

considered defenders of Orthodoxy in the East, Russia's national interests were focused on the Balkan Christians, whose numbers and geographic location made them the natural allies of the expanding Russian Empire. The Orthodox population of Syria and Palestine, whether Greek or Arab, was of relatively little importance, and the attraction of the various holy shrines was somewhat diminished by the presence of rival claimants—the Catholic and Protestant churches.

The story of Russia's halfhearted attempts to establish her presence in Syria and Palestine is devoid of drama and of major significance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whether under the Anglican Nesselrode or the Orthodox Gorchakov, pursued a policy of caution. Only a few individuals at court and in the scholarly community developed an interest in establishing Russian church missions, schools, and pilgrim houses in the Holy Land. The intrigues and struggles incidental to the appearance of the Russians there were mostly those of Russian church agents against the Greeks. The energies of the various representatives of St. Petersburg were spent largely in fencing with the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem. The Turks watched the scene with customary apprehension, while the European powers were, as usual, "alarmed."

Derek Hopwood has produced a thorough study of a minor topic, showing that Russia's involvement in Palestine was minimal. The main interest of his book lies in the chapters on the Orthodox Arabs. Here he breaks new ground. The attachment of Orthodox Arabs to Russia comes as a surprise. Their sympathy for Russia in the Russo-Japanese War is unexpected and stands in sharp contrast with the pro-Japanese sentiments of the Muslims. Mr. Hopwood's use of Arabic sources and the attention he pays to the Arabs enhance the value of his study. More careful editing would have eliminated stylistic infelicities and certain peculiarities of transliteration (such as "Kruschev").

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DAS DEUTSCHE KAPITAL IN RUSSLAND, 1850–1894. By Joachim Mai.
Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1970. 255 pp. DM 35.

This advanced doctoral dissertation (*Habilitationsschrift*) uses German foreign investment as a focus for a broad re-examination of Russo-German economic diplomacy and economic relations under capitalism. Such rethinking of the origins of the friendly cooperation presently existing between the Soviet Union and the (East) German Democratic Republic will further strengthen that cooperation, since it "exposes the motivating force of the German ruling classes in the policy of profit, theft, and conquest vis-à-vis the neighboring eastern peoples in the second half of the nineteenth century" and absolves—at least implicitly—the German people as a whole to some extent. This class-based aggression is clearly seen in the areas of politico-commercial negotiations and foreign investment, both of which are examined in detail.

Although the discussion of commercial negotiations is adequate, the work must stand or fall on the investigation of German capital. The treatment here is a continuous listing of loans, firms, and entrepreneurs with short comments or histories of each. Considering Mai's two years in the Soviet Union, his use of archives there and in East Germany, and his thorough use of printed sources, the results are rather meager. With the possible exceptions of banking operations and railroad loans, there is little evidence to support claims of superseding earlier monographs,

particularly Ischchanian's "petit bourgeois" study, *Die ausländischen Elemente in der russischen Volkswirtschaft* (1913) or B. F. Brandt's *Inostrannye kapitaly* (1898–1901). The private banking houses in the capitals, the tariff factories in Poland, and the German pre-eminence in the chemical and electrical industries, for example—all this may be found elsewhere. One interesting finding, which was not developed, was that most German investment originated before 1876 through the financing of German exports of equipment used to build Russian railroads. But generally one is almost tempted to say that, as far as previous work such as Ischchanian's is concerned, only the conclusions have changed.

In short, this conscientiously researched and conveniently accessible summary adds little that is new or important except its Marxist point of view.

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THE JAPANESE OLIGARCHY AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. By *Shumpei Okamoto*. Studies of the East Asian Institute. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970. xi, 358 pp. \$12.00.

Professor Okamoto does a solid, effective, and interesting job in tracing Japan's oligarchic policy-making in the decision to go to war with Russia, and in the kind of terms that would have to be accepted at the Portsmouth peace conference. He also raises some larger questions regarding the dilemma of making foreign policy in a modern Japan faced with the limitations and weaknesses implicit in such an oligarchic society, and argues that its very success in 1904–5 led to eventual disaster and defeat in the 1940s. It is a measure of the depth and success of the study that such questions are asked, and though I might not necessarily agree with the author's conclusions, the problems raised are stimulating and fascinating.

Specifically, the author describes in detail, with thorough documentation, the structure of the oligarchy involved in foreign policy and the conflict between a strong and chauvinistic public opinion, expressed by political activists and the press, and the more cautious government oligarchs who refused to divulge anything, but made the actual decisions for war and peace in strictest secrecy. The resultant credibility gap produced enormous shock and dismay in Japan when the Portsmouth terms were announced. Domestic repercussions included a violent press campaign and came to a climax in the Hibiya Park peace riots, which were triggered by injudicious police actions.

The conclusions of this quite impressive book are that the realistic and flexible secret decisions of the fourteen-man oligarchy in 1904–5 (the emperor, five Genro, five cabinet ministers, three top military leaders) not only totally disregarded public opinion but also created a precedent in policy-making which could not be repeated as the Genro leaders faded away and the later generation of Japanese leaders lacked the caution and realism to withstand the clamor of the chauvinistic ultra-nationalists in the 1930s.

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