

THE REVOLUTION THAT NEVER WAS:  
Perspectives on Democracy, Socialism,  
and Reaction in Chile

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- THE TRAGEDY OF CHILE*. By ROBERT J. ALEXANDER. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978. Pp. 509. \$29.95.)
- ALLENDE'S CHILE: AN INSIDE VIEW*. By EDWARD BOORSTEIN. (New York: International Publishers, 1977. Pp. 277. \$4.25.)
- SOCIALISM AND POPULISM IN CHILE, 1932–1953*. By PAUL W. DRAKE. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978. Pp. 418. \$15.00.)
- CHILE AT THE TURNING POINT. LESSONS FROM THE SOCIALIST YEARS, 1970–1973*. Edited by FEDERICO G. GIL, RICARDO LAGOS E., and HENRY A. LANDSBERGER. (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979. Pp. 480. \$24.50.)
- CHILE. AN ATTEMPT AT "HISTORIC COMPROMISE." THE REAL STORY OF THE ALLENDE YEARS*. By JORGE PALACIOS. (Chicago: Banner Press, 1979. Pp. 519. \$5.95.)
- CHILE, 1970–1973: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ITS INTERNATIONAL SETTING. SELF-CRITICISM OF THE UNIDAD POPULAR GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES*. Edited by SANDRO SIDERI, in collaboration with B. Evers. (The Hague: Martinus Hijhoff, 1979. Pp. 400.)
- THE OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE AND THE POLITICS OF CHILE, 1964–1976*. By PAUL E. SIGMUND. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977. Pp. 236. \$14.95.)
- CLASS CONFLICT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHILE, 1958–1973*. By BARBARA STALLINGS. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978. Pp. 295. \$18.50.)
- THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES. CHILE*. By ARTURO VALENZUELA. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. Pp. 168. \$3.95.)

*The End of an Illusion*

The bloody end of Chile's experiment with democratic socialism on 11 September 1973 meant the end of a twentieth-century utopia. Because of the unique nature of the Chilean process—combining political plural-

ism, a degree of institutional continuity, and a claim to socioeconomic equity—its demise affected more than leftist politicians and intellectuals. It sent shockwaves to radicals, reformists, and liberals alike in all four corners of the globe. It also added a new dimension to an ongoing political debate: the so-called crisis of democracy.<sup>1</sup> The Chilean drama is much more than a Latin American phenomenon. Many see it as a specific manifestation of a profound malaise in the very nature of the Western state, alternatively called a crisis of hegemony,<sup>2</sup> legitimacy,<sup>3</sup> or over-participation.<sup>4</sup>

In line with a new pathos in political analysis—the shift from a participatory to an “order” paradigm<sup>5</sup>—postcoup visions of Chile have reflected a pessimistic mood. The possibility of a peaceful, democratic, and evolutionary road to socialism seems to have vanished. Moreover, the very compatibility of capitalism and democracy has been brought into question.<sup>6</sup> Nearly a decade after the coup, the debate about Chile continues to be a highly controversial issue. It has been suggested that, without exception, any interpretation of postcoup Chile had to start from an explicitly ideological frame of reference.<sup>7</sup> This is an important consideration. Like Spain in the 1930s, Chile has become an issue over which academics and observers end up taking sides. This should be kept in mind in any analysis of the current literature on the subject. None of the works discussed here is—nor can it be treated as—a purely “dispassionate” or “detached” study of Chilean politics. This is not to deny their academic value. Quite to the contrary, most of them are a remarkable combination of candid passion and intellectual rigor.

They are, however, quite disparate in content and varied in political intent. At least two of the books—Robert Alexander’s *The Tragedy of Chile* and Paul Sigmund’s *The Overthrow of Allende*—are the work of Cold War Liberals. Jorge Palacios’ *Chile. An Attempt at “Historic Compromise”* presents the view of Chile’s small Communist Revolutionary Party (Marxist-Leninist, Albania orientation). Three of the other volumes, Edward Boorstein’s *Allende’s Chile*, Federico Gil et al.’s *Chile at the Turning Point*, and Sandro Sideri’s *Chile 1970–1973*, more or less represent the numerous views of Chile’s leftist diaspora. The other three books—Arturo Valenzuela’s *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Chile*, Barbara Stallings’ *Class Conflict and Economic Development*, and Paul Drake’s *Socialism and Populism in Chile*—are the result of research by academics whose views differ in political orientation but who are, on the whole, sympathetic to the Unidad Popular experiment.

Background to the Chilean Crisis

One theme running through the current literature on Chile is the notion that the institutional breakdown of 1973 predates the Unidad Popular era. Thus, irrespective of their political persuasion, most authors have attempted to characterize Chile's recent political history. Two of the studies reviewed here are particularly useful in putting the analysis in perspective—Drake's *Socialism and Populism* and Stallings' *Class Conflict and Economic Development*. They seek to elucidate the context within which profound structural and conjunctural contradictions emerged during the Allende administration.

*Socialism and Populism in Chile* is a fairly complete historical account of Chile's socialism from its formative years in the 1930s until its haphazard institutionalization in the 1950s. This period is particularly important as it covers the emergence of the short-lived Socialist Republic of 1932, the incorporation of Chilean Socialists into the Popular Front Government (1938–41), and the formation of Allende's People's Front in 1952—the predecessor of the Popular Unity of 1969. Drake's book describes in rich detail the intricacies of the Chilean political system, particularly with regard to the Chilean Left. He treats Chilean socialism as a complex, heterogeneous, and often contradictory mass movement with eclectic sets of policies and a clientelistic orientation. In sum, he sees socialism as a conglomerate more appropriately described as a populist juxtaposition of factions rather than as an orthodox Marxist movement with a centralized Leninist structure. Its most distinctive feature, besides its organizational weakness, was its fervent nationalism.<sup>8</sup> The examinations of populist movements in Latin America—*peronismo* being an example here—has shown similar structural and ideological traits.

