

Despite these warnings, the studies in the volume also carry the more hopeful message that a recognition of the continuing sources of tension in East-West relations need not lead to bleak pessimism and distraught fears concerning the decline of the West. *Détente* in one form or another is likely to continue—albeit with reduced expectations on all sides—since it does meet important Soviet needs: facilitating the importation of advanced Western technology, avoiding an unrestrained strategic arms race, providing a framework for crisis management and the avoidance of nuclear war, and preventing closer relations between the United States and China. It also must be borne in mind that, in spite of the extensive commitment of Soviet resources and debilitating American weaknesses in the post-Vietnam and Watergate periods, the Soviet Union has not been able to convert military strength into durable political influence (such as in the Sudan, Egypt, Somalia, and India).

The contributions make clear that, in the years to come, the outward projection of Soviet power will be hampered by internal political vulnerabilities—growing nationalism among minorities and the likelihood of succession problems when the Brezhnev generation in the Politburo and Central Committee (and not just a single leader as in the past) need to be replaced. Similarly, debilitating and constraining economic problems—such as the technological lag, declining growth rates, erratic agricultural production, and a squeeze on energy resources—will persist and possibly worsen. On top of all this, the attractive power for foreign elites of both Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Soviet economic model has declined precipitously. In short, Soviet weaknesses and difficulties are at least as great as those of the West, and a prudent, balanced, and, above all, unified Western policy which avoids overreaction, panic, and preoccupation with the purely military aspects of the East-West equation has every chance for success in the 1980s. As a number of the authors point out, Western disunity and internal weakness, rather than Soviet strength, are likely to be the dominant problems conditioning the critical choices for Americans in the years ahead.

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EUROCOMMUNISM AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. SPECIAL REPORT, JANUARY 1977. By *James E. Dougherty* and *Diane K. Pfaltzgraff*. Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. xiv, 66 pp. \$3.00, paper.

Eurocommunism may be viewed from three analytically separate perspectives: First, it poses a domestic challenge in such countries as Italy, Spain, or France, where Communist parties offer a more or less radical alternative to prevailing political and economic patterns, structures, and priorities. Second, Eurocommunism is a challenge to the East, because it offers, or claims to offer, the prospect of a more humane—indeed pluralistic—form of socialism, which is different from both the theory and practice of socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Third, Eurocommunism is a challenge to the West, notably to NATO and the Atlantic alliance, because of the ambiguity and uncertainty of West European Communist support for an alliance whose main function is to contain Soviet power.

Although the book under review deals primarily with the Eurocommunist threat to the Atlantic alliance, it takes a very skeptical view of all three aspects of Eurocommunism. Recent reappraisals of Communist theory and practice are seen as tactical maneuvers based on calculations of electoral necessity. Among others, the authors regard the undemocratic, Leninist principles of internal party organization and the reluctance to break with Moscow to be evidence for their skeptical conclusion.

One can share, as this reviewer does, the authors' concern about the Eurocommunist challenge to the Western alliance, and one can remain skeptical about the rather sudden "transformation" of the French Communist Party without belittling,

as they do, the impact of Eurocommunism on Eastern Europe, and ultimately on the Soviet Union itself. To the extent that West European Communist parties feel compelled to assert their independence from Moscow, criticize Soviet imperial behavior in Eastern Europe, and dissociate themselves from some of the harshest features of Soviet-style dictatorial rule, they do present an intrasystem alternative to the Soviet pattern, one that can be skillfully used by East European revisionists. While Eurocommunist ideals will not push the Soviet Union out of Eastern Europe or lead to the introduction of Western-style democracy in that region, they can reinforce already existing tendencies toward semiautonomy and encourage more moderate tendencies in the political and economic realms.

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POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN COMMUNIST STATES. Edited by *Archie Brown* and *Jack Gray*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977. xiv, 286 pp. \$24.00.

This is a book about the intriguing question of why nations respond differently to similar challenges, in this case, the Communist effort to create societies that conform to the presumed Marxist-Leninist ideal. The extremely uneven results of the bold experiment in social engineering are the problem to be analyzed and interpreted.

In trying to devise an appropriate methodology, the authors acknowledge the merits and limitations of socioeconomic explanations, but focus on the examination of those aspects of political culture that are not readily susceptible to such explanations. In his sound, thorough, and difficult theoretical introduction, Archie Brown distinguishes between "official" and "dominant" political cultures. The paradigm, referring to the crucial difference between values that are promoted and those that are actually internalized, makes it possible to analyze the interaction between the two political cultures, as well as between political culture and political change.

Inevitably, the selection of countries to be examined presents difficulties. One may question the merit of including China and Cuba in the otherwise all-European sample. It is much more justifiable to include an essay on Russian-Soviet political culture, but the essay, though well written, offers little that is not already familiar to specialists, for whom the book is intended. The main thrust of the volume is found in the chapters on Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, for which the authors have assembled an impressive array of pertinent empirical data. Although the data for Poland are the most copious, they are more successfully used by David Dyker in his essay on Yugoslavia, aptly subtitled "Unity out of Diversity." In assessing the record, Dyker does not find much substance in the overadvertised self-management formula, a key concept of the official political culture. He does demonstrate, however, that, of all Communist countries, Yugoslavia shows the narrowest gap between the regime's performance and popular aspirations—a hopeful sign for the survival of its peculiar system of "institutionalized conflict."

Archie Brown and Gordon Wightman concentrate on the 1968 reform movement in Czechoslovakia as a classic example of political culture fostering political change. By effectively using contemporary surveys of Czechs' and Slovaks' views of their national past, they pinpoint the preeminent role of historical consciousness in the reform movement. They also offer some fascinating examples of how political change influenced political culture. According to a survey conducted shortly after the Soviet invasion, for example, more Czechs and Slovaks felt affinity with the Germans and Austrians than with the Russians; so much for presumed persistence of Germanophobia in that part of Eastern Europe! The gaping abyss between official and domi-