

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION, MIGRATION, AND REMITTANCES IN OAXACA*

Leah K. VanWey, Indiana University, Bloomington

Catherine M. Tucker, Indiana University, Bloomington

Eileen Diaz McConnell, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Received 12-11-2004; Accepted Conditionally 3-30-2004;

Received Revised 6-1-2004; Final Acceptance 6-17-2004

Abstract: Researchers studying migration and development have argued over the potential that migration and associated remittances have to improve the economic and social conditions in origin communities. Past research on migration from indigenous communities in Oaxaca has similarly questioned the compatibility of traditional governance systems with high migration rates. We argue, using evidence from four Zapotec communities in rural Oaxaca, that communities can use the organizational capacity of traditional governance systems to access remittances from migrants for the benefit of the community as a whole. Communities can require payment from migrants in lieu of communal labor requirements (tequio) and may directly solicit remittances from migrants for community projects. The extent to which they enforce these requests depends on the existing organizational strength in the community. These findings imply that strong forms of community organization can make the difference between migration contributing to underdevelopment and migration contributing to development.

Remittances are an important source of income for households and communities in Mexico, and comprise an enormous aggregate transfer of money from the United States into Mexico (Inter-American Development

*Acknowledgements: The authors express thanks to Lilian Marquez-Barrientos and Ever Canul Góngora for their invaluable assistance in the collection of data. They thank the LARR editors and reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions. In addition, they appreciate the similarly valuable comments offered by George Alter, Tim Bartley, Jeffrey Cohen, and Dennis Conway. The research received financial assistance from the College of Arts and Sciences at Indiana University, as well as the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population and Environmental Change (CIPEC) through a National Science Foundation grant (SBR-952191). Finally, and most importantly, the authors thank the people of the study communities; without their generous assistance and cooperation, this research would not have been possible. All errors and opinions remain the authors'.

Latin American Research Review, Vol. 40, No. 1, February 2005

© 2005 by the University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819

Bank 2003; Pew Hispanic Center 2003). In 2002, Mexico received \$10.5 billion, just under one third of all remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean (Inter-American Development Bank 2003). Survey data show that 18 percent of the adult population in Mexico receives remittances and that the receivers are not statistically different from other adults (except that they are more likely to be women) (Pew Hispanic Center 2003). However, arguments about the effect of these remittances at the community level are mixed. In examining the consequences of migration, researchers argue for either negative or positive effects of migration on community economic development but base their arguments largely on the results of the actions of individuals and households. Few researchers have explicitly considered the role of origin communities, as more than aggregations of individuals and households, in the relationship between migration and development.

Early research on migration and development argued that migration negatively affected communities. Anthropological research from the 1970s and 1980s identified a “culture of migration” leading to a “migrant syndrome” in which remaining members of communities become dependent on remittances for meeting their consumption needs (Dinerman 1978; Kearney 1986; Mines and DeJanvry 1982; Reichert 1981; Weist 1984). Migration from a community increases the consumption desires of community members, making them dependent on the higher wages earned by migrants. This perspective is supported by studies that show that the vast majority of remittances are spent on current consumption needs (Banerjee 1984; Conway and Cohen 1998; Kearney 1986; Massey and Parrado 1994; Rubenstein 1992). Thus, young adult members of the community migrate for higher incomes to meet their own and their families’ consumption needs; the community becomes a home for the elderly and children (Stuart and Kearney 1981).


Recent economic and sociological research has challenged this pessimistic view and focused on the role of remittances in productive investment. Some researchers argue that, despite the fact that most remittances are spent on consumption, a sizable minority are spent on investments in human capital, agricultural machinery, or small businesses (Massey and Parrado 1994; Taylor 1999; Taylor et al. 1996a, 1996b). Durand, Parrado, and Massey (Durand, Parrado, and Massey 1996; Massey and Parrado 1994, 1998) further argue that even remittances spent on consumption can bring about economic development. Families who receive remittances form a sizable market for local, regional, and national products, driving economic growth (Durand, Parrado, and Massey 1996; Massey and Parrado 1994). In addition to highlighting these effects, researchers have argued that examining only the ways in which remittances are spent gives an inaccurate picture of their effects (Taylor 1999; Taylor et al. 1996a). Remittances can loosen constraints on household

budgets, allowing them to invest in new agricultural technology or in small businesses, regardless of whether they invest the remittances themselves (rather than other sources of income). Researchers examining the effects of remittances on the whole household budget have found that remittances indeed increase a household's productive investment (Rozelle et al. 1999; Taylor 1987).

These approaches to the relationship between migration and development focus on the actions of individuals or households and how they can bring about or hinder economic development. Researchers have found support for each perspective in different studies in different communities or groups of communities. In this paper, we argue that the organization of the community might explain why we sometimes see positive effects and sometimes see negative effects of migration on development. While migration is an individual and household decision (Massey et al. 1993, 1994; Massey and Espinosa 1997; Stark 1991), the effects of migration and particularly of remittances on community development depend on the strength of community organization. The sparse past research on community-level determinants of remittances argues that migrants are more likely to send remittances to a community in which there is complementary infrastructure and a certain level of economic dynamism (Lindstrom 1996). However, researchers take these community characteristics as exogenous to the migration process. We argue that they are potentially endogenous. Communities that are more strongly organized are able to encourage or coerce migrants into providing remittances for community projects, thus supporting community economic development and the economic dynamism that is often seen as a prerequisite for remittances.

We base our argument on qualitative data collected for this purpose in four Zapotec communities in the Sierra Norte and Valles Centrales regions of the state of Oaxaca, Mexico, in the summer of 2002, and earlier visits to each of these communities. The communities range in size from approximately 1,300 to approximately 3,500 people (INEGI 2001). They vary in distance to Oaxaca City, with travel time ranging from fifteen to one hundred minutes. Three of the communities are the municipal seats of the *municipios* of Sierra Alta, San Timoteo, and Cerro Verde.¹ The fourth community, San Matias, is located in another *municipio*, but it is not the municipal seat. The four *municipios* range in population from approximately 1,400 to 5,600 people in three to nine settlements, as identified in Mexico's 2000 census. In each, the municipal seat comprises the majority of the population (INEGI 2001). We collected information from members of community government, leaders and members of

1. Throughout this paper we use pseudonyms for our study communities and present rounded values for population sizes in order to protect the privacy of respondents.



Map 1 Study Area

local organizations and committees, returned migrants, and the families of current migrants on the process of migration and the remittances sent by migrants. We also focused on the political, economic, and social organization of each community.