The study of Chilean socialism is of great relevance to any understanding of the Allende period. Not only was Allende a Socialist, but his party was the largest one in the UP coalition. Most importantly, the Socialist party itself can be seen as a "model" of the ambiguities and contradictions present in the whole leftist alliance.<sup>9</sup> Central to these ambiguities was the "theoretical ambivalence towards the means to reaching power and creating socialism tempered by . . . [a] . . . pragmatic devotion to the democratic bargaining system" (p. 37). Drake suggests that, in the long run, the "contradiction of using the evolutionary institutions of formal democracy in a highly dependent capitalist system to pursue theoretically revolutionary ideology aimed at the ultimate replacement of that system was never resolved" (p. 337). Echoing Carlos Altamirano's *Dialéctica de una derrota*,<sup>10</sup> Drake convincingly argues in his epilogue that the means and the ends were simply and ultimately incompatible. When the final showdown came, Chile's socio-

economic elites, rather than the Left, would destroy the state, in their case to maintain the country's traditional social "order."<sup>11</sup>

Stallings' *Class Conflict and Economic Development* complements Drake's historical perspective by giving a systemic and structural dimension to the understanding of the Chilean crisis. In one of the best attempts I have seen to study the political economy of development from a Marxist perspective, Stallings presents a linkage model of Chilean society, politics, and economy by centering on three analytical variables: social classes, the state, and the international sector. Her central thesis is that there is a "direct relationship between the class alliance which controls the state apparatus, the resulting economic policies which are implemented, and the outcomes, . . . in terms of economic growth and income distribution" (p. 3). From this Stallings derives five main propositions: (a) social classes will combine into alliances, (b) these alliances will have different development ideologies, (c) there will be struggle between the alliances to control the state, (d) the alliances in control will implement their development ideology through economic policies, and (e) the latter will produce different development outcomes in terms of growth and distribution. Subsequently, Stallings applies her construct to the comparative study of three such "development models," understood as class projects with a claim of hegemony. She explores three different yet sequentially linked "regimes"—Alessandri's (1958–64), Frei's (1964–70), and Allende's (1970–73)—and examines the role of the state in the economy, the function of foreign capital, and the relationship between investment and consumption. Although the differences in both ideology and performance of the three regimes were indeed substantial, a number of common factors remained. For instance, Alessandri's modified *laissez-faire*, Frei's "Third Way," and Allende's "Road to Socialism" operated within a basic neo-Keynesian, import-substitution framework in which the state played a central role in development. Moreover, all three regimes maintained the congruence between market-liberal economics and market-democratic politics. The differences in policies followed more or less directly from the class base and development ideologies of the coalition. One striking factor, however, is that in each period, a cyclical pattern emerged resulting almost unavoidably in higher inflation and an exacerbated frustration.<sup>12</sup> The end result of the "constipated dialectic" between business and labor would bring about a contradiction between the bourgeois and democratic characteristics of the Chilean state. These would escalate up to the "final solution" of 1973.

### *The Rise and Fall of Chile's Socialist Experiment*

Since the 1973 coup, explanations of the failure of "Chile's road to socialism" have multiplied. However, two questions have remained central:

(1) What were the root causes of the violent collapse of Chile's political regime?; and (2) What lessons can be drawn from the Chilean experience? These questions—and their related “causal explanations” and implications—must be seen in turn in their context of two interrelated factors: the ideological orientation of the study and its epistemological conceptual framework. Since the pieces by Drake and Stallings have been treated as “background to the crisis,” they will not be directly touched upon in this section.

Alexander's *Tragedy* represents a passionate internalization of the Chilean drama from the viewpoint of a New Frontier Liberal. In his view, the “tragedy of Chile did not begin on September 11, 1973, when the military junta government came to power, but at least three years earlier, when Salvador Allende was elected president” (p. ix). Adhering to a conventional interpretation of the Chilean democratic uniqueness—the consensus society—he goes on to explore the ways in which Chilean democracy was destroyed. His central thesis is that at the core of the denouement was the “growing intolerance and extremism” that undermined the broad consensus of the polity. Although he recognizes that polarization affected both the Left and the Right, he explicitly lays the blame on the Left. Throughout his lengthy and at times fairly detailed analysis, the author stresses the preeminence of ideology over incrementalist common sense as the central factor accelerating the crisis.

Despite a clear and straightforward style, there are contradictions between incongruous stands, as in lamenting the tragedy and brutality of the current regime, while conveniently downplaying American involvement. Selective use of sources (for instance, Robert Moss and other pro-junta publications) renders his analysis flat and pregnant with “red scare” biases. Lamentation and rhetoric aside, his treatment of policies under military rule shows them in a more favorable light than those of the Allende administration. In conclusion, he asserts that the UP was consciously seeking to destroy Chilean democracy. In this context—given the inherent authoritarian nature of Marxist parties—one could infer that the “Chilean tragedy” is hardly a tragedy and that the military's reasons for seizing power (and those of Gerald Ford to justify intervention) would be highly justified.

