

the problems involved in handling data forthrightly acknowledged. While considerations of space preclude an appraisal of each case study in the book, a few general observations about their success in upholding the impressive degree of analytical rigor in the first chapter are in order.

One notes that although individual contributors offer numerous insights into events in their areas of specialization, similar depth is lacking in their review of trends and developments within the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Perhaps as a direct consequence of this nominal attention to factors shaping Moscow's and Peking's policies, fluctuations in the nature of superpower-developing state (or A-B) relationships are largely attributed to shifts in the goals and interests of the dependent state. A more thorough examination of Soviet and Chinese literature dealing with the areas discussed in the book would have added a dimension and balance which are largely lacking. Where such an analysis is undertaken, as in the chapters by Drs. Bettie and Oles Smolansky and Dr. George Ginsburgs, the persuasiveness of the authors' arguments is greatly enhanced. Furthermore, as noted by the editor, a thorough exploration of more general material, such as joint communiqués and key press statements, would presumably furnish indicators of perceptual and attitude changes. But such materials were untapped by most of the contributors. Consequently, the demanding task of delving into the elusive, speculative, and, at the same time, intriguing topic of attitude change as a basic determinant of influence awaits further study.

ILANA AND NORMAN KASS
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

THE BOKARO STEEL PLANT: A STUDY OF SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. By *Padma Desai*. Amsterdam and New York: North-Holland Publishing Company and American Elsevier Publishing Company, 1972. xviii, 108 pp. \$9.75, paper.

Padma Desai courageously ventures into a field where almost all economists now fear to tread: political economy and the proper technological choice as a key aspect of economic development. Her daring foray is successful.

As in the case of the Aswan Dam, the United States first considered construction of the enormous Bokaro iron and steel plant, opted out, and the Russians stepped in. "The Soviet Union has traditionally managed to secure generous returns on its aid program in India by 'doing what the West would not do,' especially in the areas of heavy industry and oil. However, in the case of the Bokaro Steel plant, it landed itself into a tricky and novel situation. By the time aid negotiations for the steel plant were initiated, India had already reached a stage of technological maturity so that local expertise in designing and constructing steel plants was available. Indeed, the prestigious firm of M. N. Dastur and Company was actively associated with the early planning of the project and had the competence to assess critically the proposed Soviet designs; it was, however, muscled out by the Soviet negotiators from the final aid-contract to the chagrin of an articulate and aroused public opinion cutting across most political parties" (p. xi).

The author believes that the Russians should have permitted the Indian firm, Dastur and Company, to play an important role in planning, equipping, and constructing the plant, instead of insisting on a turnkey project with minimal Indian participation. On the other hand, Dastur, although knowledgeable, had never undertaken a large steel project, and the record of Indian participation in the construction and operation of public sector steel plants was disastrous, as William Johnson showed in *The Steel Industry of India* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966). Furthermore, the completely Russian, turnkey Bhilai steel plant, which the Soviets had built for the Indians, was generally con-

sidered to be very successful. Under such circumstances one cannot blame the Russians for avoiding the risks of partnership.

M. GARDNER CLARK
Cornell University

SOVIET SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE. By *Linda L. Lubrano*. Columbus, Ohio: American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1976. vi, 102 pp. Paper.

This slim volume, appearing under the auspices of the AAASS, fills a gap with its survey of Soviet writings on *naukovedenie* (the science of science) and in somewhat more detail on Soviet sociology of science. The latter is defined as part of the study although occasionally the science of science and sociology of science seem to be synonymous.

Linda Lubrano has read very widely in the field and provides a clear account. This is essentially a work of reportage rather than of criticism. Lubrano rather cautiously interposes her own opinions—which always express good sense—from time to time.

Although the author claims that “the Marxian paradigm provides a philosophical perspective for a wide variety of subjects and opinions” (p. 7), the majority of writers cited apparently hold views that are fairly near to each other, despite distinctions of approach and emphasis. Dissenters such as Sakharov are out on a limb. The skewed distribution allows one to suppose that published material does not reflect accurately the spectrum of views actually held: works which receive the imprimatur have followed the official line. Presumably for this reason, a few rather incontrovertible propositions are offered: for example, that “greater efficiency in the organization of science will raise its productivity” (p. 69). This kind of obviousness helps to explain why the research carried out by Soviet scholars within their politically predetermined frame of reference helps to organize, rather than stimulate, thinking about the subject.

The selected bibliography includes Mikulinskii both under his last name and under Chlen-Korrespondent Akademii Nauk SSSR; and such titles as Rostov State University and Ural State University are Americanizations of the Russian originals.

Altogether, this volume provides a good description of a burgeoning activity, the results of which will help to shape Soviet scientific efforts.

RAYMOND HUTCHINGS
Croydon, England

HEALTH CARE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. By *Michael Kaser*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976. vi, 278 pp. \$30.00.

Health care has emerged, in the post-World War II period, as a major political, ideological, and financial issue the world over. The promise and the guarantee of universal access to health care at no direct cost at the time of use is part of the platform and program of every nation of the Comecon as a “civic right,” as Michael Kaser puts it in this pioneering, important, and fact-filled study.

It is a pendant to an earlier study by Alan Maynard, *Health Care in the European Community* (1975). It provides basic and indispensable information on the health services available to 9 percent of the world population, roughly 360 million people. It details the experience of sixty years of Soviet “socialized medicine,” and the thirty years of experience for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. Albania and China, which were dropped from Comecon, and Cuba and Mongolia, which joined it, do not figure in the study, the latter because they are outside Europe.