
REVIEW ESSAYS

THE TREND TOWARD DEMOCRATIZATION AND REDEMOCRATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA: Shadow and Substance

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THE CENTRAL AMERICAN IMPASSE. Edited by GUISEPPE DIPALMA and LAURENCE WHITEHEAD. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. Pp. 252. \$32.50.)

ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA, 1980-1985. Edited by PAUL DRAKE and EDUARDO SILVA. (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, Institute of the Americas, University of California at San Diego, 1986. Pp. 335. \$17.00.)

TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY. Edited by GUILLERMO O'DONNELL, PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, and LAURENCE WHITEHEAD. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Pp. 710. \$49.50 cloth. Also available in four separate paperback volumes, \$10.95 each.)

BACK TO DEMOCRACY

The study of Latin American politics—and its epistemological insertion in the realm of area studies¹—presents an intriguing case of

continuity and change. Ever since developmentalism and modernization theories emerged in the early 1960s, the predominant discourse of U.S. policymakers and mainstream intellectuals has reflected a preoccupation with counterinsurgency and maintaining the status quo.²

After the Cuban Revolution, the dominant theme among experts was the emergence of “democratic revolutions” throughout the continent under the allegedly progressive role of the middle classes and their vanguards—the “democratic left.”³ Prevention of radical socioeconomic change was emphasized along with the technical paraphernalia of development administration and reformism exemplified in the Alliance for Progress.

As the analytical paradigm’s emphasis for developing areas moved from participation to authority, a neoconservative analytical and policy focus began to overshadow the earlier Cold War liberalism.⁴ In the emerging paradigm based on stability and order, the “functional group” for preventing hemispheric radicalization was to be the “new military.” Its related prescription for social engineering would be the so-called national security doctrine. This authoritarian framework was explicitly articulated in the *Rockefeller Report* of 1969, which constituted the mainstay of the Nixon-Ford policy toward Latin America.⁵

This state of affairs was increasingly challenged by a new analytical focus emerging in the mid-1970s, particularly after the advent of the Carter administration. The *Linowitz Report* of 1975 presented a different approach to Latin America.⁶ Instead of viewing authoritarianism as a kind of “last best choice,” the report (which highlighted the views of the Trilateral Commission) conceived of militarization and its persistent violation of human rights as a major destabilizing factor for not only democracy but capitalism.⁷ Thus from the aforementioned optic, military withdrawal and a peaceful return to (or the reconstitution of) a “restricted democracy” became essential ingredients for preventing a full-fledged crisis of domination.⁸

THE DEBATE ABOUT DEMOCRATIZATION

The works reviewed here generally constitute variations on the theme of democratization, a description not intended to disqualify their analytical value or good intentions. Despite different titles, all three edited volumes deal with the same theme, and there is significant overlap in contributors and even editors. All three collections resulted from conferences of leading experts on Latin American politics held in 1984 and 1985.

*Democratization and Regional Peace:
The Central American Experience*

Giuseppe DiPalma's and Laurence Whitehead's *The Central American Impasse* originated in the international symposium "Transition to Democracy in Central America," organized with the support of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights in San José, Costa Rica. This conference was explicitly placed in the wider context of the North-South dialogue.⁹ It incorporated considerable comparative material on redemocratization and democratization from southern Europe and Latin America. Of particular importance to this encounter was the possibility of linking the process of democratization in the Central American region to the issue of international security, especially regarding the conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador.¹⁰

The introductory essay by DiPalma and Whitehead lays the analytical groundwork for the rest of the collection. They emphasize democratization and redemocratization as forms of crisis management entailing not optimal but "satisficing" solutions and "coalition mongering." They perceive democracy as an incohesive system of compromise where contending demands are incrementally processed. Drawing examples from Western Europe and South America, DiPalma and Whitehead conclude that even the worst dictatorships have eventually come to an end. Likewise, they observe that the private sector should not be discounted as a possible contributor to democratic changes, nor should the armed forces. A combination of circumstances, leadership, and simple exhaustion may create the conditions for a sort of Hobbesian social truce leading to a more enduring "contract" where business, the armed forces, and rebels could agree on a minimal *modus vivendi*.

Luis Maira's essay offers a comparative perspective on Central American authoritarianism. Unlike most of the contributions to this collection, his stimulating analysis emphasizes the explicit relationship between the absence of democracy in the region and U.S. intervention. His somewhat pessimistic view is that domestic and international conditions at present seem to be working toward the maintenance and reproduction of authoritarian politics.

Equally comparative is DiPalma's utilization of the European experience to study conflict management, which he applies to the Central American situation. His examples from Italy and Spain point out the advantages of negotiated settlements combined with the protection of corporate interests and a diffuse type of parliamentary system in maintaining democratic stability. He concludes by suggesting that the United States has a far greater, yet less positive, role to play in Central America, unlike the cases of Spain, Portugal, and Greece.

Robert Kaufman's "Lessons from the Southern Cone" adds an-

other comparative perspective by introducing the experiences of Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile. He analyzes the contributing factors and accelerators of the breakdown of democratic regimes. In a vein similar to Valenzuela's study (1978),¹¹ Kaufman argues that the causes of such breakdowns were rooted in political factors rather than in "fatal" socioeconomic factors. He goes on to outline a "stages" model of extricating authoritarianism that centers on the complex interplay among "objective" circumstances, unintended consequences, and political gamesmanship. Particularly important for Kaufman are the interactions among the center-stage actors of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes: the military ultra-right, the antidemocratic left, and the "moderate" opposition. In his view, the realization that little is to be gained by perpetual recourse to force is the factor that could unite all these sectors in a political truce.

Rosario Espinal's treatment of democratization in the Dominican Republic is an elaborate and nuanced study of a convoluted, yet incremental, movement away from authoritarianism. She concentrates on the structuring and restructuring of internal social forces in the Dominican Republic between the 1960s and the 1970s that led to a more differentiated and complex socioeconomic structure. In her view, what made the democratization of the polity possible was that the bourgeoisie retained the initiative and did not fear being upstaged by the lower classes. This possibility of maintaining socioeconomic privilege and at the same time an "open political market" without losing elite control appears at the center of the liberal-democratic hybrid.¹²

Malcolm Deas's study of the Colombian peace process between 1982 and 1985 is an interesting but disjointed account of the complicated arrangements and decisions leading to a fragile accommodation between the government and the guerrillas. The largely anecdotal and descriptive treatment fails, however, to produce an appropriately comparative or even normative framework for drawing parallels with the Central American experience.