In a similar ideological vein, but with a more coherent and sophisticated analytical framework, is the book by Paul Sigmund. Although the author chooses to concentrate on the central role of ideology in the conduct of political decisions, he presents a basically functional-structuralist argument. This thesis, much in line with the less explicit reasoning of Alexander's, is that “there are serious economic constraints on the possibilities of more than incremental changes in a democratic system” (p. xii). Thus, tinkering with the system may lead to systemic overload. In the Chilean case, the cost of the revolution was class polarization,

violence, and uncontrollable inflation; in one word, chaos. He examines the causes for the collapse of the UP government from three levels of explanation: systemic (the ideological opposition between democracy and Marxism), national (a fragile economy with an archaic political system), and personal (Allende's errors). He views the trends in Chile as worldwide trends; by "seeing the future," the author contends it is possible to argue that the combination of socialism and democracy, à la Chile, does not work (p. 13). The treatment of the subject is fairly tight, logical, and systematic, offering a number of valuable analytical reflections. Under the apparently neutral language, however, there is a visceral bias against Marxism in general, and the Allende government in particular. As in Alexander's study, "plausible denials," slight distortions, and selective use of sources help to build a subtle argument to justify the *intervención militar* and let the reader draw the unavoidable, and forgone, conclusion: socialism = disaster.

Boorstein's *Allende's Chile* does not make any pretense of "scholarly objectivity." It is an ardent, yet fairly analytical, apology of the Allende administration. As a first-hand observer, the author mixes personal anecdote and insight with a more or less standard Marxist interpretation of the events in Chile, which leads to some thematic imbalance and, at times, ambiguity. Defending the UP's strategic line of the "peaceful road to socialism," Boorstein uses the notion of "correlation of forces" as a central analytical tool. Throughout his descriptive account, he traces the dialectical interplay between support and opposition for the Allende government.

One of his central—though rather implicit—theses is that the military held the key for the long-run success or failure of the "Chilean way." Unlike most works on Chile, which either ignore or bypass the military establishment, Boorstein gives a good deal of space to describing and analyzing the Chilean military and its transnational linkages. This is, in itself, a valuable and useful exercise.

The author traces the causes of the Left's defeat back to a fairly explicit conspiracy: a combination of domestic and international forces strategically united to topple the UP government. He suggests that "The United States . . . was not only involved in that overthrow—it was the principal force behind it" (p. 257, author's emphasis). In an analysis closely paralleling Noam Chomsky's recent book,<sup>13</sup> he sees the spread of military regimes as a consequence of the crisis of peripheral capitalism. Boorstein presents two somewhat contradictory conclusions. One is a more or less optimistic defense of the viability of the electoral road to power in nations other than Chile. The other contains a pessimistic warning: "The United States is not immune. The case of Chile provides a glimpse of the fascism latent in a monopoly-dominated United States government. . . . If these officials react this way when peripheral inter-

ests are threatened, what will they do as the threat moves closer to vital areas?" (p. 25).

Another overtly political and polemical essay is Jorge Palacios' *Chile: An Attempt at Historical Compromise*, which presents a clear "maximalist" position. It is in essence a documented and often insightful discourse—or diatribe—against Chile's pro-Moscow Communists. Palacios' conceptual framework is Lenin's *State and Revolution*. The central thesis of this interpretative work is that the failure of the UP was inevitable given "the government's attachment and submission to laws and institutions that were not only controlled and used by the subversive opposition, but that were also violated by them according to their putschist plans" (p. 17). Thus, the root cause of the catastrophe was the consequence of the petty bourgeois deviations of Chile's pro-Moscow Communists, especially their thesis of peaceful coexistence with the bourgeoisie. Despite its clearly discursive and inductive style, the book contains a good analysis of the Chilean armed forces and police (this is hampered, however, by a limitation of sources). In sum, Palacios offers an articulate—yet overtly biased—condemnation of the "peaceful road" strategy; one that he contends has universal implications.

Perhaps one of the better summaries of the Chilean process is the terse and well-thought-out monograph by Arturo Valenzuela, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile*, which is part of a series under the direction of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan.<sup>14</sup> Although it deals essentially with one case study, the methodology is broadly comparative. This is an obvious advantage from the standpoint of political analysts. Together with Stallings' work, mentioned earlier, Valenzuela's piece is the only one that offers an explicit and coherent methodology; in this case an eclectic and flexible structural-functionalism. Although the approach is often accused of having "liberal biases" and putting a premium on "systems maintenance"—a critique I wholly share<sup>15</sup>—Valenzuela uses it very effectively. *Breakdown* is a further distillation and excellent synthesis of his previous works on the subject.<sup>16</sup>

Valenzuela's thesis is that the breakdown of the Chilean political regime was not due to the actions of extremists; it "was more the result of the inability of centrist forces—of democrats on both sides of the divided political system—to see the logic of escalating crisis, or, for that matter, foresee the dire consequences of a repressive authoritarian regime" (p. xiii). Using Sartori's conceptualization of "polarity,"<sup>17</sup> he suggests that systemic stability in Chile was a function of a complex tripolar arrangement of national brokerage structures and a web of political institutions. The balance of power was held by the centrist forces, chiefly the Radicals (until 1964) and the Christian Democrats (up to 1973). In his view, the principal cause of the eventual breakdown was the loss of an effective mediating force at the center of a highly polarized political

process.<sup>18</sup> However, Valenzuela's conclusions are somewhat disappointing. He argues that the coup was not inevitable and that political maneuvering oriented toward establishing a "viable" center could have aborted the uprising (there is a big transempirical "if" here). This overly optimistic view of a political process that was essentially *stalemated rather than consensual* is mitigated by an extremely perceptive observation: "the real transformation of Chilean politics began not on 4 September 1970 but on 11 September 1973" (p. 106). I will return to this critical point below in discussing the Pinochet regime.

