

those who are willing to plow through it, it has something to offer. And I, for one, shall look forward to Dr. Beyerly's next, and I trust more felicitous, work.

Does the Mouton press have no editorial policy and no editors?

NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY
University of California, Berkeley

RUSKAIA ARMIIA I FLOT V XIX VEKE: VOENNO-EKONOMI-
 CHESKII POTENTIAL ROSSII. By *L. G. Beskrovnyi*. Moscow:
 "Nauka," 1973. 616 pp. 2.79 rubles.

This book is encyclopedic. It covers virtually every aspect of military and naval affairs in Russia during the nineteenth century, including organization, composition, administration, strategy and tactics, logistics, the development and manufacture of weapons, transportation, communications, and military engineering. The book has over 160 tables in addition to various schematics detailing the structure of organizations associated with the armed forces. The work itself is systematically organized by topic, with each topic treated in a tightly chronological way. It is this encyclopedic format that is without a doubt the most useful aspect of the work. If one is interested, for example, in the problem of conscription in the nineteenth century, one can find on a year-to-year basis the precise number of those conscripted, the ratio of conscripts to the male population in a particular instance, and the occurrence and purposes of any special levies. The volume also contains very precise data on the weaponry of the period.

The prodigious and detailed presentation of specific information is not reflected, however, in any far-reaching analysis. The analysis that does appear is often couched in clichés and serves only to fit a particular set of facts within the standard Soviet view of history. This is to be regretted, because much of modern Russian history, particularly since the time Russia emerged as part of the European state system, must be understood in light of the problem that faced the empire in competing militarily with Western states possessing more highly developed resources and technical expertise. This competition cost Russia much and denied her the use of many of her resources for the development of her own land and people.

The national history of Russia has always been guns before butter, even to the point of excluding butter. The economically stagnant empire strained its limited resources to provide itself with the best defense force available. The Russian army, in particular, had the never-ending task of maintaining a force sufficient to defend the empire and maintain domestic order. In the nineteenth century this stress between national security and insufficient resources led to a century-long effort to provide an armed force that could be reduced to the smallest numbers possible in time of peace and rapidly mobilized into a large and effective field force in the event of war. A qualified success was achieved in this area by the Statute of 1874, but other problems remained largely unsolved.

The economic backwardness of the empire served as both cause and effect in the character of the Russian army. For example, the quality of leadership and troops was greatly reduced by inadequate education. A large part of the potentially productive labor force was siphoned off into the nonproductive armed forces, which consumed a quarter or more of the state's fiscal resources. And despite the best efforts of the underdeveloped Russian industry, weapons were always too few and often

obsolete. In the arms race of the late nineteenth century, in particular, the turnover in weaponry created great distress and dislocation in the Russian economy.

Moreover, conditions in the Russian armed forces were often dehumanizing. Dmitrii Miliutin referred to discipline before the great reforms as a system of terror. Discipline was arbitrary and wholly at the discretion of the unit commander, and training consisted largely of drill. It was only after the Crimean War that military planners began to call for training permitting more open forms of combat using skirmish lines, and theorists such as M. I. Dragomirov began to talk about achieving discipline by developing morale and fostering unit and personal pride.

Through all this, however, the Russian army remained inadequately prepared to fulfill its basic mission. Despite the rapid growth of her own economy, Russia fell increasingly behind the Western powers in industrial production. Weapons and training remained out of date. Russian society was beginning to dissolve in that slide toward revolution. The Russian army placed a greater burden on the Russian empire than it could bear, and in the conflicts of the early twentieth century it proved unable to fulfill the trust placed in it by its society.

FORRESTT A. MILLER
Vanderbilt University

A HISTORY OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET SEA POWER. By *Donald W. Mitchell*. New York: Macmillan, 1974. xxix, 657 pp. \$15.00.

In this massive volume Donald Mitchell traces the rise, fall, and resurgence of the Russian navy. The history begins in the ninth century, with an account of efforts by Varangian pirates to attack Byzantium; it ends more than one thousand years later, with a geographic survey of the present Soviet maritime position. In between, Mitchell describes in some detail the personages, building programs, and innumerable battles which form the tradition of the Russian fleets, and presumably have helped to shape the present-day Soviet conception of the role of naval power.

This is an interesting book. Mitchell writes well, and his descriptions of the various campaigns are often quite vivid. The account of the Russo-Japanese war is extremely well done, especially the story of the incredible voyage of the Russian fleet from the Baltic Sea, around Africa, and through the Indian Ocean, only to meet disaster in the Tsushima Straits (between Korea and Japan).

As a work of serious scholarship, however, the book unfortunately falls far short of the mark. Three kinds of shortcomings combine to rule out this volume as a definitive history of the Russian navy.

1. The book is marred by simple factual inaccuracies, many of which could have been avoided by more careful editing. Thus President Nixon is said to have ordered the mining of North Korean harbors in 1972, a date in the ninth century is listed as 1862, and so forth.

2. Virtually no references are given. Instead of documentation the reader is offered a brief bibliographic note for each chapter, which only lists the major sources consulted. The decision not to include adequate documentation could reflect the publisher's desire to produce a more readable and therefore more popular volume. On the other hand, Mitchell notes in his preface that the first draft was based solely on English-language sources and that foreign-language (including Russian) sources, which were used in preparing later drafts, were not fully satisfactory. Thus the lack of documentation may indicate serious shortcomings in