THE OAXACAN CONTEXT: GOVERNANCE AND *USOS Y COSTUMBRES* IN INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES

Oaxaca provides a particularly good setting for studying the importance of community organization. A large proportion (63.9 percent) of the state's population lives in communities of less than 5000 inhabitants (see INEGI), and 415 of the state's 570 *municipios* follow traditional forms of community organization known as *usos y costumbres* (see www.oaxaca.gob.mx). This form of organization, which varies across communities, reflects the heritage and experiences of Oaxaca's sixteen major indigenous groups (see Alvarez 1998; INEGI 1997b). These groups have struggled since the Spanish conquest to maintain their identities, local autonomy and community traditions (Cordero Avendaño de Durand 1997; Díaz-Polanco and Burguete 1996; de Gyves 2000; Nader 1990). Indigenous communities have a unique status under the Mexican constitution. They are recognized as having ancestral rights to territory; many gained colonial land titles or reasserted land rights following expropriations of the colonial and postcolonial periods (Merino Perez et al. 2000; Pisa 1994). The present composition of *usos y costumbres* that govern indigenous communities reflects the profound effects of Spanish colonialism and accommodation, as well as resistance to the dominant mestizo population over the past five centuries (see Díaz-Polanco and Burguete 1996).

Under *usos y costumbres*, the governance of the community is usually divided into two separate but equally important committees—the

Assembly of *Comuneros* and the Assembly of Citizens, along with various subcommittees. The Assembly of *Comuneros*, under the elected leadership of the president and adjunct authorities composing the Comisariado de Bienes Comunales (Committee of Communal Resources), manages communal forests and other natural resources owned by the community. In light of archival documents, communal land tenure among Zapotecs of the Sierra Norte appears to have pre-Hispanic roots (Chance 1989). The *comuneros*, composed of the adult male members born to the community (and widows of *comuneros*) also traditionally oversee the nomination of members to civil-religious committees responsible for community festivals and church maintenance.

The Assembly of Citizens and its subcommittees, under the leadership of an elected mayor and his cabinet (the *cabildo* or *ayuntamiento municipal*), manage political functions and programs related to civic activities under the state and national government. The participation of women and non-native residents in the Assembly of Citizens varies by community, but is supported by law. In communities that are municipal seats—as is the case for Sierra Alta, Cerro Verde, and San Timoteo—membership in the Assembly of *Comuneros* and the Assembly of Citizens are nearly coincident and represent the majority of the municipal population. By contrast, when an indigenous community is incorporated within a larger *municipio*, its citizens elect a representative to participate in the municipal Assembly of Citizens. The community will also select a mayor (who does not participate in the municipal decision making) for community-level responsibilities outside the purview of the Assembly of *Comuneros*. This is the case for our fourth community, San Matias.

Throughout Oaxaca's indigenous communities that abide by *usos y costumbres*, *comuneros* and citizens are expected to provide service to the community. Expectations of service vary. Generally, the *cargo* system practiced in these communities dictates that *comuneros* must serve on a governance committee or one of the subcommittees on a regular basis, often every two or three years. In some communities, the *cargo* system includes religious committees and ritual duties as well. The system brings prestige to members as they ascend in rank, and the service required constitutes compensation to the community for the rights and benefits of membership (Carabias Lillo et al. 2000; Kearney 1972; Merino Perez et al. 2000). In addition, the Assembly of *Comuneros* and its committees determine work that needs to be done in the community through "voluntary" communal labor, known as the *tequio* (often obligatory in practice). For example, the Committee of Communal Resources will determine when a road to a communal forest needs maintenance or when community boundaries need to be cleared in the forest. Similarly, the *cabildo* will determine when maintenance needs to be done on local infrastructure, such as roads and government buildings. Both entities

schedule *tequios*, in which all adult male members of the community are expected to work jointly to complete the designated projects.

Depending on community arrangements, members may pay a fee in advance or find a substitute worker when they cannot attend a *tequio*. Respondents in our study noted a variety of ways that a community may deal with migrants' absences. It may allow migrants (or in-migrants to the community) to miss *tequios* on the condition that they find a replacement to cover their duties or pay a fee to the community to hire someone else to complete their work. Alternatively, a community might require a large one-time payment from migrants upon their return to make up for all of their missed responsibilities. Other communities excuse migrants from obligations, but assign a *cargo* immediately upon their return.

In addition to labor demands, many communities require monetary contributions (*cooperación*) for community projects and activities (Cohen 1999). When projects involve the purchase of materials, such as construction materials, the community may levy a tax on each member to cover the cost.

Past researchers studying migrants from various indigenous communities in Oaxaca have explored the importance of *usos y costumbres*. The studies indicate that *usos y costumbres* facilitate the creation of transnational political organizations and effective home town associations (HTAs) in migration destinations (Hirabayashi 1993; Nagengast and Kearney 1990; Rivera Salgado 1999). Based on evidence from one community in Oaxaca, Mutersbaugh argues that *usos y costumbres* are important for understanding the process of migration (Mutersbaugh 2002). He develops a perspective on migration that actively engages the political and cultural organization of the home community. He contends that the *usos y costumbres* system, especially the *cargo* and *tequio* requirements, are used strategically by members of origin communities to limit migration and to limit the impact of migration. Within this context, migration has a negative outcome that the community is actively resisting, while individuals still desire the income and status that come from migration.

In contrast, Hirabayashi (1983), following Orellana (1973), asserts that strong cooperative traditions in indigenous (particularly Mixtec) communities of origin are necessary for the formation of migrant village associations in migration destinations. His research focuses on internal migrants in Oaxaca City and Mexico City and further argues that the village of origin must allow the migrant association to aid the development process in order for the migrant association to continue. This is one pathway through which community organization might influence remittances to communities: migrants from more organized communities tend to form migrant associations, which contribute to the development of the village for their own reasons.

Klaver (1997) examines migrants from two Oaxacan Zapotec communities in Los Angeles and finds further evidence of the continuing

importance of village ties and village identity. However, she counters that this phase of the migration process is transitory and that migration will eventually have a negative impact on the sending villages. As the migrants become more involved in their destinations and as the next generation has less contact with the home village, she predicts that the migrants will find less of value in the home community and will be less willing to fulfill their responsibilities under the *cargo* system. Clarke (2000) uses evidence from Klaver's study and others to similarly argue for the negative effect of migration on the *cargo* system. He points to high rates of out-migration among working-age men and to the investment of remittances in non-productive activities to show that "migration has not been a catalyst for rural development; nor has it reversed the economic stasis that lies behind migration in a context of population increase" (146).

We build on these past studies by focusing on the outcomes of the interaction between migration and *usos y costumbres*, maintaining that migration is not necessarily a negative outcome. We argue that the strength of community organization has a major influence on whether the outcome is largely positive or negative. Community organization is important for the management of other resources on which communities draw (e.g., communal forests, water sources) (Bromley 1992; McCay and Acheson 1987; National Research Council 2002). Collective action, specifically the formation of rules governing rights and responsibilities toward common pool resources, allows groups to overcome situations in which individually rational decisions create negative outcomes when pursued by all individuals in a group (Ostrom 1990). In this situation, collective action based on the *cargo* system also allows the origin community to mitigate the loss of labor and income when many individuals make the economically rational decision to migrate.

