

analytical framework. The attempt to present a typology of revolutionaries in which Djilas represents the "idealist," as juxtaposed to the "opportunist," is not particularly useful. The explication of nine stages of revolutionary change, through which Djilas supposedly passed, is not a defensible generalization. Some of Djilas's inclinations are attributed to his Montenegrin background, but, while undeniably leaving an imprint upon him, notably in his literary attainment, this background does not explain his divergence from Montenegrin comrades supportive of Tito's course, or from those who today seek the "centralist" solution to Yugoslav problems of pluralism.

Djilas's radical humanism comes through clearly. Although his literary criticism is sometimes superficial, his writings about Montenegro are profoundly moving. His antibureaucratic posture—that oft-noted component of the political culture of Yugoslavia—permeates his outlook. His analyses of recent developments, for example, Czechoslovakia in 1968, are provocative if not always persuasive. While observing that Yugoslavian Stalinism was "in part inherited but in greater measure developed on our own soil," Djilas has yet to explicate the events leading to Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948. Djilas, however, did alert Western students of Communist modernization to the existence of a more complex reality, and serves to this day as a unique barometer of the evolution of the Yugoslav system and of Yugoslav-Soviet relations.

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BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS WARTIME RESISTANCE IN YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE. Edited by *Phyllis Auty* and *Richard Clogg*. New York: Barnes & Noble, a division of Harper & Row. London: Macmillan, in association with the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, 1975. xii, 308 pp. \$27.50.

Based on material delivered at a conference organized by the History Department of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at the University of London, this book is a fascinating "piece of microhistory." The thread holding the subject together began as Section D of the British MI-6, which, after the Fall of France, combined with other clandestine organizations to become the Special Operations Executive, the SOE. Handicapped by a lack of precise knowledge as to what was happening in the occupied countries, the SOE had to decide which faction to support. At first it backed General Mihailović of Yugoslavia, calling him "the symbol of resistance in the Balkans," but when it became obvious that he was simply using Britain (he was fighting the Communist partisans and had contacted the Italians for his own ends), the SOE was reluctant to admit it had been mistaken.

British policy, in this period, was interpreted and manipulated by senior civil servants, generals, and officials, full of self-righteous principles and prejudices, all convinced they alone knew what was best for Britain. The traditional dislike of communism lingered on in the "corridors of power" long after the Soviet Union entered the war, and the BBC, with its frequent and inconvenient references to the activities of Tito's partisans and other left-wing resistance organizations, came to be regarded as "an unmanageable instrument of policy."

Nowadays, it might be thought cynical that "British politicians, generals and officials" were only concerned with "who was killing most Germans." It should be remembered, however, that in the early years of World War II the outcome was uncertain, and a high degree of realism was essential for survival. Of course, as British leaders had to be ruthless, so also did the resistance leaders. It was an era when the hallucination of divine righteousness touched many in brief authority, and when the SOE tended to suffer because many military leaders considered the SOE of only marginal use. One is intrigued by the comment of the chief of staff, SOE (Cairo), a brigadier, who told Fitzroy Maclean that he "would never go to Yugoslavia whatever the Commander-in-Chief, or the Prime Minister, or anyone else might say," and also by the snippet dropped by Fitzroy Maclean, somewhat relevant to the contemporary scene, that Lord Shelbourne, the minister responsible for the SOE, had suggested that he "take an oath of loyalty to the SOE"—which he declined to do.

This is one of the most interesting and rewarding books I have read recently on this period and part of the world. Countless facts, previously unknown, tumble from its pages. The words are straight from the lips of personalities who were actually involved in one or another of the aspects of British policy toward the resistance movements in Yugoslavia and Greece, and, therefore, contribute missing pieces to the still uncompleted puzzle of how the policy was formulated, how it evolved, and how it was put into mangled practice.

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AN HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO THE END OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

By *Donald Edgar Pitcher*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972. x, 171 pp. + 36 maps. 275 Dglds.

Seldom does a reviewer have the pleasure to report on a volume that he considers outstanding enough not to require criticism, but only a description of its content. Pitcher's volume falls into this extremely rare category. It will certainly be welcomed by all scholars whose interest touches on any of the geographic regions that were part of the Ottoman Empire.

Pitcher's work consists of an introduction, nine chapters, thirty-six maps, and an index of place names. The introduction is bibliographical, citing the 303 titles and the twenty-three maps and atlases used as sources and references. Carefully grouped by time periods and regions, this introduction is a good, basic, introductory bibliography for Ottoman studies.

Each of the chapters is devoted to a specific period in Ottoman history and consists of a well-written brief description of major events and specific references to relevant maps. Supplementary information, in addition to the basic data, is given when required. Chapter 1 lists several cities and gives the dates when they changed rulers during the unstable twelfth century in Asia Minor. It also gives brief descriptions of each of the emirates that emerged at the end of this period and existed when the Ottoman expansion began early in the fourteenth century. Chapter 8 lists the vilayets existing in the early seventeenth century, with references to earlier and later periods. Because each chapter gives the names and dates of the sultans whose reigns are discussed, a complete list of Ottoman rulers is