John Weeks's article on land, labor, and despotism in Central America is the first to deal with the object of the book proper—the current impasse in the region. His contribution is a tight analysis of the multiple internal and external factors acting against the development of democracy (including the U.S. role). He succinctly describes the functioning of a self-sustained pathological order: "dynastic succession, foreign corporate domination, systemic terror and a hegemonic precapitalist landed oligarchy" (p. 127).¹³ It is this order that the guerrilla insurgencies of the late 1970s and today are fighting. In Weeks's opinion, the issue of political democracy cannot be separated from the fundamental issue of socioeconomic reorganization.

Margaret Crahan's study of the Catholic Church in the Central

American crisis coherently portrays the often-misunderstood and ambiguous role of the church in the region. She views the institution not as a monolithic whole but as a combination of often-conflicting currents of traditionalists, institutionalists, and liberationists.¹⁴ The institutionalists maintain the power balance and the ideological hegemony of the organization expressed in terms of "social peace" and the preservation of Catholicism. She goes on to analyze the church's varying circumstances in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras. Her analysis presents a survivalist church, a conclusion that contradicts some popular views as well as those of the Vatican itself, which sees "theology of liberation"¹⁵ as anathema in the region. In this sense, the church is "currently playing the role of both bridge and barrier to a peaceful solution of the . . . Central American crisis" (p. 149).

Mario Solórzano's contribution on Guatemala traces the roots of Guatemalan violence and authoritarian rule to the persistence of a traditional socioeconomic order. Written from a distinctively social democratic perspective, his essay strongly indicts the "military triumphalism" of the proponents of guerrilla insurgency. Solórzano is convinced that the resurgence of politics, elections, and compromise as well as the regional peace process offer the only means of reducing violence and international conflict. In this context, he views the Socialist International and social-democratic governments in Europe and elsewhere as having important tasks to perform in reducing tensions. He also perceives the U.S. role as one that could change and actually support "real" democratic stabilization.

Rodolfo Cerdas's piece on Nicaragua stresses the continuity from traditional authoritarianism "a la Somoza" to the present form of Sandinista rule. He minimizes U.S. influence in the present state of affairs and perceives Nicaragua's brand of Marxism as a serious threat to democracy. According to his prescriptive approach, the only way "forward" is through the "reconstruction of a large democratic centre" based on a program of social change, development, integration, and pragmatism to reassure world public opinion and the United States that Nicaragua will not threaten the power balance in the region (p. 193).

Terry Lynn Karl's work on Christian Democracy in El Salvador coherently analyzes the difficult road to compromise. One of the better pieces in this collection, it offers valuable factual and conceptual insights into the conflict. She draws useful comparisons from her research on Venezuela's Christian Democrats (see her essay in the O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead volume, 3:196–219). Her rich and nuanced treatment integrates national and transnational linkages, including the role performed by such actors as General Vernon Walters, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and the Christian Democratic party in Venezuela.

The concluding essay in the DiPalma and Whitehead collection is Whitehead's piece on the prospects for a political settlement, a synthesis (or postmortem) of the efforts at solving the regional impasse. The subtitle of his essay is explicit in this regard: "Most Options Have Been Foreclosed." After studying the contending forces on the left, the right, and in the center, he concludes that reaching a settlement could be minimalist at best. His key point is that "the prospect for a political settlement still depends, as it has for so long, on the outlook of the U.S. government" (p. 244). Forecasting what is now known about U.S. secret and not-so-secret wars in Central America, Whitehead predicts a situation in which American prestige "has become closely tied to the battle fortunes of the Salvadoran army and of the Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries" (p. 231).

Democratization, Redemocratization, and Elections

Unlike DiPalma and Whitehead's regional focus, Paul Drake's and Eduardo Silva's edited volume, *Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980–1985*, approaches the issue of democratization from the standpoint of the specifically formal process of elections. They consider that although elections and democracy are not necessarily synonymous, the former are a necessary condition for the latter.

From this perspective, Drake and Silva examine elections as a device whose latent function is to instigate the opening of the political system. In this regard, the symbolic role of electoral processes may be larger than their objective impact in making a government. For analytical purposes, Drake and Silva propose a model of transition that includes a continuum of political arrangements from relatively authoritarian to highly participatory. These arrangements consist of liberalization, democratization, representative democracy, and full-fledged representative democracy. In applying this model to the Latin American situation, they suggest that the contests between 1980 and 1985 should be placed in the category of liberalization, or at the most, democratization. Representative democracy and full participatory democracy appear to be a long way off, even for those countries that reached these levels in the past.

Terry Lynn Karl analyzes the relationship between elections and democratization in El Salvador. She systematically discusses the nature of the Salvadoran state and the internal conflicts within the power bloc. In particular, she examines the growing transnationalization of its two main components: Duarte's Christian Democrats—openly endorsed by U.S. official policy and backed by CIA support—and the Salvadoran military, which has direct U.S. military backing. In this context, she concludes that from 1982 to 1985, elections were staged largely to dem-

onstrate to U.S. constituencies that democracy was prevailing. Karl contends that such premature political engineering may have blocked the formulation of a substantive democratic compromise.

John Booth's contribution on Nicaragua explores the question of whether the national elections in 1984 were a form of "domestic demonstration," as was charged by the Reagan administration. Studying the context of the election—including the ongoing U.S.-sponsored war, U.S. intervention, the electoral system, the campaign, and the election results—Booth concludes that "the election itself, scrutinized by some six hundred foreign and press observers, appears scrupulously conducted under procedures (designed by Swedish electoral advisors) that maximize secrecy of the ballot, prohibited pressures or retaliation against voters and nonvoters alike and effectively barred fraud" (p. 46). Despite censorship (which was rationalized on the grounds of the state of emergency), Nicaraguans had extensive access to political information from competing parties. The most notorious interference, Booth notes, "came from U.S. diplomats who repeatedly visited with leaders of the parties to the right of the FSLN . . . and urged them to withdraw from the election" (p. 44). Parallel findings emerge from Wayne Cornelius's contribution on the same topic, which is based on his earlier report to the Latin American Studies Association.