The volume edited by Sandro Sideri, *Chile 1970–1973*, is an attempt at a self-criticism of Allende's economic policy. It is the result of a seminar held at the Institute of Social Studies in the Hague, in April and July 1976, at which prominent Chilean exiles—leftist technocrats and *políticos*—exchanged ideas about the UP experience. Whereas one could have expected a fairly disjointed and even self-serving set of presentations, the book contains a number of well-documented, analytical essays about the UP's economic model and its failure. Given the prominence of the actors—former ministers and parliamentarians, ex-officials of the Central Bank and high-ranking civil servants—there are many valuable and often candid insights into the period. Sideri establishes an explicit dependency framework in the introduction, then probes into the "interaction between the international economic and power system and the domestic economic, social, and political structures during the process of accelerated social change" (p. xiv). The theoretical framework is quite appropriate to tie together the various individual chapters. The author's principal thesis centers on the notion of program viability; for him, in order to analyze why the coup took place, "it is necessary to look . . . at the implementation of the UP's programme and the conditions under which it was carried out" (p. xvi). Viability has two dimensions: one internal or domestic, one external or international. In the Chilean case, the author suggests that it was the lack of external viability that undermined the internal viability of the project. In other words, the UP initially underestimated the constraints imposed by the external sector.

The book contains analytical pieces on the Chilean economy before the 1970 election, the structural transformation of the Allende period, the external sector, copper nationalization, "social and mixed property" in the industrial sector, the nationalization of the banks, and the political economy of inflation. Particularly important articles, given the context of the book, are Clodomiro Almeyda on "The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government," Fernando Fajnzylber on "The External Sector and the Policies of the Unidad Popular Government," and Carlos Fortín on copper nationalization. Almeyda, who held the portfolio of Foreign Relations and also Defense, gives an eyewitness account of the infiltration of the Chilean armed forces. He contends that U.S.



intelligence services, chiefly the Office of Naval Intelligence, played the central role in the technical preparation of the coup. He suggests that, as in the case of Brazil in 1964, the U.S. military and naval forces even contemplated direct involvement in the coup operations (pp. 115–16). In the same vein, Fortin notes that the issue of copper nationalization was used as a pretext by the Nixon regime to intervene and topple the Allende government.

Of all the essays, however, the best clues to understanding the unfolding of the Chilean crisis are provided in Sergio Ramos' piece on inflation. Using a lucid structuralist framework, Ramos sees the inflationary spiral in Hirschman's terms as a type of institutionalization of the class struggle.<sup>19</sup> His model of "multiple dysfunctions" accelerated by the incongruous policies of the Allende administration is not only a good piece of self-criticism, it also provides a sound theoretical foundation for understanding the mutation of a political stalemate into a repressive-authoritarian order.

Sideri uses three interrelated levels of explanation to summarize the main reasons for the collapse of the UP experiment. First, he contends that the dominant powers in the international system played a decisive role. Second, he suggests that the extreme external vulnerability of the Chilean economy accelerated fiscal deficits that, combined with short-sighted (and short-run) policies, resulted in an accelerated fiscal crisis. Third, it was the fiscal crisis that fueled the political crisis and created an environment that justified armed intervention. He concludes, however, that the coup was not directly *caused* by the fiscal crisis and the ensuing chaos. Rather, he contends that the crisis gave the opposition a motive, a rationale to interrupt the process by the power of arms. It was the only alternative left to them (p. xviii).

Somewhat broader in scope, but equally useful from an analytical and testimonial point of view, is Gil, Lagos, and Landsberger's *Chile at the Turning Point*. . . . Like Sideri's volume, it is an edited version of a conference, this one held at Chapel Hill, N.C., in May 1975. Participants were a number of prestigious "observers" and "actors" from the UP government, and also included exiled Christian Democratic leader and ex-presidential candidate, Radomiro Tomić. The book begins with a treatment of the Allende years, followed by a discussion of the causes of the coup and an analysis of the emerging authoritarian state. However, the pieces included lack a common theme or themes, and the overall outcome is uneven and slightly unfocussed, largely due to the incongruity between the general framework presented in the introduction and the approach used by individual contributors. Whilst the editors follow the notion of "bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes" advanced by O'Donnell,<sup>20</sup> individual contributions range from modified functional-

structuralism to class analysis to dependency theory to Huntington's "political order" models.

Ideologically, the book is generally sympathetic to the Chilean Left, although from a somewhat social-democratic point of view. The editors present two opposing theses to explain the Chilean phenomenon. One is that the *vía chilena*—as a "second road to socialism"—was not viable and that the attempts to traverse it would lead "almost inevitably to the destruction of the democratic system . . ." (p. 2). The editors felt this "conservative" explanation was too monocausal for the complex Chilean reality; thus, they propose an alternative thesis derived from the theory of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. Centering upon the effects of social, economic, and political contradictions inherent in the development process, the thesis suggests that it is development itself that, in the long run, destroys the democratic system. Like the first thesis, it proposes that the demise of Chilean democracy was almost inevitable: "It would have occurred regardless of the kind of civilian government ruling in Chile" (p. 3). Despite the excellent quality of most of the contributions, these two theses are only tangentially addressed—if at all—by the participants. The high degree of thematic continuity in the Sideri volume is lacking in *Chile at the Turning Point*.

