

sharply specified in the preface, and there are indeed significant variations of tone, with Seifert as the more cautious judge of phenomena such as transnational corporations, the future of world government, and so forth. The book grew out of a seminary course taught by the two authors and will likely serve as a text in such courses elsewhere.

## Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics, 1707-1977 by Christopher Harvie

(George Allen & Unwin; 318 pp.; no price)

England must maintain title to North Sea oil if it is ever to get out of hock or survive in hock. The Scottish nationalists know that well and are determined to use it as leverage in their campaign for independence. Mr. Harvie speaks for a more leftward view and is willing to give the English the oil money if Scotland is then freed to move ahead with its own internal socialist revolution. Most everyone agrees that the current discussion of "devolution" of powers means that the relationship between Scotland and England is undergoing major change. In the debate over the nature of that change Harvie represents an intriguing but distinctly minority argument. The book is more of a tract than the dispassionate historical analysis its title and subtitle might suggest.

## Correspondence (from p. 2)

Secondly, everything that happened under the Emergency is definitely not happening now. The mood of fear that I encountered a year ago is absent. The rule of law has been restored and the complete lifting of censorship is self-evident.

Thirdly, the Janata government's performance is better than its image. It may appear slow, but it is heading in the right direction. It is having to deal with a legacy of economic mismanagement.

Its price policy has been reasonably successful in the light of world inflation. Its economic ideas are revolutionary. The impatience and cynicism are more evident in the cocktail circuit than among those doing constructive work.

Finally, may I say that the idea that democracy is good for us, but not for others, is a Western attitude that many Indians find abhorrent. Indeed, the prime minister, Morarji Desai, was saying to me only a few hours before I read your article that he hoped the March election results would have dispelled this idea. He also said, with much vigor, "Nowadays people regard politics as a place without ethics or morality. That is all wrong. Unless you bring morality into politics you cannot bring morality into society because government has the greatest influence in people's lives, whatever people may say about it."

Michael Henderson

London

Ralph Buultjens Responds:

Mr. Henderson's objections to *Worldview's* publication of my interview with Mrs. Gandhi suggest a somewhat one-dimensional focus; as a professed advocate of democracy, it is strange that he wants to prevent publication of viewpoints with which he does not agree. I draw to his attention Voltaire's sentiments, which encapsulate the essence of democracy: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."

To indicate that it is possible to make an objective evaluation of events in India during the past decade without attempting to examine Mrs. Gandhi's perspectives is a suggestion unworthy of serious consideration. Mrs. Gandhi is a significant historical figure, who retains a considerable public following, and should be treated as such. In my interview I attempted to probe elements of her personality, beliefs, and views that would give us some insight into what motivates her and how she perceives events.

Mr. Henderson also makes three other observations that suggest a rush to judgment at a pace exceeding that of even the present Government of India. Those who profess to believe in the rule of law should be particularly careful not to confuse with judgments evidence presented before commissions of inquiry; indictments must not be presented as convictions of guilt. It is

almost one year since Mrs. Gandhi's defeat at the polls. Thus far, despite intensive and often aggressive investigation, she has not been convicted of any act of malfeasance in office.

In assessing the public mood, wide differences of opinion are possible. My own observations, based on several visits to India, differ sharply with those of Mr. Henderson. I have to report that several members of the Janata government themselves, in public and private statements, express disappointment in the performance of their own party. Its economic ideas, rather than being revolutionary, are as yet vague blueprints primarily reflecting an amalgam of rural-oriented economics with Gandhian (Mahatma) sentiments. As yet little has been done to give these any real form or meaning. A mood of fear, which Mr. Henderson claims to have encountered one year ago, is far from absent—supporters of Mrs. Gandhi and many others who disagree with the present government will currently testify to this. One can argue that the objects of fear may have shifted, but given recent events, one surely should not proclaim that India is free from fear.

In controversial times, such as those on which Mr. Henderson and I have focused, most viewpoints are contested. However, in such conflicts objectivity and truth should not be the first casualties!

## "The Legacy of Echeverría"

To the Editors: A resident of Guadalajara, Mexico, born and raised in that city of nearly two million in the Mexican highlands, the writer of the letter that follows, is fluent in both Spanish and English. He has visited the United States and Canada and does much in his homeland to encourage better communication and understanding between his countrymen and people of the U.S. and Canada. Six years ago this studious and intelligent young Mexican was in Seattle for a month as my guest, and whenever I am in Guadalajara, his home and the homes of all in his family are always open to me. In forwarding the November *Worldview* article on Mexico ("What Mexico's President Inherited" by Robert Drysdale) to this Guadalajara friend I had asked for his comments on the report so that they might be sent on

to the editors of *Worldview*. The following came in early response.

Philip Prichard  
*Seattle, Wash.*

"I am glad you sent me that interesting article on Mexico by Robert Drysdale that was in the November issue of *Worldview*. Drysdale's comments about "The Legacy of Echeverría" are mainly true and show that the writer was knowledgeable about his subject. When reading the article I was impressed by its truth, for that is the feeling here even today about our former President Echeverría. Definitely his administration did some good things, and yet there were some things done that were ill-advised for Mexico.