Three other contributions to *Elections and Democratization in Latin America*, those by Kevin Middlebrook, Juan Molinar, and Wayne Cornelius, deal with Mexico and the issue of liberalizing a bureaucratic and highly institutionalized authoritarian polity. Middlebrook analyzes the origins and effects of the liberalizations of the 1960s and the formulation of the 1977 electoral reform law. He sees these openings emerging from an elite-dominated and mass-based revolutionary party as an attempt to restore legitimacy. He observes that although the 1977 reforms constituted a kind of political engineering geared to increasing opposition representation in parliament, their effects have been minimal, by and large. If anything, the Mexican political system has increased its authoritarian tendencies.

Molinar treats Mexico as a "semi-competitive system" and contends that Mexican elections, unlike those of most Latin American countries, are largely nonideological. Molinar argues that open and competitive electoral systems elsewhere in Latin America preceded and followed political exclusion. Semi-competitive systems, despite their meaninglessness, are paradoxically more inclusionary and less repressive. While the Mexican alternative is frustrating, Molinar believes that competitive elections are frightening and ultimately lead to praetorianism.

Cornelius's study centers on political liberalization and the 1985 elections in Mexico. He shares Molinar's view of Mexico as an inclu-

sionary authoritarian regime with highly centralized decision making and an extraordinary capacity for co-optation. But there is no place in such a system for large national opposition parties, dissident movements, or large-scale popular mobilization. The 1985 election must therefore be understood in the context of such a system. The collapse of world oil prices had drastically reduced maneuverability through co-optation and compromise. The further extension of electoral reforms by the de la Madrid administration was a risk calculated to provide an outlet for popular frustrations. These elections also reflected a conflict within Mexico's power bloc between the technocracy and the old-time politicians who still control the party machinery. The government was attempting to reduce the influence of corrupt local party officials and bosses. But conflict within the party hierarchy resulted in an election in which fraud was used as least as widely as before.

The Argentine case is also analyzed in three articles. Marcelo Cavarozzi focuses on the interplay between Peronism and radicalism; Manuel Mora y Araujo analyzes the nature of the Alfonsín coalition; and David Rock and Suzanne Avellano discuss the significance of the 1983 presidential elections.

Cavarozzi's analysis delves into the origins of the repetitive cycle of Argentine political instability in which a disintegrating political formula leads to further political fragility and finally to regime collapse. He finds at the bottom of this self-perpetuating malaise a persistent pattern of political and social exclusion dating back to the 1930s that has engendered an ongoing situation of catastrophic equilibrium. In the absence of a truly developed party system, a weak state was managed more or less directly by *factores de poder* (the military, business, and unions), and confrontation and violence became the prevailing forms of political expression. These tendencies culminated in the ruthless military regime (1976–1982) that led the country from the "dirty war" to the climax of the Falklands fiasco. Cavarozzi interprets the 1982 opening as a direct consequence of military defeat and views the rise of Raúl Alfonsín and his Radical party as having grown out of the increasing deterioration and internal polarization within the Peronista movement. Just as the military intervention of the 1930s and 1940s effectively weakened the Radical party, the interventions between 1955 and 1983 undermined, at least temporarily, the strength of the Peronistas.

Mora y Araujo's study of the Alfonsín coalition concentrates heavily on electoral and survey data. Taking a sociological approach, he traces the socioeconomic basis of the forces supporting the Alfonsín government and draws an ideological map of the different political forces operating in Argentina. He finds the paradoxical situation of a center-right coalition headed by a center-left party. Mora y Araujo con-

cludes with the foreboding prediction that this new Argentine majority will be less stable than either of its two twentieth-century predecessors—Yrigoyen's Radicals and the Peronistas—a prediction sustained by the 1987 parliamentary and provincial elections.

David Rock and Suzanne Avellano concentrate on the socioeconomic context surrounding the 1983 elections and come up with a dismal scenario. The combination of a declining economy, a pressing debt burden, and a progressive "lumpenization" of society presents the danger that norms of democratic behavior will be insufficient to restrain an outbreak of mass opposition resulting from falling living standards. In this context, the authors argue that "national populism" may still prove to be Argentina's only alternative to dictatorship—and its only feasible form of democracy.

The Uruguayan case is examined by three authors. Howard Handelman looks at the legitimacy crisis of the military regime and the 1980 plebiscite; Charles Gillespie concentrates on the 1982 primaries; and Juan Rial discusses the triumph of the center. Handelman's essay focuses on the decay of democracy leading to the 1973 "coup in installments" and analyzes the military's defeat in the plebiscite, which set in motion the process of democratic transition. Charles Gillespie analyzes the 1982 Uruguayan primaries and the revival of Uruguay's political party system. Juan Rial stresses the triumph of centrist tendencies in Uruguay on the basis of a study of survey data from all three parties (the Colorados, the Blancos, and the Frente Amplio). This proclivity toward moderation (and fear) suggests that the Uruguayan political system may reinstitute a party system that is removed from the more objective socioeconomic conflicts of society. This tendency was precisely the flaw in the Uruguayan system before the 1970s.

The Brazilian trend toward electoral redemocratization is discussed by Gláucio Soares and David Fleischer. Soares deals with electoral trends from the 1964 coup to the *abertura* in 1981, and Fleischer with the 1982 and 1985 elections. The Brazilian case is remarkable in that the national security regime that emerged there in 1964 never suspended electoral processes. Redemocratization in this context took place incrementally through political institutions affecting the scope and competitiveness of elections. Soares argues that socioeconomic forces helped undermine the electoral base of traditional parties, making possible a gradual emergence of centrist forces. These same socioeconomic factors also helped to undermine the legitimacy of the military regime. By 1981 the political structure that had managed Brazil through the "miracle years" was faced with total collapse from within: stagflation, unemployment, deindustrialization, growing indebtedness. At the end, even big business deserted the governing regime. The po-

litical opening became a way to trade failure for democracy, and thus political liberalization quickly gave way to democratization and the election of 1985.