Jorge Tapia Videla's overview is a good synthesis of Chilean politics, very much in the vein of Valenzuela, except that he uses stalemate rather than consensus as the main term of reference for Chilean politics. He examines the different phases of political stalemate leading to a hopelessly deadlocked system with a weak government, a strong opposition, and an extreme polarity. He suggests state power had become a mere fiction and professional violence the only valid political currency.

Clodomiro Almeyda's contribution, similar to his piece in Sideri, offers good insight into the UP's foreign policy. It shows that the government's assessment of the global configuration in which it was operating was relatively superficial and naive. Particularly good are his comments regarding clandestine and military penetration of the Chilean state. Sergio Bitar's piece on the interaction between politics and economics contains good analysis and surprisingly high doses of self-criticism. It presents a crisp and penetrating argument rejecting Rosenstein-Rodan's thesis of "Allende's incompetence"<sup>21</sup> and traces the confrontation on the political and economic fronts from 1970 to the coup. He sees the government's underestimation of ideological factors and the weak link between political and economic leadership as contributing to the crisis. David Baytelman's views regarding agriculture—the Achilles' heel of the UP government—are congruent with those of Bitar's. Pío García's piece on the "social property sector" also follows this line of argument. His assessment may well summarize the other author's conclusions—in his

view, the UP government “allowed important bases of the economic power . . . to survive and, with them, the bourgeoisie’s ability to manipulate the middle sectors and disrupt the economy for political reasons . . .” (p. 181).

Exploring the causes of the demise of the republican order, Rado-miro Tomić presents an intense yet extremely perceptive article on the relationship between the Unidad Popular and his own Christian Democratic party. In a profoundly autocritical manner, he explores the failure of the Christian Democratic administration’s “revolution in liberty” (1964–70). In his view this failure was the inevitable outcome of the contradiction between the PDC’s economic development project—reinforcing capitalism—and its social development program oriented at producing broad social mobilization. This systemic contradiction facilitated the UP victory in 1970, but also gave the Left a bitter legacy of unfulfilled expectations. For Tomić the inability to establish a working entente between the Left and the PDC was the main factor in accelerating the growing polarization and the final breakdown. He also stresses the role played by the CIA in changing the psycho-cultural climate of tolerance through ideas and experiences alien to the Chilean way of life (pp. 236–37). In a lucid presentation, reminiscent of recent works on the use of psychological warfare techniques in Chile,<sup>22</sup> Tomić asserts that the “intervention . . . destroyed the moral basis of civic debate and made political crime, which Chile had not known for a century, once more a weapon of struggle” (p. 238).

Similarly perceptive is Luis Maira’s brilliant piece on the strategy and tactics of counterrevolution. Looking at the mutation from a tripolar to an extremely bipolar system of political brokerage, Maira shows how ideological and structural rigidity ultimately created a self-fulfilling prophecy. This was fueled by externally orchestrated clandestine actions—e.g., the Pérez-Zújovic assassination (p. 258)—resulting in a kind of political brinkmanship ultimately geared at self-destruction. Because the government was caught, in spite of itself, in a system of norms that could not change, it became increasingly incapable of using extra institutional mechanisms to solve the crisis in its favor. In fact, it was the opposition—national and transnational—that ultimately gained the upper hand and succeeded in changing the rules of the game.

The thrust of this argument is found as well in Hugo Zemelman’s essay on the problems of transition to socialism. For Zemelman the institutional nature of the Chilean way “was not an option chosen from among others less viable but rather was a condition imposed by the bourgeoisie in order to maintain its domination intact” (p. 276). That is, the Chilean elites always retained *metapower*.<sup>23</sup> Conversely, the Left could only “win” inasmuch as the elites adhered to the rules laid down by themselves. Of course, they did not. Jorge Tapia Valdes questions the

myth of the "Chilean Revolution." He contends that the Chilean road to socialism was the most that Chilean reality could permit (p. 299). The socioeconomic goals were quite modest and were never designed to (nor could they) create a socialist society. In a direct reference to those who mystify the UP experience, Tapia Valdes asserts that despite its enormous revolutionary potential "*the goal of the Chilean road was specifically the kind of road chosen, not the type of socialism to which it lead*" (p. 299, author's emphasis). In fact, he reasserts the distinctively democratic nature of the process, one which both the ultra Left and the Right have often overlooked.

Julio Silva Solar examines the errors of the UP and the role of the Christian Democrats. Partly contradicting Tomić's characterization of the PDC as a "working class party," he describes the distinctively bourgeois nature of the PDC. Representing a constituency of Chile's middle strata, it was highly vulnerable to a scary language of "class struggle" and "proletarian hegemony." The threat of an impending revolution (which never took place) resulted in the extreme alienation of an otherwise "liberal" class. Chile's *clase media*, despite its being objectively proletarianized, was subjectively oligarchical and imbued with notions of "order" and "respectability." Here Silva Solar illustrates Lipset's thesis of middle-class "centrist" radicalization. In a polarized situation, radicalism from the center resulted in a rapid shift to defend the ideological hegemony of Chile's bourgeoisie. In this sense, bourgeois ideological and psychological influence was decisive. It played a fundamental role in mobilizing a large middle-class constituency, including the officer core, against the "Marxist menace."

