

Throughout the book the figure of Stalin dominates everything, and Vasilevsky devotes several pages (pp. 127–30) to Stalin as a military leader, giving him credit for a good knowledge of strategy and political factors and to a lesser degree for being a tactician, a picture similar to that given by Zhukov and Shtemenko. He also points out some of the less pleasant aspects of Stalin's personality, such as his refusal to visit the front, his stubbornness, and his sharp tongue—exemplified in his remark during the summer of 1942, "We have no Hindenburgs." Vasilevsky is also kind to his colleagues and devotes the last pages of his book to mollifying those with whom he had clashed in the past. Vasilevsky remained an important military figure in the postwar period, but despite the title of the book he unfortunately says little about this aspect of his career.

The second volume of Shtemenko's memoirs covers the period 1943–45 and the operations of the General Staff during the great offensive campaigns of the Red Army. Unlike Vasilevsky, who was away from Moscow for long periods of time and actually received a front command in February 1945, Shtemenko was present at Moscow and with A. I. Antonov ran the General Staff. The second volume is not as informative as the first but sheds some light on the coordination of offensive operations as well as Stalin's political and strategic thinking. Shtemenko goes beyond pure military matters and discusses such questions as Soviet policy in Eastern Europe as well as diplomatic relations with the Western allies. Both books add to our knowledge of Stalin and the Soviet Union, but both suffer from the distortions and exaggerated discretion that seem to be the hallmarks of recent Soviet historical writings.

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THE SOVIET COLONIZATION OF ESTONIA. By *William Tomingas*. New York: Kultur Publishing House, 1973. 312 pp.

In the introduction the author declares his intention to offer a "detailed review of the events that led to the loss of independence of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania." However, the reader seeking new information and analysis about the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union will be disappointed. Latvia and Lithuania are only occasionally mentioned, and the Estonian case is handled in a largely unscholarly manner. In fact, the book is not a scholarly inquiry but simply a demonstration of Soviet injustice in dealing with Estonia.

The book does have the virtue of including documents from the Estonian side in the September 1939 negotiations on Soviet military bases, but these have appeared previously in English. Beyond this, the author relies on a few basic sources, and the material presented is generally well known. The book is not well written, and it contains numerous errors, such as confusing Old and New Style dates and describing the Russian Constituent Assembly elections as taking place on January 21/22, 1918 (pp. 29–30). In several places the book slips into a personal memoir not supported by other evidence. The concluding chapter on the first year of Soviet rule tends to be journalistic and anecdotal.

More important, the book suffers from an extremely narrow conceptual scope and a tendency to view the Estonian situation in a vacuum. There is little treatment of pre-1939 Estonian foreign policy or of the attitudes and roles of other European states in the two crisis periods of September 1939 and summer 1940. The author

ignores Estonia's domestic problems and the role these may have played in her actions. Above all, in describing the two crises themselves the book offers no real analysis of the actions of the Estonian government. For example, the questions raised by the lack of resistance and the rather strange passivity of the government are not broached.

This is an impassioned statement on the treatment of a small nation by a larger one. Although most of the material is accurate and some of it moving, this book does little to advance our understanding of the incorporation of Estonia into the Soviet Union.

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PROISKHOZHDENIE PARTOKRATII. 2 vols. By *A. Avtorkhanov*. Frankfurt am Main: Possev-Verlag, 1973. Vol. 1: TsK I LENIN. 728 pp. DM 32, paper. Vol. 2: TsK I STALIN. 534 pp. DM 23, paper.

Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov's contributions to Western understanding of the CPSU apparatus are well known. In this detailed work he presents a history of the party's Central Committee from its establishment in 1898 to its demise in the Stalinist purges of the thirties. Inevitably the author has had to cover some rather well-traveled ground, but he has done this in a rather novel manner and with the benefit of his vast personal experience. One of the virtues of this lengthy work is that it contains many of the most quotable passages from the records of the party debates in congresses and in polemical statements.

As a history of the Leninist Central Committee the work is a study of the various opposition movements within the Bolshevik ranks and Lenin's disagreements with his own followers. Stalinism and the advent of the "partocracy" are viewed as a "higher phase of Leninism," as an outgrowth of Lenin's practices and policies. After all, it was Lenin who, at the close of the Tenth Congress in 1921 while outlawing factions, proposed to "discuss with rifles" instead of with theses the merits of the Workers' Opposition platform (1:661). Thus Stalin's methods of dealing with the Trotskyite Left Opposition, the Kamenev-Zinoviev "New Opposition," the "Unified Opposition" of Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Trotsky, and the "Right Opposition" had a basis in Leninist practice.

At the same time the author gives much attention to Lenin's break with Stalin over nationality policy and the Georgian Question and to the suppression of Lenin's letter to the Twelfth Congress. Avtorkhanov stresses Stalin's power over both Krupskaja and Lenin's secretary, L. Fotieva, and his ability to create the legend that Lenin's letter was not to be opened until after his death (2:48 ff.). Central to the Stalin-Trotsky rivalry is the character of the antagonists. Trotsky is depicted as a revolutionary who could not become the master of power and as a Hamlet-like figure incapable of carrying out Lenin's wishes at the Twelfth Congress because of his fear that the party might not understand his forming a "bloc" with Lenin. Indeed, the impotence of the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, and Bukharinites in the face of Stalin's bureaucratic apparatus and their inability to use violent means to unseat or dispose of him can be explained, according to Avtorkhanov, in terms of their being "slaves of communism while Stalin was its master" (2:238). To them he was still a Communist, and the alternative to Stalinism was seen as another Kronstadt, a "popular revolution against communism in general." The oppositionists,