DATA COLLECTION

A team of interviewers started in each community by visiting the authorities of the *cabildo* and Comisariado de Bienes Comunales. The interviewers obtained permission for the study from authorities, building on prior visits that had introduced the researchers and their interests. The team conducted interviews with authorities, returned migrants, households with migrants, and leaders of community groups. The open-ended interview topics included the community's experiences with migration, community governance and *comuneros'* responsibilities, community projects (church maintenance, fiestas, road improvements, border maintenance, etc.) and funding, participation of women and non-native residents. The particular experiences of the community and respondents shaped additional themes explored in each interview. The decision to interview community leaders as well as migrants ensured

that we would obtain information on the receipt and use of remittances by community groups, which might not be known by the returned migrants with whom we were able to speak.

COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTION OF STUDY COMMUNITIES

The economic organization of our study communities reflects the economic character of the region. The Sierra Norte and Valles Centrales contain the majority of Oaxaca's commercially valuable pine forests (INEGI 1997a), and forest products represent 10 percent of the state's gross domestic product (GDP) (Anta Fonseca et al. 2000). Land suitable for agriculture is scarce. In Oaxaca as a whole, only 14.22 percent of the land supports agriculture. Just over 8 percent of the land in Oaxaca is dedicated to pastoral uses, but these include areas on steep slopes and marginal soils better suited to forestry (INEGI 2000). Income and employment outside of agriculture and forestry are also scarce except in Oaxaca City, where commerce, industry, and services represent the major economic activities (INEGI 2000). Forests represent the principal natural resource for many indigenous communities in Oaxaca; 90 percent of Oaxaca's forest resources are communally owned (Anta Fonseca et al. 2000). The Sierra Norte produces more commercially valuable pine and oak lumber than any other region in the state (INEGI 1997a). All of the study communities have commercially valuable forests that also entail watersheds and areas for grazing livestock.

Table 1 shows the basic characteristics of each of our study communities. Sierra Alta and San Matías operate community-owned timber-harvesting enterprises, which comprise an important dimension of local economic activity. Both communities follow timber-harvesting management plans designed to achieve sustainability. Sierra Alta runs its own sawmill, and sells its sawn lumber to regional markets. San Matías sells timber as roundwood; *comuneros* have debated purchasing a sawmill but have not yet reached the consensus needed for such a major investment. In addition, Sierra Alta has a gravel production plant, while San Matías has a transportation cooperative and a fledgling ecotourism enterprise. Although most households in both communities practice subsistence agriculture—reflecting a strong cultural preference for their own local maize—they have become less dependent on agriculture in recent years. Both communities have experienced economic transformations that spurred migration. Historically, Sierra Alta's men worked as miners in a nearby silver mine, now exhausted. Today many Sierra Alta residents work as employees for businesses in a nearby town, run their own small ventures, or labor seasonally in agriculture and community enterprises. San Matías's farmers have found agricultural markets

Table 1 Basic Characteristics of Study Communities

	<i>Political Status</i>	<i>Distance from Oaxaca City</i>	<i>Economic Base</i>	<i>Community Enterprises</i>	<i>In-migration</i>
Sierra Alta	Municipal seat	~100 minutes	Wage labor Agriculture Community enterprises	Timber and sawmill operation Gravel plant	Low
San Matías	Indigenous community within a larger municipio	~60 minutes	Weaving Community enterprises	Roundwood harvesting Transportation cooperative Ecotourism	Low
Cerro Verde	Municipal seat	~15 minutes	Commuting to formal employment in Oaxaca City	None	High
San Timoteo	Municipal seat	~30 minutes	Commuting to formal employment in Oaxaca City	None	High

unfavorable and, with few options for employment, women (and some men) have turned to producing traditional Zapotec weavings for the tourist market. By contrast, Cerro Verde and San Timoteo have no community-owned enterprises, and relatively few households practice subsistence agriculture. Both communities lie within thirty minutes of Oaxaca City, and increasing numbers of the population work in professional, business, and service-oriented jobs. These communities have been growing rapidly as outsiders move in to take advantage of the rural ambience, a reliable water supply, and better security as compared to Oaxaca City.

Each of our four study communities is recognized as an indigenous community by the state of Oaxaca and is governed by *usos y costumbres*. However, there is notable variation across communities in the rules governing the contributions of community members, particularly members who are currently migrants, and in the enforcement of these rules. Table 2 shows the variations across communities in these aspects of community organization, as well as in the ways in which they access remittances. Each community has a Committee of Communal Resources, which manages the communally-owned natural resources, and either a municipal mayor (if it is the municipal seat) or a community mayor and a municipal representative (if it is not the municipal seat). These principal *cargos* jointly constitute the political leadership of the community. In each community, positions on governing committees and subcommittees are filled

Table 2 *Community Organization and Remittances in Study Communities*

	<i>Form of Governance</i>	<i>Frequency of Tequios</i>	<i>Tequio Enforcement</i>
Sierra Alta	<i>Usos y costumbres</i>	10–48/year, varies with needs and plans	Shirkers face public humiliation, forced labor and/or fines
San Matías	<i>Usos y costumbres</i>	3–12/year, varies with needs and plans	Members under quota are fined and/or make up missed <i>tequios</i>
Cerro Verde	<i>Usos y costumbres</i>	5–6/year	Members absent without an excuse are fined
San Timoteo	<i>Usos y costumbres</i> (considering a political party system)	1–3/year, each neighborhood may schedule more	Enforcement is infrequent

Respondents provided varying answers; the most consistent answer is presented. In each community except San Matías, there were a few respondents who were not sure that returning migrants were held responsible for any missed *cargos* or *tequios*. Authorities generally appeared most knowledgeable, but they are the ones responsible for enforcing the rules, and therefore they may overstate their actual adherence to enforcement duties.

according to the *cargo* system, with adults of the community serving on a regular basis. While men occupy positions of authority in all of our study communities, women often serve on committees related to education, health and sanitation, and church functions. Even though some of these *cargos* constitute full-time jobs, the people serving receive no monetary compensation. Each community also mounted *tequios* for routine maintenance of borders, forests, and government property, as well as for special projects such as church or school construction.

The requirements for labor and monetary contributions, the amount of committee participation required, and the level of enforcement of the rules vary from community to community. San Matías and Sierra Alta

