chosen well, in an effort to illustrate the main topics of the book. The forty-nine tables, twenty-one graphs, and seventy-two maps alone offer enough raw information to make it an invaluable reference work for all Russian historians. One of the book's major shortcomings is the author's tendency to rely on simplistically worded diplomatic reports for descriptions of complex domestic developments such as the Revolution of 1905 or even the industrialization process itself. Given the reasonably developed character of contemporary scholarship on these subjects, one is left puzzled by the absence of any reference to such historians as Leopold Haimson, John McKay, or Theodore von Laue.

The style of the book is quite uneven. In particular, the opening chapter, devoted in part to methodological problems, is badly written. Sentences such as "the locational trends as uncovered through hypothesis testing and how individual industries fit into the overall locational scene are points of interest" (p. 11) obfuscate rather than clarify the important problems raised in the book. One should note, however, that Mr. Bater's writing style improves with each chapter. It is as if the literary traditions of St. Petersburg itself finally triumph over the technical jargon of our own epoch.

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DEFENDING AMERICA. By *Robert Conquest* et al. Introduction by *James R. Schlesinger*. New York and San Francisco: Basic Books and Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1977. xiv, 255 pp. $13.95.

This is one of several recent collections of papers and articles by what might be labeled the alarmist camp—those who see a "present danger" in Soviet-American relations, who view détente as a measure of American utopianism engendered by either naïveté or the trauma of Vietnam or domestic chaos, and who perceive the Soviet Union (in James Schlesinger's words, in the preface to this volume) as a power animated by a "revolutionary zeal from which still flow[s] the motivating force behind Soviet policies. . . ." This volume presents an impressive barrage of heavy artillery by such figures as Robert Conquest, Theodore Draper, Paul Nitze, and Paul Seabury, over the imprimatur of Senator Henry Jackson.

More surprising, perhaps, than the fact that the quality of contributions varies greatly and that many (but not all) are strident and more polemical than substantial, is the somewhat perfunctory quality of most arguments: the authors have no doubt been through this exercise many times before, have argued the same points and responded to the counterarguments so often that it is unfair and futile to expect anything new. Except for the technically complex and competent arguments (be they right or wrong) by Albert Wohlstetter in the strategic realm and by Gregory Grossman in the economic, the basic lines of the argument are not only predictable but, in this reader's conviction, based on a profound misunderstanding of Soviet-American relations.

Some, like Schlesinger, insist that the Soviet view of détente is substantially the same as their view of the Cold War, and that this supports his belief in the "persistence" of Soviet strategy and tactics based on "deep-seated ideological convictions." Others, like Eugene Rostow, find expansionism "deeply embedded in the Russian mind. . . . The Czars never stopped pushing toward the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, as well as toward the Balkans, the Baltic, Korea, and Afghanistan. . . ." The sketches abound in references to the Mongol heritage, the "despotic" culture, with Russianness and communism reinforcing each other. As Robert Conquest asserts, "the Soviet rulers are the product of a long tradition. . . . They are not to be converted to new ideas by argument; hardly by experience." Even those who are not absorbed

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in the study of Marxism-Leninism "are nevertheless soaked in that tradition and *determined* by it" (italics added). Their outlook is likewise predetermined: "They are unable to abandon the world claims intrinsic to their whole psychology."

Given such simplistic and loaded assumptions, it becomes unnecessary for the contributors to dwell in any detail on what Soviet policy actually is or might be. Most of the authors show remarkably little knowledge of Soviet affairs. What comes across is a highly schematic, formalistic view of the "Russian threat," which feeds the pervasive insecurity that informs this volume.

Underlying many of the papers is a sense of the West as surrounded, isolated, beleaguered, outwitted, degenerate, and losing. In turn, the Soviet Union is seen as possessing hidden resources, allies, reserves, and skills. Secret cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Third World is taken for granted. There is a fear of American businessmen and politicians succumbing to the lure of Soviet trade. In a characteristic borrowing of Soviet assumptions ("there is no accident") even trivia (such as a silly Polish-Mongolian friendship treaty) assume ominous significance. A casual reader of this collection would scarcely realize that Portugal and Chile did not in fact go communist; that Soviet strategy in the non-Western world, from Indonesia to Egypt, has suffered major setbacks; that there was no bandwagon or domino effect of the events in Indochina in 1975; that Communist states such as Vietnam and Cambodia are not Soviet satellites but are in fact fighting each other.

A characteristic scenario is presented by Eugene Rostow: "Starting in the 1950s the Soviets chose a Middle Eastern strategy as their principal means to the end of conquering Western Europe." In this scheme Egypt is logically described as a "Soviet proxy, ally, and satellite," and Soviet efforts to envelop Europe from the south are pursued "with great skill." Meanwhile, we learn, the "Arab states have turned to the Soviet Union for help in order to destroy Israel."

