

My tabulations, based on the dictionary, show the following: (1) about 45 percent remained as loyal Communists right down to the demise of the Comintern in 1943, (2) another 13 percent died as Communists before 1943 (of natural causes, accidents, combat, or execution by anti-Communists), (3) about 20 percent left the Comintern before 1943, either voluntarily or by expulsion, but did not suffer punishment, (4) another 18 percent were, before 1943, expelled and executed, or died in a Soviet prison or labor camp, or simply disappeared during the Great Purges. The remainder (approximately 4 percent) includes several about whose careers uncertainty prevails and a few who committed suicide, for whatever reasons. All except about eighty joined the Comintern before 1924.

Too much should not be expected of this dictionary. The authors assert that it is "neither complete nor final." The dictionary will not disclose why these persons became Communists. For about forty-three the year of birth remains unknown. For over half (434) evidently no information has been found concerning the social class and occupation of the subject's parents. A slight omission is the authors' failure to note the posthumous rehabilitation of several victims of Stalin's purges, such as Hanecki, Krestinsky, Lenski, Berzin, and Sultan-Zade. At least eight persons do not seem to meet the authors' criteria for inclusion; the most obvious are Luxemburg and Liebknecht, who were murdered before the Comintern was founded, and Crispian and Dittmann of the USPD, who opposed fusion with the Comintern. One regrets that the authors did not provide an appendix listing the members of the leading organs of the Comintern.

But these are minor points. The *Dictionary* is a substantial contribution that will be welcomed.

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DIE NATIONALEN GEBIETSEINHEITEN DER SOWJETUNION: STAATLICHKEIT, SOUVERÄNITÄT UND AUTONOMIE IM SOWJETFÖDERALISMUS. By Jürgen Arnold. *Abhandlungen des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, vol. 27. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1973. 176 pp. DM 28.

This is a concise, levelheaded, clear, and scholarly *legal* analysis of Soviet federalism. Herein lies its virtue for jurists. Nonjurists, however, are likely to consider its approach a limitation.

In a brief historical introduction the author clearly and persuasively sketches the Bolshevik conception of federalism. He shows that Lenin saw a federal structure as a lesser evil compared with the threatening total disintegration of the former Russian Empire. But at heart Lenin remained an advocate of the centralized unitary state. Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, too, have tended to regard the Soviet (Federal) Union as a transitory phenomenon.

The second part of the book is a minute analysis, based on rich Soviet and Western sources, of the formal (*formelle*) and real (*materielle*) position of the Soviet territorial units—from the Union republics down to the autonomous provinces—in Soviet and international law. The author is properly judicious in evaluating the somewhat unusual position of the Ukrainian and Belorussian republics in the United Nations (see pp. 145–46): he calls them secondary or derived subjects of international law. His overall conclusion is eminently realistic: "The

Soviet Union is a binding of the non-Russian Union republics to the RSFSR; the form of the tie is the (centralized) unitary state" (p. 156).

The nonjurist would add that the federation provisions of the Soviet constitution have become an issue with some dissidents. In 1961 the Ukrainian Lukianenko, a graduate of the Moscow University Law School, almost paid with his life for an attempt to test its secession provision (art. 17). That provision is taken seriously in the 1969 Program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union, in Sakharov's memorandum of March 5, 1971/June 1972, and it underlies Solzhenitsyn's letter of September 5, 1973. If Brezhnev has his way, the "Soviet people" will abolish the Union to create a single Soviet state. If Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov are the ultimate victors, Russia may once again become ethnic Russia minus the empire. For the time being, Arnold's book is a valuable legal guide to a transitory phenomenon that has endured for over fifty years.

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SOTSIAL'NAIA STRUKTURA SEL'SKOGO NASELENIIA SSSR. By
Iu. V. Arutiunian. Moscow: "Mysl'," 1971. 374 pp. 1.39 rubles.

Arutiunian begins his study with a review of attempts in the 1920s to classify the peasantry in terms of social structure, proceeds to a discussion of the necessity for collectivization, and then deals with changes that have occurred since then. Unfortunately, many of his statistical data for the USSR as a whole are based on 1959 census data, but other data, including Arutiunian's own field research (done in 1968–69), indicate that really striking change in the countryside occurred in the 1960s. Collectivization may have allowed improvements in land use and the utilization of labor, as well as increased access to cultural facilities on the part of peasants, but the impression gained from Arutiunian's work is that changes in rural areas were by no means as rapid during the thirty years following collectivization as they had been in the first decade of the Revolution and as they were during the decade of the 1960s. To take only one example: "If we compare the level of education of administrators and specialists in agriculture in the 1930s and beginning of the 1950s (up to 1953), then it is not hard to be convinced that in this respect there were no significant advances, although the general cultural level of the entire rural population increased markedly" (p. 68). From 1950 to 1954, nine million people left the villages for the cities (p. 69), a fact which had adverse effects on the development of a rural intelligentsia (insofar as an intelligentsia with a specifically rural outlook is desirable): 42 percent of the high-level specialists in Kalinin Oblast and 45 percent of those in Krasnodar Krai came from cities and worker settlements; 44 percent of those in Kalinin Oblast and 31 percent of those in Krasnodar Krai were educated primarily in urban schools (p. 279). Although the same may not be true for the Tatar ASSR, Arutiunian indicates that only 20 percent of administrators and specialists began their careers in kolkhozes, whereas more than 80 percent of the unskilled and semiskilled workers started out in kolkhozes (p. 308).

Arutiunian's book has great significance on a number of levels, some of which will be immediately apparent to those working in more than one discipline within Soviet studies. By choosing Kalinin Oblast, Krasnodar Krai, Moscow Oblast, and the Tatar ASSR from which to take statistical samples, he has been able to show