<i>Migrant Responsibility for Missed Tequios</i>	<i>Participation in Cargos</i>	<i>Migrants' Obligations to Fulfill Cargos</i>	<i>Methods of Accessing Remittances</i>
Migrants offer compensation for missed <i>tequios</i> ; migrants who give nothing may be fined ¹	All participate; non-native may not assume highest posts	Migrants have no obligations until they return, unless it is their turn on the school committee	Donations requested for fiestas and projects
Returning migrants pay for missed <i>tequios</i> to regain community standing	All participate, non-native may not assume highest posts	Migrants must return every 1–3 years to serve or lose rights, unless family members serve for them	Fees for <i>tequios</i> , donations for fiestas, and occasionally other projects
Returning migrants are given a <i>cargo</i> ; no obligation to pay for missed <i>tequios</i> ¹	Native-born must participate, non-native cannot participate but must pay extra taxes and fees	Migrants have no obligations until they return	None
Returning migrants who refuse to pay for missed <i>tequios</i> may be scolded ¹	Participation is mainly voluntary	Migrants have no obligations until they return	One instance of donation for a festival

present stronger organization than Cerro Verde and San Timoteo. This is evidenced by frequent *tequios* (3–12 times a year in San Matías and 10–48 times a year in Sierra Alta), and strict enforcement of participation. In Sierra Alta, *comuneros* who miss *tequios* without prior permission are subjected to public humiliation (being paraded through town under guard) followed by manual labor to compensate for missed *tequio* hours; or if the person has adequate resources, he may pay a fine that exceeds the local daily minimum wage. As in many communities, Sierra Alta's men must serve for two types of *tequios*: those called by the *cabildo* (generally related to construction or maintenance of community infrastructure) and those called by the Committee of Communal Resources (for maintenance and projects related to natural resources and protection of community borders). One respondent, who had served many *cargos* and currently held the position of president of the Secondary School Committee, noted, "... every week there is *tequio*, that is why

we are at the level we are . . ." (Respondent #21, June 4, 2002). Another respondent, who was serving as the head of a major committee, agreed: "Tequios are the greatest source of progress for the community . . ." (Respondent #23, June 5, 2002). Even so, *tequios* represent a source of tension between the individual and the community. During informal conversations (with no tape recorder present), Sierra Alta residents complained about the hours of unremunerated labor. Yet everyone recognized a need for communal labor to accomplish local projects and none argued that *tequios* should be curtailed.

In San Matías, tensions over *tequios* reached a breaking point several years ago, and the community came up with a novel compromise. Community authorities explained that *comuneros* had become rebellious due to the onerous demands for their labor. Through debate in the assembly, *comuneros* decided to replace most *tequios* by paying for labor with a portion of the timber operations' profits. With this decision, they addressed two pressing issues: the need for more local employment and rising resistance to the burden of *tequios*. In the present, each *comunero* must still do *tequios*, but he can choose which ones to attend for his quota. Enforcement remains high; shirkers must pay a fine equal to double the daily wage for each *tequio* short of the quota. The mother of a migrant reported, "If you do not [fulfill your *tequios*], they fine you or give another *tequio*. If a young man does not do it . . . he will be put in jail, given a fine, a 250 peso fine, and have to do two, three days of *tequio* . . . [he] has to do *tequio* and pay the fine" (Respondent #12, June 19, 2002).

San Matías also puts strong pressure on migrants to return for service in the *cargo* system; migrants reported that they had to return every one to three years to carry out their service or find someone else to carry out their responsibilities. Otherwise, they risk loss of membership rights. A woman, whose father was returning from the United States to do his *cargo*, explained: "He will serve all of 2003 because he has that commitment with the authority. He has to fulfill that commitment" (Respondent #12, June 19, 2002).

Sierra Alta does not require that migrants return on a schedule to fulfill a *cargo*, unless it is a migrant's turn to serve on the school committee. Neither does the community demand that migrants pay for missed *tequios*. Nevertheless, respondents reported a strong expectation that migrants would compensate the community for missed *tequios* according to their resources. One man explained,

Supposedly it [paying for missed *tequios*] is voluntary, so it isn't obligatory. More than anything, people here are very conscientious . . . We aren't obligated, but the majority of the migrants would feel bad to come back and not give something . . . So it's really a moral issue." (Respondent #21, June 4, 2002).

One person, however, reported that a recalcitrant migrant had been fined for failing to contribute. The community also expects migrants to

promptly participate in *tequios* and the *cargo* system upon their return. One key contrast with San Matías is that Sierra Alta has thus far maintained enough *comuneros* to fill committees and positions of authority. For San Matías, the rate of migration is so high that it is difficult to fill positions unless migrants return when called.

In contrast, San Timoteo places less emphasis on *tequios* and *cargos*. In San Timoteo, community authorities call *tequios* only a few times a year. Each neighborhood, however, may require additional *tequios* for such tasks as cleaning a shared water canal. Participation appears to be optional, with longtime residents showing greater willingness to participate than the growing numbers of recent in-migrants. Shirkers are rarely sanctioned; yet if someone requests water service or repairs they must be current with *tequios* or corresponding dues. When asked what is done about the people who avoid *tequios*, the president of the Committee of Communal Resources elaborated,

Of course, normally not everyone goes. In the end, what the *municipio* opts to do is to await the moment in which it can lay down the law. That moment comes when someone needs [the services of] the commission. For example, someone says, "You have to put in a water line." Well, we're going to do it, but [I reply] "if you want water, then you owe me five *tequios* that are worth this much, so you have to pay that much." And that's how we do it. (Respondent #2, June 17, 2002)

Moreover, participation in San Timoteo's *cargo* system appears to be waning, as some citizens—particularly in-migrants—are leaning toward political parties as a preferable means of governance.

With the relatively low demands placed on permanent residents, it is not surprising that San Timoteo likewise places few demands on migrants. Those who leave are not required to compensate the community for missed *tequios*, nor are they required to return to fulfill *cargos*. One respondent noted, however, that migrants' families expect them to send remittances to cover the migrants' fees and *cooperación*: "Migrants send [money] to their families so that they can stay current with obligations. If migrants don't, they don't lose any rights, but they may be scolded [by the *cabildo*]." (Respondent # 1, June 16, 2002).

In Cerro Verde, *comuneros* are asked to participate in *tequios* only five to six times each year, but those who do not participate are fined—200 pesos as of 2002. The community is unusual in its mandate for nighttime patrol responsibilities assigned to twenty to thirty men in rotation; this *cargo* is strongly enforced and shirkers may have their water cut off. All *comuneros* participate in *cargos* according to their abilities and ambition. Some serve many positions, while others remain in an entry-level post on the patrol for most of their lives. In terms of requirements placed on migrants, Cerro Verde's Assembly of *Comuneros* agreed in 2002 to grant migrants a leave from *tequios* and *cargos*; this decision merely

formalized a long tradition of leaving migrants free of obligations. The municipal secretary noted, however, that authorities demand service of return migrants: "As soon as they find out that you're back, they put pressure on you, they don't wait a moment and they give you a *cargo*, that's the way we do it here." (Respondent #43, June 25, 2002). Thus the community has aspects of organization that distinguish it. While it places few requirements on residents, its organization is higher than that found in San Timoteo but lower than that of Sierra Alta and San Matías. Therefore, we do find variation in the strength of community organization among these communities despite their common allegiance to *usos y costumbres*.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION, MIGRATION, AND REMITTANCES IN STUDY COMMUNITIES

We described above the variation in the level of organization across study communities. We turn now to the association between organization and migration and between organization and remittances. Based on the discussion above, table 3 shows our evaluation of overall community strength as well as levels of migration and remittances. The communities vary in the level of migration and the destinations of migrants, but the patterns have no apparent relationship with the strength of community organization. San Matías and Sierra Alta, the two most strongly organized communities, differ markedly in the destinations of their migrants. There is little migration to other parts of Mexico, including to Oaxaca City, from San Matías, but many migrants go to the United States. Sierra Alta has a high level of migration to Oaxaca City and Mexico City, but comparatively few go to the United States. In each community, the motivations for the migration are economic. While respondents reported low levels of migration to the United States beginning during the Bracero program, migration increased during the past two decades because of the loss of mining jobs in Sierra Alta and a general lack of jobs in San Matías. In this respect, our study communities mirror Oaxaca as a whole. Many migrants left their homes in Oaxaca for other regions in Mexico, particularly Mexico City, during the early and mid-twentieth century (Cohen 2001; Hirabayashi 1993). While some participated in the Bracero program, migration to the United States from Oaxaca was not widespread until the 1980s (Cohen 2001; Durand, Massey, and Zentano 2001).