The third part of Gil's volume deals with the international repercussions of the coup and with the emergence of Chile's *estado de excepción*. Philippe Schmitter discusses the impact of the Chilean coup in Europe, particularly in Portugal. He concludes, in a line of reasoning not too different from that of Sigmund's: "Chile calls us to the sobering reflection that all attempts to install socialism . . . by nonviolent means have led either to the eventual establishment of a party dictatorship, laying the basis for domination by a new bureaucratic class, or to a military dictatorship, preparing the way for a restoration of the previous order" (pp. 357–58). Henry Landsberger and Juan Linz's piece gives a very useful and penetrating comparison of Chile with the collapse of the Spanish Republic. Despite obvious specific differences, striking similarities emerge between the two cases when the structural parameters are examined. The authors found "that the danger of breakdown is not confined to countries that have . . . been unstable. The Chilean case indicates that stability, nonviolence, and both formal and (a good deal of) real democracy in the past do not guarantee their continuation even in the most immediate historic future" (p. 407).

Alan Stern and Glaucio Dillon Soares, respectively, present two comparative cases. Stern's study looks at the experience of Italy's Communist party—the *compromesso stórico*. Dillon Soares sketches the antecedents of the Brazilian national security regime, the first such "model" in Latin America. These perspectives are useful for building generalizations, but do not add much to the substance of the book.

One article deserving special attention is a first-rate piece by a group of anonymous Chilean scholars under the pen name of P. Bule. There is a chilling, disturbing, and fascinating account of the country's cultural system under military rule. With an extraordinary degree of documentation, they describe the regime's ideology (its basic values, ideological programs) as well as the mechanisms for the transmission of values (formal education at primary, secondary, and university levels and informal education in the media and interpersonal relations). They conclude that, in today's Chile, control of the working classes "is achieved by keeping individuals at minimum levels of physical subsistence and by physical repression. Terror plays the manipulative role *par excellence*. Propaganda is complementary and reinforces terror but is not essential. For the middle sectors, where ideological controls play the principal role, propaganda is the key mechanism and terror is complementary" (p. 393).

José Nun's observations on authoritarian regimes provide a general and closing overview of the process of the militarization of contemporary Latin America. Elaborating on his now classic concept of "the middle-class military coup," Nun observes that we "find ourselves in the midst of a process of movement toward a new kind of state . . ." (p. 466). In the context of a redefinition of dependence and sharpening social conflicts, the liberal state has ceased to be the most adequate means to secure bourgeois domination. National security regimes appear to provide this security: total security by total terror.

### *Après le Déluge*

Rather than summarizing the principal traits of the works reviewed in the preceding section, I will conclude by discussing a number of points that require special consideration.

First, there is the issue of questions left unasked and unanswered or, worse, timidly asked. The more "scholarly" literature particularly has failed to probe systematically into two sensitive and interrelated subjects—the Chilean military establishment and the extent of U.S. involvement in Chilean politics. It is surprising that the military is generally avoided as a subject by most liberals and reduced to the dynamics of class struggle by many Marxists. Certainly the 1973 coup could not have assumed the form it took—nor could it have taken place—without

some specific cultural, structural, and behavioral characteristics extant in the Chilean military machine. Even *dependentistas* fail to provide a specific linkage model<sup>24</sup> to analyze the transnational connections of the security forces. True, in the Marxists' case, as Miliband has argued, the lack of a specific theory of the state (at least until recently) has impeded the study of political institutions, such as the armed forces, which possess a relative degree of autonomy from the "class coalition" proper. In the meantime, contextualism has prevailed over more specific historical sociology. In recent years, however, the works of Poulantzas, Miliband, Wolfe, Habermas, and, very especially, Laclau—not to mention the re-discovery of Gramsci—have offered a promising methodology for research.<sup>25</sup>

On the liberal, non-Marxist side of the spectrum, this absence seems to respond to another kind of contextualist bias: structural-functional and systemic analyses have emphasized the "input" side of the political process, neglecting the role of institutions. However, some studies have been done, including an excellent series of working papers produced by FLACSO, not to mention the pieces by Frederick Nunn, Liisa North, and myself.<sup>26</sup> Perhaps the 1980 FLACSO volume by Augusto Varas, Felipe Agüero, and Fernando Bustamante, *Chile, democracia, fuerzas armadas*, will finally lay this "oversight" to rest. In my opinion, a complete picture of the events of 1973 and, most importantly, of the repressive state itself will not be obtained until the military establishment is appropriately studied.

Another deficiency in most of the literature is the lack of a systematic and thorough treatment of the nature of American intervention. True, since the ITT papers and the U.S. Senate Report on intelligence activities, this "taboo" theme—one carrying the stigma of being "non-academic"—has more or less crept into U.S. official and academic circles. It is equally true that much more needs to be done. CIA activity appears to have been significant—perhaps more than reported. However, it was not the only type nor the most intense kind of U.S. clandestine operation going on in Chile, both before *and after* the coup. One could argue that these two themes—the military and U.S. clandestine activities—still do not sit well with most "serious" academics; they are "unprofessional" and disquieting subjects. In this context, I perceive a sardonic tone when Gil et al. discuss the U.S. training of Latin American officers and question how some North American values—e.g., those referring to human rights, basic liberties, etc.—are not "transmitted" as effectively as others, e.g., the benefits of "free enterprise" (p. 10). Going further, I question two basic premises extant in mainstream American academia: (a) that the counterinsurgency doctrine is intrinsically democratic; and (b) that the core values of the U.S. military establishment are very different from those of their Latin American counterparts.<sup>27</sup>

