

perpetrated the killing and why" (ibid.). Armenians in Adana were considered by opponents of the Young Turks to be allied to the reformers. The massacres were a reaction against the Young Turks. But when Dadrian speaks about "cooperation of the governmental functionaries with Ottoman military authorities, who made ample use of the arsenals of the local garrisons" (182), it is not clear to this reader which Turks carried out the killings. "Turks" and even "government" have to be disaggregated here to distinguish those supporting the Young Turks and those on the side of Abdul Hamid, for the Adana events were part of a larger intra-Turkish political struggle. If Dadrian wants to argue that Young Turks were involved in the massacres, even though their Adana opponents had begun the attacks on the Armenians, he needs to provide both a more complete narrative and persuasive evidence.

My own investigation of the Armenian genocide sees the tragedy of 1915 as a far more contingent event than does Dadrian's research. Though related to long-term Ottoman developments, the very scale and timing of the genocide require more explicit connection to the evolution of Young Turk thinking from Ottomanism to Turkish nationalism, the defeat of Enver Pasha's army at Sarikamish in the winter of 1915, and the opportunities offered by the cloak of a world war.

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To the Editor:

Professor Chary aimed to synthesize the basic tenor of my book in the first two paragraphs of his review of *Panslavism and National Identity in Russia and in the Balkans 1830–1880: Images of the Self and Others* (*Slavic Review* 55, no. 4). He discerned correctly that I examine the rise of Panslavism manifested in the course of three major events: the Slav Congress in Prague 1848, the Slav Congress in Moscow in 1867, and the resurgence of Panslav solidarity during the uprising in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1875–1878. However, his main objection is misleading and merits additional clarification. Chary claimed that I did not disclose that Alexander II and his ministers were not supportive of Panslavism. In fact, I point out intermittently throughout my book (40–71), that neither Nicholas I nor Alexander II condoned Panslav aspirations. The Third Section of the Emperor's Private Chancery established a secret watch in order to identify Slavophiles' goals. Nicholas was mistrustful of the intellectuals who were the principal supporters of Panslavism; he even imprisoned Iurii Samarin as well as Sergei Aksakov in the Petro-Pavlovsk fortress. He personally interrogated Samarin, a godson of Alexander I, demanding specific clarifications of the Panslav ideological positions (70–71). However, in April 1877, under the pressure of widespread support for the embattled South Slavs, Alexander II issued a proclamation on the eve of the fourth Russo-Turkish war of the century. In this proclamation he stressed the long-standing desire to "protect the Christians of Bosnia, Hercegovina and Bulgaria" who were under Turkish rule (110–11). The emperor did not single out the atrocities that occurred in Bulgaria as the main reason for the military intervention, as Chary purported in his review. As to the situation in Bulgaria, I chose to limit my discourse, save for a number of references, in order to emphasize the main tenor of the book.

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Professor Chary replies:

I accept Dr. Milojković-Djurić's response to my review as valid. I had no intention of belittling her excellent study in my comments, but merely wished to call attention to another aspect of the issue. I still assert that, despite the tsar's proclamation, after the disaster of the Serbo-Turkish War, Magahan's revelations of the Rhodope massacres were the major impulse for the failed Constantinople Conference and the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War.

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