

rately to appraise the potentialities of the Yugoslav economy. This may be the consequence more of political reaction to Yugoslavia, especially by some European countries with significant influence over Yugoslavia's external markets. In effect, the cyclical movements may be surface manifestations of more fundamental factors, which may be largely political. The country's institutional arrangements and policies are by no means blameless in compounding these surface manifestations into serious problems. As a minimum they should be more flexible in accommodating and facilitating Yugoslavia's rapid economic development. Something similar occurred during the first part of the nineteenth century in the United States, especially during the turbulent 1830s and early 1840s when the country was the recipient of large but erratic capital imports. At that time there was also concern among some Europeans about whether, in fact, the United States was a viable political entity.

GEORGE MACESICH  
*Florida State University*

BETWEEN OLD AND NEW: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE UNDER SULTAN SELIM III, 1789–1807. By *Stanford J. Shaw*. Harvard Middle Eastern Studies, 15. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. xiii, 535 pp. \$15.00.

The Ottoman Empire was before all else an Orthodox Sunni Muslim state in the eyes of those who shaped and directed its destiny. The leaders regarded as their chief task to extend the realm of Islam over previously "hostile" lands until finally, in accordance with the will of Allah, the entire world would follow the true path. While difficulties within the state began much earlier, the fiction that it was fulfilling its destiny could be maintained until 1699, when for the first time the Ottoman Empire had to yield Muslim-ruled territory to the enemy. The following eighteenth century was, from all points of view, the most critical and least satisfactory in Ottoman history, forcing even the ultraconservative ruling elements to admit that something was wrong.

Before this realization could be converted into action, a man had to ascend the throne who shared this conviction and had some basic knowledge of events both at home and abroad and the moral conviction and courage to act. This man was Sultan Selim III. Professor Shaw, one of the best contemporary Ottoman scholars, is finally doing what should have been done a long time ago—a study in depth of the "reform period" beginning with the rule of Selim III. The volume before us is the first in a series that Shaw proposes to produce dealing with the Ottoman reformers. It includes, quite properly, the short reactionary reign of Sultan Mustafa IV, representing the last successful attempt to block a development that had become inevitable.

Selim III faced incredible odds. His rule coincided with the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars; the Serb Revolt broke out toward the end of his reign; he faced the determined opposition of the great majority of those in office whose help he needed; and the bureaucratic and especially technological obsolescence of his state forced him to start building new institutions from scratch. The author is not only fully cognizant of these and numerous lesser difficulties, but has investigated and explained them all. The research that made this detailed analysis possible would amaze the reader if he had not come to expect this kind of scholarship and thoroughness from Professor Shaw. Equally impressive is the manner in which this massive re-

search was transformed into well-reasoned and well-documented explanations. Like his previous works, this latest effort will represent the final word on the subject for a long time to come.

*Between Old and New* does not deal with the "life and times" of Selim III, but is devoted almost entirely to the problems the times created for a man who intended to introduce drastic change. This is the only feature of the book that leaves this reviewer slightly dissatisfied. Selim III and the others move through the pages like marionettes across the stage. We learn little about them as human beings—about their motivations, their reactions to failure and success. Although the events that took place and in which they participated have been masterfully explained, these people still remain largely unknown and incomprehensible if we wish to understand them not as representatives of interest groups but as individuals. Despite this reservation, the student of Ottoman history must be more than grateful for having this volume at his disposal and can look ahead with great expectations to the next one that will continue the story of Ottoman reform.

PETER F. SUGAR

*University of Washington*

THAT GREECE MIGHT STILL BE FREE: THE PHILHELLENES IN THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. By *William St. Clair*. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972. x, 412 pp. \$14.95.

Unlike earlier accounts of Philhellenism, which are generally limited in scope, this well-developed study investigates the entire movement. As a literary and political current, Philhellenism came to serve varied purposes for different people, and eventually the Greek War of Independence attracted over 1,100 foreign volunteers with diverse backgrounds, motivations, expectations, and ambitions. Offering lively passages with colorful anecdotal material, St. Clair skillfully analyzes the complex composition of the Philhellenes, who ranged from romantic idealists and officers of proven ability to adventurers and frauds.

The author is best, however, at describing the clash of "European" and "Eastern" cultures. Idealistic persons naturally sense extreme frustration when the causes they advocate do not maintain their preconceived values or image. In this case, the highly motivated Philhellenes had to cope with the mysterious Greeks, who resembled their Turkish overlords more than their classical forebears, so much revered by European societies living to the west of Greece. The foreign volunteers witnessed the poorly disciplined Greek troops using hit-and-run tactics and an illogical plan of battle, which frequently ended in atrocities committed on both the enemy forces and the defenseless civilian populations. The Greeks, in turn, mocked the Europeans' reliance on trained infantry lined up for systematic rifle fire, generally ineffective on the country's irregular terrain. The cultural incompatibility between Philhellenes and Greeks resulted in mutual scorn, limited cooperation for the development of the revolutionary armies, and disasters on the battlefield. Europeanized Greeks among the national leadership faced similar problems in relations with their countrymen. Those disenchanted Philhellenes who survived and returned to their homelands had difficulty publicizing their unfortunate experiences, largely because the romantic preconceptions of Greece's rebirth and gallant struggle proved too strong and fashionable to contest. And where idealistic Philhellenes faltered in the attempt to advance the cause of the Greek rebels during the war's earlier stages,