intertwined with feelings of guilt and shame, because how could you possibly withhold support for the people who are willing to risk life and limb to protect you and your way of life? Supporting the troops acts like a balm, soothing civilian anxiety tied to opting out of military service. In this framing, all those who serve are heroes and are entitled to support from the general civilian population. Millar goes even further, arguing that "support is the new service" (p. 146), a claim that certainly has merit in the U.S. context but that might not be as generalizable as some of her other observations. Like me, Millar is Canadian and shares a vignette in the preface about feeling the social expectation of supporting the troops. Having grown up in Québec, where anti-military sentiment more visibly accompanies narratives of war opposition, I am interested in those fissures and nuances in multi-lingual and multi-cultural contexts and would look forward to Millar's take on them in future work.

In terms of the research data, Millar opted for a stratified data collection strategy to analyze "Support the Troops" narratives in the United States and in the United Kingdom, acknowledging that the discursive practice is more prevalent in the United States. What is particularly important about the empirical analysis is that it focuses not just on official discourse, but narratives from different types of stakeholders, which allows the reader to grapple with the totalizing nature of this narrative and discursive practice. Yes, "Support the Troops" is "reified by state discourse" (pp. 87-88) but it is adopted and instrumentalized by a number of different players, from the community level to the international realm. Indeed, Millar points to the prevalence of "Support the Troops" narratives in alliance politics. It's at this point of the book that, though the comparison between the United States and the UK is instructive, one gets curious about how the argument might travel across a broader set of cases. Canada, for example, could have been added as another "special ally" fairly seamlessly (Chapter 8 devotes some space to exploration of special allies), especially given its refusal to participate in the 2003 war in Iraq. It would have strengthened the empirical grounding of this chapter and more decisively answered the question of how "Support the Troops" narratives adapt to non-participation and war opposition.

Another aspect warranting further development would be some analytical engagement, and even some empirical overview, of the activities that were carried out during the GWOT period that were *not* war. If anything, it makes the argument more persuasive because through the range of other activities, members of the military, even if not in a war, benefit from automatic support in a way that other professions with at times comparable tasks do not (think law enforcement).

Reading this deeply analytical account of the "Support the Troops" discourse during the GWOT years made for some truly enthralling, but at times demoralizing reading given how hard it is to walk back deeply entrenched and affective narratives. The conclusion offers some respite, especially in the last two pages of the book when Millar proposes bold avenues for change, building on her research findings. It implies nothing short of tearing down this consensual but ultimately unhealthy "Support the Troops" artifice. While I may have taken an entirely different research design to investigate the embeddedness of supporting the troops, I'm convinced I would have arrived at a similar sentiment, namely that while we have a duty of care toward troops, veterans and their families, our democratic debate tied to the use of force is undermined by affective and uncompromising bonds toward the military. To realize that the "support the troops discourses severely constrained the conditions of legitimate political dissent during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan" is an important finding that has been echoed in the work of other scholars of civil-military relations (p. 194). For example, Peter Feaver's book *Thanks for Your Service: The Causes and Consequences of Public Confidence in the US Military* draws similar conclusions about the social pressure and bipartisan consensus around supporting the troops and being deferential to military expertise. Both works, by drawing from very different arguments, literatures, and methodologies, raise alarm bells about increasingly entrenched (and worrying) dynamics of democratic civil-military relations. Indeed, this crucial amendment of the liberal military contract passed with such roaring approval that it is incredibly delicate to question it. While the discourse and practice of supporting the troops create a reassuring connection to military service for the rest of society, Millar's incisive analysis foregrounds the cost involved, which is civilian complicity in the democratic use of force and, by the same token, the harms of war.

Response to Stéfanie von Hlatky's Review of *Support the Troops: Military Obligation, Gender, and the Making of Political Community*

— Katharine M. Millar [ID]

My sincere thanks to Stéfanie von Hlatky for her sharp and generous engagement with my work. It's been a feminist joy to engage with her in this critical dialogue about civil-military relations, gender, and the politics of war. As alluded to in her review, which incisively unpacks the political stakes and implications of my argument, my work draws upon feminist political and IR theory to interrogate the naturalization of the pervasive societal assumption that support is, "obviously", owed to those who fight. This assumption sheds light on von Hlatky's considered

observations about the empirical bounds of my analysis and invitation to challenge or extend my argument by considering different cases.

