

trine of dominion founded on grace, because “new classes and groups were thrusting towards political and economic power,” and it was therefore necessary to develop “a new basis for authority and wealth” (p. 161). They also account for the fourteenth-century Bohemian reform movement—“part of the general European middle-class revolution” (p. 91). At one remove they also account for the Czechs’ receptivity to realist philosophy—that is, idealism; for cynical, materialistic nominalism could not inspire real reform. What rescues the essays from the insipidity into which such ideas and methods constantly threaten to lead is Betts’s habit of working directly from the primary sources, and certain traits of his own character which kept him from combining inept judgments into elaborate constructions.

Space limitations make a detailed discussion of the several essays impossible, and I shall merely indicate some of my favorites. “Some Political Ideas of the Early Czech Reformers” is a stimulating introduction to the generation of John Milič and Matthew of Janov; “English and Czech Influences on the Hussite Movement” is good on the actual contacts between the two countries; “Jerome of Prague” and “Peter Payne in England” remain extremely useful—the former is perhaps the most successful essay in the book, in point of originality. But for critical judgment I would single out “Masaryk’s Philosophy of History,” which combines a fundamental respect for the man with a refreshing critique of his dicta on the many subjects that he did not understand. And: “I find it one of the weaknesses of Masaryk’s teaching that, though he always insists on the importance of religion, he never tells us what his religion is. An admiration of Jesus and a somewhat vague belief in providence seem to be the substance of his theology.”

The other essays in the collection include “The Influence of Realist Philosophy on Jan Hus and His Predecessors in Bohemia,” “National and Heretical Religious Movements from the End of the Fourteenth to the Middle of the Fifteenth Century,” “Richard FitzRalph, Archbishop of Armagh, and the Doctrine of Dominion,” “Society in Central and Western Europe: Its Development Towards the End of the Middle Ages,” and “Social and Constitutional Development in Bohemia in the Hussite Period.” There are also a few others, less meritorious than these, on John Hus, the University of Prague, and late medieval philosophy. The whole is prefaced by a biographical memoir that suggests something of why everyone who knew Betts seemed to like him.

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ZAHRANIČNÍ ODBOJ 1914–1918 BEZ LEGEND. By *Karel Pichlík*. Prague: Svoboda, 1968. 504 pp. Kčs. 35.

The struggle of the Founding Fathers of the Czechoslovak Republic—Masaryk, Beneš, Štefánik—for national independence was the subject of many Czechoslovak historical works after World War I, when President Masaryk became a living national monument. After 1939 such writings stopped, and until 1945 the mere mention of Masaryk’s name became an offense that carried the death penalty. After 1948 Czech Communist historians produced a number of works portraying the former national heroes as reactionaries, servants of Western capitalism, and enemies of the Czechoslovak and Russian peoples. Pichlík’s book, one of the thousand flowers that blossomed briefly during the Czechoslovak Spring, is a thoroughly researched, critical history of the work of the leaders in exile and a thoughtful revision of pre-

vious accounts. It covers some already familiar ground but discovers new realities under old "legends."

Before 1914 nearly all Czech politicians, from the internationalist left to the chauvinist State Righters on the right, shared the belief that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was doomed unless it reformed itself; but when World War I came, only Masaryk was ready for action in exile. He was supported with money and manpower by groups of Czech and Slovak settlers in France, the United States, and Russia. Pichlík describes the politics and intrigues of these émigré associations, but his focus is on Masaryk, the driving force behind the Czechoslovak national movement and its political leader.

Pichlík's scrutiny reveals Masaryk's remarkable qualities untarnished. Masaryk's laconic diary, his brief letters, and his thoughtful speeches bear witness to his personal and political wisdom. His statesmanship was global, his ideals humanitarian, and his politics and methods decent. He tried to infuse sense into the irrationality of the war, and his speeches declaring democracy and self-determination of nations to be war aims of the Western Allies predated Wilson's by nearly three years. Even in exile Masaryk sensed keenly the aspirations of his people, and by the end of the war "his democratic socialism became dominant not only among the exiles, the émigrés, and the soldiers-in-exile, but also among the population at home."