*The Transformation of the Chilean Political System*

In light of the preceding analysis it is worth considering the apparent “regression” of Chile’s level of political “development.” Undoubtedly, the Chilean experience raises fundamental questions about the adequacy of the progressive, stage model of political change prevailing in both liberal and Marxist thinking. In this respect the Chilean pattern of rapid involution has an ominous touch of universality. With growing tensions between economic capabilities and social expectations and between elites and nonelites—complicated by worsening fiscal, legitimacy, and sovereignty crises in the Western state—Chile does offer a plausible though nightmarish scenario of things to come. It seems pertinent here to stress that the Chilean process involved the mutation of a stalemated political system into a repressive one, whilst maintaining the continuity of Chile’s dominant groups. It was a revolt of the elites, a preemptive counterrevolution by the country’s dependent bourgeoisie against a shadow revolution—one that never was. In my opinion the most distinctive feature about the UP was not its revolutionary character; Allende was not presiding over a revolutionized society (at least not until the business strike of October 1972), nor had the government coalition the capacity to unleash one. Perhaps the most predominant trait of the *vía chilena* was its relentless and chaotic incrementalism: a sort of “muddling through” on the way to a distant socialist society that meant many different things to many constituencies.

Seen from this perspective, both the UP phenomenon and its brutal demise can be explained as specific manifestations of one single, long-range process that involves the growing contradiction between liberal capitalism (market economics) and liberal democracy (market politics) in the modern state. That the Chilean experiment carried the “socialist” label appears, in this context, less important than the exhaustion of a certain mode of elite domination (and transnational domination). This seems to be a worldwide trend of great significance. Proliferation of what Chomsky has called subfascist regimes<sup>28</sup> in peripheral capitalist countries has resulted from a change in the style of control exercised by dominant foreign and domestic groups—a redefinition of the terms of dependence. This redefinition requires a new political project, one combining demobilization with marginalization and growing reliance on external constituencies and, most important, one resulting in the transnationalization of the state.<sup>29</sup>

*The New Chilean Model*

Valenzuela’s argument that the real transformation of Chilean politics began not on 4 September 1970 but on 11 September 1973 must be

considered seriously. The outcome of the process of transformation discussed above was that the peaceful road to socialism became the rationale to unleash the violent road to fascism. Pinochet's Chile is a far greater challenge and a more significant experiment for the West than Allende's socialism. The Chilean way of 1970 provided a model for a few European countries and perhaps for one or two in the Third World. Conversely, the Chilean "new order" offers a laboratory for the reconstruction of capitalism both in the "periphery" and the "center."<sup>30</sup> In this regard, more than Frei's *Revolution en libertad*, Chile is once again a "showcase."

It is erroneous to keep on looking at Chile's repressive regime as purely a negative reaction to Allende's Chile; whilst it may be reactionary, it represents more than a mere overreaction to the UP. The model has, in Manuel Antonio Garretón's terms, a *foundational* dimension: a *proyecto histórico* envisioning a new society, a new economy, and a new state.<sup>31</sup> It also contemplates a recombination of the ruling coalition and a search for a new hegemony. The maintenance of the regime cannot be explained purely as the result of coercion. In the last eight years, ideological control has enhanced the aforementioned hegemony (here the analysis of P. Bule discussed earlier acquires great relevance). The results of the 1980 plebiscite, for all its fraudulent traits, were an indication that a form of crude legitimation had taken place.<sup>32</sup> All this appears to point in the direction of a *longue durée*. This trend is favored by what I consider the overt sympathy towards repressive, antidemocratic regimes expressed by the administration in Washington.

The new Chilean way suggests one of the means—a second way of sorts—to implement this great leap backward in economic thinking. So far Great Britain, the United States, and Jamaica have unfolded a similar economic "model" using the "peaceful road."<sup>33</sup> In more than a metaphorical way, the Chilean experiment—and overall experience—has global relevance. The central question here is no longer whether socialism and democracy can coexist; this was a question for the past. The question for the future is whether or not neoliberalism will be compatible with pluralistic and participatory democracy, not only in Latin America but in Europe and North America as well.

#### NOTES

1. Michael Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), pp. 1–5, 169.
2. Cf. José Nun, "The Middle Class Military Coup," in Claudio Véliz, ed., *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 86–88; also Aníbal Quijano, *Nationalism and Capitalism in Peru. A Study of Neo-Imperialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 6–17.
3. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. 50.