In the two less strongly organized communities, we see similar variability in migration patterns. Both San Timoteo and Cerro Verde have high levels of commuting to Oaxaca City due to their proximity. But while migration to the United States is common in San Timoteo, migration to other Mexican destinations is uncommon. Cerro Verde shows lower rates of migration to the United States, but higher rates of

Table 3 Relationship between Organization, Migration, and Remittances in Study Communities

Community	Strength of Organization	Migration	Remittances to Community
Sierra Alta	high	high within MX	low to U.S. high
San Matías	high	low within MX	high to U.S. high
Cerro Verde	intermediate	medium within MX	low to U.S. low
San Timoteo	low	high within Oaxaca	high to U.S. low

migration to other parts of Mexico. Overall, however, migration streams out of Cerro Verde are small compared to those out of San Timoteo. While both communities had a few men who participated in the Bracero program, migration from San Timoteo increased dramatically in the middle of the twentieth century because of the closing of textile factories in the community. In both of these communities, in-migration by outsiders (often professionals) represents the most important demographic trend perceived by residents.

In contrast to the apparent lack of association between migration patterns and community organization, there appears to be a strong relationship between community organization and remittances from migrants to community groups. Remittances are sent from migrants to their families in all communities. In the most organized communities, however, community government accesses remittances through fees assessed on migrants for missed *tequios*, and donations received for festivals, maintenance of religious structures, or occasionally for maintenance of other infrastructure.² These donations evidently allow the community to avoid or reduce fees assessed on resident households, or to spend these fees on other projects. In the less organized communities, remittances only go to families and religious festivals. The ways in which the two highly organized communities get remittances from migrants vary, but each is able to leverage migrants' income in ways that support *usos y costumbres* and community projects.

In Sierra Alta, community groups receive remittances from migrants in other parts of Mexico and in the United States. The main way in which the community groups get these remittances is by directly requesting them from the migrants. Respondents reported contacting migrants directly and contacting migrant HTAs to request contributions for special projects. Migrants readily comply with these requests. For example, when

2. The data collection for this study occurred at the time of the extension to the study area (and to all of Mexico) of government programs, known commonly as two-for-one or three-for-one programs, matching migrant remittances for community projects. One respondent noted hearing about the programs, but none of the communities had undertaken any projects using this program.

an interviewer asked a community leader in Sierra Alta whether migrants ever send money to organizations, or for community development, the response was:

Oh, yes, they are very collaborative, that's the way the people of [Sierra Alta] are [inaudible], we have a culture and it's our way—people who work in Oaxaca or Mexico City, they have their committees there. . . . [I]n Mexico City, I don't remember its name, but it has a president, a treasurer and the people who work there in the city. When we need some help for the fiestas or the schools . . . my sister is there . . . we write to her and people spread the news to everyone and they send [a contribution]. It's the same with the people who live in the United States; they contribute above all for the patron saint's fiesta. (Respondent #26, June 5, 2002)

The head of the fiesta committee from the previous year reported that migrants had contributed between fifteen and eighteen thousand pesos (Respondent #27, June 7, 2002).

Another respondent, the president of the primary school committee, responded positively to the question of whether he had ever sought support from migrants. When asked how this was done, he explained: "Mainly it's a question of having personal relationships with people who like to help the community. More than anything, it's people who want to help the whole community, not just the schools." He noted, however, that some requests followed a more formal approach:

For the people who reside in the U.S.A., there is someone who heads their group; it's the same in Mexico City and Oaxaca City. Usually a municipal authority writes to that person to propose a certain project and request assistance. Then the people who live there get together in their meeting place to see the plan and discuss it. They don't turn down a request, they help out. (Respondent #21, June 4, 2002)

Migrants from Sierra Alta do not pay the regular community fees that resident community members pay. The migrants regularly contribute to the annual town festival, and the committee in charge of the festival contacts migrants through relatives. Other committees use contact information as well to request money from migrants. For example, respondents reported that migrants have contributed to the Catholic church, maintenance of a local basketball court, construction of a chapel and a new municipal building, and other public works. Thus migrants' contributions provide income that supports community projects. Given the perpetual shortage of funding, these contributions may enable such projects or free up limited funds for other community projects.

In San Matías, migrants send money to the community for the festivals and parties, sporting events, church maintenance, and some public works. The community contacts U.S. migrants through an HTA in Los Angeles, asking primarily for contributions for the community patron saint's festival. From past research, we know that migrants gain social

status by contributing to fiestas and thus have an incentive to do that without any additional coercion by the community (Cohen 2001; Mountz and Wright 1996). San Matías is not as proactive in requesting contributions for other sorts of projects as Sierra Alta is. However, the community is proactive in accessing other money from the migrants. The government of San Matías gets remittances by expecting migrants to pay fees to the community while they are absent and requiring them to pay for missed *tequios*. The migrants may pay these fees either as they go along (the funds may be used primarily to hire replacement labor) or upon their return.

Notably, both Sierra Alta and San Matías apply income generated from their community enterprises to support community projects as well as to maintain the enterprises. The organizational competence of these communities thus includes the creation and maintenance of community-controlled enterprises to achieve community goals—especially local employment and development projects—beyond the bounds entailed by state and national-level contributions or programs. Accessing remittances represents an additional dimension of their effective institutional arrangements.

In contrast to these stories of community access to remittances, migrants send money almost solely to their families in Cerro Verde and San Timoteo. The only example a respondent reported of a migrant sending money for a community activity in San Timoteo was a contribution for a band for the Day of the Dead festival five years prior. In both of these communities, respondents differed on exactly what the rules are, with some saying that the migrant does not have to pay fees but is expected to perform service promptly upon return, and others saying that fees must be paid or else the migrant loses rights. This variability in respondents' answers indicates that community authorities fall short in communicating and enforcing the rules consistently.

DISCUSSION

The data we present here focus on the instrumental effects of community organization, i.e., the receipt of money from migrants. These instrumental effects are intimately tied with noninstrumental effects. Even when remittances go primarily to family members or community fiestas, remittances serve to confirm migrants' ties to the community. Specifically, remittances from migrants represent one aspect of maintaining individual identity and continually recreating a meaningful community identity. The extent to which migrants maintain community ties and fulfill their community's expectations must be understood in the context of *usos y costumbres*. Community members describe their obligations as burdensome even as they express support for *usos y costumbres*.

