

up in the revolutionaries' romantic self-portraits of their steadfast solidarity for their cause. Most political exiles in the late tsarist era, as Sarah Badcock has recently shown, were more concerned on a day-to-day basis with finding food to survive than with their revolutionary dreams.

The Siberian exile system, like all grand state enterprises, was shaped by the interplay between ideas and reality. Beer wonderfully documents how exiles' lives hinged on the whims of local officials and how corruptible they were. Exiles themselves reshaped and undermined the system by petitioning the state or simply fleeing. Beer argues that it was the space and administrative weakness in exile that helped to subvert the system by leaving the exiles, especially the political convicts, alone. Even as the bell of Uglich returned home from exile in 1892, the Russian government doubled down on the Siberian deportation system for political criminals. It did not work, as prisoners boldly rebelled against the tsarist state and gained national and even international sympathy. Siberian exile had gone from a sign of state power to a sign of its weakness. The author aptly presents Siberia as a metaphor for the whole of tsarist Russia. The exile system began with the promise of building future wealth and expanding state power but, by the early twentieth century, it was clearly doomed to fail. The exiles, themselves literary and philosophical writers, painted Siberian exile as part of the inhumane despotic autocracy.

The House of the Dead builds upon recent scholarship in Russian studies on space and power, colonization, and penology. Beers especially draws up on the ideas of Edward Said (orientalism) and Michel Foucault (discipline and punishment), but the theoretical ideas are implied rather than explicitly stated. He ends, understandably, in 1917 and the decree to stop state exile to Siberia. Does this mean that the Siberian exile system was an archaic legacy and that liberal criticism of the inhumane nature of the exile system prevailed? Beer notes in his epilogue that under the Bolsheviks deportation to Siberia became far worse, with "the ruthless exploitation of convict labor on an industrial scale justified by the need for a 'purification of society' and by the prospect of 'individual rehabilitation'" (376). Beer may, or may not, be arguing that the Bolsheviks took up the liberal critiques and made the Siberian exile system into a modern form of punishment. A study of the interconnected stories of liberating journeys home by exiles, the emergence of Soviet penology, and the administrative transformation of Siberian exile into the brutal gulag system still needs to be written. Beer's wonderful book sets the path and is sure to inspire a new group of scholars to pursue the topic. The House of the Dead is a thought provoking and important study of Siberian exile that will certainly become a classic in our field.

AARON B. RETISH  
Wayne State University

***A Prison without Walls? Eastern Siberian Exile in the Last Years of Tsarism.***

Sarah Badcock. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016. xv, 195 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Figures. Maps. \$95.00, hard bound.

doi: 10.1017/slr.2018.45

Sarah Badcock focuses on the experiences of criminal and political exiles in eastern Siberia during the years 1905–17. Her evidence comes from central archives and the regional archives of the Republic of Tatarstan, the Sakha Republic, Irkutsk Region, Nizhegorod Region, and the Russian Far East (Primor'ye, Khabarovsk, and Blagoveshchensk). Despite her disclaimer that she has written a "messy history" of a "kaleidoscopic set of experiences (178)," some theses emerge.

First is her apt description of the Russian Empire as “a shabby and shaggy beast, which did not know its population effectively” (4). While the state situated its criminals into deceptively precise categories in its central records, it soon lost track of them after they arrived in eastern Siberia to complete their sentences. Fully 43% of exiles sent to Irkutsk region alone were unaccounted for in 1913. The state did not know where those 31,043 exiles were; they were listed as having “run away” or being “absent without explanation” (130). Criminals serving a hard labor (*katorga*) sentence were easier to track. Exiles, however, received state support so inadequate that they moved constantly around their assigned exile regions in search of work or loot to feed themselves. Badcock’s examination of the material reality of impoverished exiles supports her conclusions about the “shabbiness” of a state whose stinginess and bungling led to “incidental and arbitrary suffering (177)” for the majority. Her conclusion that exiles became “a significant burden” on the locales where they landed (106) is convincing.