The caricature continues in all earnestness with a new domino theory: "If we are driven from Europe and the Mediterranean . . . China and Japan would necessarily make their own accommodations with the Soviet Union and we would be alone in an ominous world." Images of Britain A.D. 1940, appeasement of 1938 vintage, and containment à la 1947 abound. These images also shape the nostalgic perception of Paul Nitze, who quotes extensively from his own writings of a simpler age. His arguments are essentially familiar—his piece is reprinted from *Foreign Policy*, as is the Wohlstetter chapter—insisting on (1) the Soviet edge in "throw-weight" (a measure whose adequacy has been seriously challenged by other American analysts, on various quantitative, as well as qualitative, grounds); and (2) the Soviet advantage in "survivability" after a nuclear exchange, a most problematic contingency based largely on taking at face value the formal expectations of Soviet civil defense doctrine (a proposition widely contested by others acquainted with both the reality of Soviet civil defense preparations and Soviet operational assumptions in decision making).

Fortunately, not all contributors make their task as facile as Robert Conquest does. He argues that "the human rights issue remains the key test of their animus against *us*, a test of the basic motivations of their foreign policy." By defining the problem of détente in such a way as to make human rights within the Soviet Union "the one true criterion of progress to peace," he assures a situation in which "progress toward peace" is precluded, Q.E.D. Other authors limit themselves to the more innocent and justified fun of pointing to the plethora of conflicting definitions of détente, a sport which readily shows that the Nixon administration promised or expected too much and that Henry Kissinger oversold détente, which (the argument is familiar) has in any case worked to Moscow's advantage.

While some of the presentations—such as those by Gregory Grossman and Walter Laqueur (with whom I disagree rather seriously)—are competent and deserve attention, the political implications are all of one sort: a call for eternal vigilance. It is

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troublesome here to see a series of propositions made by authors who seem to be certain that they have all the answers: if any of them harbors any doubts, this never becomes apparent. Seeing the world in Manichean terms, with the world of goodness pitted against that of evil, they monochromatically tend to ignore such questions as what may legitimately bother "the other side" about the United States and its allies; whether the record of Soviet failures and "muddling through" does not belie the assumptions of diabolical purposefulness; and what the assumption of a worst-case scenario may do about conjuring up self-fulfilling prophecies.

More specifically, with regard to Soviet reality, there is a consistent failure throughout this volume to recognize any diversity of Soviet perceptions and operational objectives, any evolution or conflicts, any Soviet mind sets or arguments which —however widely held—cannot be publicly spelled out in Moscow because they imply a clash with the "classics" of Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet learning process and emancipation from "ideological blinders" have been gradual and uneven, but they have been real. To say that nothing essential has changed since the Cold War (let alone the "Mongol yoke") is both to misread the present and to prejudice the future.

The world, as it emerges from these pages, is a simple one; the theme is given by the title and subtitle of the book: the need for "defending America" in a post-détente world. Hence, we are told more about one strand of current American perceptions than about the real world.

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THE TROUBLED DÉTENTE. By *Albert L. Weeks*. Introduction by *Gene Sosin*. New York: New York University Press, 1976. xxiv, 190 pp.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND DÉTENTE. Foreword by *General Andrew J. Goodpaster*. With contributions by faculty members of the U.S. Army War College. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1976. xxiv, 360 pp. $10.00, cloth. $6.95, paper.

Books and articles dealing with definitions, history, complexities, and prospects of "détente" continue to flow off the presses. The term "détente," at one time fairly precise in its meaning in international diplomacy—a reduction or relaxation in tensions between nations—has come to be used to encompass almost all aspects of contemporary international politics. It has little descriptive or analytical utility left, but remains convenient as shorthand in the discussion of the ramifications of East-West relations. Writers of the most diverse qualifications and from many academic disciplines participate in the discussion, with specialists in Soviet affairs perhaps the least numerous among them. The two volumes under review are examples of the many studies currently available.

Albert L. Weeks approaches the subject from the perspective of a Soviet specialist. He traces largely familiar aspects of Soviet doctrine on relations with capitalist countries from Lenin to the mid-1970s. His emphasis is on continuing, underlying elements, though he notes fluctuations in operational Soviet policies over the decades. One of his theses, that substantial shifts in Soviet policy toward the West were evident at the time of Stalin's death twenty-five years ago, has been previously explored in greater detail by other scholars, notably by Marshall Shulman. Nevertheless, Weeks's book provides a useful if selective updating through the Twenty-fifth Party Congress. It suffers somewhat from its concentration on the Soviet view and from a lack of judgment concerning the success or failure of Soviet purposes. The discussion of American policy choices, found toward the end of the book, is relatively

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