Despite the weight of the duties, the system provides benefits for community members by maintaining communal resources and local infrastructure and by conferring membership rights and status. Moreover, the *cargo* system provides an important context to reinforce ethnic and community identity, and reconfirm the advantages of collective action.

Cohen (1997, 1999, 2001) has extensively studied migration out of Oaxacan communities from the perspective of the home community and remaining household members. He argues for the importance of village identity and asserts that remittances from international migration can benefit the community by advancing individual households and by financing community improvements. From the migrants' points of view, the support of community projects, particularly fiestas, is an avenue to increased social status. Cohen points out that the loosening of household budgets through remittances from migrants to families allows those families to support the community more and to attain more status in the community (Cohen 2001). These recent studies are consistent with the findings of Mountz and Wright (1996), studying the transnational social space created by migrants from one community in Oaxaca to Poughkeepsie, NY. They find that remittances from migration pay for increases in the social status of families in the village largely through the sponsorship of fiestas by these families.

These findings are also consistent with the findings of Klaver (1997). She argues that these status-driven remittances depend on the migrants' ties to the home community and will therefore be transitory. Remittances for social status only occur if the migrant is oriented toward the home community and the home community can provide some benefits (monetary or non-monetary) in return for higher status. By allowing more agency for the home community in the process of migration and remittances, we can argue that not all communities are destined to follow Klaver's predictions. Our results suggest that higher levels of organization in home communities are associated with higher levels of remittances and more effective management of other resources. These highly organized communities have the potential to use the remittances that occur as a result of non-economic attachment to the community to develop community enterprises and infrastructure that will make it continue to be attractive to maintain community membership into the next generations of migrants.

It remains to be seen whether this potential is realized. Our evidence also indicates that all communities, even highly organized ones, find migration to be a challenge. Not only is the temporary absence of members difficult, but some migrants never send remittances and never return. In a pessimistic moment, one municipal authority in San Matías shared:

Migrants have had lots of problems . . . because they leave at a very young age. What we want as a community is that they prepare so that they can face

tomorrow (inaudible). We want the new generation [to stay]. We have to equalize the way of life. . . . For that reason there is worry. . . . There are a lot of things to do. Who is going to do them? The young ones leave. Now we don't have their energy, there isn't that ability to overcome (Respondent #19, June 20, 2002).

Yet for well-organized communities, members seek ways to maintain contact with migrants and encourage their long-distance participation. In Sierra Alta, the efforts are particularly well planned, with leaders visiting the groups in Mexico City and Oaxaca City periodically. The president of the *cabildo* discussed one such visit,

In February, the members of the municipal committee went to Oaxaca City to meet with them [the migrants' association]; it wasn't so much to ask for assistance, it was to stay in touch with them, so that we won't lose contact. . . . we rarely ask for economic assistance. More than anything, we want to maintain ties (Respondent # 21, June 4, 2002).

CONCLUSIONS

Past research has painted a pessimistic picture (Dinerman 1978; Mines and DeJanvry 1982; Reichert 1981) or an optimistic picture (Taylor 1999; Taylor et al. 1996a) about the effects of migration on development. Pessimists have focused on the spending of remittances on consumption or the increasing dependence of origin households on the income from remittances. Optimists have focused on the multiplier effects on consumption spending on the community and regional economy and the role of remittances in loosening household budget constraints. We argue that both of these lines of research have largely overlooked the potential direct flow of remittances to communities and the proactive behavior of communities in garnering these remittances. The community-level effects of remittances do not depend solely on the inclinations of migrants and the behavior of their origin households.

We argue that communities can indeed access remittances for projects that range from festivals and sporting events to infrastructure maintenance and development. However, the ability of communities to be proactive relates to their existing level of organization. We provided examples here of communities that are more highly organized with respect to governance and the management of natural resources which are also proactive toward capturing remittances for the community. These communities differed in the strategies employed for capturing remittances, but both were able to capture the remittances through their actions while our two less well-organized study communities were not.

One could argue that the traditions of *usos y costumbres* in our study communities are somewhat unusual in Mexico as a whole, making these results idiosyncratic. The variability in the strength of organization across our four study communities, however, shows that strong organization

is not an inevitable result of *usos y costumbres*. The variability among these communities highlights the value of in-depth case studies for understanding the role of community in the migration process. Although this study involves a small sample, our results point to the need for a consideration of community organizations elsewhere. Indigenous groups in other regions of Latin America may have traditional institutions for local government that have parallel implications for migration and development. In addition, the management of communally owned resources is not unique to our study area. Communities across Mexico cooperatively manage resources on *ejido* and indigenous land (Merino Perez and Alatorre 1997; Aguilar and Zapoteco 1997; Klooster 2003; Bray et al. 2003; Anta Fonseca, Plancarte Barrera, and Barrera Terán 2000; Wilson and Thompson 1993). Diverse rural communities throughout Latin America and other parts of the world have traditionally managed natural resources (Agrawal 2000; Bauer 1987; Brouwer 1995; Gómez-Pompa and Kaus 1990; McCay and Acheson 1987) which in at least some cases constitutes a notable dimension of community governance and organization (e.g., Behar 1986; Netting 1976).

We would further argue that communities with any type of governance, with or without communally owned resources, have the potential to come together to manage their migrants and remittances in a similar fashion. Extensive research on long-enduring, local arrangements for groups to jointly manage forests, water resources, fisheries, and pastures (Acheson 1987; Berkes 1989; McKean 1982; National Research Council 2002; Ostrom 1990) has revealed conditions under which collective action is likely to emerge and endure. Groups that organize effectively to manage natural resources manifest four principal characteristics: prior experience with self-organization, trust or a level of confidence among group members, dependence (economic or otherwise) on the resource in question, and the expectation that the benefits of organization will exceed the costs (Ostrom et al. 1999).

The *cargo* system, and associated village-based identity, in indigenous communities provides the prior experience with organization and the trust among community members. Others have provided evidence that origin communities depend on remittances to the household (Cohen 2001; Hulshof 1991; Mountz and Wright 1996). We provided evidence here that communities can come to depend on remittances to the community and the participation of migrants in governance (through their financial and human capital), and that the benefits of organization can exceed the costs. This suggests that other communities with previous experience with organization may similarly be able to organize to access remittances if they perceive the benefits of such efforts. This is an aspect in which outside development practitioners may be able to assist communities and encourage them to leverage existing organization.

Effective collective action also depends on the condition of the resource base, which in this case includes human resources. Resources most likely to be amenable to group management are those for which the group can perceive identifiable boundaries, reliable indicators of conditions, and relatively predictable resource flows and anticipate benefits from collective management (Ostrom et al. 1999). The maintenance of village-based identities through migrant associations and continued *cargo* requirements ensures that migrants maintain a clear perception of the boundaries of their obligations and the social benefits as well as risks of ignoring them. The communication between migrants and families may provide reliable indicators of the financial and human capital of the migrants, which can be shared with others in the community and serve as a basis for requesting contributions. The requirement that migrants remit in lieu of completing *tequios* and that they return for *cargos* ensures a relatively steady and predictable flow of financial and human capital to the community. From the perspective of well-organized communities, managing flows of remittances and the return of migrants for community labor offers important benefits. In some cases, such management may be an integral part of maintaining the community. Without pressure from their natal communities, and possibly HTAs, it seems likely that the migrants would remit irregularly and only to their families.