Other Czech exiles turned into messenger boys of the great powers from whom they sought help for their national aims. Masaryk retained political, financial, and personal independence and dignity even as he haunted the antechambers of Allied statesmen. He avoided vassalage to any of the Allies. Above all he tried to stay clear of the Russian vortex, into which gravitated the Pan-Slavist right and the extreme left of Czech politics. When his liberal friends came to power in Russia, Masaryk hurried there to organize an army of Czechoslovak POWs. After the treaty of Brest Litovsk that army became a prize sought by France to shore up the Western front, by Trotsky to form a nucleus of a future Red Army, by Britain to turn Archangel and Murmansk into bases for intervention against the Soviets, and by the Wilson administration to make United States intervention in Siberia morally justifiable

Masaryk did not want the Czechoslovaks to intervene in Russian affairs. He pleaded with Wilson for recognition of the Bolsheviks and aid to Russia, and for ships for his troops. Lansing wanted to use the army to "police" a United States mission to Russia, but Masaryk wanted to negotiate for a speedy removal of the troops to the Western front. Had Masaryk's policy been followed, United States-Russian relations would have taken a different course. But nonintervention was abandoned by the commanders of the army stalled along the tracks of the Trans-Siberian railway and cut off from communication with their leader; they were panicked into fighting. Their initial military success became an inducement for Allied intervention, to which Masaryk gave in only because he had no alternative. But he never believed in the success of foreign intervention in Russia and worried about the Czech troops becoming its vanguard. He could no longer count on the sympathetic support of Russia to shield the new Czechoslovak state against Germany.

Pichlík's work is based on archival materials in Prague previously long closed to research—Masaryk's Archive and the Military Archive (and their counterparts in Yugoslavia)—as well as a rich collection of Czech and Slovak émigré publications. It contains a useful bibliography of published and unpublished sources in

Eastern Europe; no Western materials were used. There are no footnotes to indicate the sources of quotations. If this omission is truly due to a desire "to conserve space," as the author notes, such economy is regrettable, because it reduces the usefulness of an otherwise excellent book.

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DIE TSCHECHEN UNTER DEUTSCHEM PROTEKTORAT. Vol. 1: BESATZUNGSPOLITIK, KOLLABORATION UND WIDERSTAND IM PROTEKTORAT BÖHMEN UND MÄHREN BIS HEYDRICHS TOD (1939–1942). By *Detlef Brandes*. Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg, 1969. 372 pp. DM 45.

It is not easy for a reader to find his bearings amid the literature concerning Czech resistance during World War II. Partisanship is the rule rather than the exception. The points of view are many, the reliable works are few. It is confusing enough (although at least understandable) to encounter two historians separated by political barriers expressing radically different viewpoints on the same basic issue; it is downright frustrating to be confronted with two different viewpoints on the same subject coming from the same Czech (Marxist) author, one expressed in the mid-fifties, another in the mid-sixties. Yet, this is precisely what an unwary reader has had to endure for the last twenty years. With the publication of Brandes's volume this agony should abate, and the pieces should begin to fall into place. Until now, no monograph on Czech resistance has appeared in a major Western language; and only one has been published in the Soviet Union (A. I. Nedorezov, *Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v Chekhoslovakii 1938–1945 gg.*, Moscow, 1961). The latter is a semipopular account, strongly propagandist in tone. A good many major and minor works have appeared in Czechoslovakia since the end of World War II, but only those published in recent years make a serious attempt to be objective and to give due consideration to non-Marxist viewpoints.

Brandes's work originated as a doctoral dissertation written for the University of Munich. He consulted many archival sources, including those found in Koblenz and Bonn as well as the German records microfilmed at Alexandria. He was also fortunate enough to be able to use in Prague certain documents to which Western historians have seldom obtained access. His account begins with Hitler's occupation of the Czech Lands in 1939 and ends with the assassination of Heydrich in 1942. He analyzes the programs of various resistance groups, and tries to evaluate the strength of the resistance and the mood of the Czech people. The messages transmitted from the Czech underground to London, the reports of the SD-Post and other German offices in Prague, the memoirs of the participants—all these provide the heuristic basis on which the account is constructed. The approach is strictly clinical; the role of the Communist Party in Czech resistance—a much-disputed subject—is discussed in terms that neither minimize nor exaggerate its significance. Brandes's volume constitutes a valuable contribution in several respects. It will make it possible for historians to fit Czech resistance into the European framework. It throws fresh light not merely on resistance but also on collaboration. It treats in detail German occupation policies and the reactions they evoked among the population. It is a first-rate piece of work and should be a model for others to follow.

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