David Fleischer's analysis of the 1982 and 1985 elections further explores the pattern of transformation discussed by Soares. Fleischer suggests that while the military stepped gracefully out of the limelight, it still retains real political power. The 1982 election marked a clear shift to the left and center-left, and the 1985 presidential election represented an unequivocal rejection of the military regime, despite the military's attempt to maintain an indirect electoral formula. He concludes that the military will continue to play a fundamental role in Brazilian politics, with elections providing merely a "good distraction from the nation's serious economic and social woes" (p. 237).

Democratization and Redemocratization: A Comparative Perspective

Of the three books discussed here, O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead's is the most comprehensive and comparative. Although it too originated from a conference (this one sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.), its scope and theoretical ambitiousness far surpass those of the other two books. The massive effort involved in this undertaking is attested by its seven hundred pages, comprehensive bibliographies, references, and analytical indexes. It is in fact not one but four books arranged thematically in four sections: Southern Europe, Latin America, Comparative Perspectives, and Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies.

The Southern European Model of Transition / Abraham Lowenthal's foreword sets the parameters of *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Starting from a perspective of "thoughtful wishing," he points out that the process of transition from authoritarian regimes is the central question of political scholarship, especially in Latin America. He also stresses the importance of national, as opposed to international, factors in this process. According to Lowenthal, the nature of the transition is shaped by historical circumstances unique to each country but patterned in predictable ways by several factors: the manner in which previous democratic systems broke down, the nature and duration of the authoritarian period, the means utilized by authoritarian regimes, the actions of the opposition, economic circumstances, the counsel of outsiders, and prevailing international "fashions."

Philippe Schmitter, the main editor of the first volume, provides a comprehensive *tour d'horizon* on the transitions in Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey after World War II. Building on a theme first discussed by Nicos Poulantzas (but from a diametrically opposite theo-

retical perspective),¹⁶ Schmitter constructs a framework for the comparative analysis of democratization. In so doing, he outlines diverse international and domestic factors that differentiate Europe from Latin America, including the level of resource scarcity, the persistence of the bureaucratic-authoritarian experience, and the international context. In the last regard, he observes that “the United States, whose policies towards democratization in Latin America have been ambiguous and variant from one case to another, has consistently supported it in Southern Europe—at least once it became evident that protecting or reinstating former authoritarian allies was no longer a viable option” (p. 4). Schmitter contends, however, that international factors have played only an indirect and often-marginal role. According to his central thesis, for democracy to remain a viable alternative, “a country must possess a civil society in which certain community and group identities exist independent of the state and in which certain types of self-contained units are capable of acting autonomously in defense of their own interest and ideals” (p. 4). He stresses political parties, consensus, coalition building, consociational arrangements, and the existence of a historical bloc capable of maintaining a protracted state of “civiness.” In this sense, Schmitter concludes that the only way to achieve democracy is through a liberal bourgeois or social-democratic consensus. He openly suggests that countries like those in Latin America may be compelled to choose from the restricted menu of a tame democracy based on a Southern European formula involving elite pacts, parliamentarism, coalition politics, and proportional representation favoring centrist and right-of-center parties.

This theme is further developed in Salvador Giner’s broad historical and structural analysis, which concentrates on the political economy, legitimation, and the state. Using a modified version of modernization theory,¹⁷ Giner traces the intricate relationships between the rise of capitalism in late-developing societies and the emergence of authoritarian political formulas. Drawing examples from all of Europe, he analyzes the rise of fascism and the development of social forces that ultimately brought about a “modern” society, thus creating the conditions for political pluralism. Giner views the Southern European experience as one of democratization “from above.” In essence, this interpretation entails a narrowness of choices. But he challenges the consociational thesis as an appropriate description of contemporary Southern European politics. According to his view, consensus has been the outcome of mutual agreements and concessions under powerful surveillance from above and outside, unlike the Swiss, Dutch, and Austrian cases.

Schmitter’s and Giner’s more general discussions are buttressed by specifics on transitions in the ensuing case studies: Gianfranco Pas-

quino on the demise of fascism in Italy, José María Maravall and Julián Santamaría on Spain, Kenneth Maxwell on Portugal, Nikiforos Diamandouros on Greece, and Ilkay Sunar and Sabri Sayari on Turkey. Although all these cases exhibit striking differences, they share numerous common elements. The process of democratization in all these countries emerged after a relatively long period of internal decay within the dictatorships. This process of decay was accelerated not by a radical left outside the system but by broad social alliances where centrist and right-of-center forces played major roles. The transition did not seriously affect the existing socioeconomic order (except perhaps briefly in Portugal). In fact, the transition to democracy served to legitimate and consolidate capitalism. Thinking back on Giner's arguments, it appears that all these countries underwent a process of socioeconomic modernization and "*transformismo*" supported by an interdependent scheme of economic integration. The only exception thus far seems to have been the case of Turkey, where a full-fledged transition has yet to occur.

Democratization, Redemocratization, and Liberalization in Latin America / The analysis of European transitions is important for the study of present-day Latin America. This generalization holds not so much because they offer a truly comparable set of circumstances (the opposite may be true) but because European transitions seem to attract many analysts looking for a "quick fix" for the Latin American crisis. The European section provides the conceptual backdrop and general introduction for the Latin American cases.

Guillermo O'Donnell's essay opening the Latin American section begins by suggesting that international factors are more favorable to democracy in Southern Europe than in Latin America. He perceives Latin American authoritarianism as assuming many forms—from traditional patrimonial systems (Somoza's Nicaragua, Batista's Cuba, or Stroessner's Paraguay) to populist authoritarianism (Perón's Argentina) to bureaucratic authoritarianism (Pinochet's Chile). O'Donnell observes that in Latin America (unlike Europe), cases of carefully pacted political democratization have been rare. He considers pacts as extremely significant in preventing the resurgence of authoritarian politics. Most important, he admits that the model of democratization discussed throughout the volume is limited to *nonrevolutionary* transitions from authoritarian rule (2:10).

The volume on Latin America contains eight case studies: Argentina is discussed by Marcelo Cavarozzi, Bolivia by Laurence Whitehead, Brazil by Luciano Martins, Chile by Manuel Antonio Garretón, Mexico by Kevin Middlebrook, Peru by Julio Cotler, Uruguay by Charles Gillespie, and Venezuela by Terry Lynn Karl.

