

nant political cultures makes post-1968 Czechoslovakia appear to be at the opposite end of the spectrum from Yugoslavia—the nation which, in the same survey, emerged as the most congenial to the citizens of Czechoslovakia.

The subtitles, “Socialism for Everyman?” in the article about Poland and “An Uneasy Stability” in the one about Hungary, suggest the authors’ difficulty in conveying the salient features that distinguish the political cultures of the two most “historic” nations of Eastern Europe. In fact, the characterizations could just as easily be reversed or applied to other countries. Does a consensus about the merits of a strictly limited partnership with the Russians provide the vital common base that unifies the official and dominant political cultures in Poland, the most important member of the Soviet bloc? Or does that distinction belong to perhaps the least important member of the bloc, Hungary, where George Schöpflin has discovered a remarkable revival of forms reminiscent of the time Francis Joseph wore the crown of Saint Stephen?

Although all of the contributors modestly stress the exploratory nature of their work and the provisional character of their findings, those findings—summed up in a brilliant final essay by Jack Gray—carry considerable weight. To the central question of how successful the strenuous Communist effort to mold a new “socialist man” has been, Gray answers that, in Eastern Europe, the experiment has been a failure, while in Cuba and China its results remain uncertain. His conclusion is as unassailable as it is devastating from the Communist point of view: whatever the changes in traditional political cultures, they have been directed more toward liberal democracy than toward the totalitarian Communist model, because “experience of Communist government has not weakened but actually strengthened the conviction among the population that political freedom brings both greater justice and greater efficiency.”

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**AUTHORITARIAN POLITICS IN COMMUNIST EUROPE: UNIFORMITY AND DIVERSITY IN ONE-PARTY STATES.** Edited by *Andrew C. Janos*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1976. xii, 196 pp. \$3.75, paper.

This volume of seven essays—three general papers and four dealing with particular groups of countries—is the fruit of a colloquium organized by Andrew C. Janos in 1973 on the “politics of change” in Communist-ruled Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union. The essays stress the factors of continuity as well as of change. The general papers, in particular, are characterized by an effort to introduce concepts that bring the discussion of Communist-governed societies closer to the general methods of social science. This effort has met with uneven success in the different contributions. Because of space constraints, my comments will be confined to the general papers.

Mr. Janos’s opening essay, “Systemic Models and the Theory of Change,” offers an ambitious matrix of different types of authoritarian regimes, but the extent to which later concepts overlap, or form subgroups of, the former is not always clear. An unfortunate example is his use of the terms “millenarian” and “chiliastic”—derived from Latin and Greek terms which refer to an identical religious or quasi-religious outlook—to denote completely different and, in fact, largely contrasting types of systems. Nevertheless, most of the distinctions thus introduced prove to be useful tools for a description of different stages in the development of different societies under Communist rule, and give rise to many sound and valuable observations. I especially appreciate Janos’s critique of the widespread notion of Stalinism as a regime of

"Thermidorian" consolidation. His essay, however, is more of a contribution to a description of change than to a *theory* of change.

In my opinion, the outstanding single paper in the volume is T. H. Rigby's fifty-page essay, "Politics in the Mono-Organizational Society." This concept, based on Rigby's earlier distinction between "traditional, market and organizational societies," and later applied in his essay in Robert C. Tucker's volume on Stalinism, seems particularly appropriate for focusing on the common features that distinguish Soviet-type systems—both in their phase of forcible, "totalitarian," transformation and in their postrevolutionary (or, in my language, "post-totalitarian") consolidation—from all systems of the Western type. Introduction of the term "mono-organizational" leads Rigby to a fruitful use of the results of organization theory. Though he gives credit to Alfred G. Meyer for having inaugurated the organizational approach to Soviet studies by his famous analogy with "USSR Inc.," Rigby avoids the major weakness of that analogy—that in a corporation the goals are given, while in the politics of any entire society they are necessarily disputed—by introducing the concepts of "goal ambiguity and conflicting standards." Beyond that, his distinction between a "mechanical" and an "organic" type of bureaucracy—with the organic type prevailing in the party hierarchy as distinct from the state machine—is highly enlightening. Rigby is, of course, very cautious concerning developmental future tendencies, perhaps because the organizational approach is less suited to illuminate ideological and value changes.

Zygmunt Baumann's interesting essay, "The Party in the System-Management Phase," is less fortunate in choice of terms but bolder in approaching the future. "System-management phase" itself is, of course, perfectly clear, but the term "party-nomial system" is a veritable monstrosity. Moreover, he attributes an arbitrary meaning to the familiar Hegelian-Marxist term "civil society." His definition—based on a French interpretation of Gramsci—explains the term as an intermediate space between the political power structure and the everyday behavior of the masses, linked by a belief system; this leads to such sentences as "all civil societies have entered the social system as ideological schemes . . ." (p. 102). But leaving language aside, Baumann is clearly concerned with the vital problems of legitimizing ideologies and value consensus, and he advances the striking thesis that the growth and semitolerance of intellectual dissent is shifting the locus of ideological activity away from the center of political power. That is, it is forcing the ruling elite to renounce its monopoly over ideology and to confine itself to intervening *ex post facto*, to truncate the ideologies produced by others. He even speaks of a *modus vivendi* between the regime and this new phenomenon. Although this seems to overstate the present situation, it is true that there are significant links between elements of the ruling elites and the main currents of the dissenting intelligentsia—both the "liberalizing" and Westernizing tendencies on the one side and the neo-Slavophile and ultranationalist ones on the other—and Mr. Baumann may well be right in pointing to these beginnings as a harbinger of future long-term developments.

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DISSENT IN THE USSR: POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, AND PEOPLE. Edited by  
*Rudolf L. Tökés*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press,  
1975. xvi, 453 pp. \$15.00.

Of all the books and articles that have appeared since 1975 on the subject of cultural dissent and the so-called "democratic movement" in the USSR, this thoughtful and far-ranging collection remains among the best. It raises some key issues: the political significance of dissent, the range of ideas, beliefs, and convictions that motivate dissident activities, the modes of communication, and what, if anything, is being accom-