Further research is needed to verify the importance of community organization in a wider variety of settings, as well as to expand knowledge of the relationships between remittances and community organization within Oaxaca. This research suggests that development practitioners have additional grounds for encouraging the preservation of traditional forms of community organization and supporting participatory development schemes. These schemes have primarily been employed for the management of natural resources, but our results point to the importance of participatory community approaches for managing human as well as natural resources in communities in developing countries.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acheson, James M.
1987 "The Lobster Fiefs Revisited: Economic and Ecological Effects of Territoriality in Maine Lobster Fishing." In *The Question of the Commons*, edited by B. J. McCay and J. M. Acheson, 37–65. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Agrawal, Arun
2000 "Small Is Beautiful, but Is Larger Better? Forest-Management Institutions in the Kumaon Himalaya, India." In *People and Forests: Communities, Institutions and Governance*, edited by C. C. Gibson, M. A. McKean and E. Ostrom, 57–86. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.
- Aguilar, Jasmin, and Albino Tlacotempa Zapoteco
1997 "Organización campesina y manejo de recursos naturales en el trópico seco." In *Semillas para el cambio en el campo: Medio ambiente, mercados y organización campesina*,

- edited by L. Paré, D. B. Bray, J. Burstein and S. Martínez, 155–65. Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, UNAM-IIS: Sociedad de Solidaridad Social “Sansekan Tinemí”: Saldebas, Servicios de Apoyo Local al Desarrollo de Base en México.
- Alvarez, Luis Rodrigo
1998 *Geografía general del Estado de Oaxaca, 3ª edición*. Oaxaca: Carteles Editores.
- Anta Fonseca, Salvador, Antonio Plancarte Barrera, and Juan Manuel Barrera Terán, eds.
2000 *Conservación y manejo comunitario de los recursos forestales en Oaxaca*. Oaxaca: Secretaría de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca (SEMARNAP), Delegación Oaxaca, Mexico.
- Banerjee, Biswajit
1984 “The Probability, Size, and Uses of Remittances from Urban to Rural Areas in India.” *Journal of Development Economics* 16 (3): 293–312.
- Bauer, Dan
1987 “The Dynamics of Communal and Hereditary Land Tenure Among the Tigray of Ethiopia.” In *The Question of the Commons*, edited by B. J. McCay and J. M. Acheson, 217–30. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Behar, Ruth
1986 *The Presence of the Past in a Spanish Village: Santa María del Monte*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Berkes, Fikret, ed.
1989 *Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development*. London: Belhaven Press.
- Bray, David Barton, Leticia Merino-Perez, Patricia Negreros-Castillo, Gerardo Segura Warnholtz, Juan Manuel Torres-Rojo, and Henricus F. M. Vester
2003 “Mexico’s Community-Managed Forests as a Global Model for Sustainable Landscapes.” *Conservation Biology* 17 (3): 672–77.
- Bromley, Daniel W., ed.
1992 *Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy*. San Francisco: ICS Press.
- Brouwer, Roland.
1995 “Common Goods and Private Profits: Traditional and Modern Communal Land Management in Portugal.” *Human Organization* 54 (3): 283–303.
- Carabias Lillo, Julia, J. Delvalle Cervantes, and Gerardo Segura Warnholtz, eds.
2000 *Voces del monte: Experiencias comunitarias para el manejo sustentable de los bosques en Oaxaca*. México: Proyecto de Conservación y Manejo Sustentable de Recursos Forestales en México (PROCYMAF), Secretaría de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca (SEMARNAP).
- Chance, John C.
1989 *Conquest of the Sierra: Spaniards and Indians in Colonial Oaxaca*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Clarke, Colin
2000 *Class, Ethnicity and Community in Southern Mexico: Oaxaca’s Peasantries*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, Jeffrey H.
1997 “Migration Matters: Household, Community and Transnational Movement in Rural Oaxaca, Mexico.” Paper read at Latin American Studies Association Conference, in Guadalajara, Mexico.
1999 *Cooperation and Community Economy and Society in Oaxaca*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
2001 “Transnational Migration in Rural Oaxaca, Mexico: Dependency, Development, and the Household.” *American Anthropologist* 103 (4):954–67.
- Conway, Dennis, and Jeffrey H. Cohen
1998 “Consequences of Migration and Remittances for Mexican Transnational Communities.” *Economic Geography* 74 (1):26–44.
- Cordero Avendaño de Durand, Carmen
1997 *La vara de mando: Costumbre jurídica en la transmisión de poderes*. Oaxaca: Honorable Ayuntamiento de Oaxaca de Juárez, Biblioteca del 465 Aniversario.
- Díaz-Polanco, Hector, and Araceli Burguete
1996 “Sociedad colonial y rebellion indígena en el Obispado de Oaxaca (1660).” In *El*

fuego de la inobediencia: Autonomía y rebellion India en el obispado de Oaxaca, edited by H. Díaz-Polanco, 17–52. Oaxaca, México: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social.

- Dinerman, Ina
1978 "Patterns of Adaptation Among Households of US-Bound Migrants from Michoacan, Mexico." *International Migration Review* 12: 485–501.
- Durand, Jorge, Douglas S. Massey, and René M. Zentano
2001 "Mexican Immigration to the United States: Continuities and Changes." *Latin American Research Review* 36 (1): 107–27.
- Durand, Jorge, Emilio A. Parrado, and Douglas S. Massey
1996 "Migradollars and Development: A Reconsideration of the Mexican Case." *International Migration Review* 30 (2):423–44.
- Gómez-Pompa, Arturo, and Andrea Kaus
1990 "Traditional Management of Tropical Forests in Mexico." In *Alternatives to Deforestation: Steps Toward Sustainable Use of the Amazon Rain Forest*, edited by A. B. Anderson, 45–64. New York and Oxford: Columbia University Press.
- Gyves, Leopoldo de
2000 "Juchitán: A Free and Autonomous Municipality." In *Indigenous Autonomy in Mexico*, edited by A. Burguete Cal y Mayor, 117–33. Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs.
- Hirabayashi, Lane Ryo
1983 "On the Formation of Migrant Village Associations in Mexico: Mixtec and Mountain Zapotec Cases." *Urban Anthropology* 12 (1):29–44.
1993 *Cultural Capital: Mountain Zapotec Migrant Associations in Mexico City*. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.
- Hulshof, Marije
1991 *Zapotec Moves: Networks and Remittances of US-Bound Migrants from Oaxaca, Mexico*. Amsterdam: Koninklijk Nederlands Aardrijkskundig Genootschap.
- Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI)
1997a *La explotación forestal en el estado de Oaxaca*. Aguascalientes: INEGI.
1997b *Oaxaca: Perfil Sociodemográfico*. Aguascalientes: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Geografía e Informática.
2000 *Anuario Estadístico: Oaxaca, Edición 2000, Tomos I & II*. Oaxaca, Mexico: INEGI, Gobierno del Estado de Oaxaca.
2001 *Estados Unidos Mexicanos: Principales resultados por Localidad XII Censo General de Población y Vivienda 2000 (CDROM)*. Aguascalientes: INEGI.
- Inter-American Development Bank
2003 *Sending Money Home: An International Comparison of Remittance Markets*. Washington, DC: Multilateral Investment Fund, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Kearney, Michael.
1972 *Winds of Ixtepeji: World View and Society in a Zapotec Town*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland.
1986 "From the Invisible Hand to Visible Feet: Anthropological Studies of Migration and Development." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 15:331–61.
- Klaver, Jeanine
1997 *From the Land of the Sun to the City of Angels: The Migration Process of Zapotec Indians from Oaxaca, Mexico to Los Angeles, California*. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.
- Klooster, Daniel
2003 "Campesinos and Mexican Forest Policy During the Twentieth Century." *Latin American Research Review* 38 (2): 94–126.
- Lindstrom, David P.
1996 "Economic Opportunity in Mexico and Return Migration from the United States." *Demography* 33 (3): 357–374.
- Massey, Douglas S., Joaquín Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor
1993 "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal." *Population and Development Review* 19 (3): 431–66.
1994 "An Evaluation of International Migration Theory: The North American Case." *Population and Development Review* 20 (4): 699–751.

