

tactical reasons, the Communists, who had emerged as the strongest party in the new Czechoslovak National Front, insisted on resolving the old question of "one nation or two?" in favor of the explicit recognition of the Czechs and Slovaks as two distinct nations in the National Front's Košice program in April 1945. Since then, Slovak Marxist historians have developed the broadest notion of Slovak history yet. It comprises all history that has unfolded in the territory of present-day Slovakia from the earliest times to the present, whether or not it has had a specifically Slovak character. In this view, of which the volume under review is a good illustration, Slovakia's social and economic history is given due attention. It is much less satisfactory in dealing with political history, especially under the First Republic, when the Communists had to enter into free competition for Slovak votes and did not always come out of the contest with flying colors.

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SLOVENSKÁ POLITIKA V STREDNEJ EURÓPE, 1890–1901: SPOLUPRÁCA SLOVÁKOV, RUMUNOV, A SRBOV. By *Milan Krajčovič*. Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied, 1971. 302 pp. Kčs. 45.

Ever since the existence of a nationality problem in Hungary, there has been an abundant and continuous flow of scholarly and polemical writings on the subject. But until recently little was said about the attempts of the non-Magyar nationalities to form a united front to oppose the transformation of Hungary into a Magyar national state. The present volume is the first monographic study of the initial successes and failures of an "alliance" of Slovaks, Rumanians, and Serbs. It is built around the organization of the so-called Congress of Nationalities, held in Budapest in 1895, and deals primarily with political problems rather than with economic and cultural development.

The first three chapters describe the conditions in Hungary which persuaded Slovak, Rumanian, and Serb leaders to join forces and offer numerous examples of early cooperation among them, notably their support of one another at press and political trials like that of the Rumanian Memorandum of 1894. It is evident that the resumption of full-scale political activity after the doldrums of the 1880s coincided with the rise of a new generation of national leaders, who, less wedded to tradition than their forefathers, were eager to try new methods of struggle and became the chief promoters of the alliance. The innumerable conferences and meetings which led to the convocation of the Congress of Nationalities are described in great detail, and due credit is given to the Rumanians for their initiative and perseverance. Much attention is also accorded the internal political evolution of the Slovaks and the West European reaction to it.

The fourth chapter deals with the Congress of Nationalities, the platform it adopted, and the significance accorded it by the Hungarian government and the European press. The author suggests that its main accomplishment was to demonstrate the fallacy of the doctrine of the Magyar national state. After the Congress the alliance manifested itself in a few protests against the celebration of the thousandth anniversary of the founding of Hungary by the Magyars and government projects to Magyarize geographical and personal names, but, as the last two chapters make clear, it failed dismally to live up to the expectations of its creators.

The final blow came in 1901 when the leaders of the Slovak National Party announced that they were abandoning the common policy of boycotting parliament and would run a slate of candidates in the forthcoming elections. But the author finds the underlying causes of collapse to have been the weakness of the Slovak party and internal dissensions among the Rumanians and Serbs.

Krajčovič has made extensive use of unpublished Slovak sources and newspapers, and for this reason the sections on the Slovaks constitute the most original part of his work. His information about the Rumanians and Serbs, on the other hand, has been drawn largely from either this Slovak material or from secondary sources. Little use, for example, has been made of the Rumanian press and Rumanian archive holdings, and as a result he can offer little that is new in the way of interpretation. The same may also be said about the Serbs. But his factual account of both movements is nonetheless ample. The main weakness of the work, it seems to me, is the author's failure to place the events of the 1890s in historical perspective and to treat them as part of a complex process that had begun much earlier in the century. An introductory chapter surveying the development of the three national movements since 1848 would have enhanced the importance of the Congress of Nationalities as a departure from tradition, would have offered a broad basis upon which to judge the unworkableness of the alliance, and, perhaps most valuable of all, would have provided new insight into the general nature of nationalism in the Habsburg Monarchy.

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MAGYAR-AMERIKAI KAPCSOLATOK, 1945–1948. By *Dr. Péter Várkonyi*. Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1971. 266 pp. 25 Ft.

Contrary to Soviet history in which only the future is certain and the past changes according to the party line, in this book the history of Hungarian-American relations in 1945–48 is repeated according to the best traditions of Rákosi's and Stalin's spokesmen. As in Orwell's *1984*, in which the Ministry of Peace was responsible for waging war, in Hungary the Communist seizure of power is presented as an internal democratic transformation. This Aesopian language is used throughout the volume. The triumph of the progressive social forces was opposed by reactionaries supported by the villain of the piece, the United States. The goal of the aggressive American monocapitalism has been world domination. Accordingly, the United States supported the reactionary forces and opposed the democratization of Hungarian social life. Despite malevolent American interventions and some misleading free elections, the progressive forces prevailed, thanks to the always-ready help of the Soviet Union, the presence of the Soviet army, and Soviet leadership in the Allied Control Council. Moreover, it is noted in broader context that "it was not the military presence of the Soviet Union which determined the character of the social transformations in the East European countries—although its fateful significance can hardly be overestimated—but it was the British and before all the American military presence which prevented similar fundamental social transformations in the overwhelming majority of European countries" (pp. 36–37).

The policy of equilibrium followed by the coalition government in Hungary is presented as a sinister plot. The author even criticizes Rákosi's approval of, and participation in, the trip of a Hungarian government delegation to Washington in