Fabry's basic conception has not, however, changed. Germany was threatened by all sorts of dangers in the period under review, and Hitler reacted to foreign dangers rather than taking the initiative himself. The major decisions were all taken elsewhere. It was the British who decided that German hegemony in Europe must be broken; it was the Soviet Union that unleashed the war. Hitler had neither the intention nor a plan to seize parts of the Soviet Union until pushed into such a scheme by the Soviet government itself. In 1939 and in 1940 the key initiatives lay with Stalin. In 1939 "the decision about the fate of the small [Baltic] states was made in Moscow" (p. 124); in 1940 poor Hitler did not know what to do and had to protect German interests against Soviet aggressive designs.

Although there is much useful information in the book, Fabry's thesis is no more convincing now than before, and his methodology is as revealing as ever. By ignoring all German approaches to Poland for a joint anti-Soviet policy before January 1939, it is possible to declare them never to have been made. When the nature of American warnings to the Russian government of German invasion plans is sufficiently distorted, the passing on of significant—and reliable—intelligence can be made into a devious maneuver. If the Red Army's occupation of Petsamo in the Winter War is overlooked, Soviet interest in the nickel mines after their return to Finland can be made into an anti-German move. If the account is sufficiently juggled, Hitler's decision of July 1940 to expand Finnish territory as an aspect of the conquest of Russia can be attributed to Soviet moves of August 1940. Chronology is not Fabry's strong point. Not only are there many misdatings, such as that of Litvinov's dismissal, but there are other inversions: in October 1940 Hitler could not allow Soviet influence in Bulgaria, because he would need it in the spring of 1940 (1941 is surely meant) to rescue Italy from a disaster in Greece that had not yet occurred. An example of a different type of misconstruction is Fabry's equating of German systematic deep air reconnaissance over the Soviet Union beginning in October 1940 with three Soviet planes sighted over Rumania on June 6, 1941 (p. 357).

There are interesting materials in this book that supplement what we currently know, especially about German-Soviet economic relations. Our knowledge of Stalin's expansionist aims, however, does not have to lead to a picture of a frightened and confused Hitler driven by events over which he had no control and constantly outsmarted and pressured by his Soviet counterpart. Such drastic "revisionist" approaches are usually more revealing about the author and the times in which he writes than about the events he purports to describe. It is, therefore, not surprising that the book opens and closes with thinly disguised critical comments about the "Ostpolitik" of Willy Brandt's government.

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THE BERLIN CRISIS, 1958–1962. By *Jack M. Schick*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971. xix, 266 pp. $9.50.

This book is the best account of United States policy in the Berlin crisis. It argues persuasively that Eisenhower was readier to concede than Kennedy, that both effectively accepted the existence of East Germany, and that Kennedy's strategy "pertained to the worst potential contingency affecting the Western position in Berlin rather than the most likely contingency at that time—Soviet and East German

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action against the refugees" (p. 168). The sophisticated and subtle analysis of the Western position will probably remain the definitive treatment for a long time.

Yet this book falls short of being a definitive treatment of the whole subject, because the Soviet position and the Soviet tactics are not differentiated satisfactorily. Soviet sources have not been adequately used. The text belies the author's claim (p. xvii) that he relied on *Pravda* and *Izvestiia,* for by my count they are cited only three times. Michel Tatu's *Power in the Kremlin* inexplicably does not even appear in the bibliography. If the author had assumed that the Soviet goals in the Berlin crisis ranged from a minimum to a maximum, and that different elements in the Soviet political elite were prepared to take different degrees of risk, he would not ask on page 185 why Khrushchev relented, but rather why in 1961 the Soviet Union accepted the minimum goal of stemming the emigration from East Germany. Schick rather surprisingly omits the well-known Kennedy interview with Stewart Alsop and the Gilpatric statement which officially revised the interpretation of the missile gap that Kennedy had campaigned on the year before. This must have contributed to Soviet caution in 1961 and, as Schick convincingly demonstrates, made the emplacement of missiles in Cuba seem like a necessary condition for a bolder Soviet strategy in Berlin in 1962.

Schick has given us a definitive treatment of the Western side in the Berlin crisis; the definitive study of the Soviet side remains to be written.

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ISTOCHNIKOVEDENIE ISTORII SSSR XIX–NACHALA XX V. Edited by *I. A. Fedosov* et al. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1970. 469 pp. 1.37 rubles.

In the USSR *istochnikovedenie,* or the methodology and critical study of sources, is a well-established auxiliary historical discipline. Its methods and techniques were already developed before 1917. Soviet historians and archivists have applied these methods and techniques to new areas of economic and social history and made them accessible to a large number of history and library science students. *Istochnikovedenie* is a required course for students specializing in history at Soviet universities, pedagogical institutes, and schools for archivists. Since 1940 a number of handbooks have been published for such students, the most recent of which is the present volume. It is the only general introduction to the study of Russian historical sources for the entire period 1800–1917.

The subject matter of the sources discussed in this manual falls into seven general categories: (1) social and economic history, (2) institutional and legislative history, (3) foreign policy, (4) the liberation movement, (5) the periodical press, (6) memoirs, diaries, and personal correspondence, and (7) the works of Lenin. The authors' collective includes seventeen individuals, who have contributed to this volume seventeen chapters and a bibliography. Each general category is divided chronologically into separate chapters. Seven of these chapters concern the "period of imperialism," 1890–1917, and they tend unmistakably to be less critical and more tendentious than the remaining ten chapters for the period 1800–1890. However, the chapter on diplomatic history during the "period of imperialism" is very good. Written by V. I. Bovykin and I. I. Astafiev, it provides one of the

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