

DIE HABSBURGERMONARCHIE, 1848-1918. Vol. 1: DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHE ENTWICKLUNG. Edited by *Alois Brusatti*. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973. xxii, 666 pp.

The idea to have the history of the Habsburg Monarchy between 1848 and 1918 written by various scholars from different nations dates back to the early fifties and was inspired originally by a project of the Rockefeller Foundation to study the problems of multinational federations in view of the planned European Community. Carried on under the auspices of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, the giant task is laid out to comprise nine volumes covering the economic, social, geographical, political, and cultural aspects of the subject. Recently the first volume, containing thirteen essays dealing with the economic development, was published.

The first essay on the position of the Monarchy in the world economy (by N. T. Gross) gives the cue for the main subjects debated in most of the following studies: the peculiar fact of the relatively slow economic growth and the striking regional disparities within the Habsburg Empire. The authors offer exhaustive explanations for the "nonspurlike development" which entailed a considerable lagging behind compared with Germany and other European powers at the end of the period under review. Of the numerous reasons tracked down, the multinational character of the Monarchy might be somewhat overvalued.

It is true that from the 1880s much energy was absorbed by the escalation of the nationality conflict. While the unification of the fatherland and industrialization were complementary goals of nationalist policies in Germany, the Monarchy lacked this impetus to economic integration. But precisely in the period of deteriorating relations between the various nations of the Dual Monarchy, between 1880 and 1913, the rates of industrial growth in the empire were at their highest and comparable to those of other developed European countries (see R. L. Rudolph's essay in this volume).

The growing particularism fostered regional aspirations for autarchy. After the *Ausgleich* of 1867, Hungary regarded independent industrialization as essential in her struggle for political autonomy. Yet less than one-third of the Monarchy took part in industrial progress. Tremendous income disparities between the various regions diminished the advantage of the allegedly huge interior market. A regional development policy of the central government practically did not exist.

Had it not been for particularism, the industrialization of Hungary would not have proceeded at its astonishing pace. With a growth rate of industrial production amounting to an average of 6 percent a year in the period investigated, a remarkable exploitation of natural resources, and the establishment of heavy industry (which had begun to supply the Balkans with machinery), the Hungarian development from the sixties to the First World War is a fine example of the efficiency of a vigorous national industrialization policy.

In the essay dealing with Hungary in particular (by I. T. Berend and György Ránki, Budapest), the retarding influence to the Hungarian economy because it could not develop within the setting of a politically independent state is, in my opinion, overrated. The authors themselves stress the importance of the Monarchy's common market for Hungarian agricultural sales and financing industrial development. Under political independence, up to 1937, compared with 1913, gross industrial output in the postwar territory rose in real value by a little over

1 percent per year—not very impressive, even if we take into account war, territorial losses, and the world economic crisis (see Frederick Hertz, *The Economic Problem of the Danubian States*, London, 1947).

The book offers a thorough analysis of all essential aspects of economic growth: the development of industry and agriculture, the role of banking and the formation of a modern transport system, the rise of the entrepreneur, the structure of trade, and the problems of fiscal policy. The editors regret that some foreign contributors were not in a position to keep their promises (a hint at the delicate character of collaboration with scholars from the other side of the Iron Curtain?).

Most of the essays are amply furnished with statistics and charts. Three maps (by H. Matis and K. Bachinger) show the distribution of jobs and branches of industry. An extensive index makes this praiseworthy compilation of outstanding studies also a highly valuable reference book henceforth indispensable for anybody interested in the modern history of "Mitteleuropa."

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A NEMZETŐRSÉG ÉS HONVÉDSÉG SZERVEZÉSE 1848 NYARÁN
[The Creation of the National Guard and of the Honvéd Army in the Summer of 1848]. By *Aladár Urbán*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1973. 426 pp. + 8 pp. plates. 83 Ft.

In the spring of 1848, Hungary was granted virtual independence within the Habsburg realm. With her own ministries of finance and war, and with the beginnings of a diplomatic service, she was preparing to shed anything more than a mere personal union with the rest of the Monarchy. Since, however, the authority of the Hungarian war minister over the regular troops stationed in Hungary, and over Hungarian regiments stationed outside the country, was rather doubtful, it became imperative for the new Hungarian government to create an armed force ready to protect the bourgeois national revolution. National Guard companies had at first been formed spontaneously in the Hungarian cities; then they had been expanded rapidly and efficiently by Prime Minister Lajos Batthyány. He was able to turn the voluntary movement into a nationwide obligation and to put the National Guard under his own authority. Officers and NCO's were lured from the imperial-royal army. In opposition to older Marxist historiography, Professor Urbán argues that Batthyány's swift action was due not only to his desire to prevent massive proletarian and peasant uprisings but also to his determination to make Hungary truly self-governing. Nor was the National Guard a consequence of unrest among the non-Magyar nationalities: when the Guard was created, the nationalities had still been quiet. Yet the Guard system did not quite achieve its purpose. The peasants generally disliked their new obligation, and increasingly so did the non-Magyar nationalities. The Guard was organized on a county basis, and the Guardsmen were determined to fight only within the narrow confines of their homeland.

When the Serbs revolted, in the summer of 1848, Guard units were engaged to serve against them for only four weeks. Poorly armed Guardsmen created nothing but trouble, and many headed for home soon after arriving at the front. Fortunately for Hungary, Batthyány had already set up special mobile Guard battalions ready to serve for the duration. More important, in May 1848 a regular