

cerned with military affairs. Most Western works on the war, however, rely almost exclusively on German documents and personal accounts. From the historiographical point of view the immense German documentation is far more satisfying, and when carefully examined may shed light on significant aspects of the Soviet system. Ideally, this examination should be carefully meshed with use of Soviet sources. Unfortunately, despite the vast increase in availability and diversity of Soviet accounts, recent Western books based primarily on German documentation use even less Soviet information than the studies completed in the early 1950s did. Thus Leach's book, though impressively documented from a wide range of unpublished German writings and interviews, rarely makes use of even translated Soviet accounts such as those presented by Seweryn Bialer in *Stalin and His Generals*.

Leach's book is valuable for substantiating certain fundamental aspects of German conduct which indirectly limited the significance of Soviet responses. For example, using a broader range of German documents, he confirms Gerhard L. Weinberg's finding that Hitler made a firm decision to attack by the end of June 1940. Leach also supports Weinberg's conclusion that a key factor was Hitler's hope of undermining Britain by destroying its only major potential Continental ally, although Leach attributes somewhat greater relative importance to Hitler's fascination with *Lebensraum*. He also confirms our general knowledge of German inability to establish an intelligence network in the USSR. Similarly, Leach provides additional documentary evidence of Wehrmacht involvement in the notorious order for the killing of Soviet "commissars." His quantitative information on Soviet-German munitions production (with comparisons to Great Britain) is the most complete I have seen. On a somewhat more controversial level, Leach makes a strong case that Hitler's decision (August 1941) to use the main German forces to encircle the Soviet forces defending Kiev was sounder than the alternative of persisting in a frontal movement toward Moscow. Leach doubts that more severe damage could have been inflicted on the Soviet army—the overriding objective—in front of Moscow. I am less impressed by his argument that, even if captured, Moscow would have constituted (as in 1812) a risky salient for the invaders. More telling is Leach's analysis of the logistic situation, which, he asserts, could not have supported a massed drive on the central front before late September 1941.

In sum, this book has limited interest for Soviet specialists. For historians of the Nazi system, on the other hand, the bibliography of sources in English and German, and the appendixes containing translations of little-known documents, will be welcome.

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ENEMY AT THE GATES: THE BATTLE FOR STALINGRAD. By *William Craig*. New York: Reader's Digest Press, E. P. Dutton, 1973. xvii, 457 pp. \$10.95.

Military history, perhaps because of the violence involved, fascinates amateur historians. Over the years we have been treated to books by Cornelius Ryan, John Toland, Alan Clark, and others, that sell well but add very little to our knowledge. *Enemy at the Gates* belongs to this genre. In it William Craig has attempted to tell the story of the great clash of arms that took place in Stalingrad during the Great Patriotic War. The result is less than an overwhelming success, since Craig is not

qualified for the task. He admittedly does not know Russian and is unfamiliar with the vast Soviet literature on Stalingrad. His knowledge of German is questionable. He lists documents, but the lack of footnotes keeps us in the dark about the extent of their use. He leaves a strong impression that he has based his book on secondary sources, including such questionable items as the bogus *Khrushchev Remembers* memoirs. There are many sources the "selected bibliography" fails to list—primarily Russian, but also some German ones.

In addition, the narrative contains numerous factual errors. For instance, Franz Halder did not seriously plot against Hitler, Vasilevsky was not a marshal at the time of Stalingrad, and the Twenty-first Army was not a tank unit. The book also fails to come to grips with the central questions of the Stalingrad campaign. Why did Stalin, despite his superb intelligence service, so badly miscalculate Hitler's intentions in the summer of 1942, and why did the Red Army perform so poorly in the field? It is now fashionable in some quarters to consider Stalin an able war chief, and yet the disaster that befell Russia in the summer of 1942 had the earmarks of bungling leadership. De Gaulle's keen observation that he was less impressed with the Soviet victory at Stalingrad than with the depth of the German advance is indeed on the mark.

If the author's goal was to write a melodramatic and popular account of this epic conflict, then his rambling and exaggerated book (no one dies a simple death in *Enemy at the Gates*) is already outclassed by the writings of Paul Carell. For those interested in a history of the great battle, the excellent little paperback by Geoffrey Jukes, *Stalingrad: The Turning Point*, should be quite adequate for the present.

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AID TO RUSSIA, 1941–1946: STRATEGY, DIPLOMACY, THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR. By *George C. Herring, Jr.* Contemporary American History Series. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1973. xxi, 365 pp. \$15.00.

The author presents a realistic picture of the place of lend-lease aid to the USSR in the policy of the United States. Herring's fundamental thesis is that lend-lease for Russia and Britain was intended mainly to facilitate the victory over Germany and was to terminate with the end of hostilities and not continue into the postwar period for reconstruction or any other purpose. The book therefore stands against the general views of the American revisionists of the 1960s who in one way or another imply that the United States perfidiously broke an understanding with the Russians after it became clear that the aggressive American use of economic power had failed to produce the desired results. Herring maintains, always with sound reasoning, that no amount of American aid to the Soviet Union could have brought about major Soviet concessions, particularly in East Central Europe, which was of pre-eminent importance for Soviet security interests. He suggests that limited concessions were obtainable from the Soviet Union, but only if large-scale aid had been offered and used for leverage carefully and adroitly. Economic assistance could not have accomplished much in the absence of a general agreement on postwar problems, something the "wide divergence of attitudes and objectives rendered . . . impossible" (p. 275).

Herring's study clearly shows the lack of any clear U.S. policy on aid to the