My analysis isn't intended to be empirically generalizable: even in liberal democracies, supporting the troops is not a mechanistic phenomenon. I do aim, though, for analytical generalizability around the problem I see "support the troops" as addressing—that all states need to have some way of "making right" the terms of participation in state force. This is particularly acute in liberal democracies, with ideals of equality and liberty, and in states without conscription. It's true that support may not be the "new service" everywhere, nor would I expect it to be. But states everywhere will have some normative reckoning with military service (likely tangled up with gendered ideas of what it means to be a good person).

Which brings us to von Hlatky's excellent point about Québec and the co-existence of anti-war and anti-military sentiment. Rather prosaically, though I see supporting the troops as a mandatory discourse, it doesn't materially prevent the articulation of anti-military sentiment, merely its ability to be socially received as intelligible and legitimate political dissent for "good" masculine citizens. I'd be curious, then, to what extent anti-military rhetoric is intersubjectively and contextually legitimated within various communities within Québec and how that dissent in turn relates to political membership within the Canadian state. If membership within this particular political community is contested, we might likewise see the bounds of martial political obligation loosened. Similar questions could be raised about Canada's status as a "special ally"—a great observation, given the prevalence of "support the troops" discourse within Canada during the Global War on Terror (GWoT) in relation to Afghanistan—as U.S. political discourse did, indeed, frame Canada's non-participation in Iraq as a betrayal (of the United States? of the liberal imperial international order?).

This relationship between obligation, violence, and political membership also pertains to the push to consider non-war activities during the GWoT. Von Hlatky is right, that despite the recent prevalence of, for instance, "Blue Lives Matter" discourses in the United States, they don't operate the same way—an important avenue for future work. Here, I think the difference between the normative role of law enforcement within the political community (in idealized liberal understandings) and that of the military is important. Participation in policing is not an idealized component of political belonging and law enforcement is meant to keep the peace, rather than use violence. These differences in relationship to citizenship and sacrifice—as well, of course, as historical and contemporary experiences of racist, sexist, trans- and homophobic state violence—give law enforcement, immigration, and state surveillance a different political inflection.

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The United Nations Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, more than twenty years on from Security Council Resolution 1325, has developed from an initial (hard won) declaration of the centrality of gender equality to war and peace to a complex, wide-ranging, and technical policy architecture embedded (if inconsistently) across states and international organisations. This process, as Stéfanie von Hlatky interrogates in this important book, has resulted in a situation wherein military institutions, predominantly tasked with collective force, are now also asked to act as transformative agents of gender equality.

Drawing upon a fine-grained analysis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's implementation of the WPS agenda, von Hlatky argues that the feminist principles of WPS are subject to "norm distortion", wherein agents (militaries) are able to redefine norms via implementation away from, or even in contrast to, the intent of their principals (NATO states) (pp. 7-9). Specifically, *Deploying Feminism* argues that militaries focus WPS implementation on the ability of gender—in the form of deployed women or context-based gender analysis—to improve operational effectiveness, rather than broader gender equality (pp. 11-12; 50; 154-5). Von Hlatky thus tackles a particularly thorny, high-stakes iteration of what feminist IR scholars refer to as the "dual agenda" that accompanies gender mainstreaming: an institution is meant to hold "two aims simultaneously: first, the promotion of gender equality and gender justice as an end in its own right; and second, making mainstream policies more effective in their own terms by the inclusion of gender analysis" (see Sylvia Walby, "Gender Mainstreaming: Productive Tensions in Theory and Practice," *Social Politics* 12[3], 2005, p. 3).

It's perhaps worth mentioning that I have also (occasionally) done WPS activities with NATO and military institutions. I nodded along with von Hlatky's, careful explication of the typical talking points (and cul-de-sacs) within military institutions: there must be more women but militaries cannot (or will not) specifically recruit/deploy more women; a sense of bafflement as to what gender analysis is and gender advisors are meant to do; the