

ignores Estonia's domestic problems and the role these may have played in her actions. Above all, in describing the two crises themselves the book offers no real analysis of the actions of the Estonian government. For example, the questions raised by the lack of resistance and the rather strange passivity of the government are not broached.

This is an impassioned statement on the treatment of a small nation by a larger one. Although most of the material is accurate and some of it moving, this book does little to advance our understanding of the incorporation of Estonia into the Soviet Union.

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PROISKHOZHDENIE PARTOKRATII. 2 vols. By *A. Avtorkhanov*. Frankfurt am Main: Possev-Verlag, 1973. Vol. 1: TsK I LENIN. 728 pp. DM 32, paper. Vol. 2: TsK I STALIN. 534 pp. DM 23, paper.

Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov's contributions to Western understanding of the CPSU apparatus are well known. In this detailed work he presents a history of the party's Central Committee from its establishment in 1898 to its demise in the Stalinist purges of the thirties. Inevitably the author has had to cover some rather well-traveled ground, but he has done this in a rather novel manner and with the benefit of his vast personal experience. One of the virtues of this lengthy work is that it contains many of the most quotable passages from the records of the party debates in congresses and in polemical statements.

As a history of the Leninist Central Committee the work is a study of the various opposition movements within the Bolshevik ranks and Lenin's disagreements with his own followers. Stalinism and the advent of the "partocracy" are viewed as a "higher phase of Leninism," as an outgrowth of Lenin's practices and policies. After all, it was Lenin who, at the close of the Tenth Congress in 1921 while outlawing factions, proposed to "discuss with rifles" instead of with theses the merits of the Workers' Opposition platform (1:661). Thus Stalin's methods of dealing with the Trotskyite Left Opposition, the Kamenev-Zinoviev "New Opposition," the "Unified Opposition" of Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Trotsky, and the "Right Opposition" had a basis in Leninist practice.

At the same time the author gives much attention to Lenin's break with Stalin over nationality policy and the Georgian Question and to the suppression of Lenin's letter to the Twelfth Congress. Avtorkhanov stresses Stalin's power over both Krupskaja and Lenin's secretary, L. Fotieva, and his ability to create the legend that Lenin's letter was not to be opened until after his death (2:48 ff.). Central to the Stalin-Trotsky rivalry is the character of the antagonists. Trotsky is depicted as a revolutionary who could not become the master of power and as a Hamlet-like figure incapable of carrying out Lenin's wishes at the Twelfth Congress because of his fear that the party might not understand his forming a "bloc" with Lenin. Indeed, the impotence of the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, and Bukharinites in the face of Stalin's bureaucratic apparatus and their inability to use violent means to unseat or dispose of him can be explained, according to Avtorkhanov, in terms of their being "slaves of communism while Stalin was its master" (2:238). To them he was still a Communist, and the alternative to Stalinism was seen as another Kronstadt, a "popular revolution against communism in general." The oppositionists,

it is pointed out, placed an exaggerated value on the word, as though Stalin could have been halted by lexical means.

Avtorkhanov contends that Stalin actually created the several post-Lenin oppositions, endowing them artificially with a cohesion, programmatic character, and organizational quality that they did not really possess. Thus the "New Opposition" at the Fourteenth Congress was not unified, and its various spokesmen did not take identical positions. However, Stalin imputed to each opposition more than it said in order to accuse it of factionalism.

The author bases his work principally on official party documents and on standard sources and statements of the various principals. He also relies heavily on Trotsky's autobiography, on the fifth edition of Lenin's works, and on recently published documentary sources. It is rare for him to depart from the documented record, and yet such is the case when he accepts at face value the account provided by E. Kazakevich (in "Vragi," *Izvestiia*, April 21, 1962) of Lenin's involvement in Martov's departure from Russia. Martov's biographer, Israel Getzler, has branded this Soviet account "pure fiction," but Avtorkhanov does not apprise the reader of that fact or of the discrepancies in the two accounts. Nor does he point out (1:368) in citing the multivolume CPSU official history that its claim of 350,000 members in October 1917 is inflated by at least 110,000 in contrast to previous official versions. There are also several lacunae, and that is surprising for a work of such length. The reader will not find here a treatment of the philosophical controversy of 1908–9 and its subsequent manifestations nor of the Capri School nor the extent and success of the Okhrana's infiltration of Lenin's organization (apart from the case of Roman Malinovsky).

