

was interpreted. As an effort at an analysis of this difficult and fascinating subject, the book is indeed to be welcomed. In a field that has often been the focus of idle speculation, dubious tales, and outright fabrications, the author's attempt at a systematic and scholarly review makes a significant contribution.

If the Whaley book is not entirely satisfactory, three deficiencies are primarily responsible. The first failure is in part the author's and in part the publisher's. There are so many errors of detail—misidentifications, errors in geography, and so forth—that the reader cannot help becoming skeptical, and possibly unfairly skeptical, of other portions of the text. In the second place, the author accepts too many dubious sources in the text only to enter strong reservations in the footnotes and backnotes. Sometimes Whaley will accept a far-out theory in one portion of the text (for example, Farago's assertion that Sumner Welles leaked the existence of Magic to the Soviet ambassador who tipped off the Germans who warned the Japanese, pp. 44–46) only to reject it implicitly elsewhere (p. 155). The speculative structure is strained too often; how can one list as a warning something which "may well have reached Russian ears by some indirect route" (p. 116)?

In the third place, the analysis of Stalin's interpretation of the information he was receiving is suggestive but incomplete. Whaley's main point, if I have understood it correctly, is that the model he ascribes to Roberta Wohlstetter's Pearl Harbor theory—a great variety of intelligence noises serving to obscure those signals which pointed in the right direction—does not apply to Stalin's surprise on June 22, 1941, because Stalin had read the signals as pointing in a specific direction: a German ultimatum which would precede an attack. There is even more evidence than Whaley cites to support his reading of Stalin's view—for example, the clues pointing to Soviet willingness to make territorial concessions to Germany in Lithuania. Nevertheless, Whaley does not succeed in proving that Stalin's misreading was the product of deliberate German deception, nor does he even try to explain why Stalin might have thought he would receive an ultimatum prior to invasion when Hitler had not followed such a procedure with *any* of the eight countries he had previously invaded during the war.

With all these reservations, Whaley is to be commended for tackling an exceedingly difficult project with a feeling for the intelligence problems of the time and for the seriousness of the events he describes. A future revision may remedy some of the defects, and the opening of new archives might assist such a process.

GERHARD L. WEINBERG
University of Michigan

GERMAN STRATEGY AGAINST RUSSIA, 1939–1941. By *Barry A. Leach*.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973. xv, 308 pp. \$17.75.

During the past twenty years, works about World War II on the eastern front have become numerous enough to constitute a distinct genre, indispensable for limited areas of Soviet studies but often of slight interest to most students of the Soviet system. The problem is compounded by the fact that with rare exceptions World War II studies are divided into two sharply distinct categories. One group consists of books based on the increasingly numerous Soviet memoirs and histories (very rarely on interviews). Obviously such works are apt to contain considerable information useful to Soviet specialists—even those who are only peripherally con-

cerned with military affairs. Most Western works on the war, however, rely almost exclusively on German documents and personal accounts. From the historiographical point of view the immense German documentation is far more satisfying, and when carefully examined may shed light on significant aspects of the Soviet system. Ideally, this examination should be carefully meshed with use of Soviet sources. Unfortunately, despite the vast increase in availability and diversity of Soviet accounts, recent Western books based primarily on German documentation use even less Soviet information than the studies completed in the early 1950s did. Thus Leach's book, though impressively documented from a wide range of unpublished German writings and interviews, rarely makes use of even translated Soviet accounts such as those presented by Seweryn Bialer in *Stalin and His Generals*.

Leach's book is valuable for substantiating certain fundamental aspects of German conduct which indirectly limited the significance of Soviet responses. For example, using a broader range of German documents, he confirms Gerhard L. Weinberg's finding that Hitler made a firm decision to attack by the end of June 1940. Leach also supports Weinberg's conclusion that a key factor was Hitler's hope of undermining Britain by destroying its only major potential Continental ally, although Leach attributes somewhat greater relative importance to Hitler's fascination with *Lebensraum*. He also confirms our general knowledge of German inability to establish an intelligence network in the USSR. Similarly, Leach provides additional documentary evidence of Wehrmacht involvement in the notorious order for the killing of Soviet "commissars." His quantitative information on Soviet-German munitions production (with comparisons to Great Britain) is the most complete I have seen. On a somewhat more controversial level, Leach makes a strong case that Hitler's decision (August 1941) to use the main German forces to encircle the Soviet forces defending Kiev was sounder than the alternative of persisting in a frontal movement toward Moscow. Leach doubts that more severe damage could have been inflicted on the Soviet army—the overriding objective—in front of Moscow. I am less impressed by his argument that, even if captured, Moscow would have constituted (as in 1812) a risky salient for the invaders. More telling is Leach's analysis of the logistic situation, which, he asserts, could not have supported a massed drive on the central front before late September 1941.

In sum, this book has limited interest for Soviet specialists. For historians of the Nazi system, on the other hand, the bibliography of sources in English and German, and the appendixes containing translations of little-known documents, will be welcome.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG
University of Wisconsin

ENEMY AT THE GATES: THE BATTLE FOR STALINGRAD. By *William Craig*. New York: Reader's Digest Press, E. P. Dutton, 1973. xvii, 457 pp. \$10.95.

Military history, perhaps because of the violence involved, fascinates amateur historians. Over the years we have been treated to books by Cornelius Ryan, John Toland, Alan Clark, and others, that sell well but add very little to our knowledge. *Enemy at the Gates* belongs to this genre. In it William Craig has attempted to tell the story of the great clash of arms that took place in Stalingrad during the Great Patriotic War. The result is less than an overwhelming success, since Craig is not