

DIPLOMAT IN PARIS, 1936–1939: PAPERS AND MEMOIRS OF JULIUSZ ŁUKASIEWICZ, AMBASSADOR OF POLAND. Edited by *Wacław Jędrzejewicz*. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970. xxvi, 408 pp. \$12.50.

This is a companion volume to *Diplomat in Berlin, 1933–1939: Papers and Memoirs of Józef Lipski*, published in 1968. Skillfully edited by Professor Wacław Jędrzejewicz, these two volumes constitute the most important publication in English on Polish foreign policy in the crucial years leading to the Second World War.

Juliusz Łukasiewicz, the Polish ambassador to France during that period, was one of the closest collaborators of Foreign Minister Józef Beck. Soon after the collapse of Poland he was removed from his post by the new Polish government-in-exile. During the first months of his forced inactivity he wrote memoirs of his ambassadorship in Paris and published them after the war in the form of articles for Polish émigré periodicals. Jędrzejewicz has expanded the memoirs by incorporating sixty-four documents (mostly Łukasiewicz's reports to Beck) into the text. These documents are by far the most important and valuable part of the book. Jędrzejewicz also provided excellent—although occasionally marred by a strong pro-Polish bias—introductory and connecting notes and bibliography.

The documents reveal that during the Czechoslovak crisis even French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet had a more realistic view of Hitler's designs than Beck and Łukasiewicz. For Łukasiewicz the Czech crisis was "a tremor in which are disappearing the remnants of the Austrian monarchy and Moscow Pan-Slavism." The Poles considered Czechoslovakia "to be an artificial creation and a source of irritation." As to Soviet guarantees for that country, Łukasiewicz told Bonnet they were "absolutely illusory," and he "indicated the absolute impossibility of any cooperation with Russia in the area of Central Europe and the Baltic." He believed that Hitler was interested in the fate of the Sudeten Germans only. On September 13, 1938, he told Bonnet that he "saw nothing tangible to make one think that Hitler would march on Prague, and that his doctrine rather seemed to exclude this." Earlier, on May 27, Łukasiewicz had insisted that "it was absolutely unreasonable to presume that in the twentieth century, after a great war, a result of which was the triumph of the national principle, any state, even one stronger than Germany, could annex territories inhabited by other nations against their will." In December Łukasiewicz doubted that Hitler was about to incorporate Memel into the German Reich. Even as late as February 1, 1939, he refused to admit that Poland was threatened. But once the long-cherished illusions were dispersed, he began to assail the "ridiculously weak policy" of France and Britain. He was alarmed by their overtures to Russia. He did not want them to treat the Soviet government "as a first-rank partner," reserving this role for Poland, Rumania, and Turkey. By treating these three "most important neighbors" of Russia as "first-rank partners of the West," he was sure that the Western powers would force the Soviet government to change its tactics and "to accept the Anglo-French plan without any major changes."

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