

## REPLY

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Judging from his comments, Martin Weinstein has modified or changed some of the positions he took in his book, *Uruguay: The Politics of Failure*. Simultaneously, he protests my critical review that challenged these same positions. But he cannot expect to have things both ways.

Although Weinstein complains that I interpreted his views on Uruguayan ruralism and corporatism literally (would he prefer allegorical interpretations?), his book did acknowledge, not surprisingly, that ruralism “was rooted in the countryside” (p. 48) and did explain corporatism as “the centuries old falangist (corporatist) ideal of a society built upon and regulated through the functional operation of its essential pillars or sectors” (p. 134). His book did conclude that rural-based corporatism had triumphed in Uruguay. On this conclusion my review pointed out: (1) that two conflicting elements within the post-1973 military coup government—its adherence to a free market economy and its authoritarianism—“do not fit easily into a corporatist framework” (this is somewhat different from what Weinstein has the review saying and it is correct, unless he has changed his understanding of corporatism); (2) that the book exaggerated the centrality of ruralism in Uruguayan politics; and (3) that this exaggeration caused Weinstein to expect post-1973 coup government economic policies that have not come to pass.

*Uruguay: The Politics of Failure* argued, “After two years in power and with the added prodding of the oil crisis, it appears that the Uruguayan military and supporting civilian interests are prepared to abandon any meaningful attempt to modernize the industrial sector. Rather the image of an agrarian state has an ever increasing hold on the imagination of the leadership. As these men see it, the future is an Uruguay that is one big estancia [ranch] importing its industrial needs from its northern neighbor, i.e., Uruguay as an agrarian client state of Brazil” (pp. 135–36). Weinstein’s comment no longer argues that government economic policy aims at making Uruguay one big ranch. Instead, he argues that nontraditional exports do not have enough labor in them. Other objections to government economic policies could be made—that they have depressed real wages and failed to stem emigration or control inflation. But the review’s point still stands: Weinstein’s exaggeration of the centrality of ruralism made him expect economic policies narrower than those actually in effect, a point reinforced by the recent Uruguayan construction boom based on Argentine capital and tourism.

The comment claims that the population figures I cited in the review

really confirm the book's explanation that Batlle's early twentieth-century politics were immigrant based. They do not. *Uruguay: The Politics of Failure* explained Batlle's political success on his channeling into the Colorado Party "the huge influx of immigrants in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth" (p. 20). I responded that there was no huge influx of immigrants, that both as percentages of total population and absolutely, there were fewer immigrants in Uruguay and in Montevideo during the Batlle era than before. I went on: "Immigrants were a presence (the Colorado Party played the Hymn to Garibaldi at party meetings) but most of them preferred not to become citizens because foreigners were exempt from the National Guard dragnet during civil wars." The comment no longer mentions a huge influx of immigrants and doesn't challenge my statement that most immigrants then did not take part in politics. Why then is the presence of substantial numbers of immigrants in Montevideo proof that Batlle's politics were immigrant based?

I did not fault *Uruguay: The Politics of Failure* for insufficient use of primary sources. I said that Weinstein "was wrong to believe that, though the period was poorly researched, his methodology could overcome his reliance on secondary sources, many of them polemics for positions different from his own." The book does rely on secondary sources. Let me take as an example the chapter on ideology (his comment uses the phrase "idea-systems"): 80 percent of the footnotes cite secondary sources. My review did state that Weinstein made "factual errors in describing early electoral laws and later political personalities" but that such errors did "not fundamentally change the process Weinstein describes." Let me now offer examples. It was not the 1904 electoral law (p. 56) but the 1897 electoral law that first provided minority representation; the 1910 electoral law did not reach "effective proportional representation" in Montevideo and Canelones (p. 57). In Montevideo, the most voted party would get at least two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies even if it had only a plurality, the second most voted party would get from one-third to one-twelfth of the seats, and other parties would get no seats. In the 1938 election (p. 75), Alfredo Baldomir was President Terra's brother-in-law not his son-in-law; the other Colorado candidate was not Eduardo Acevedo Díaz (the novelist and one-time Nationalist leader who had died in 1921) but Eduardo Blanco Acevedo, who was Terra's *consuegro* not his father-in-law.

Weinstein's comment claims that my treatment of his book's dedication was particularly disturbing and out of context. I believe that someone who dedicates a book "To Ruth and the Tupamaros . . . Two Forms of Love" wants readers to know it. I did not find in the book's analysis the conclusion that the Tupamaros were partly responsible for the destruction of democracy in Uruguay. I am sure that the dispassionate reader will find, as I did, that the book's discussion of the Tupamaros is consistent with its dedication.