- Massey, Douglas S., and Kristin E. Espinosa
 1997 "What's Driving Mexico-U.S. Migration? A Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Analysis." *American Journal of Sociology* 102 (4): 939–99.
- Massey, Douglas S., and Emilio A. Parrado
 1994 "Migradollars: The Remittances and Savings of Mexican Migrants to the United States." *Population Research and Policy Review* 13:3–30.
 1998 "International Migration and Business Formation in Mexico." *Social Science Quarterly* 79 (1): 1–20.
- McCay, Bonnie J., and James M. Acheson
 1987 "Human Ecology of the Commons." In *The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources*, edited by B. J. McCay, and J. M. Acheson, 37–65. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- McKean, Margaret A.
 1982 "The Japanese Experience with Scarcity: Management of Traditional Common Lands." *Environmental Review* 6 (2): 63–88.
- Merino Pérez, Leticia, and Gerardo Alatorre
 1997 "Las condiciones de los aprovechamientos forestales en los casos de distintas comunidades en México." In *El manejo forestal comunitario en México y sus perspectivas de sustentabilidad*, edited by L. Merino, 35–132. Cuernavaca: Universidad Autónoma de México, Secretaria de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca (SEMARNAP), Consejo Mexicano para la Silvicultura Sostenible.
- Merino Perez, Leticia, Patricia Gerez Fernández, and Sergio Madrid Zubirán
 2000 "Políticas, instituciones comunitarias y uso de los recursos comunes en México." In *Sociedad, derecho y medio ambiente*, edited by M. Bañuelos, 57–144. Mexico, D.F.: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, SEMARNAP, PROFEPA, CONACYT, SEP.
- Mines, Richard, and Alain DeJanvry
 1982 "Migration to the United States and Mexican Rural Development: A Case Study." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 64 (3): 444–54.
- Mountz, Alison, and Richard Wright
 1996 "Daily Life in the Transnational Migration Community of San Agustín, Oaxaca and Poughkeepsie, New York." *Diaspora* 5 (3): 403–28.
- Mutersbaugh, Tad
 2002 "Migration, Common Property, and Communal Labor: Cultural Politics and Agency in a Mexican Village." *Political Geography* 21 (4): 473–94.
- Nader, Laura
 1990 *Harmony Ideology: Justice and Control in a Zapotec Mountain Village*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Nagengast, Carole, and Michael Kearney
 1990 "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness and Political Activism." *Latin American Research Review* 25 (2): 61–91.
- National Research Council
 2002 *The Drama of the Commons*. Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change. Elinor Ostrom, Nives Dolsak, Paul C. Stern, Susan Stovich, E. U. Weber, eds. Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
- Netting, Robert McC.
 1976 "What Alpine Peasants Have in Common: Observations on Communal Tenure in a Swiss Village." *Human Ecology* 4 (2): 135–46.
- Orellana, Carlos
 1973 "Mixtec Migrants in Mexico City: A Case Study of Urbanization." *Human Organization* 32 (3): 273–83.
- Ostrom, Elinor
 1990 *Governing the Commons*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ostrom, Elinor, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richar B. Norgaard, and David Policansky
 1999 "Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges." *Science* 284 (5412): 278–82.

- Pew Hispanic Center
2003 "Remittance Senders and Receivers: Tracking the Transnational Channels." Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center.
- Pisa, Rosaria Angela
1994 "Popular Response to the Reform of Article 27: State Intervention and Community Resistance in Oaxaca." *Urban Anthropology* 23 (2-3): 267-306.
- Reichert, Joshua S.
1981 "The Migrant Syndrome: Seasonal U.S. Wage Labor and Rural Development in Central Mexico." *Human Organization* 40: 56-66.
- Rivera Salgado, Gaspar
1999 "Migration and Political Activism: Mexican Transnational Indigenous Communities in a Comparative Perspective." PhD diss., University of California, Santa Cruz.
- Rozelle, Scott, J. Edward Taylor, and Alan de Brauw
1999 "Migration, Remittances, and Agricultural Productivity in China." *American Economic Review* 89 (2): 287-91.
- Rubenstein, Hymie
1992 "Migration, Development and Remittances in Rural Mexico." *International Migration* 30 (2): 127-53.
- Stark, Oded
1991 *The Migration of Labor*. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
- Stuart, James, and Michael Kearney
1981 "Causes and Effects of Agricultural Labor Migration from the Mixteca of Oaxaca to California. Working Papers in U.S.-Mexican Studies No. 28. Program in United States-Mexican Studies: University of California, San Diego.
- Taylor, J. Edward
1987 "Undocumented Mexico-U.S. Migration and the Returns to Households in Rural Mexico." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 69:616-38.
1999 "The New Economics of Labour Migration and the Role of Remittances in the Migration Process." *International Migration* 37 (1): 63-88.
- Taylor, J. Edward, Joaquín Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Douglas S. Massey, and Adela Pellegrino
1996a "International Migration and Community Development." *Population Index* 62 (3): 397-418.
1996b "International Migration and National Development." *Population Index* 62: 181-212.
- Weist, Raymond E.
1984 "External Dependency and the Perpetuation of Temporary Migration to the United States." In *Patterns of Undocumented Migration: Mexico and the United States*, edited by R. E. Jones, 110-135. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenheld.
- Wilson, Paul N., and Gary D. Thompson
1993 "Common Property and Uncertainty: Compensating Coalitions by Mexico's Pastoral Ejidatarios." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 41 (2): 299-318.