4. See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 78–92.
5. See Donal Cruise O'Brien, "Modernization, Order, and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal: American Political Science, 1960–1970," *Journal of Development Studies* (July 1972), pp. 351–78.
6. See "Imitation does not work," Interview with Raúl Prebisch, *South* (January 1981), pp. 29–33.
7. Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Visions of Chile," *LARR* 10, no. 3 (Fall 1975):156–58.
8. Ernest Halperin, *Nationalism and Communism in Chile* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965), p. 40.
9. Norman Gall, "The Chileans Have Elected a Revolution," *The New York Times Magazine*, 1 November 1970, p. 106.
10. Carlos Altamirano, *Dialéctica de una derrota* (México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, S.A., 1977), pp. 213–25.
11. Cf. Jorge Nef, "Chile. A Post Mortem," *New Scholar* 7, nos. 1–2, pp. 271–81.
12. A good study of the political functions of inflation in Chile is provided in the classical study of Albert Hirschman, *Journeys towards Progress* (New York: Twentieth Century, 1963), pp. 202, 209, 223.
13. Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *The Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume I. The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1979), pp. ix–83.
14. Cf. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stapan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). Valenzuela's books is a section of this larger project, Part 4, pp. i–168.
15. See my critique of Valenzuela's *Political Brokers in Chile . . .* in "Chilean Politics: Dreams and Nightmares," *Review/Revista Interamericana* 9, no. 1 (Spring 1979):144–48.
16. Arturo Valenzuela, *Political Brokers in Chile. Local Government in a Centralized Polity* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977); also Arturo and Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Chile: Politics and Society* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976).
17. Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: A Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara and M. Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 3–42.
18. To a great extent his findings are congruent with my study on the fragmentation of centrist politics in Chile. J. Nef, "Centrist Fragmentation and Political Disintegration: The Chilean Case," *North-South. Canadian Journal of Latin American Studies* 4, no. 8, pp. 89–115.
19. Hirschman, *Journeys*, pp. 209–24.
20. Cf. Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernización y autoritarismo* (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1972), *passim*.
21. Cf. P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Why Allende Failed," *Challenge* (May-June 1974). Also in a letter to the *New York Times* of Sunday, 16 June 1974.
22. Fred Landis, "The CIA Makes Headlines. Psychological Warfare in Chile," *Liberation* (March-April 1975), pp. 21–32. Also Donald Freed and Fred Landis, *Death in Washington. The Murder of Orlando Letelier* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill and Co., 1980), *passim*.
23. The concept has been elaborated by Tom Baumgartner, Walter Buckley, Tom R. Burns, and Peter Schuster, "Meta Power and the Structuring of Social Hierarchies," in Tom R. Burns and Walter Buckley, eds., *Power and Control: Social Structures and Their Transformation* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976), pp. 224–25.
24. See, for instance, the formulation by Douglas Chalmers, "Developing on the Periphery: External Factors in Latin American Politics," in Yale H. Ferguson, ed., *Contemporary Inter-American Relations. A Reader on Theory and Issues* (Engelwood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 12.
25. See, amongst others, Nicos Poulantzas, *Las crisis de las dictaduras. Portugal, Grecia, España* (México: Siglo XXI, 1976), *passim*; also *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: New Left Books, 1973), pp. 255–360. Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society. An Analysis of the Western System of Power* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1974),

- passim. Alan Wolfe, *The Limits of Legitimacy: Contradictions in Contemporary Capitalism* (New York: Free Press, 1977), passim. Ernesto Laclau, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory* (London: New Left Books, 1978). A good synthesis of Gramsci's work can be found in Carl Boggs, *Gramsci's Marxism* (London: Pluto Press, 1976).
26. See, for instance, Jorge Chateau, "Antecedentes teóricos del estudio de la geopolítica y doctrinas castrenses. Notas para una investigación," *Documento de Trabajo* (enero 1977), mimeographed; "Características principales del pensamiento geopolítico chileno. Análisis de dos libros," *Documento de Trabajo* (marzo 1977), mimeographed; and "Geopolítica y regionalización. Algunas generalizaciones," *Documento de Trabajo*, no. 75-78 (agosto 1978), mimeographed; Augusto Varas and Carlos Portales, "Carrera armamentista y conflicto local en América del Sur: tendencias generales e hipótesis de trabajo," *Documento de Trabajo* (noviembre 1977), mimeographed. Frederick M. Nunn, "New Thoughts on Military Intervention in Latin American Politics: The Chilean Case, 1973," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 7 (1975), pp. 271-364. Liisa L. North, "The Military in Chilean Politics," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 11, no. 2 (Summer 1976):73-106. J. Nef, "The Politics of Repression: The Social Pathology of the Chilean Military," *Latin American Perspectives*, nos. 1, 2 (Summer 1974), pp. 58-77.
  27. Perhaps an examination of counterinsurgency and national security doctrines, both creatures of Cold War America, will throw some light on the understanding of military bureaucracies and the threats they pose to democracy in the periphery . . . and the center. I suggest reading the United States Army Special Warfare School, *Counterinsurgency Planning Guide*, Special Text Number 31-176, prepared by the Department of Counterinsurgency, United States Army Special Warfare School (2d ed., Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, May 1964); also William Barber and Neale C. Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power: Counter Insurgency and Civic Action in Latin America* (Columbus, OH.: Ohio State University Press, 1966).
  28. Chomsky and Herman, *Political Economy of Human Rights*, pp. 47-83.
  29. I have elaborated on this notion in "Chile's 'Neo-Democracy': A Road to Pluralism on the Mystification of Dependent Corporatism?," Paper presented at the Conference on Latin American Prospects for the Eighties, The Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, 13-15 November 1980. The transnationalization of the state is a process characterized by six traits: (a) functional incorporation of external constituencies to the support system of the state, (b) manifold external linkages providing inputs to maintain adequate support become more important than internal constituencies, (c) accumulation and legitimation occur at the transnational level, (d) internal constituencies are marginalized, (e) external accountability of the state in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy, (f) denationalization.
  30. Cf. *The Economist*, Survey, 2 February 1980, passim.
  31. Manuel Antonio Garretón, "Institucionalización y oposición al régimen autoritario chileno," CLACSO, Feb.-March 1980, passim; mimeographed.
  32. *Dialogando*, no. 39 (October 1980), p. 1.
  33. Cf. Fred Landis, "Robert Moss, Arnaud de Borchgrave, and Right-Wing Disinformation," *Covert Action*, no. 10 (August-September 1980), pp. 37-44.