Cavarozzi's discussion of Argentine political cycles is a more detailed and systematic treatment of his contribution on Peronism and Radicalism in Drake and Silva's *Elections and Democratization in Latin America*. In Cavarozzi's view, diversification of electoral alternatives is a factor that could reinforce the chances for democracy. Likewise, a strengthening of parity between the two major parties could establish a mechanism for regulating political conflicts. Given the present economic crisis, however, the contextual constraints against compromises may prove insurmountable.

Whitehead's discussion of Bolivia's failed democratization (1977–1980) interprets the present experience as yet another political experiment in the country's last one hundred years. The failure of the 1952 agrarian populist revolution to consolidate a new kind of state was dramatized by the return of military rule in 1964. Through a variety of combinations, military control (ranging from Caesarism to incipient national security) continued unabated until 1977. In that year, General Hugo Banzer embarked on a process of electoral transition. What began as "controlled" liberalization got out of hand as demands from all sectors increased and the regime itself fragmented into conflicting factions. But the collapse of the regime did not guarantee a return to democracy because the opposition was also split over tactics and fundamentals. Bolivia's neighboring right-wing regimes were also concerned about a possible leftist government. The 1980 presidential elections signaled to the military hard-liners that only a military coup could preserve the institution's perquisites—the large-scale illicit enrichment of officers through unrestrained narcotics trade. Whitehead concludes on a fairly pessimistic note, arguing that unless the capacity of the security forces to commit crimes with impunity is revoked, there can be no definite transition to democracy. Thus the central issue of democratization remains the question of how to subject official security forces to democratic control and the rule of law.

Luciano Martins's essay on the liberalization of authoritarian rule in Brazil begins with three fundamental propositions. First, despite apparent stability, authoritarian regimes are subject to continuous processes of adaptation. Second, the transformation of such regimes is not necessarily the consequence of their overthrow but of evolutionary change. Third, the establishment or reestablishment of democracy is just one possible outcome of transformation. Focusing on the structural characteristics of Brazilian authoritarianism, Martins examines the ideological and organizational contradictions within the power bloc. These tensions and their consequences triggered a unique liberalization process, which was originally rooted in an attempt by the government to overcome internal economic problems. Incrementally, however, what

began as an attempt to trade economic failure for political democracy expanded the realm of political expectations. In this context, the most difficult question becomes how to absorb the military bureaucracy as an institution into a democratic regime.

Manuel Antonio Garretón concentrates on the reasons why the present Chilean military regime has not changed in the direction of greater political openness. To answer this question, he looks at the systemic crisis of 1973. Garretón contends that the military regime that emerged at that time was not just a reactionary response by the country's elites and their international allies but an attempt to create a new model of capitalist reconstruction: authoritarian capitalism. The latter translated into an institutionalization of military rule by forming a cohesive national security regime. Although the economic project collapsed from within as a result of the 1983 economic crash, the politico-military component remained intact. This outcome, combined with the weakening of the opposition, has made the emergence of a viable alternative unlikely. Thus while other authoritarian regimes have "faded into the sunset," the Chilean dictatorship paradoxically endures as a caricature of the country's reputed "stability."

Julio Cotler studies the military interventions and withdrawals in Peru between 1962 and 1980 that led to a transfer of power to civilians.¹⁸ He perceives a fundamental change in military tactics between 1962 and 1968. While in 1962 the officers sought to contain popular mobilization, in 1968 they attempted to carry on accelerated reformism to prevent threats to national security. This transfer in 1980 brought back the same right-of-center government that had been deposed in 1968. The pattern of military withdrawal from power also differed from those of the past. The significant difference was that the military's perennial adversary, APRA (now exorcised of some of its past radical leanings), had become a perfectly acceptable contender. Cotler concludes that "the problem of democracy in Peru . . . [is] once again to determine what kind of political participation would be possible for the popular and middle sectors" (2:172). In these circumstances, democratic consolidation will depend on the state's capacity for intermediation among highly conflictual groups and demands.

Charles Gillespie's essay on the Uruguayan transition from military-technocratic rule to democratic rule goes beyond his piece on elections discussed earlier. This contribution focuses on the crisis leading to the 1973 coup and the creation of a peculiar "collegial" authoritarian regime. He stresses that the military never was able to command the support of the civilian right wing, and that despite prolonged efforts at repression, they failed to institutionalize a Chilean-type model. Gillespie concludes that the phasing out of military rule has led to a new type of engineered stalemate where renovation of leadership and

policies play a major role. Despite stalemate, a more subtle learning process—the lessons learned by major political actors in order to avoid the chaos that brought about military rule—contributes potently to democratic consolidation.

Terry Lynn Karl's article discusses a historical "model" of a successful transition to democracy. She looks at the intricate negotiations among elites that are characteristic of "consociational" democracies, which in the Venezuelan case resulted in the Pact of Punto Fijo. A pacted democracy of this kind involves a social contract with a high degree of stability, predictability, institutionalization, and an overwhelmingly conservative bias. The combination of prosperity and popular demobilization of this kind of *democracia pactada* is nevertheless built on a fragile structure—a nonrenewable resource that is being depleted. In this sense, the Venezuelan experience with democratization may prove too unique to apply to the rest of the region.

Comparative, International, and Theoretical Perspectives / Volume Three of Transitions from Authoritarian Rule deals with comparative perspectives in the process of democratization. Unlike the case studies, which have a distinct idiographic intent, all the essays in the third volume address the more general elements present in transition.

Laurence Whitehead highlights the role of international actors, especially nongovernmental organizations, in the process of revival and consolidation. Drawing on European examples, he notes a general absence of governmental and nongovernmental actors in the region working toward maintaining democracy. Particularly important is the lack of a democratic-left interlocutor within the dominant regional power, the United States, which has given right-wingers at home and in Latin America free rein in thwarting social reform as well as political democracy.

Adam Przeworski's largely theoretical piece analyzes the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and the impetus for liberalization. He characterizes Western democracy as a system of uncertainty and a form of class compromise that maintains the socioeconomic status quo. He concludes that democracy basically entails freedom from physical violence but not necessarily a just society. In his view, democracy "restricted to the political realm has historically existed with exploitation and oppression" in society (3:63).

