible means of manipulation, deception, bribery, and corruption.

In the West this book will appeal to a limited audience. As such its contribution, it seems, would be more to the sociology of knowledge than to industrial sociology. The Soviet reader will, on the other hand, garner a rapid overview of the field of American industrial sociology—seen, of course, through a Soviet ideological screen.

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AN ELBE UND ODER UM DAS JAHR 1000: SKIZZEN ZUR POLITIK DES OTTONENREICHES UND DER SLAVISCHEN MÄCHTE IN MITTELEUROPA. By *Herbert Ludat.* Cologne and Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1971. x, 210 pp. DM 52.

This volume contains five "sketches" by a recent laureate of the Palacký Medal, who has both produced and edited important publications on the medieval settlement and the social as well as political structure of the Slavic-German borderlands. The studies are assembled here not so much as final statements but rather as summaries of recent research and points of departure for new discussions.

The introductory essay sets the stage. It is the author's contention that the widespread rebellion of the Slavs in the Lutetian (sometimes called Veletian) confederation in 983 caused a major break in the "progress of Christianization of Europe." This rift was about to be healed by the concerted efforts of Ottonian emperors and Piast kings, both anxious to preserve the intricate network of political and family alliances in the area. However, Bolesław Chrobry's attack on the Lusatian march, his annexation of Bohemia, and then in 1003 the alliance between Emperor Henry II and the heathen Slavs against the king of Poland made an end to this cooperation. These events are seen as tragic steps which set the empire and Poland on very divergent courses with far-reaching historical consequences. The rest of the studies, two on the developments in the central area of Brandenburg and two on the great noble families involved in the conflicts (Ekkehardine margraves, Piast kings, and Liudolfing-Ottonian emperors), attempt to elucidate the details of the events around the turn of the millennium and the motives of the protagonists.

The author intends to prove that it is wrong to infer "national" and "anti-imperial" motives from the actions of the Polish kings, as many historians, even of recent date, have done. The alternative, offered with an impressive array of evidence augmented by well-founded conjectures, is based on the assumption that local and dynastic, or clan, loyalties were much more decisive motives than such modern concepts as Polish-German enmity. There can be no doubt about the thoroughness of the supporting research: the less than a hundred pages of text, very concise in itself, is documented by over five hundred notes (pp. 93-176), many of which are veritable treatises on some obscurity in the textual, linguistic, or archeological evidence. The bibliography lists over six hundred titles, mainly from the two Germanies, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

Still, most of the crucial arguments in support of the suggested new solutions are conjectural. No wonder, considering the dearth of source material in this no man's land between Saxony and Poland. Even if many of the positive statements are open to challenge and may be corrected, the critique of the historical tradition of national observance is very enticing indeed. The meticulous research into the genealogies of the families of the area (summarized on four tables in the appendix) draws attention to motives which sound much more convincing for an age that knew very well the force of clan solidarity, but hardly the notion of "state," let alone that of "nation." It would be, of course, very interesting to know more about the importance of kinship ties below the level of the leading, noble families; this might add to the social dimensions of the conflict between German and Polish Christian-feudal lords and the Slavic, often pagan, "free" population. But our sources will hardly ever permit us to go beyond the rather general assessments produced so far.

The author summarizes his views on the major issues apropos the significance of the famous meeting in Gniezno in the year 1000 and its aftermath. He stresses that it is inappropriate to see the Piasts striving for some kind of "Western-Slavic hegemony in basic opposition to the empire. The rise of this kingdom and the elements of its ideology are to be understood in the context of the Christian-universal concept of the Ottonian emperors. In this framework the Piasts assumed and fulfilled the tasks of members and supporting forces of a renewed Christian Roman Imperium" (p. 92). Bolesław's "unforeseen" attack in 1002-3 is explained by his relationship to the family of Margrave Ekkehard, whose murder was undoubtedly instrumental in the ascendance of Henry II. The Piast's claim to the marches is shown as neither "anti-German" nor "pro-Polish" but part and parcel of the system of allegiances among the noble families between the Elbe and the Oder. The five sketches of this volume supply important "brickstones" for a solid base to the lofty superstructure of Ottonian *Renovatio Imperii,* and are particularly valuable as contributions to the ongoing discussion between German and East European historians anxious to overcome traditional national prejudices and unwarranted retrojections of modern conflicts into the early Middle Ages.

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WENZEL: EIN UNWÜRDIGER KÖNIG. By *Heinz Rieder*. Vienna and Hamburg: Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 1970. 303 pp. DM 24.00.

The first five or six chapters of this book are brief and clear in discussing Charles IV and then his son Wenzel (or Wenceslas or, in Czech, Václav), especially during the period of the Great Schism between Rome and Avignon. Very little in them, however, cannot be found in such works as the author himself cites: Bachmann's *Geschichte Böhmens,* Lindner's *Geschichte des deutschen Reichs unter König Wenzel,* and volume 3 of Palacký's *Geschichte von Böhmen.* But in fact most of the forty books, almost all in German, that the author cites have been to some degree superseded. During the last twenty or thirty years many important works have appeared, mainly in Czech but also in English and French. Only four Czech books have been cited—only one of the dozens of writings of the late, eminent F. M. Bartoš on the subject, one work by Josef Macek, whose title is given defectively, and two others that have relatively little to do with Wenceslas. The author should have used Tomek's *Dějepis Města Prahy* (volume 3), Bartoš's *Husitská Revoluce* and *Doba Žižkova,* and several other Czech works, as well as English monographs such as Howard Kaminsky's *History of the Hussite Revolution* and Ruben Weltsch's *Archbishop John of Jenstein, 1348–1400,* which drew considerable material from the fine publications of Paul de Vooght. If the author had used the reviewer's *John Žižka and the Hussite Revolution,* he would have avoided several obvious mistakes. Žižka did not leave Pilsen in 1418–19 and organize Tábor as "Feldhauptmann" (p. 277). Žižka's march from Pilsen to Hradiště-Tábor occurred, after a battle with the royalist army, in April 1420. Wenzel Koranda was not a professor of theology but a priest in Pilsen. Jan Želivsky (p. 279) was indeed important, but the priest Johann von Seelau (p. 280) was the same man.

I shall mention further only mistakes from the last two pages. "Accession to the throne [of Bohemia] through compromise was impossible for Sigismund," writes Mr. Rieder; in fact the king was crowned on July 28, 1420, with the help of the Catholic lords of Bohemia. Rieder writes that even in 1419–20 the Hussites took the offensive: "the horrors of the Hussite storm rolled across the borders of Bohemia into Germany." In fact five great crusades, impelled by the wishes of Rome but using mainly German and Hungarian armies, were launched against the Bohemian people from without. Only after seven years did the Utraquists begin to fight outside Bohemia and carry the revolution into other lands. It is not clear whether Rieder's expression "fiendish heresy" (*teuflische Ketzerei*) is meant to be serious. Perhaps not. But the latter part of the book is far less clear than the beginning, aside from its errors.

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