

working order would go to prove that the framers of the constitution labored under no illusion as to the inevitable outcome of their work. Both of these great statesmen, on retiring from their premierships, proceeded to organize political parties under their leadership. It can, therefore, be reasonably presumed that, while those statesmen were fully aware that party cabinets would be an essential outcome of representative institutions—that to some kind of party cabinets Japan must some day come—they were at the same time determined that such a momentous step should be taken very cautiously and gradually. At the time the constitution was framed there existed no political parties competent to form cabinets, and the leaders of such parties as existed were mostly untrained and inexperienced men simply clamouring for power. So the Meiji statesmen found in the throne the sheet-anchor to hold secure the ship of state in troubled waters, and considered the imperial mandate clause a conservative safeguard, pending the organization and education of parties worthy to be entrusted with governmental responsibilities. A few years of parliamentary experience, however, revealed that a cabinet unsupported by strong political parties is virtually impotent for law-making, and even for administrative purposes. For the opposition in the lower house, if commanding a majority, could by sheer obstruction prevent the voting of the budget and other legislative measures.

The history of various ministries formed since 1890, ranging from a cabinet that stood completely aloof from political parties to a cabinet entirely controlled by the leaders of the majority party in the lower house, is the history of a series of experiments to find the way to adjust the principle of the imperial mandate and that of parliamentary mandate, so as to ensure the smooth working of the constitution and safeguard the welfare of the nation. The days of experiment are not yet over.

T. IYENAGA.

*New York City.*

**Antecedents of the Russian Revolution.** The resignation, in the summer of 1916, of the Russian minister of foreign affairs, Sergei Sazonov, was keenly regretted as well within Russia as among her allies. It had been generally interpreted, as a mere result of differences between the talented and influential minister on one side, and the governing group on the other, with respect to the immediate attitude to be taken towards the future independence of Poland. However, the subse-

quent development of an acute crisis in the internal political situation of Russia clearly shows that Sazonov's dismissal was only the first step of a well calculated campaign, led by a surprisingly small group surrounding the throne; a campaign which bears all the earmarks of plain treason.

The firm will of the whole nation, clearly expressed by the Duma, the press, the organizations of the local governments (the "zemstvos") and the municipalities ("goroda"), and even by the oldest representatives of the burcaucracy among the appointed members of the upper chamber of the Russian diet and the ultra-reactionary council of the united nobility, was to fight to the bitter end. This determination was, however, openly defied by the governing camarilla surrounding the throne, whose evident purpose was to prevent, by all means available, a crushing defeat of Germany. Boris Stürmer, German in both name and sympathy, succeeded Sazonov as minister of foreign affairs and at once began secret negotiations with Russia's enemies. At the same time Protopopov, who in his capacity of assistant chairman of the Duma was sent to England and France as a member of the Russian parliamentary delegation, betrayed the confidence of his constituents and deserted the national cause. On his way back to Russia he held a secret interview with the German ambassador in Stockholm; and as a reward he was appointed *minister of the interior pro tem*.

Soon afterwards the pro-German intrigues of the court circle were openly denounced in the Duma by Dr. Muliukov, leader of the Constitutional Democrats (popularly known as the "Cadets"), by the eminent Octobrist Shidlovski, and by Purishkevich, a former leader of the ultra-reactionary wing of the Duma; and although the censorship was brought sharply to bear, the news of what was going on spread with great rapidity and aroused a storm of indignation. Stürmer was dismissed (November 24) and Trepov was appointed prime minister, with at first Neratov and later Pokrovski (former assistant minister of finances), as minister of foreign affairs. But the change did not alter the policy of the governing camarilla; and evidence of the real intention of the court was seen in the fact that Protopopov, who was universally accused of treason, was allowed to retain his position as a member of the cabinet. The demand of both houses of the diet for a cabinet responsible to the representatives of the people was scoffed at. The solemn promises of the prime minister, and his attempts to form a patriotic cabinet which should be united in its policies, resulted in a struggle between him and Protopopov; and the contest

ended in the resignation of Trepov and the complete victory of Protopopov and the clique supporting him. Stürmer returned to the cabinet in the capacity of a minister without portfolio. A nominal head for the cabinet was found in the person of the entirely colorless Prince Golitzin.

Meanwhile, the popular apprehension began to find expression in numerous nation-wide congresses of different organizations, strongly recalling the pre-revolutionary period of 1905. The government employed all means, illegal as well as legal, to prevent these meetings; and at last, when the crisis became acute, the meetings of the *zemstvos* and municipal unions were suppressed by force. These two great national organizations had saved the Russian armies in 1915 from the utter destruction which would have come as an unavoidable result of the complete inadequacy of the governmental methods of supplying the troops with ammunition and food.

However, the associations had time unanimously to adopt resolutions calling on the Duma to refuse to dissolve and to declare its sitting permanent, thus assuming unlimited power and repeating the example of the French National Assembly in 1789. The government answered these resolutions by confirming Protopopov as full-fledged minister of the interior; by dismissing the exceedingly popular minister of public instruction, Count Ignatiev; and by a series of similarly provoking measures. And thereafter the governing camarilla labored to bring about, as a last resort, an open revolutionary outbreak, in order to justify before the allied nations and the world a separate peace with Germany. The murder of the evil spirit of the Russian court, the vicious drunkard, Grigori Rasputin, failed to change the situation. As was asserted by Rasputin's former friend, the monk Tliodor, "Rasputin is dead, but '*Rasputinstvo*' (the spirit and the methods of Rasputin) are still alive."

In their effort to avert the revolutionary outbreak which the court camarilla was trying to provoke as a last chance to turn the cards in favor of Germany and to save the face of the autocratic régime, the leaders of the progressive parties seemed for weeks to be struggling against overwhelming odds. And that part of the world which knew most about the situation was hardly prepared to hear of the turn of events whereby in early March the nationalistic, anti-dynastic, and anti-German elements got the upper hand, drove the camarilla from power, and forced the Tsar to speedy abdication.

NICHOLAS GOLDENWEISER.

*New York City.*