Alfred Stepan examines diverse paths toward democratization. Comparing the experiences of Europe and Latin America, he discusses eight such models: internal restoration after external reconquest, internal reformulation, externally monitored installation, redemocratization initiated from within the authoritarian regime (by civilian or military leaders or institutions), society-led regime termination (withdrawal of

support), party pact, organized revolt led by democratic reformist parties, and Marxist-led revolutionary war. Throughout his discussion, Stepan exhibits a distinct preference for a combination of models one through seven, with their individual appropriateness being determined by the specific circumstances. What is evident, however, is Stepan's generalized Huntingtonian skepticism about the democratic possibility of a revolutionary alternative.

Robert Kaufman's piece on liberalization and democratization in South America is an elaboration of his similar contribution to the DiPalma and Whitehead volume. He analyzes the breakdown of authoritarianism within the framework of an in-depth model of the limits on choices in peripheral societies. The phases of the process of breakdown are problematic and reversible. It begins with a lessening of fear and is followed by a struggle over the rules of the game that leads to a phase in which the military and capitalist elites calculate the trade-offs between repression and toleration of opposition. Kaufman ends by analyzing the experience of reconstruction of democratic coalitions and their variable political alternatives: national populist, social democratic, and center-right. All these scenarios preclude significant mass participation as well as the possibility of real socioeconomic change. The article is based on an undisguised acceptance of the notion of "restricted democracy"¹⁹ where at least "governments that now openly employ coercion and torture would be replaced by ones that must compete in mass elections and respect civil liberties . . . [even] when they are stacked explicitly in favor of capitalist elites and the middle classes" (3:107).

Alain Rouquié's chapter deals with the demilitarization and institutionalization of polities dominated by the military. His central thesis is that "no matter how central their position in the political system and how great their autonomy of decision-making, the governing military are constrained by the political culture of the dominant internal or external classes whose self-interested liberalism constitutes a restraint on the organic tendencies of the men in uniform" (3:112). Rouquié cites numerous contemporary and historical cases to illustrate his argument and points out that demilitarization of the government without demilitarization of the political system is futile.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso's essay is somewhat more limited in scope in interpreting the role of Brazilian entrepreneurs in the *abertura*. He points out a significant change of attitudes and behavior of the country's capitalists between 1964 and the end of the 1980s. In this context, Cardoso sees the role of the private sector as both crucial and limited. While its participation in liberalizing an authoritarian regime should not be underestimated, the private sector cannot be assumed to be an upholder of a liberal democratic system.

John Sheahan's article on the linkage between democratization and economic policies concisely assesses the authoritarian nature of the socioeconomic reforms instituted by military regimes. He warns against the illusions of political democratization and contends that long years of military rule have actually effected a profound socioeconomic counter-revolution. He foresees the possibility of a built-in contradiction of formal democratization without socioeconomic redemocratization. But this socioeconomic redemocratization contains a contradiction of its own in that it will threaten the hegemonic control of the business classes, making them once again prone to adopt authoritarian solutions.

Teleologies and Prescriptions / Volume 4 of *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* is an attempt by editors O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead to summarize a number of theoretical and tentative conclusions about what they call "uncertain democracies." In so doing, they stress the essentially normative value of political democracy as a desirable goal. They see transition as a form of change from a certain authoritarian regime toward an uncertain something else. The latter could be anything from a "true" political democracy, to a more authoritarian system of rule, to simple confusion, to violent confrontation or revolution. For purposes of clarification, the editors attempt to define such key concepts as transition, liberalization, and democratization. They contrast the latter two concepts while at the same time indicating their interconnectedness. Liberalization entails the opening of an authoritarian regime largely under the initiative of the rulers leading to a form of "limited authoritarianism" ("*dictablanda*" as opposed to *dictadura*). Democratization, in contrast, may contain restrictions on actors and agendas leading to "limited democracy" (*democradura*). The editors accept the premise that "it is both possible and desirable that political democracy be attained without mobilized violence and dramatic discontinuity" (4:11). This conservative stand excludes, by theoretical reductionism, the possibilities of any form of popular democracy.

The remaining sections of Volume 4 are equally normative. The discussion of opening and undermining authoritarian regimes involves various stratagems and game-type patterns of interaction. These categories include dealing with social mobilization, settling past accounts without upsetting the present, defusing but not necessarily disarming the military, and calling for leadership, courage, and Machiavellian *virtu*. Most important, however, is the editors' "factual conclusion—stated . . . as a normative preference . . . that the only route to political democracy is a pacific and negotiated one, based upon initial liberalization and on the subsequent introduction of institutions of electoral competition, interest representation, and executive accountability—with the . . . trade-offs, and uncertainties such a course . . . entails" (4:34). Ac-

ording to this line of reasoning, they envision pursuing relentless incrementalism, negotiating and renegotiating pacts, and resurrecting civil society as the fundamental devices for bringing about "controlled" elections. In the editors' view, elections must be formally honest but must keep "the proper balance," that is, "parties of the Right-Center and Right must be helped . . . and parties of the Left-Center and Left should not win by an overwhelming majority" (4:62).

Their final argument boils down to two fundamental observations: first, "the property rights of the bourgeoisie are inviolable" (4:69); and second, "the armed forces serve as the prime protector of the rights and privileges covered by the first restriction . . . [and] their institutional existence, assets and hierarchy cannot be eliminated or even seriously threatened" (4:62). These conclusions add up to defining the essence of political democracy as rooted in stalemate.²⁰

CONCLUSIONS ON POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, AND EPISTEMOLOGY

The fifty or so essays contained in the three conference collections under review generally comprise interesting and sometimes provocative reading. The most striking similarity is their thematic unity. This similarity is not surprising given the considerable degree of cross-pollination and collaboration among the individual scholars involved in more than one of these undertakings. Taken altogether, these essays make important contributions to the debate about democratization and the nature of the Latin American state. It is nevertheless patently evident that they do not cover the entire gamut of such a debate.²¹ The prevailing editorial orientation falls generally within mainstream U.S. political analysis of Latin America, although here a distinction should be made between the editors and the individual contributors. Perhaps in this sense, Drake and Silva's *Elections and Democratization in Latin America*, despite its narrower focus, is the work that offers the most valuable insights on democratization in the present Latin American context. The lack of editorial line is combined with a broader representation of critical, "revisionist" thinking that the other editors were less inclined to include. Unfortunately, this eclecticism has its price. Drake and Silva's brief introduction is too sketchy, too loose, and too noncommittal to provide a useful framework for analysis. Perhaps the editors will work with some of the rich materials and insights in various contributions to their book to provide a more cohesive and comprehensive work in the future.