The author is at his best in setting the record straight and in pointing out contradictions in the statements of the principal leaders. Thus Trotsky could boast of the Bolsheviks' "great achievement" of having "killed the free market, exploitation, competition, and speculation" in April 1920, but subsequently claim in his memoirs that two months earlier he had proposed to the Central Committee the abandonment of "war communism" (1:594). Avtorkhanov clarifies the record in pointing out that it was Trotsky and not Stalin who originally advocated the preferential development of heavy industry. The electrification of the economy proposal emanated not from Lenin—as is commonly stated—but from S. Gusev (1:600–601). Trotsky is recorded as advocating concentration camps to deal with "labor desertion" and obtaining adoption of the measure at the Ninth Congress.

Avtorkhanov, a former CPSU official and graduate of what is now the Higher Party School in Moscow who spent five years in Stalin's prisons, possesses insights and a profound sense of the nature of the Soviet system. His work also has historiographic value in providing a corrective to the official multivolume history. His lengthy characterizations of Lenin, Stalin, and the various oppositionists provide graphic portraits. He also offers many provocative judgments and employs a lively style. If Stalin was a "total ignoramus" regarding Marxism—which can be debated—Avtorkhanov sees this as an advantage, in that it freed him from the "dogmatic fetters of Marxist orthodoxy" (2:469). The author regards Stalin as having been responsible for the death of Kamo in Tbilisi in 1922. He also examines the circumstantial evidence offered by Khrushchev that implicates Stalin in the murder of Kirov, and the mysterious death of Kirov's chief bodyguard, Borisov, in an "accident."

The subsequent purges resulted in the destruction of the Central Committee in

1937–38. In an appendix Avtorkhanov lists the names of all Central Committee members and candidate members elected between 1898 and 1934. Of the total of 284 persons, forty-five died of natural causes prior to the Great Purge; eight committed suicide; 188 were executed or perished in Stalin's prisons; twenty-two fell into disfavor and were expelled from the Central Committee; and only twenty-one remained as survivors of the Great Purge. However, of the twenty-one survivors three were executed in 1952–54 and six (Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Poskrebyshev, and Khrushchev) suffered disgrace. Avtorkhanov sees the purges and the "peace of the graveyard" that subsequently characterized the CPSU as the consequence "not of the persecution mania of an ill person but [of] a profoundly thought-out strategy to ensure his [Stalin's] absolute rule against every contingency" (2:516).

Because of its contents and format the work should be of special interest to Soviet readers.

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SOVIET RUSSIA MASTERS THE COMINTERN: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN THE ERA OF STALIN'S ASCENDANCY. By *Helmut Gruber*. Garden City: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1974. xvi, 544 pp. \$3.95, paper.

This volume is the second of a planned trilogy by Mr. Gruber dealing with international communism from Lenin up to the Hitler-Stalin pact (the first volume was entitled *International Communism in the Era of Lenin*). The book contains forty-four documents grouped under two headings, "The Bolshevization of the Comintern" and "The Comintern and the Colonial Peoples." The work is enriched by copious bibliographies.

The book is not intended for the general public but for specialists who have had difficulty in finding their way through the immense documentation on the contemporary Communist movement. The usefulness of such collections is indisputable, for the sources are not always accessible to historians, and the enormous mass of materials may discourage students as well as teachers. It remains to determine whether the author's selection is of a nature likely to clarify or define the politico-historical phenomena within each period in question.

Gruber justifiably comments that "no doubt there were important differences between the eras of Lenin and Stalin; but there were also striking continuities." Nevertheless, one must not confuse the superficial continuities with the profound differences, the latter having led rapidly to changing the very nature of the relations between the Soviet Communist Party and the national sections of the Comintern. The decisive influence of Lenin and his lieutenants on the Communist movement and organization was due to their real superiority, their prestige acquired in the Russian Revolution, and their experience exceeding that of the ex-socialists who joined their cause. This state of things was in the process of rapidly evolving in an egalitarian direction when the death of Lenin intervened. The influence of Stalin, the totalitarian, after a period of transition, was due to the grip of the Soviet secret services on the leadership of the Communist parties and to the considerable financial means brought into play.

One may also ask if the documents gathered by Gruber take full account of