"The *Worldview* article on Mexico touches on several aspects of our present situation and condition both truthfully and with considerable perceptiveness. I would say it is one of the all too rare United States reports on my country which really explores and tries to explain something of our reality.

"As I think Robert Drysdale would understand, here in Mexico we now have great hope and confidence in President Portillo and his administration. I hope that your discerning United States writer whose article on Mexico was in that November *Worldview* magazine will continue to write of my country so that the United States and Mexico will come to have a much increased understanding of each other. So thanks again for sending the Drysdale report, for it is not only interesting and informative to me but to all those of my countrymen with whom I find opportunity to discuss it. It has been good to read and reflect on that clear and discerning outside viewpoint on Mexico."

José Luis

*Guadalajara, Mexico*

## Defense of Taiwan

To the Editors: Sentiments expressed in Richard John Neuhaus's "Excursus" on the U.S. commitment to Taiwan ("American Pragmatism on Panama and China," October, 1977) represent the only honorable course that the U.S. can follow in the event other considerations do not override them. The United States, in its Defense Treaty, has solemnly pledged to defend Taiwan in the event of attack and to preserve its

free choice as to its own form of government. This pledge, when given, was solemn and binding and cannot be lightly dismissed.

Like Mr. Neuhaus, I consider pledges to carry a deep-seated meaning. However, a number of factors in the situation in the Far East have given me pause. Unfortunately these factors have not, to my knowledge, been widely discussed in the normalization debate.

The first factor is Japan. Defense of Taiwan cannot be the sole responsibility of the U.S. Japan's wishes must be considered.

Taiwan's defense directly affects Japan. Should the Japanese decide that a free Taiwan is essential to its security, then Japan must contribute to Taiwan's defense—in alliance with the U.S. or on its own. Japan's Self-Defense Force has the naval and air capability to bolster vastly the Taiwanese army and to control the straits. Its industrial strength and weapons' capability plus its large merchant marine give Japan the strength it needs to back up its forces.

Second, from Japan's point of view, Taiwan's defense and South Korea's defense are linked. The golden triangle of trade in Northeast Asia integrates both countries into Japan's economy. Taiwan and Korea are essential to Japan's inner defense lines. And the loss of one weakens the defense of the other. Therefore Japan's interests are paramount.

But this also means that the combined strength of the Japan-Taiwan-South Korea triangle is available to defend Taiwan. Already close links between Korea and Taiwan are in place. Japan's cementing link to this triangle gives the forces of this area the muscle they need to fend off any intervention short of nuclear war.

Because of this alliance there is little need for U.S. support, except through the provision of strategic nuclear support to serve as an umbrella. The U.S. has already pledged this support to Japan through its 1961 treaty. Moreover, U.S. nuclear support to Japan is triggered, not only by a treaty, but because Japan is strategically important to the defense of the U.S. By contrast, Taiwan and South Korea have importance to the U.S. only because of their relation to Japan's defenses. Individually or in combination, the fall of Taiwan and/or South Korea would not directly threaten the U.S.

Given these facts, the defense of Taiwan is an issue that, strictly speaking, is in the province of Japan. This becomes readily apparent when it is realized that the U.S. would hesitate to defend Taiwan were Japan to object. Japan's importance to our defense gives that country a strong veto power over our own actions. Indeed, Taiwan could not be defended in the face of Japanese hostility. Japan's views must be taken into account.

In light of this very real situation one wonders what the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan means. On the one hand Japan's security—not ours—is at stake, and Japan has the means and the need to play a major role. On the other hand Japan has veto power over our own desires.

Therefore Japan is the pivotal power in the region and has the responsibility for Taiwan. The emergence of Japan has changed the underlying conditions upon which the U.S. mutual defense treaty with Taiwan was based.

Thus it is critical to ascertain Japan's intentions relative to Taiwan. So far Japan has played China's game but has kept "trade" relations with Taiwan. What Japan's reaction to a Communist invasion of Taiwan would be are unknown. But it is certain that the communization of Taiwan would be a disaster to Japan. Observers have not been able to ascertain Japan's intentions because of the U.S. treaty that masks the need for more explicit statements. In this sense the situation is analogous to South Korea, where U.S. troop pullouts bring the day closer for Japanese assumption of support for the South Koreans.

The second factor is U.S. troop pullouts. Defense of Asia, whether in Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, or the Philippines, is passing into the hands of Asians, except for nuclear support. This transition means less need for a U.S. frontline role against China and greater need for a strategic role to offset growing Soviet strength via its naval buildup in the Pacific and along the Chinese border. This new role does not require U.S. commitments to send ground forces to Taiwan or anywhere else because this is an Asian job. Nor does it require U.S. pledges to local powers, except strategically.

The third factor is the Soviet buildup, which threatens all of Asia from the Indian Ocean to the Sea of Japan and