These conclusions are at odds with the more romanticized view of Siberian exile available in memoirs of political exiles of an earlier generation. Badcock’s periodization of the exile experience comprises a second argument. She historicizes eastern Siberian exile by tracking changes in penal regulations, the size and composition (political and criminal) of the exile population, and the experiences of exile. She identifies the revolutionary events of 1905–7 as a major turning point. Policies hardened, political exiles’ experiences worsened, and the exile population surged. Badcock reports an “exponential increase in the number of *katorga* prisoners” in the empire as a whole, from 6,123 in 1905 to 31,748 in 1915, with the majority of hard labor prisons being in Siberia (24). Meanwhile, arrests of participants in workers’ actions and political disturbances in 1905–7 created a population of political exiles from the working class. Their modest means made life in exile far more precarious than the comfortable existence of well-heeled political exiles of the 1870s–90s, who had arrived with cash and supplies in their luggage, and more cash and supplies on the way from family members back home. In 1907–17, by contrast, overcrowding in prisons and small monthly state stipends for exiles created severe poverty, hunger, homelessness, and disease for exiles and those family members (largely women and children) who voluntarily followed them to eastern Siberia.

Late Imperial inspection reports, complaints from regional administrators, and records from medical facilities and wretched orphanages for exiles’ children left behind an uncanny prequel to scenes from Soviet-era GULAG corrective labor camps and special settlements. Off-loading undesirables onto eastern Siberian locales without adequate planning, funding, or personnel was as prevalent in the region in 1907–17 as it was in the 1930s–50s. Equally endemic were such familiar diseases in the GULAG as tuberculosis, dystrophy, pellagra, furunculosis, and scurvy, with their legacies of permanent disfigurement and disability for those who survived the exile experience.

Badcock’s attention to geography, maps, and movement contributes to spatial history. She introduces her methodology as “social history with a more cultural approach” (23). She acknowledges the challenges of describing the experiences of the increasingly proletarian exile community, given the preponderance of memoirs written by members of the intelligentsia. Regional administrative records and correspondence offer alternative evidence.

Badcock’s writing is uneven. This volume illustrates the need for academic publishers to invest in thorough copyediting. The number of compositional errors exceeds what Oxford University Press should bring to press. Some wince-worthy Russian-language mistakes made their way into the book. Badcock also repeats her statements (and occasionally, the same sentences) too often in the course of each

chapter. Given Badcock's research challenges in eastern Siberia, the rough spots in her published results are regrettable.

CATHY A. FRIERSON  
*University of New Hampshire*

***Russlands Westen: Westorientierung und reformgesetzgebung im ausgehenden Zarenreich 1905–1917.*** By Benjamin Beuerle. *Forshungen zur Osteuropaishen Geschichte*. Band 82. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2016. 351 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Photographs. €49.90, paper.  
doi: 10.1017/slr.2018.46

The focus of Benjamin Beuerle's study on the western orientation in Russian political life encompasses the various ways the interest in western developments and practices entered the debates in the Russian State Duma during efforts to pass reform legislation (1905–17). He carefully points out the difficulty in defining various concepts of the west, the distinct west European countries and parliamentary forms of government that were used in the Duma debates.

The book is organized to accommodate the research on three specific Duma debates and the importance of these issues in the west. After an introductory chapter to set the historical stage for the creation of the Duma, Beuerle devotes a chapter to each of them: one on the peasant land reforms from 1906 to 1908, the second on the need for health insurance for the working class, and third, the debate on abolishing the death penalty that took place in the first session of the duma in 1906. Since the death penalty had not been abolished in western European countries and the United States, the author points out one reform movement that was not based on a western model; nevertheless, the debates in the Duma were filled with references to western commentaries on the death penalty. The analysis is complicated by the fact, however, that executions were used much more frequently just after the 1905 Revolution when military courts were used for political cases and the number of executions soared. In the first six months of 1906, 770 people sentenced to death. This overuse of the death penalty made its abolition a most urgent issue for both the educated elite and the working class and peasants.

Beuerle clearly states his conviction that the form and activities of the Duma and State Council provide significant evidence that a viable western-type governmental order was developing and functioning with increasing effectiveness before the outbreak of World War I. He falls into the category of optimists in looking at the political and social developments in Russia after 1907. Beurle states that he will have achieved a great deal if his book succeeds in contributing to the view that a burgeoning political culture existed between 1905 and 1917. He insists it was this growing political order and its developmental potential along a European course of progress that was disrupted and ultimately buried by a series of violent social and political upheavals—the World War, the Bolshevik Dictatorship, the Civil War, and the Terror (337). Beuerle emphasizes and possibly overstates what he considers the growing pro-western direction in Russian society. He does not shed enough light on the strong anti-western elements in Russian society nor the inordinate power of the Tsar who was allowed by law to shut down the Duma and call for new elections in order to change the political face of the Duma just after seventy-two days of meetings.

Curiously, the author's research on specific Duma debates only covers the early part of the period discussed; the land reform debates he includes end in 1908 and does not address the specifically Russian issues involving the *obshchina*. The death