In contrast, DiPalma and Whitehead's *The Central American Impasse* suffers from a too-ambitious (although laudable) focus. In this case, the conference paper format does not seem to have worked effectively. The link between peace and democracy (and human rights) of-

fers an analytically sound, relevant, and promising avenue for further research. In a practical sense, this link was already part of the agenda of the Contadora initiative, is presently contained in the Arias Plan,²² and constitutes a major concern of institutions such as the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights and the University for Peace (both centered in Costa Rica). Moreover, this link between peace and democracy offers an interdisciplinary opportunity to overcome the epistemological discontinuities present in the problematic relationship between the fields of international relations and comparative politics. As in the case of the Drake and Silva collection, however, the explicit theoretical associations remain sketchy at best.

In more substantive matters, *The Central American Impasse* exhibits three fundamental weaknesses throughout the text. First, the work lacks a coherent framework that would link domestic democratization with regional peace, resulting in a collection of essays that falls short of rendering a comprehensive overview. Neither the introduction nor the conclusions provide much conceptual “mortar” for joining the individual articles, which vary greatly in focus, intent, and quality. Second, an attempt to provide comparative “context” resulted in five of the eleven essays covering topics other than the “Central American impasse.” Third, most of the essays (with some noticeable exceptions) are short on relevant socioeconomic and international analysis of the crisis. This lack is particularly serious in view of the explicit linkage model suggested by the editors from the onset, a conceptual framework with some degree of theoretical elaboration.²³ Many of the articles cite evidence of a pattern of complex (or “new”) dependency emerging in the region as a result of the growing transnationalization of individual states. Yet this important trend is not systematically conceptualized in the text.

Perhaps the most disappointing of these books is the one with the greatest intellectual promise—O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead’s *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. This enterprise was not only ambitious in scope but contained the most explicit search for theory and analysis. Like the other two collections, it evidences an unequivocal sense of haste. What may be a minor editorial problem for the other two works becomes a substantial deficiency in an enterprise with long-awaited theoretical prospects involving some of the most prestigious names in the field. The result is that the parts add up to a great deal more than the whole, meaning that the synthesis in Volume 4 does not seem to be based on the analyses of the individual contributors. The findings of the editors appear to be an elongation of their introductory remarks and their normative preferences rather than a systematization of the case studies. Clearly, the European experience discussed in Volume 1 provides rich comparative material, but it offers little that helps

in explaining or understanding Latin American politics from a theoretical viewpoint. This limited usefulness is conceptually significant, but here again, few of the structural and historical differences between Southern Europe and Latin America are theoretically highlighted. As with DiPalma and Whitehead's collection on Central America, overemphasis on the comparative context (Western Europe in this case) precludes a nuanced view of the interconnections among socioeconomic and international variables and the process of democratization.

The general theoretical orientation of all three books emphasizes the breakdown of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. It also deals with opposition alliances and negotiation strategies but leaves largely untouched the other two central issues of democratization suggested by Gillespie (the political economy of regime change and the corporate interests of the power holders).²⁴ In this sense, the implicit and explicit analytical framework is still being excessively constrained by its conceptual predecessor, the bureaucratic-authoritarian model. This model has undoubtedly been one of the most valuable structural-historical paradigms for understanding the crisis of the state in the region (especially in some of the relatively more-developed Southern Cone countries). But as Cammack has suggested, the bureaucratic-authoritarian model also presents some conceptual and operational limitations.²⁵

As with modernization or dependency theories (each of which influenced the bureaucratic-authoritarian construct in a specific way), the theory of bureaucratic-authoritarianism and its crisis tend to enhance the relevance of certain factors while fading out that of others. For instance, in the texts reviewed here, three important elements are downplayed by the editors: the role of the military bureaucracy as a relatively autonomous, yet internationally dependent, component of the state; the interrelationship between the socioeconomic order and the Latin American state; and the specific linkages between the domestic and international milieu (especially the complex interplay between various domestic and U.S. constituencies). This analytical reductionism in turn results in an incomplete understanding of the process of democratization and its circumstances and alternatives. The empirical and theoretical focus on "limited democracy" ends up coalescing with a normative preference for the maintenance of the status quo. This tendency is manifested in the conceptual inability of two of these collections—DiPalma and Whitehead's and O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead's—to deal with the Nicaraguan experience as other than a more subtle and sophisticated version of official discourse, albeit under social democratic guise. Thus the convergence among the three books discussed here is not purely thematic. Fundamental agreement exists about a general paradigm for studying Latin American politics. Even if one keeps

in mind the various contributors who do not share the underlying analytical framework of the editors (for example, Maira, Espinal, Weeks, Karl, Booth, Rock, Avellano, Soares, and Sheahan), the dominant tendency appears inclined toward a revived structural-functional understanding of the political process.²⁶ In this sense, the debate about democratization discussed in these three works shares many of the basic conceptual and normative assumptions of the “progressive” developmentalism of the 1960s. The emphasis on stability, diffusion, cumulation, incrementalism, and “end of ideology” provokes a sense of *déjà vu*: the “paradigm surrogate.”²⁷ The new approach, however, departs from its intellectual predecessor in placing far less emphasis on stages of growth and other economic “deterministic” factors present in classical modernization theory. On the contrary, a renewed focus is placed on a kind of relative autonomy of the political realm that emphasizes coalition building, pact formation, and political strategies. This comment does not imply that pure virtue of a voluntaristic nature is perceived as the determinant factor in bringing about desired outcomes. Instead, political action is conceived as constrained by the limits of what is possible and “realistic” as well as by an overwhelming preoccupation with preserving a given socioeconomic and international order—that is, liberal capitalism and U.S. regional hegemony.

A fundamental question here is whether the kind of “democracy” that the editors and many of the contributors talk about is really democratic. Admittedly, it does not correspond to the conventional Western definition. Neither is it congruent with the practice of democracy in the more institutionalized polities in the region (like Chile or Uruguay) prior to the establishment of national security regimes. Nor does this kind of democracy include the possibility of a popular revolutionary democracy. Moreover, a less ideologically loaded and more “practical” question could be raised: to what extent could the actual practice of “restricted” democracy lead to political stability?

