

This book is an excellent case study not only of the horror of legalized anti-Semitism but also of the heartless immigration restrictions of the Western nations, especially Britain and the United States. These restrictions virtually passed a death sentence on untold numbers of European Jews.

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BÜRGER ZWEITER KLASSE: ANTISEMITISMUS IN DER VOLKSREPUBLIK POLEN UND DER UdSSR. By *Richard Hammer*. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1974. 278 pp. DM 26.

When Jimmy Carter laid a wreath at the Ghetto Memorial in Warsaw at the end of 1977 and stood in silent tribute, few Jews in Poland thrilled to his gesture. There are hardly any left. Amid a population of thirty-four million, their number has dwindled to below six thousand. When World War II broke out, the Jewish community consisted of three and a half million people. More than three million fell prey to the Nazi holocaust. Of those who survived, often by fleeing beyond the reach of Nazi Germany, many trickled back to their home towns in a vain search for family members and a resumption of normal lives.

Hatred of Jews, endemic to large strata of the population, continued to persist. Bureaucratic and popular hostility culminated in the Kielce pogrom in 1946, which provided the impetus for mass migration to D.P. camps in Germany's American zone of occupation. Several hundred thousand, mostly those with strong Jewish affiliations, moved to the West, often with Palestine/Israel as their destination.

Those who did remain in the People's Republic of Poland—some 45,000 in 1951—were veteran Communists or were sympathetic to the new regime. Having severed religious ties with the Jewish community, they considered themselves full-fledged Poles and expected communism to solve the "national question." Their tragic story is the subject of this book, whose pseudonymous author—active in economic and later in scientific affairs—was one of them.

In the beginning, the new rulers welcomed the Jewish-born citizens. Capable people were needed in the bureaucracy, the intellectual community, and the state-controlled economy. Hence, Jews initially did play a certain role among the cadres of the new society. Although few in number, they came to serve, unwillingly and unwittingly, as pawns in factional infighting among the leadership of the ruling PPZR Communist Party.

Nationwide campaigns were waged against "Zionists" and "Revisionists," code words for Jews in party lingo. Top leaders from Moscow resorted to crude Jew-baiting during visits to Poland. General Mieczyslaw Moczar, the ambitious minister of the interior, made himself spokesman and spearhead of the "Partisans," who agitated against the handful of Jews remaining in Poland. Even Wladyslaw Gomulka, a symbol of liberalization in 1956 when popular outrage swept him into power, tried, a dozen years later, to make the Jews the scapegoat for the blunders of his own regime: Edward Gierek, his successor, went along.

Not only were cultural and educational activities liquidated, save for a few showpieces, but Jews were first purged from their positions and then, in effect, expelled from the country. Even Jewish Communists, who had devoted a lifetime to the fight against Zionism, were forced to renounce Polish citizenship and to go through the motions of requesting permission to emigrate to Israel, in order to provide the Polish leadership with an alibi. (In 1969, Denmark and Sweden accepted three thousand of these bewildered people who, though branded as Zionists, were in fact such determined non-Zionists that they refused to set foot in Israel.)

The author discusses these events, as seen in their Marxist-Leninist Polish domestic setting, on 263 informative pages. The book is a valuable inside account of the penultimate stage in the disappearance of Poland's Jewish population from the annals of history.

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GLEICHGEWICHT, REVISION, RESTAURATION: DIE AUSSENPOLITIK DER ERSTEN TSCHECHOSLOWAKISCHEN REPUBLIK IM EUROPA-SYSTEM DER PARISER VORORTEVERTRÄGE. Edited by *Karl Bosl*. Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1976. 424 pp.

At its conferences in November 1975 and April 1976, the Collegium Carolinum of the University of Munich dealt with the foreign policy of the First Czechoslovak Republic. The conference papers are published in this volume, which maintains the consistently high standard of all Collegium Carolinum publications. The small countries neighboring Czechoslovakia get full—one might even say superb—treatment at the hands of Jörg Hoensch, Karl Richter, Peter Burian, and Detlef Brandes. Burian also presents a perceptive study of Beneš's policy in the League of Nations and of his political thought. It is amusing to be reminded of the cult of personality that Beneš enjoyed and encouraged as president, even among the Sudeten Germans. Hans Lemberg presents an equally important paper on the Little Entente.

The articles dealing with Czechoslovak policy toward the countries outside the immediate Central European area are not as satisfactory, except for the paper by Oswald Kostrba-Skalicky on the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Without consulting Russian sources, he deals with diplomatic relations, with the "Slavonic" contacts between the two nations, the role of the Czechoslovak Communists, and the change of policy inaugurated by Beneš in 1935. William Sheldon and Peter Hartmann on American and French policy, respectively, treat only certain specified areas, while Wolf Gruner's paper, "British Interest," is an analysis of British involvement in the Central and East European area as a whole and is not concerned specifically with Czechoslovakia. Francesco Leoncini makes a valiant attempt to explain Italian-Czechoslovak relations on the basis of inadequate documentary material.

The articles which will receive the greatest attention are the four dealing with Czechoslovakia's overmighty neighbor, Germany. Masaryk and Beneš were conscious of the precarious nature of Czechoslovak independence. All policy, both internal and external, had to be subjected to the maintenance of independence. Moreover, although Czechoslovakia could no doubt play a significant part in maintaining European peace and therefore her independence, she was but an object of international policy. It was the Great Powers that disposed: Czechoslovak freedom of action was limited to subordinating its policy to that of one of the Great Powers. There were only three possible alternatives, and even these alternatives were more apparent than real, given the nature of the Czechoslovak Republic and of international relations. Czechoslovak independence and the further development of the "Czechoslovak" nation could be achieved by dependence on the Entente powers plus a rejuvenated Russia (in the very early days it was to be a democratic Russia); or in close alliance with the smaller states of Central and Eastern Europe; or in dependence on Germany. These alternatives were mutually exclusive. Alliance with Germany was as unthinkable in the Weimar era as in the Hitler era; Beneš and Masaryk had not spent their lives fighting Pan-Germanism in order to lead their liberated peoples into subjection. A bloc of allied East and Central European states was equally excluded; the differences between Poland and Czechoslovakia were too great to be overcome. The Little Entente