Even a cursory view of the present state of such democratization in Latin America does not provide a very encouraging picture. Saddled with an insurmountable debt burden, contending with the extraterritoriality and metapower of their security forces as well as with growing demands for revindication from below, many of these democratic experiments have already exhibited symptoms of acute deterioration. In the present crisis of the Western economies, these weak “receiver” regimes are likely to be toppled by equally weak but hard-line “militocracies.” Thus a new cycle of instability could be reinduced. The fundamental issue in Latin America seems to be less a matter of making the region safe for democracy than of creating a safe and genuine economic, social, and political democracy for its people.²⁸

NOTES

1. For a discussion of Cold War politics and area studies, see my article "Latin American and Caribbean Studies in Canada: A Developmental Perspective," *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 3, no. 1 (1982):178–79. It is important to stress the connection between the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of October 1958 and the development of area studies—including Latin American studies—in the United States. Compare Lucien Pye, "The Confrontation between Discipline and Area Studies," in *Political Science and Area Studies, Rivals or Partners?*, edited by Lucien Pye (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), 5, 12–13.
2. Compare Arturo Escobar, "Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of His Work to the Third World," *Alternatives* 10 (Winter 1984–85):370–400.
3. Compare Yale Ferguson, "The United States and the Political Development of Latin America: A Retrospect and a Comment," in *Contemporary Inter-American Relations: A Reader in Theory and Issues*, edited by Yale Ferguson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 354.
4. See Donal Cruise O'Brien, "Modernization Order and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal: American Political Science, 1960–1970," *Journal of Development Studies* 4 (1972):331–78.
5. Compare Nelson Rockefeller, *The Rockefeller Report of a United States Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969).
6. Compare Commission on United States–Latin American Relations (Sol Linowitz, Chairman), *The Americas in a Changing World* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973).
7. See Tom J. Farer in *Dialogue* 19 (Fall 1978):14.
8. In the *NACLA Report* for March–April 1979, the term *crisis of domination* is used in the Gramscian notion of deflation of force, p. 6. See also Robert Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay on Method," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12, no. 2 (1983):162–75.
9. See Willy Brandt, *North-South, A Program for Survival: The Report of the Independent Commission on International Development under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1980). Also see William Graf, "Anti-Brandt: A Critique of Northwestern Prescriptions for World Order," in *Socialist Register*, edited by R. Miliband and J. Saville (London: Merlin Press, 1981), 20–46.
10. See Inter-American Dialogue, *Rebuilding Cooperation in the Americas* (Washington: Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies, 1986), 16–34.
11. See Arturo Valenzuela, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
12. A similar case appears to have been the transition to democracy in Venezuela after the fall of Pérez Jiménez, which is discussed by Karl in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. For a discussion of the liberal-democratic hybrid, see C. B. McPherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). Also see my article "Stalemate and Repression in the Southern Cone: An Interpretive Synopsis," *New Scholar* 8 (1983):371–85.
13. Weeks's use of the term *hegemony*, unlike that of Gramsci's, means overwhelming, illegitimate control that often relies on force (which corresponds to Gramsci's concept of domination).
14. For a general analysis of trends and factions within the Latin American Catholic Church, see Ivan Vallier's classic study, *Catholicism, Social Control, and Modernization in Latin America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
15. Compare Gustavo Gutiérrez, *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1973).
16. Compare Nicos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain* (London: New Left Books, 1976). Poulantzas's neo-Marxist analysis concentrates on class formations and contradictions within the bourgeois capitalist state leading to "restructuring."
17. See, for instance, Gabriel Almond, "The Development of Political Development," in

- Understanding Political Development*, edited by Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), 437–90.
18. Middlebrook's article on Mexico is the same one already reviewed in my discussion of the Drake and Silva collection.
 19. See my essay "Political Democracy in Latin America: An Exploration into the Nature of Two Political Projects," in *Latin American Prospects for the 1980s: Equity, Democratization, and Development*, edited by Archibald Ritter and David Pollock (New York: Praeger, 1983), 161–81.
 20. Compare with my article "Stalemate and Repression in the Southern Cone," *New Scholar* 8:371–85.
 21. For instance, see *Generals in Retreat: The Crisis of Military Rule in Latin America*, edited by Philip O'Brien and Paul Cammack (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985).
 22. See Rodrigo Jauberth Rojas, *Plan de paz de Oscar Arias: ¿intervencionismo o nuevo tipo de negociación regional?* (Mexico City: PECA, CIDE, CICAH, 1987).
 23. See, for instance, Douglas Chalmers, "Developing in the Periphery: External Factors in Latin American Politics," in Ferguson, *Contemporary Inter-American Relations*, 11–34; or Jorge Nef and Francisco Rojas, "Dependencia compleja y transnacionalización del estado en América Latina," *Relaciones Internacionales*, nos. 8–9 (Dec. 1984):101–22; and Jorge Nef, "Crise politique et transnationalisation de l'état en Amérique Latine: Une interprétation théorique," *Etudes Internationales* 17, no. 2 (June 1986):279–306.
 24. Compare Charles Gillespie, "From Authoritarianism Crisis to Democratic Transitions," *LARR* 22, no. 3 (1987):167–68.
 25. O'Brien and Cammack, *Generals in Retreat*.
 26. See, for instance, Almond, "The Development of Political Development," 437–90; also Jorge I. Domínguez, "Political Change: Central America, South America, and the Caribbean," in Weiner and Huntington, *Understanding Political Development*, 65–99. Cammack has referred to this epistemology as the "historical-structural" method. See O'Brien and Cammack, *Generals in Retreat*, 5. Compare my comments on trilateralism, military withdrawal, and restricted democracy in "Political Democracy in Latin America," in Ritter and Pollock, *Latin American Prospects*, 163–73.
 27. Compare Susanne Bodenheimer, "The Ideology of Developmentalism: American Political Science Paradigm, Surrogate for Latin American Studies," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 15 (1970):95–137.
 28. I presented this argument in "Redemocratization in Latin America or the Modernization of the Status Quo?," *N.S. Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 11, no. 21 (1986):43–55; and also in "Violence and Ideology in Latin American Politics: An Overview," in *Violence et conflits en Amérique Latine*, edited by Marcel Daneau (Quebec: Le Centre Québécois de Relations Internationales, 1985), 5–34.